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Abstract 
 
 
Since the re-establishment of the stock market in China in 1990, cross-listing1  by 
Chinese companies has been growing constantly, and has become a complementary 
source of foreign capital inflows into the Chinese economy via international stock 
markets in addition to the inward foreign direct investment started in 1980. By the end 
of 2008, there were over 800 Chinese securities listed and traded in several major stock 
exchanges around the world, which have raised total capital amounting to over US$112 
billion according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Report 
(2008). The experience of Chinese companies’ cross-listing in the international stock 
exchanges has, to some extent, provided an example of company-initiated bonding 
practices among the various bonding mechanisms such as diversifying shareholder base, 
opting into higher financial disclosure, and improving corporate governance. 
 
With the increasing presence of Chinese companies listed and traded in the international 
stock markets, research on Chinese cross-listing is emerging as a new focus for 
academic research in the field. A number of studies have investigated the price disparity 
and price discovery between dual-listed Chinese securities (focus on Hong Kong and 
New York dual-listings); yet little is known about how bonding effects Chinese firms 
cross-listed in international stock markets, the price and market linkage among those 
dual- and triple-listed shares, and whether investment strategies could be developed 
from the price disparity phenomenon between dual-listed shares. 
 
Building upon the existing literature on cross-listing, and using the data of listed 
Chinese companies during the period of 1993–2008, this study examines the relevance 
of the theories of the bonding hypothesis, cointegration and the law of one price in the 
context of Chinese firms’ cross-listing in the international capital markets. The results 
suggest that Chinese cross-listings exhibit a bonding premium only in the United States 
(US) markets, while the non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm 
performance than those listed in London, Singapore and Hong Kong. Further, the results 
reveal that for all the listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a 
                                                 
1
 In this study, the terms cross-listing, overseas-listing, international-listing, dual-listing, and triple-listing 
are used interchangeably to eliminate any possible conflict of semantics. All these terms have the same 
meaning when a security is registered for trading on more than one exchange. Dual-listing or triple-listing 
means a Chinese security is listed and traded on two or more exchanges.  
  
 v
positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of international 
accounting standards as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the 
host stock exchanges has less effects on Chinese firms’ performance, but the adoption 
of Big Four auditing firms does. And the interaction between cross-listing with different 
corporate governance mechanisms have different effects on firms’ valuation. The study 
suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee 
the improvement of the firm performance. 
 
Instead of using market indices, this study examines the short and long-term price 
linkages among the dual- and triple-listed Chinese securities in different stock markets 
over the period of 1993–2008. The empirical results reveal that most of the dual-listings 
traded in China A- and B-share markets, and the Hong Kong and New York stock 
markets exhibit a stationary long-run relationship. Some of the dual-listed China A- and 
H-share also exhibit cointegrated relationship. The results also suggest that Hong Kong 
and New York markets have a very strong interactive relationship in terms of the dual-
listed stocks. The stock’s total return index series for those cross-listed Chinese stocks 
are cointegrated and pricing errors are corrected almost immediately. Lastly, arbitrage 
opportunities for the 14 pairs of Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and 
their underlying shares traded in New York and Hong Kong markets were examined. It 
was revealed that a portfolio of 14 dual listed stocks earns an average daily return of 
1.28 per cent over the period studied when transaction costs were considered and market 
risk was controlled. 
 
This study contributes to the literature on the bonding hypothesis and firm valuation on 
cross-listing by constructing an integrated conceptual framework that explains why the 
bonding effect might not have explanatory power for all the cross-listed Chinese firms. 
As an exploratory study of corporate governance of Chinese cross-listings and 
investment strategy, this study also provides researchers with theoretical and 
methodological implications for future studies in this line of research. Further, it also 
proves that arbitrage opportunities existed for some of the dual-listed shares but risks 
are also associated with it. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
China, the most populous country and one of the four oldest civilisations in the world 
with a written history of more than 4,000 years, finally opened its doors to the outside 
world in 1979. The country has since undergone tremendous changes. In addition to the 
profound political and social transformations, the economic regime in China has been 
gradually converting from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system. One 
of the important and significant aspects of these economic transformations and reforms 
is the re-establishment of the stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai of China in the 
early 1990s. This has been followed by an established and gradually improved legal 
framework for governing the activities of the stock markets and financial markets. 
Lucrative opportunities unleashed by these developments together with the continuous 
rapid growth of the Chinese economy have attracted considerable attention from 
academic researchers, industry practitioners and policy makers to China’s stock 
markets.1 
 
Among all the transition economies around the world, China has followed a rather 
unique method to transform its Soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more 
market-oriented economy but still within the almost unchanged political system. This 
system has been termed ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ and can be viewed as 
one type of mixed economic system. Therefore, economic transformation has been 
taking place without political democratisation and without large-scale privatisation. 
Liberalisation has proceeded incrementally and privatisation was delayed until two 
decades after the initiation of the reforms, and yet to date, the country has achieved a 
high and stable economic growth rate. Over the past decades, China’s economy has 
enjoyed average annual growth rates in excess of 9 per cent. The economy was recorded 
at an annual growth rate of 7.5 per cent during the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan 
(2006–2010). The ‘once-in-a-century’ global financial meltdown that occurred in the 
latter half of 2008 seemly hit China’s economy hard, especially in the export sector, 
                                                 
1
 A reference to China refers to Mainland China in this study, which does not cover the securities markets 
in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau SAR and Taiwan Province of China. 
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which was badly affected with a significant slide in economic growth and a fall in 
earnings of listed companies. However, given the small size of overseas investments by 
China’s enterprises and securities institutions, this global financial meltdown had a 
rather limited direct impact on China’s securities markets (CSRC 2008). 
 
Since its formation in 1990, the Chinese stock market has enjoyed rapid growth with the 
incremental development of China’s market economy. By the end of 2008, China’s 
stock market was the second largest in Asia after Japan,2 with a total of 1,625 publicly 
listed companies and a market capitalisation of 12.13 trillion Renminbi (RMB),3 which 
accounted for about 40 per cent of China’s Gross Domestic Production (GDP) (CSRC 
2008). The Shanghai Stock Exchange was ranked the sixth biggest stock exchange in 
the world by market capitalisation in 2008 (World Exchanges 2008), and all of this 
remarkable performance has been achieved under relatively poor legal and financial 
systems. China’s stock market has been performing better than the markets of most 
other transitional economies as measured by the number of listed firms, market 
capitalisation, liquidity and fundraising capacity (Pistor & Xu 2005). 
 
Besides the constant economic growth in China and the continuous reforms of the 
Chinese stock market, the more integrated international financial markets make it 
possible and easier for Chinese companies to list internationally. As the Chinese A-
share market swings between an ultra-wide band, Chinese companies suddenly find 
themselves swamped with many choices as the overseas exchanges ease their rules to 
cosy up to the new Chinese listing candidates. Both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
private Chinese companies actively seek to list internationally. The Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange are not the only contenders for Chinese 
listings as they were at the early stage of the development of the Chinese stock market. 
Singapore, National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) and the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM) have become the 
most popular destinations for Mainland Chinese companies. However, when it comes to 
                                                 
2
 On 16 July 2009, China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest stock market by value after the 
Chinese government stimulus spending and record bank lending boosted share prices in 2009, sending the 
value of China’s domestic stock market to $3.2 trillion, compared with Japan’s $3.20 trillion. The last 
surpassed Japan in stock market capitalisation was from 7 January to 24 January 2008 (Bloomberg News 
2009). 
3
 At the end of 2008, total free-float capitalisation of these 1625 companies listed on the two stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen was RMB 4.52 trillion, representing a decrease of 51 per cent from 
the end of 2007. The total market capitalisations in 2008 represent a 63 per cent decrease from the end of 
2007. 
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attracting large SOEs to launch offshore initial public offerings (IPOs), the Hong Kong 
stock market becomes the best performer. In 2006, the Hong Kong market saw giant 
IPOs launched by Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
while Singapore exchange is traditionally stronger in attracting manufacturers. By the 
end of 2008, over 800 overseas incorporated companies from Mainland China were 
listed on the different exchanges in either IPO or American Depository Receipt (ADR) 
forms. These include 456 on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-shares and red-chips), 
44 on the New York Stock Exchange, 76 on NASDAQ, 64 on the London Stock 
Exchange, and 150 on the Singapore Exchange, raising a total of US$112.157 billion. 
Meanwhile, 57 H-share companies had issued A-shares in the Chinese Mainland stock 
market (CSRC 2008). 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Given the fast development of Chinese cross-listing in the international stock markets as 
summarised in the previous section, Chinese cross-listing has been of particular interest 
to researchers. In spite of rich literature on cross-listing, conventional theories presented 
in previous studies may not adequately explain the phenomenon and behaviour of 
Chinese companies’ cross-listing in the international stock markets that is being 
examined in this study. 
 
First, most previous research on international cross-listing has focused on well-
developed financial markets such as that of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States (US). Most notably, the focus of the studies was on either US 
stocks cross-listed on an overseas exchange or foreign firms trading on US exchanges as 
ADRs (Karolyi 2006). As an emerging market, the study of Chinese cross-listing could 
enrich the literature of the global cross-listing phenomenon with a more complete 
dataset. 
 
Secondly, the policies adopted in the well-developed stock markets and Chinese stock 
markets differ significantly. For example, the policies adopted in the stock markets of 
Hong Kong, the US and Singapore are free market-oriented. Hong Kong residents can 
hold Chinese B-shares and other foreign equities, but Chinese residents in Mainland 
China are not allowed to trade Hong Kong shares and other foreign shares, although 
hundreds of Chinese companies are listed in Hong Kong markets and other overseas 
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markets (Su 1999). This suggests that overseas listing is likely to have little impact on 
the domestic Chinese market because of such strict policy on capital flow (Forbes 2005). 
Meanwhile, short selling is not allowed in the Mainland Chinese market, while in the 
Hong Kong, Singapore, London and US markets, investors who are trading Chinese 
cross-listed securities should have the potential of being integrated in terms of the open 
and free trading environment with virtually complete access for foreign investors, and 
no regulatory constraints prevent cross-border arbitrage in cross-listed securities, and 
the markets are in fact actively arbitraged by institutional investors. 
 
Regarding corporate governance issues, despite the challenges of an under-developed 
legal system, corporate governance standards for Chinese firms are often seen as either 
lacking or deficient in their operation (Liebman & Milhaupt 2008). Moreover, the 
overseas-listed Chinese firms are operating under Mainland China laws but with shares 
listed on the other stock exchange for example, London Stock Exchange, they must 
operate within and according to the rules of two significantly different systems. All 
these issues suggest that these cross-listed Chinese firms in international stock markets 
inevitably reflect the political, economic and social preoccupations of Mainland China, 
yet must simultaneously recognise and comply with the demands made by the host 
countries’ legal system and securities markets. 
 
Lastly, this research is the first study that explicitly examines Chinese cross-listings 
traded in several major stock exchanges. The examination of relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance of Chinese listed firms through the angle of 
cross-listing has not been reported in the literature, and neither has the arbitrage strategy 
between the dual-listed Chinese firms. These represent important theoretical gaps that 
this thesis aims to fill. 
 
Therefore, the research in this thesis has three objectives, as stated below: 
1) To investigate the relationship of bonding hypothesis, corporate governance and 
firm performance of Chinese cross-listings. One of the issues of bonding 
hypothesis is that foreign firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak investor 
protection rights cross-list on US stock exchanges to legally bond themselves to 
higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement, hence enhance the equity 
valuation (Coffee 1999, 2002). Liu and Kang (2007) surveyed 84 cross-listed 
Chinese firms, and they suggested that raising capital is the first important factor 
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for Chinese firms selecting the exchange, good governance ranked the fourth 
important factor to select an exchange. Protecting minority shareholder’s interest 
as a bonding effect shows less importance. Therefore, in this study, the 
relationship between Chinese cross-listings and corporate governance under the 
bonding hypothesis will be examined. 
2) To examine the interdependence relationship among different classes of shares 
of China that traded in different markets mainly in Hong Kong, the US, and the 
local A- and B-share markets in China. Prior studies that examined the 
interactions between China-related stocks mostly conducted on stock indices of 
each class of shares in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong. However, the study 
of the relationship between China-related stocks by investigating the behaviour 
of individual stock prices and returns of classes of shares issued by the same 
company is meaningful and interesting.  
3) To explore the cross-border arbitrage opportunities. Although short selling is 
restricted in Chinese markets, considering the market conditions of Hong Kong 
and the US, arbitrage opportunities could be found for the Chinese firms that are 
dual-listed on these two markets. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 describes the research background, 
the objective of the research, the thesis structure, and the contributions of the research. 
Chapter 2 introduces and examines the overall Chinese cross-listing phenomenon. 
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature on cross-listing. The associated effects 
associated with cross-listing are reviewed with details. 
 
The Chapters 4 to 6 report empirical test and findings. More specifically, Chapter 4 
examines the relationship among the corporate governance, bonding hypothesis and 
firm performance; Chapter 5 examines the price relationship between the Chinese dual 
and triple cross-listings, cross-listings return behaviour, and market co-movement; and 
Chapter 6 explores the arbitrage opportunities for the Chinese dual-listed securities. For 
each of the issues under investigation, a conceptual framework is developed depicturing 
the hypothesised relationships between dependent and independent variables, which are 
then tested against empirical data investigate using various statistical techniques and 
procedures. Chapter 7 presents a small case study of one of Chinese cross-listing 
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companies from a multi-dimensional perspective. Chapter 8 concludes the study, lists 
the limitations of this research and suggests some of the future potential research. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
This study adopts different methodologies to examine the Chinese cross-listing issue, 
which includes three major quantitative empirical studies. Therefore a mixed method is 
suitable for this study because the study is of an exploratory nature in terms of the 
investigation of Chinese cross-listing phenomenon from different aspects. By adopting 
panel data analysis, the study provides an empirical test to the framework and 
hypotheses derived from bonding theory. The time series quantitative data collection 
and data analysis process for Chinese dual and triple-listings provides a detailed study 
of return and market linkage for Chinese cross-listing, which includes unit root test, 
cointegration analysis, Granger causality test and error correction models. Multivariate 
regression is also adopted to examine the market co-movement for Chinese dual-listed 
securities. Lastly, a simple daily arbitrage strategy is used to examine the statistic 
arbitrage opportunities for the dual-listed Chinese shares that traded both in the Hong 
Kong and New York markets. The results of these analyses are reported in the following 
chapters. 
 
1.5 Contributions of the Research in the Thesis 
 
This research builds on the existing literature on global cross-listing and makes the 
following original contributions to the body of knowledge in the area of cross-listing. 
 
First, a great majority of the Chinese listed securities in two domestic stock markets and 
Hong Kong stock markets are converted from large SOEs. The government had a 
majority control of these listed firms, and the majority shares of these listed firms were 
not open for trade until 2006. Prior studies on the corporate governance and other 
related issues of Chinese listed firms were largely limited to this category (SOEs). The 
present study examines international cross-listed Chinese firms and extends the research 
from SOEs to the private Chinese firms and other small-medium-sized Chinese firms, 
which allows an understanding of whether encouraging Chinese firms to list overseas 
would help the Chinese government develop a robust, well-regulated securities market 
in China. The empirical study of the corporate governance and Chinese cross-listing 
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provides an implacable example for policy makers, market participants and corporate 
executives. 
Secondly, previous theories, including agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976), 
property rights theory (Alchian & Demsetz 1972), the theory of incomplete contracts 
(Williamson 1975, 1985), and transaction costs (Williamson 1975, 1985) make different 
contributions on the corporate governance and the firm value within the country level. 
In the case of China, previous empirical work regarding the corporate governance issue 
has been focused on the effects of ownership structure on firm performance although 
with mixed results. This study applies bonding theory as the framework, examining the 
corporate governance issue through a different angle, which is beyond the border and in 
an international perspective.  
 
Thirdly, most prior studies on Chinese overseas listing have focused on the A-share and 
H-share (Chinese securities listed on Hong Kong markets) markets. This study 
examines the Chinese securities cross-listed in multiple international locations. Besides 
Hong Kong and the US, Singapore and London are also included. Notably, there has 
been limited research reported on triple cross-listings between developed and emerging 
markets, and most of the prior studies have been conducted based on the pair-wise 
analysis for cross-listings and the adoption of indices to represent the individual share 
behaviour. It is expected that this research will bridge the gap by providing insights into 
the relationship among Chinese cross-listings under different market environment 
conditions and extend the existing literature on international financial markets and 
cross-listing. It is also necessary to further investigate the arbitrage strategy for Chinese 
ADRs and underlying securities in multiple markets. Moreover, this study provides a 
database and the framework that will permit further research and analysis into more 
specific issues on Chinese cross-listings. 
 
Lastly, the findings in this study reveal some important practical implications for 
directors and managers of Chinese enterprises who have their securities listed overseas 
or who are interested in cross-listing in the future, and for policy makers considering 
further reform and the development of the Chinese stock markets. Copying the 
corporate governance mechanisms from developed countries or passively adopting the 
requirements of the host market is not an ideal approach. For example, this study shows 
that the independent director practice does not work effectively for firms listed in China. 
The expanded board size of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong stock markets appears to 
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create an overlapped effect. The management of firms should be aware of the 
inefficiency caused by passively adopting the corporate governance practice required by 
the host stock exchange. Another important implication is the portfolio of international 
diversification of securities when acquiring the securities from the emerging market like 
China; if the securities traded on these markets are not cointegrated, international 
diversification among these assets is effective. Lastly, the Chinese policy-makers are 
currently discussing the application of a so-called ‘arbitrage mechanism’ to eliminate 
the price spread for the dual-listed Chinese securities (Chang & Ren 2009). However, 
no such mechanism can effectively ‘arbitrage away’ the price difference between the 
dual- and triple-listed securities. This study will help Chinese market participants to 
better understand market segmentation, and the limits and risks of arbitrage strategy. 
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Chapter 2: Chinese Cross-Listing 
 
 
2.1 China Stock Market History 
 
For more than 30 years, since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
China had gone through the centrally planned economy, in which all enterprises were 
state owned or collectively owned and all investments were centrally planned and 
funded by government, as well as by loans from the state-owned mono-bank system 
(Wong, 2006). In December 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping, the Chinese 
government launched the Open Door Policy calling for economic reform1. China has 
since begun the process of transforming its economic system from centrally planned to a 
more marked oriented economic system, while retaining the overall control of the 
Chinese Communist Party in the country. The economic reform and open-door policy 
gradually lead to the re-establishment of the stock markets in China in 1990 (Field, 
1984). 
 
The stock market history in China can be traced back to nineteenth century when the 
first and original securities market was established in Shanghai. Following the First 
Opium War, the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 established an area in Shanghai known as 
the International Settlement. This development prompted the emergence of foreign 
markets in the area, and culminated in the introduction of securities trading in the late 
1860s. In June 1866, the first share list began to appear, prompting a number of banks to 
form a legal framework for joint-stock companies. This was coupled by an interest in 
diversification for investors and trading houses (although the trading houses themselves 
remained partnerships). 1880s saw the Chinese mining industry booming. In 1891, the 
Shanghai Sharebrokers’ Association was established, creating China’s first stock 
exchange. Most of the shares were supplied by local companies, and banks took the 
opportunity to dominate the majority of the private shares. By the turn of the century, 
Hong Kong and Shanghai banks had consolidated the majority of the trading shares 
from foreign bases. In 1904, the Association moved to establish another exchange in 
Hong Kong, expanding the grip of the Chinese market in the world economy. In 1920, 
in response to the development of a modern financial market in Shanghai, the Shanghai 
                                                 
1
 The economic reform was announced at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978. 
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Stock and Commodities Exchange was formally established (Ji, 2002). This was 
followed the next year by the Shanghai Chinese Merchant Exchange. In 1929 the 
markets combined and officially formed the Shanghai Stock Market. Rubber became 
one of the prime stocks at the same time as a number of foreign companies, such as 
those from Japan, began to consolidate their economic control of the Chinese Stock 
Market. In 1941, the Japanese military took control of Shanghai and the stock market 
ceased operation (Ji, 2002). After the Chinese Communists Party took over the power in 
China in 1949, all of the markets, including native banks and private model banks, were 
officially closed, as the Communist Party saw this as one of the symbols of capitalism, 
which did not fit for China’s new economic development path (centrally planned 
economy) (Ji, 2002).  
 
Following  the introduction of economic reforms in December 1978, some local 
Chinese government started experimenting with selling shares of SOEs directly to 
domestic individuals in order to raise equity capital as part of enterprise reforms in the 
late 1980s (Wong, 2006). Curbed trading and a black market were formed followed by 
the establishment of Over the Counter (OTC) trading systems in a way of more 
organized but less formal exchanges. In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
were opened with formal approvals of the central Chinese government. Since then, the 
Chinese government has introduced a series of policies in an attempt to develop its 
underdeveloped stock markets (Swanson and Lin, 2008). 
 
2.2 China Cross-Listing 
2.2.1 China Cross-listing Background 
 
The creation of China stock markets follows a political rather than an economic logic. 
The decision makers shape the stock markets in a politically-motivated way rather than 
a market-oriented way (Cooper, 2002). Under this situation, the excessive government 
control could be seen everywhere, especially in these China stock markets. For example, 
to prevent cash-starved and poor quality SOEs flooding into the stock market, the 
Chinese government adopt the IPOs quota system under the supervision of the State 
Planning Committee, the Central Bank, and CSRC, who would determine the quantity 
of equity to be issued each year; the quota was then distributed among the various 
provinces and eligible central government departments (e.g. Ministries) (Chen et al., 
2001).  
  
11 
However, this quota system prevents many large companies and the companies with 
high growth potential from getting listed. After the open-door policy in 1979 of China2, 
more and more small and medium sized Chinese private enterprises emerged. But, 
comparing with the SOEs, those small and medium sized Chinese private enterprises 
lacked needed funding, which to some extent prevents them from achieving fast growth. 
China’s commercial banking system has not evolved sufficiently to serve these groups 
of companies’ need for funding. Historically, the big four state-owned commercial 
banks favour lending to SOEs rather than private enterprises. Therefore, these private 
Chinese firms have to finance their own growth with their own reserved funds. The re-
establishment of the stock market in China has seemingly provided an alternative source 
of finance to this group of firms, yet they have to queue for many years in order to get 
listed on one of China’s two domestic stock exchanges. To a large extent, the Chinese 
stock exchanges are almost out of reach to small and medium sized private firms, 
although they are liquid and large in size. This is even so for some of the already 
restructured Chinese SOEs. By March 1998, there was only one non-state owned 
company - Sichuan New Hope Agriculture Stock Co., Ltd. gained the permission to list 
from the Chinese government and became the first listed private enterprise. Under this 
circumstance, the CSRC found that overseas-listing could be another channel to solve 
the problem. Therefore, in March 2000, the CSRC gave up the IPOs quota allocation 
system (Wong, 2006) 
 
2.2.2 History of China Cross-listing 
2.2.2.1 Back-Door Listing  
 
The first wave of Mainland Chinese firms listed abroad occurred in Hong Kong in the 
1980s. During that time, the central Chinese government ministries and 
provincial/municipal governments were eager to establish a financial base in Hong 
Kong before the Chinese stock markets officially re-established (De Jonge, 2008). As 
we have noted, and the Open Door Policy has brought about China’s integration into the 
global economy, especially a higher level of integration between the Mainland China 
and Hong Kong economies3. In 1980s, the provincial and municipal governments were 
                                                 
2
 The economic reform was announced in December 1978, but the indication of the open-door  policy was 
in 1979 after the first joint venture law introduced in April 1979. 
3
 Six years after Deng Xiao Ping led Chinese government announced the open door policy in 1978, 
Margaret Thatcher signed the bilateral treaty by which Britain agreed to return the Hong Kong territory to 
Chinese control. Ever since then, Hong Kong has developed an ever-closer partnership with Mainland 
China. And the handover on 1 July 1997 makes the linkages between these two economies become 
indissoluble. 
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the main players in relation to listing in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Before the 
Chinese firms could be officially allowed to list directly on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, they must have been already having significant back-door listing cases. This 
back-door listing involves a Hong Kong company being taken over by a Mainland 
China holding company that is controlled by a central government ministry or 
provincial/municipal government. Generally, this takeover target is a Hong Kong shelf 
company or a company that is in  financial distress. After the takeover, the Mainland 
China company injects capital into this Hong Kong ‘shell’ company, and the Hong 
Kong ‘shell’ company is then used as a listing vehicle by the Mainland China parent (Su, 
2003). These Mainland–controlled and Hong Kong-incorporated companies are now 
known as ‘red-chips’. For example, China Travel was founded in 1927 and now 
operates under the State Council. The company listed its own subsidiary in Hong Kong 
in 1992 under the name China Travel International Investment Hong Kong Ltd. This 
Hong Kong subsidiary, China Travel Service (Holdings) HK Ltd was founded in 1985. 
 
The Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 cooled down the international enthusiasm 
for red-chips. But Deng Xiao Ping’s Southern Tour in 1992 led to a China-related 
stocks revival. Between 1992 and 1993, the Chinese central government dominated the 
back-door listings with more than 15 red-chip investment vehicles created. Also, 
historically, in 1992 the central government’s exertion of power and influence under 
Deng Xiao Ping’s leadership was at a high point. Therefore, the year of 1992 becomes a 
year which the Mainland authorities took measures to assert control over the red-chip 
listings by establishing a centralized approval mechanism for all Hong Kong listings by 
Chinese subsidiaries. The year of 1992 also witnessed official communications being 
established between the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Mainland Regulatory 
authorities to discuss the direct listing of China-based companies, instead of via Hong 
Kong-incorporated listing vehicles (Niu, 1997). 
 
The takeover of a shelf company to achieve a back-door listing in Hong Kong was 
accompanied by the outflow of assets from the mainland China. The Chinese central 
government quickly became concerned about this outflow of the country’s assets and 
took a further step by allowing direct listings on overseas exchanges as an alternative 
venue for raising foreign capital for Mainland-incorporated SOEs. Hong Kong then 
became the first and most popular foreign exchange accessed by mainland Chinese 
companies.  
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2.2.2.2 Early Stage Listing in Hong Kong and the USA 
 
In September 1992, the State Council of China published its list of nine SOEs selected 
to be the first ever to issue H-share equities. The first H-shares, issued by Tsingtao 
Brewery Company, were opened for offer in the Hong Kong market on 29th June, 1993, 
and began trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 15th July, 1993. But the 
Chinese government initially refused to allow primary listings to proceed in New York, 
London or any other place outside of China apart from Hong Kong. The government 
believed that the Hong Kong market for China-based issues should be developed before 
proceeding further. Therefore, the primary listing became one single offering, which 
took place in three parts: a share sale in Hong Kong, a public sale of ADRs in the 
United States, and a sale of Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) outside the United 
States (De Jonge, 2008). 
 
At the early stage of cross-listing, the Chinese government was aware that due to the 
poor infrastructure of the local capital market, it was better to list those SOEs that are 
large in capital scale and perform reasonably well on Hong Kong and New York Stock 
Exchanges rather than listing domestically. Generally, these SOEs listed in Hong Kong 
and New York in 1990s were the ones that have been strong performing and have 
previously preferred the prestige and fund-raising potential of listing-abroad. These 
companies are regarded as being the “best of the best” (Huang and Song, 2005). 
Effective from 2005, any Chinese company wishing to list overseas is also required to 
list locally. For example, China Mobile, and Aluminum Corporation of China were 
listed back on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007. 
 
2.2.2.3 Recent Trend 
 
Over the last few years we have seen significant changes in the stock exchange 
landscape globally. Several major key players of the stock exchanges are trying to focus 
on new sources of profits and winning business outside the home market. They are 
tripping over each other in China to tout the advantages of listing abroad to Chinese 
companies and regulators. (Kang, 2008).  In China’s case, few of the private Chinese 
companies can resort to raising new money from local equity markets because of a long 
queue to list on the two main Chinese bourses. Meanwhile, the Chinese government 
recognizes the needs of Chinese companies to raise share capital and generally does not 
stand in the way of private firms that seek to tap into the world’s capital markets. 
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Therefore, under this circumstance, these small to medium-sized Chinese companies 
finally have their time to be listed on stock exchanges, but only with the permission 
from the Chinese government.  
 
In recent years, Chinese firms have been dominating the worldwide IPOs, notably for 
the world’s biggest IPO by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. in 
October 2006, who raised a total amount of US$21.9 billion. However, Hong Kong 
dominates both in terms of Chinese listing numbers and issuing size. Most of these 
Chinese shares traded in USA are registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission and traded as ADRs. The early ADRs traded in the New York Stock 
Exchange also have underlying shares listed and traded in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. For the characteristics of the Chinese companies related to the host stock 
exchange, Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges attract the Chinese monopolized 
companies in the field of natural resources, banks, and telecoms. NASDAQ gathered 
Chinese IT, dot com companies and pharmaceutical companies. Singapore appears to be 
more attractive to industrial, food and retailing Chinese companies. 
 
2.2.3 Location of Chinese Cross-listing 
 
The last decade witnessed a more diversified listing location for Chinese firms. Besides 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange as popular 
locations for Chinese cross-listing, London AIM, NASDAQ and Singapore have attract 
more and more Chinese firms to list, especially the small to medium sized private 
Chinese firms. For example, among the nearly 100 overseas Chinese listings in 2006, 
these Chinese private firms accounted for 87 per cent to list in Singapore and Hong 
Kong4. Those smaller Chinese firms have traditionally looked to the Hong Kong and 
Singapore markets, but there are too many Chinese firms looking to list for those 
bourses to satisfy demand. And a greater number of them do not fulfil the 
profitability/track record requirements of the existing market and are therefore unable to 
obtain a listing. Therefore, Hong Kong Growth and Enterprise Market (GEM) and 
London AIM, which removed the entry barrier, enabling growth enterprises to capitalize 
on the growth opportunity of the region by raising expansion capital under a well-
established market and regulatory infrastructure, become the hot destinations for these 
Chinese firms. AIM has been incredibly successful in attracting the listings of, and 
                                                 
4
 23 May, 2007 China Security Paper 
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raising money for, international small-cap growth companies in recent years and it is 
natural that Chinese companies now seek funding on AIM. But GEM never took off 
because it failed to attract sufficient quality companies or institutional investors. 
Meanwhile, listing in AIM, HK GEM and Singapore avoids the costs of complying with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Sarbanes-Oxley requirements, 
which some companies find increasingly burdensome. But generally speaking, AIM, 
Hong Kong GEM and Singapore failed to attract quality Chinese companies.  
 
Besides the stock exchanges mentioned above, several other stock exchanges have also 
become the listing destinations for Chinese firms. For example, Shangdong Gongyou 
Machines Limited becomes the first Mainland Chinese enterprise listed in the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange. So far, there are total of 14 Chinese firms listed on the stock exchange 
of Frankfurt by the end of 2008. Meanwhile, on the 26th April 2007 Asian Media 
becomes the first Chinese firm listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The Korean Stock 
Exchange also approved the listing request for China Huafeng Textile Group on the 1st 
June 2007. Besides the more diversified listing destinations, the Chinese cross-listing 
phenomenon also becomes a mutual interaction between the Chinese companies and 
overseas stock exchanges. On the 3rd December 2007, NASDAQ set up their China 
headquarters office in Beijing. Later, on the 11th December 2007, the New York Stock 
Exchange also opened their office in Beijing. It is reported that the London Stock 
Exchange and the Korean Stock Exchange are going to have their office in China soon. 
So far, there are a total of nine foreign exchanges that have representative offices in 
China5 (Xinhua News Agency). 
 
Since the first cross-listing of Chinese companies in Hong Kong was announced on 
October 24 1992, and as of December 2008, there are 513 Chinese cross-listings 
including the dual or triple cross-listings on the major stock exchanges internationally. 
Table 2.1 is a summary of the distributions of these Chinese cross-listings in various 
stock exchanges. It demonstrates that the location choice of Chinese cross-listings have 
experienced two different trends in two different phases. The first phase occurred during 
the period of 1990-2000 where most of the cross-listings were located in the Hong 
Kong Mainboard market and only a limited number of Chinese companies were listed in 
New York and Singapore. Notably, even those Chinese listings in New York are also 
                                                 
5
 The foreign exchanges with representative offices in China are: Hong Kong Stock Exchange, New York 
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Korea Exchange, Singapore Exchange, London 
Stock Exchange, and Deutsche BÖrse Group. 
  
16 
  
Ta
bl
e 
2.
1:
 
C
hi
n
es
e 
O
v
er
se
a
s 
Li
st
in
gs
 
C
ro
ss
 
M
a
rk
et
s 
by
 Y
ea
r 
19
92
-
20
08
 
Th
is 
ta
bl
e 
pr
o
v
id
es
 
su
m
m
ar
y 
st
at
ist
ic
s 
o
f C
hi
n
es
e 
fir
m
s 
lis
te
d 
in
 d
iff
er
en
t s
to
ck
 e
x
ch
an
ge
s 
by
 y
ea
rs
.
 
 
G
er
m
a
n
y
Si
n
ga
po
re
To
ta
l
A
B
H
K
 
M
ain
bo
ar
d
H
K
 
G
EM
Su
b-
to
ta
l
Lo
n
do
n
 
SE
Lo
n
do
n
 
A
IM
Su
b-
to
ta
l
A
M
EX
N
Y
SE
N
A
SD
A
Q
14
4A
O
TC
Su
b-
to
ta
l
Fr
an
kf
u
rt
Si
n
ga
po
re
C
ro
ss
-
lis
tin
gs
19
90
8
19
91
5
19
92
40
18
0
19
93
12
4
23
6
6
1
1
1
3
9
19
94
11
0
17
8
8
1
5
2
8
1
17
19
95
24
12
1
1
1
3
4
1
6
19
96
20
3
15
6
6
1
1
4
6
1
13
19
97
20
6
16
15
15
3
1
4
1
3
1
5
1
25
19
98
10
6
5
2
2
0
1
1
2
2
6
19
99
98
2
3
3
1
1
5
9
20
00
13
6
6
3
3
6
2
2
1
3
1
5
1
14
20
01
79
3
4
7
2
1
1
4
4
15
20
02
71
4
11
15
1
1
1
5
6
22
20
03
67
10
8
18
2
1
1
2
6
13
37
20
04
10
0
8
8
16
1
4
5
2
8
1
4
15
30
66
20
05
15
9
3
12
7
7
2
8
2
12
23
54
20
06
66
17
3
20
24
24
4
2
4
10
24
78
20
07
12
6
9
9
15
15
2
19
10
1
1
33
7
27
91
20
08
77
6
1
7
4
4
3
1
1
24
29
7
4
51
To
ta
l
16
61
11
4
11
0
41
15
1
6
56
62
6
44
33
12
54
14
9
14
13
7
51
3
So
ur
ce
s:
 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 o
f C
hi
n
es
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
lis
te
d 
in
 C
hi
n
a
 A
 
a
n
d 
B 
m
a
rk
et
s 
a
re
 
o
bt
a
in
ed
 
fro
m
 
CS
M
AR
 
da
ta
ba
se
.
 
In
for
m
a
tio
n
 o
f C
hi
n
es
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
lis
te
d 
in
 U
SA
,
 
Lo
n
do
n 
AI
M
,
 
 
Si
n
ga
po
re
,
 
a
n
d 
Fr
a
n
kfu
rt
 
a
re
 
o
bt
a
in
ed
 fr
o
m
 
th
e 
st
o
ck
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
w
eb
sit
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
Lo
ca
l M
a
rk
et
s
O
v
er
se
a
s 
M
a
rk
et
s
M
a
in
la
n
d 
C
hi
n
a
H
o
n
g 
K
o
n
g
U
n
ite
d 
K
in
do
m
U
SA
  
17 
dual-listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. Starting from 2001, the cross-listing 
phenomenon for Chinese firms has been accelerated with more location choices, which 
could be labelled as the second phase. London AIM, Hong Kong GEM, and NASDAQ 
have become attractive listing locations for Chinese firms. Meanwhile, the listing 
numbers in Singapore have been greatly increasing, starting from the second phase of 
the cross-listing. And, since then, there has been no more Chinese companies issued B-
shares in the China B market. More specific data on the Chinese cross-listing companies 
are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
2.2.4 Modes of Chinese Cross-listing 
 
With more and more Chinese private firms going public in international markets, how 
to list internationally becomes another characteristic for the listing modes of Chinese 
private firms, especially for those who don’t have the resources or profits for a splashy 
initial public offering. There are three major overseas listing modes that a Chinese firm 
can choose from. The first mode is primary listing. The primary listing involves 
restructuring the current company, setting up a holding company in Mainland China, 
getting the approval from the local government and the overseas stock exchange, 
finding the lawyers, registered accountants and banks, auditing, and lodging the files to 
apply for listing on the stock exchange. And compared to most of the Chinese private 
firms, this whole public process is complicated with high costs, regulatory barriers and 
extensive time commitments.  However, most of the SOEs would not worry about the 
listing expenses related to the primary listing. These Chinese companies have explicit 
goals to choose direct IPOs process when looking to get a Hong Kong or U.S. stock 
listing. 
 
The second mode is termed reverse merger. The reverse merger mode makes the 
overseas-listing process faster and less onerous than the primary listing model or IPO. 
This listing mode has been adopted greatly by Chinese private firms. With this mode of 
listing, a Chinese firm is acquired by a U.S. or an international shell company, and this 
company could be worth nothing, which is publicly traded. The buying company pays 
for the acquisition target with the shares. When the transaction is closed, the target 
company receives enough stocks to have the controlling ownership of the company that 
“acquired” it. Then, the board of this shell company resigns and the Chinese board takes 
over, changes the name of the company, and issues new security to hedge funds or other 
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new investors, raising millions of dollars. And this process only takes a few months. 
One of the successful Chinese companies that adopted this mode and got to list in the 
USA successfully is Sinovac Biotech Ltd, a China Beijing-based vaccines maker that 
has raised $12 million capital in 2003. According to the Reverse Merger Report that 
with more than 20 per cent involved foreign companies seeking US listings, Chinese 
companies accounted for 60 per cent of the foreign deals in 2006 (Dolbeck, 2006).  
 
The third overseas listing mode is merger & acquisition. This mode involves setting up 
an investing company offshore. The offshore company registration locations for most of 
the Chinese private firms are the Cayman Island, Bermuda, Bahamas, the British Virgin 
Island, and the Bahamas, where tax exemption benefits are accessible. This offshore 
investing company should have some degree of ownership control of the Chinese 
domestic company. Then a target company is chosen to issue the new shares and merge 
with the capital of the China domestic company. Therefore, the China domestic 
company doesn’t need to pay the cash to acquire its shares, and the prior controlling 
shareholder is kept. 
  
But no matter which overseas-listing mode the Chinese firm chooses, these Chinese 
firms have substantial operation activities in China, and are also incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands or other tax-exempt locations, and problems occur sometimes. Unlike 
in the United States, where many relevant jurisdictions are effective in place, the 
Cayman Islands and other tax-exemption countries’ laws do not specifically provide for 
shareholder appraisal rights on a merger or consolidation of a company. This may make 
it even more difficult to assess the value of any consideration shareholders may receive 
in a merger or consolidation if the shareholders believe the consideration offered is 
insufficient. For example, most of the company directors and officers reside outside the 
country of the host stock exchange and consequently so do the assets of those company 
personnel. As a result, it may be difficult or impossible for the shareholders to bring an 
action against the listed company or these individuals in China or in the country where 
the company is incorporated in the event that the shareholders believe that their rights 
have been infringed under the applicable securities laws or otherwise. Even if the 
shareholders are successful in bringing an action of this kind, the laws of the Cayman 
Islands or other tax-exemption country and of China may render them unable to enforce 
a judgment against the assets or the assets of the directors and officers. Further, 
shareholders of the Cayman Islands exempted companies have no general rights under 
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Cayman Islands law to inspect corporate records and accounts or to obtain copies of 
lists of shareholders of these companies. The directors have discretion under their 
articles of association to determine whether or not, and under what conditions, their 
corporate records may be inspected by shareholders, but are not obliged to make them 
available to shareholders. This may make it more difficult for the shareholders to obtain 
the information needed to establish any facts necessary for a shareholder motion or to 
solicit proxies from other shareholders in connection with a proxy contest. Therefore, 
public shareholders may find it even more difficult in protecting their interests in the 
face of actions taken by management and members of the board of directors or 
controlling shareholders of a Chinese listed company than a U.S. company. 
 
2.2.5 Chinese Share Classes 
 
A “split-share” system has existed in the Chinese stock market since the re-
establishment of the stock market in the early 1990s, which allows Chinese companies 
to issue different classes of shares to domestic and foreign investors. The classes of 
shares include A-share, B-share, H-share, L-share, N-share, S-share, T-share, Red-chip, 
and ST-share. A summary of the major types of shares are illustrated in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2: Listed Chinese Companies Share Types 
 
 
The A-shares, which were available to local investors, are denominated in Renminbi 
(RMB), not freely convertible to international currencies, and are traded in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Since November 2002, Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFIIs), such as large banks, funds, and securities companies with at least $10 
billion in management, have been allowed to buy up to 10 per cent of a company's 
shares (still held in Chinese currency) (Ni, 2009). 
Type of Shares
A-share Domestically listed shares, denominated in RMB currency. Foreign investors may 
excluded by these shares.
B-share Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated companies, which denominated in US
dollar in Shanghai and HK dollar in Shenzhen.
H-share Shares of Mainland China registered companies listed in Hong Kong.
Red-chips Shares of companies registered overseas and listed abroad (principally in Hong Kong)
which have strong connection with Chinese government.
ST share Stocks that have financial or other abnormalities and have the potential to be terminated 
from stock exchange.
Other-share Overseas listed shares, denominated in local currency.
Description
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B-shares were first created in early 1991 to be sold solely to foreign investors using 
foreign currency. The B-share market was driven by the idea that foreigners eager to 
invest in China were at first willing to pay more per share than their domestic 
counterparts. B-shares are denominated in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The demand for B-shares 
has been significantly lower than A-shares, the long-term performance of the B-share 
market has lagged far behind the A-share market, even when a company issues both A- 
and B-shares with identical voting and dividend rights. Since no arbitrage trades are 
possible between these two types of shares, the A- and B-shares of the same company 
are traded at different prices.  
 
Red-chip is defined as a Mainland China based company that is incorporated 
internationally and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The business of the 
company is based and operated in Mainland China, and is usually controlled by 
shareholders in Mainland China. A red-chip company is a company that has at least 30 
per cent of its shares in aggregate held directly by Mainland China entities, or indirectly 
through companies controlled by them, with the Mainland China entities being the 
single largest shareholders in aggregate terms. Alternatively, a company would be 
considered  a red-chip company if less than 30 per cent, but more than 20 per cent, of its 
shares are held  directly or indirectly by Mainland China entities,  and there is a strong 
influential presence  of Mainland China-linked individuals on the company's board of 
directors. Mainland China entities include SOEs, and entities controlled by provincial 
and municipal authorities. Normally, these companies have strong connection with the 
government. The word ‘red’ represents the Peoples’ Republic of China and the Chinese 
Communist Party (De Jonge, 2008).  
 
H-share refers to the situation where a company is incorporated in Mainland China but 
its shares are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These are essentially the shares 
of Mainland Chinese companies registered in Hong Kong and traded on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, denominated in Hong Kong Dollars. When a Chinese firm pursues an 
international listing, it would first need to get an approval from the Chinese government. 
Generally, the companies that are listed in Hong Kong have been strong companies 
selected in part to showcase Chinese companies on the international stage, and a 
significant number of them are China's best A-list companies that have previously 
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preferred the prestige and fund-raising potential of listing abroad. The H-shares are 
available to all foreigners.  
 
The N-share refers to the shares of Chinese companies listed in either the New York 
Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ. Like H-shares, most of these listed companies are 
considered the strongest Chinese companies, and are selected by the Chinese 
government and registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and 
trade their shares in the United States at the early stage. These companies are regarded 
as being the “best of the best”, in that they are strong and profitable Chinese companies. 
The shares are traded as ADRs, which is seen to be an easy way for an American citizen 
to invest in a foreign company. Since July 2006, the local institutions that are a member 
of the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (DQIIs) program can buy shares from 
international exchanges (Ni, 2009). 
 
A number of types of shares are named in line with their listing locations. For examples, 
shares of Chinese companies that are listed on the Singapore exchange are known as S-
shares. L-shares are the shares listed on the London Stock Exchange or the AIM board 
in London and T-shares are the shares listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. A foreign 
investor looking to invest in China has thus a number of alternatives. They may be 
prohibited from buying A-shares in a company listed in China, but could buy B-, H-, L-, 
N-, T-, or S-shares in the same company. Interestingly, Chinese domestic investors bear 
the brunt of the risk in China's developing market since they can invest only at home 
while most foreigners are off that limit.  
 
Lastly, a distinctive class of shares is called Special Treatment (ST) or *ST. ST and *ST 
is the ticker symbol to differentiate these stocks from other Chinese stocks traded in the 
stock market. The listed companies that are attached with this ticker symbol are the 
companies that in situations where financial and other abnormalities may lead to the 
termination of the company’s status make it difficult for investors to judge the 
company’s outlook or may have a negative impact on the investor’s interests. The 
securities exchanges then assign Special Treatment to such a stock, including the 
issuance of a warning for delisting risk and other special arrangements.  
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2.2.6 Chinese ADRs 
 
An ADR is a stock that trades in the United States but represents a specified number of 
shares in a foreign corporation, and it was introduced to the financial markets in 1927 as 
a result of the complexities involved in buying shares in foreign countries and the 
difficulties associated with trading at different prices and currency values (Amary and 
Ottoni, 2006). ADRs are bought and sold on American markets just like regular stocks, 
and are issued/sponsored in the U.S. by a bank or brokerage. For this reason, U.S. banks 
simply purchase a bulk lot of shares from the company, bundle the shares into groups, 
and reissue them on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange or 
the NASDAQ. In return, the foreign company must provide detailed financial 
information to the sponsor bank. The depositary bank sets the ratio of U.S. ADRs per 
home-country share. This ratio can be anything less than or greater than 1. This is done 
because the banks wish to price an ADR high enough to show substantial value, yet low 
enough to make it affordable for individual investors. Most investors try to avoid 
investing in penny stocks, and many would shy away from a company trading for 50 
Russian roubles per share, which equates to US$1.50 per share. As a result, the majority 
of ADRs range between $10 and $100 per share (ADRtraders.com). If, in the home 
country, the shares were worth considerably less, then each ADR would represent 
several real shares.  
 
There are four different types of ADR issues (Source: ADR Reference Guide - 
JPMorgan, February 2006):  
• Level 1 – Trading on the non-NASDAQ OTC. This is the most basic type of 
ADR where foreign companies either don't qualify or don't wish to have their 
ADR listed on an exchange. Level 1 ADRs are found in the over-the-counter 
market and are an easy and inexpensive way to gauge interest for its securities in 
North America. Level 1 ADRs also have the least restrictive requirements from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
• Level 2 – Level 2 issues involve trading shares on NASDAQ, the American 
Stock Exchange, and the New York Stock Exchange, but cannot be sold as a 
public offering. Meanwhile, the issuers are required to comply with strict 
disclosure requirements. 
• Level 3 – On Level 3, new equity capital is raised. ADRs can be listed on one or 
more U.S. exchanges and are registered with the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission for public offer to U.S. investors. In addition to the requirement of 
a Level 2 issues, a prospectus must be prepared and additional SEC disclosure 
requirements must be met as well. Chinese firms that list in New York typically 
trade in Level 3 American Depository Receipts.    
• Level 4 -Private Placement Rule 144A ADR Programs. The issue of this level 
was established for the private placement of new shares with minimal disclosure 
requirements and is restricted to qualified institutional buyers. 
 
The DR ratio is individual to each company.  That is, companies trade in ADRs that are 
packaged at a ratio of one ADR to the number of underlying shares in the package.  For 
example, in a 1:100 ADR, each depository receipt corresponds to 100 shares of the 
company (NYSE, 2007).  The ratio depends on the underlying value of the individual 
shares. The receipts are then listed in the US by the issuing institution, and they are 
traded as if they were actual shares of the foreign company.  
 
Chinese securities listed in US markets mostly take the form of type 3 of ADRs, which 
are listed and traded in the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, OTC and the 
American Stock Exchange. Appendixes 1.1 to 1.4 provide detailed information on the 
ADR ratio of Chinese listed companies. 
 
2.2.7 China Cross-listing and Market Cooperation 
 
The establishment of a B-share market and other Chinese shares listed internationally 
have allowed foreign investors to make alternative investments and also enabled those 
Chinese firms to raise foreign capital, improve corporate governance and manage risks. 
But to list in international markets requires an extensive list of approvals and is tightly 
controlled by the Chinese government (Walter and Howie, 2006). Since 1995 (five 
years after the re-building of the stock market) the Chinese government introduced 
several rules regarding the issuing B-share, H-share, and other shares in foreign markets. 
Therefore, to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital, one Chinese firm must satisfy the 
requirements stated in the securities regulations, and meet the following conditions: It 
must have obtained approval from the relevant authorities for its use of foreign 
investment, or for its conversion into a foreign-funded enterprise. It must have a stable 
source of adequate foreign exchange income, and the total amount of its annual foreign 
exchange income must be sufficient to pay the annual dividends. The proportion of B-
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shares to the total number of shares must not exceed the ceiling determined by the 
relevant authority. The aggregate amount of shares to be issued is fixed in each year, 
and the total number of firms allowed to issue foreign shares is also limited (De Jonge, 
2008).  
 
The CSRC has actively participated in multilateral and bilateral consultations and 
dialogues at international level and regional levels to improve the cooperation with 
overseas securities regulators, international organizations and government agencies. 
Signing bilateral memoranda of understandings (MOUs) is one of the major means to 
strengthen regulatory cooperation with international peers. By the end of 2008, CSRC 
has assigned 43 MOUs with regulators in 39 jurisdictions. For example, there is the 
Chinese-Hong Kong Memorandum of Regulatory Co-operation on the Regulation of 
Mainland Enterprises Listed in Hong Kong that was signed on 19 June 1993. An 
important outcome of this negotiation was the introduction of Mandatory Provisions to 
be included in the Articles of Association of all Hong Kong-listed mainland companies. 
These Mandatory Provisions resulted from joint efforts by the Hong Kong Securities 
Commission and the State Restructuring Commission of the People’s Republic of China 
to bring corporate governance standards within Hong Kong-listed mainland firms more 
into line with those prevailing in other Hong Kong listed firms. In Hong Kong, the 
Mandatory Provisions are required under, and supplemented by, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange listing Rules. In Mainland China, they are enforced through, and 
supplemented by, the Special Regulations of the State Council concerning Floating and 
Listing of Shares Overseas by Companies Limited by Shares and the Notice on the 
Implementation of Essential Clauses in Articles of Association of Companies Listed 
Overseas. Since 1993, the Mandatory Provisions have ensured that all H-share firms 
have certain binding clauses in their Articles of Association which serve to subject 
directors, supervisors, and senior management to a number of important fiduciary duties 
owned to the company and its shareholders (De Jonge, 2008).  
 
The cross-listed Chinese firms are required to adopt an international accounting 
standard (IAS), which differentiates the cross-listed Chinese firms from the pure locally 
listed Chinese firms (Article 36, Operating Rules on Issuing B-shares by Joint Stock 
Limited Companies). For those dual-listed Chinese firms, they need to maintain a dual 
reporting system and auditing of IAS-based disclosures. The CSRC also requires that 
IAS-based disclosures be audited by international auditing firms, whereas Chinese 
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)-based disclosures are audited by 
locally certified accountants. These special provisions might pressure the B-share 
companies to observe and to conform to international governance standards more 
closely. For Chinese listings in the Hong Kong market, a sufficient management 
presence in Hong Kong must be present based on the Hong Kong regulation. Besides 
this, the board of directors must include at least two independent non-executive 
directors who have the character, integrity, independence, and experience necessary to 
fulfill their role on the board. The investor protection provisions equivalent to those 
given in the laws of Hong Kong must be included in the H-share companies’ 
constitutional documents (Hong Kong Stock Exchange). In the Singapore market, 
annual reports could be conducted in accordance with Singapore Financial Reporting 
Standards (SFRS). But the financial statement conducted in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or U.S. GAAP need not be 
reconciled to SFRS (Singapore Stock Exchange). 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The above sections present a broad picture of the history of the China stock markets, the 
characteristics of the Chinese shares, and the reason that cause Chinese firms to cross 
border list their shares. These reasons could be the driving force by the government, or 
could be the self-growth needs by the Chinese company itself. But the procedure for 
Chinese companies to get publicly listed at home, however, still remains complex and 
strictly controlled (Wei and Kang, 2009). Although it is not hard to get listed in 
international markets nowadays, these overseas-listed Chinese firms would face more 
challenges by meeting the rules and regulations under two different legal and market 
systems. High level and complicated government regulations, policies, and rules make 
cross-listing a complicated process for Chinese firms to list and trade in the 
international stock markets.  Therefore, investigation into the Chinese cross-listing 
would be interesting and important as the phenomenon seems to be inconsistent with 
existing lines of literature. Due to the data availability, this study will restrict the 
Chinese dual and triple listings that traded in Hong Kong, New York, NASDAQ, 
London, and Singapore markets.  
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Chapter 3: Review of Cross-listing 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Technological progress and the liberalisation of capital market policies greatly facilitate 
the capital market internationalisation and mitigate market segmentation. The first wave 
of internationalisation of markets began during the 1970s with investors and firms 
investing funds in foreign equity markets to diversify their portfolios and earn higher 
returns than were possible with only a domestic portfolio (Foerster & Karolyi 1993). 
Then, another globalisation phenomenon saw firms actually cross-listing their stocks on 
foreign capital markets in the early 1980s. 
 
During the 1990s, the number of foreign companies with shares cross-listed and trading 
on major exchanges outside of their home markets reached as high as 4,700 and 
included among their numbers were not only companies from developed economies, but 
also many from emerging economies opening up their stock markets to foreign 
investors for the first time (Karolyi 2006). However, the past years have witnessed a 
significant slowdown in the pace of new international cross-listings and in the fraction 
of global trading on overseas exchanges. From May 2007 to May 2008, 35 large 
European companies, including household names such as Ahold, Air France, Bayer, 
British Airways, Danone and Fiat, terminated their cross-listings on stock exchanges in 
New York as the requirements for deregistering from US markets became less stringent. 
On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, too, some well-known companies, such as Boeing and 
BP, have recently withdrawn their listings (Dobbs & Goedhart 2008). By the end of 
2008, the overall foreign listing in world exchanges decreased to 3,046 (World 
Federation of Exchanges 2008). London, NASDAQ, New York and Singapore still 
attract the most foreign company listings. 
 
The long-held conventional wisdom of cross-listing has been challenged. During the 
1990s, a great body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has examined the issue 
of cross-listing, seeking to understand the net benefits of the corporate decision to list 
shares on overseas exchanges. Similarly, there have been a dozens of new academic 
studies of the benefits and costs of listings that depart from the conventional wisdom of 
previous studies and that seek to rationalise the changing and now more complex world 
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of cross-listings. 6  These studies extend our understanding of the cross-listing from 
different angles, and mainly focused on three aspects: (i) corporate governance and 
legal bonding; (ii) multiple listing and informed trading, price discovery and 
information transmission, and (iii) arbitrage. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an extensive literature review on cross-listing 
and its new research initiatives of corporate issues within past years. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance and Legal Bonding 
 
Firms cross-list for a number of reasons, including lowing the cost of the capital 
(Stapleton & Subrahmanyam 1977; Errunza & Losq 1985; Alexander, Eun & 
Jankiramanan 1987); gaining access to foreign capital market and increasing visibility 
and ability to raise equity (Baker et al. 2002); increasing shareholder base (Merton, 
1987); and enhancing trading liquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Domowitz et al. 
1998). A number of recent studies (Coffee, 1999, 2002; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998) have 
particularly emphasised that firms can engage in a higher level of investors’ protection 
to respect minority shareholders’ rights by cross-listing in a market that has a stronger 
and enforceable legal system (such as the US stock exchanges), in turn substituting for 
their weak home country institutions. This argument is known as the bonding 
hypothesis in the literature. 
 
In many countries, especially in the emerging capital markets, minority investors are 
poorly protected by the local legal environment and controlling shareholders who can 
extract value from the firm efficiently and easily. However, by cross-listing their 
securities in a better legal protection, market firms can escape a weak domestic legal 
environment and reduce investor expropriation risk (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). As 
early as 1997, La Porta et al. (1997) explained the differences between national 
corporate governance systems by differences in the legal systems. They show that 
minority shareholders are better protected in the common law system than in the civil 
law system. As a result, better protection of minority shareholders promotes the 
separation of ownership and control. Later, the concept of bonding first appeared in 
Stulz’s (1999) study. More recently, Coffee (1999, 2002) borrowed the term bonding to 
                                                 
6
 Early research in the area of cross-listing postulated the economic benefits of cross-listing could be 
found in many studies, especially Karolyi (2006) and Abdallah et al. (2010). 
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refer to a mechanism by which firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection 
of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves 
to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement in order to attract investors who 
would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or who would discount such stocks to reflect the 
risk of minority expropriation). Bonding was originally used in law and economics to 
refer to the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors 
that it will perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher 
price (King and Segal 2004). Coffee (1999, 2002) suggests that foreign firms may 
cross-list on the US stock exchanges in order to commit themselves to protecting 
minority shareholders. Later, a number of empirical studies have been tested for this 
bonding theory using different proxies. In the literature, these bonding practices include 
adopting the stringent international accounting standards, hiring reputable outside 
auditors, having outside directors, diversifying ownership by having foreign strategic 
investors as block holders, and finally, and most importantly, listing the firms on 
foreign stock exchanges (Cai 2007). 
 
A number of papers have suggested that one useful way to ‘bond’ managers not to take 
excessive private benefits is to cross-list the firm’s stock on an exchange that imposes 
higher legal and regulatory costs than the firm’s primary exchange (Karolyi 2006). 
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) were the first to rationalise in this way the 
decision by non-US firms to list on the US exchanges either directly or through an ADR 
program. Both the functional convergence hypothesis offered by Coffee (1999, 2002) 
and the bonding hypothesis proposed by Stulz (1999), and Benos and Weisbach (2004) 
declared that firms wishing to raise capital by bonding themselves to protect the 
interests of their minority shareholders, according to the theory’s first part, increases 
long-run q (Tobin’s q, the measurement of firm value). One way to accomplish this 
bonding is to use a US listing (cross-list on an exchange like the New York Stock 
Exchange or NASDAQ), whose legal system protects minority shareholder interests as 
well as any other in the world to assure that minority shareholders are less likely to be 
exploited. Coffee (1999, 2002), Fuerst (1998), and Stulz (1999) also argued that cross-
listing on a US stock exchange can enhance the protection of minority investors for 
firms coming from the countries who have weak protection of minority rights or poor 
enforcement mechanisms. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) also argue that firms can escape a 
weak domestic legal environment and reduce investor expropriation risk by cross-listing 
their securities in a better legal protection market. They suggest that common law legal 
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system protects investors better than civil law systems and investors may not want to 
hold equities in a firm from a country with poor investor protection rules because they 
may fear expropriation by concentrated shareholders or managers. 
 
Reese and Weisbach (2002) provided evidence concerning the expected relations 
between cross-listings, shareholder protection, and equity offerings by examining a total 
sample of 2038 cross-listings as of June 1999. Their results showed that after cross-
listing in the US, firms from countries with weak investor protection are able to raise 
more equity capital at home. Doidge (2004) tested the bonding hypothesis in the context 
of non-US firms cross-listed in the US via ADRs and found improvements in the 
protection afforded to minority investors and decreases in the private benefits of control. 
He compiles a panel dataset of 745 non-US firms from 20 countries that have dual-class 
share structures via level 2 or 3 ADRs through 1994 to 2001. By conducting panel data 
regression and event study analyses, consistent with the bonding hypothesis, he found 
that firms cross-listed on a US exchange on average, have statistically significant 43 per 
cent lower voting premiums than firms that do not, meanwhile, the size of difference in 
voting premiums is negatively related to measures of minority investor protection. 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) developed a simple model stating that a firm lists in 
the US if its controlling shareholders find it advantageous to limit their expropriation 
from minority shareholders, and then to model the trade-off that controlling 
shareholders face when deciding whether to list or not. Through the study of the 
valuation difference between the foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the US 
with the non-cross-listed firms from the same country, their research showed that firms 
from around world that cross-list their shares in the US have higher valuations than 
other firms from their country that do not cross-list. They interpreted this as the result 
that the controlling shareholders of firms that wish to cross-list have more incentives to 
limit their consumption of private benefits from control, which directly supports the 
bonding argument. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005) also found that firms from 
emerging markets benefits from a US listing through an enhanced access to external 
capital markets, as well as the improvement of shareholder protection. 
 
Kumar and Ramchand (2006) provided a framework that complements the bonding 
hypothesis in international cross-listing by highlighting the incentives for dominant 
shareholders of firms to cross-list their securities. They theoretically and empirically 
examined the relationship between dominant shareholder influence, takeover and the 
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cross-listing, claiming that by cross-listing in a foreign country with an active takeover 
market and strong investor protection rights, the firm is able to reduce the costs of 
equity-financed acquisition. Moreover, dominant shareholders in these firms trade-off 
control dilution against value creation from acquisitions, whose benefits still accrue 
substantially to them. Using Cox and Tobit regression analysis, Kumar and Ramchand 
(2006) empirically tested the predictions on a sample of 364 firms that cross-listed in 
the US during 1990–2003, and the results supported the theoretical framework that 
dominant shareholder ownership and control rights dilute subsequence to the cross-
listing. 
 
The studies above show that improving shareholder protection may explain why some 
non-US firms cross-listed their shares in US. However, there is growing debate on the 
bonding theories. Some recent studies suggest that bonding may not be a complete 
shield for minority shareholders (Coffee 2002). MacNeil (2001) also found that the real 
legal commitments made by foreign firms that listed in London are not as strong as they 
first appeared. The simple model of bonding hypothesis could not reflect the complex 
manner in which an overseas listing links a company with the system of corporate 
regulation in an overseas listing jurisdiction. Licht (2001a, 2001b, 2003) argues that the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an inefficient body that does not 
enforce corporate governance rules for foreign issuers and maintains a ‘hands off’ 
policy for the most part. In particular, Siegel (2005) empirically tested the bonding 
theories by examining all Mexican companies with a Mexican equity listing prior to the 
crisis of 1994–1995. The evidence showed that the US SEC and minority shareholders 
have not effectively enforced the law against cross-listed foreign firms, cross-listing in 
the US did not deter Mexican firms’ insiders from expropriating corporate resources. 
Moreover, SEC action against any US-listed foreign firms has been rare and mostly 
ineffective throughout the history of the federal securities laws. Gozzi, Levine and 
Schmuckler (2006) compiled a database of over 9,000 international and domestic firms 
across 74 countries over the period 1989–2000, comprising almost 67,000 firm-year 
observations, to conduct the analysis on the bonding and corporation cross-listing by 
documenting the evolution of Tobin’s q before, during and after firms’ cross-listing 
(more broaden, firms internationalise). They found that Tobin’s q does not rise after 
internationalisation. The evidence challenged the statements that cross-listing produces 
an enduring effect on q by bonding firms to a better corporate governance framework 
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that includes the reduction expropriation of corporate resources by dominant 
shareholders. 
 
Another contribution against the bonding hypothesis is called reputational bonding, 
which contextualises that the place where the bonding happens is through the operation 
of the financial markets by the reputational mechanism, not through the courts (Sigel 
2005). King and Sigel (2004) examined cross-listing premiums for Canadian firms 
relative to their domestic counterparts, and argue that reputational bonding is what 
matters, not legal bonding. In Hong Kong, this legal enforcement effectiveness also 
caused some concern when several Mainland Chinese firms were involved a series of 
scandals. For example, Beijing Media, a Hong Kong listed Mainland Chinese private 
firm, never disclosed any information to the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) 
of Hong Kong about the arrest of their six senior management members by the Beijing 
anti-corruption bureau between June to September 2005. The Hong Kong investors had 
no idea about this until this information was revealed in a Chinese magazine called 
Finance and Economics (Sun et al. 2006). Further, Euro-Asia Agricorp, Fareast 
Pharmacy and Kelong Electric were also involved into different criminal offences 
committed by these firms’ management (Sun et al. 2006) 
 
Bris, Cantale and Nishiotis (2007) made an effort to separate various cross-listing 
effects such as increased liquidity, governance, removal of barriers and greater financial 
flexibility and showed that the effects of improving investor protection are 
economically small. Dewenter et al. (2005) demonstrated that the emerging markets 
with relatively weak legal regimes can offer value-relevant bonding mechanisms to 
local firms by observing Korean firms listing on Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation System (KOSDAQ) having higher Tobin’s q values than the Korean Stock 
Exchange. Sun et al. (2006) tested the bonding hypothesis in the context of Chinese 
firms listed in Hong Kong and found strong support evidence. They contrasted a sample 
of 53 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong against a control sample of domestic firms 
listed only on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, and observe a general existence 
of cross-listing premiums of H-share firms. Between the comparison of B-shares and H-
shares, the cross-listing premium is larger for H-share than for B-share firms, which is 
measured by higher market-to-book value ratio (MBR ratio) and higher price-to-
earnings ratio (P/E ratio). Both A-shares and B-shares are traded in China and carry the 
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same voting right, and the only difference between A-shares and B-shares is the 
accounting method used (Cai 2007). 
 
3.2.1 Hypothesis Development 
 
When Chinese firms choose to list their shares internationally (no matter whether it is a 
SOE or a private firm), they are committed to an increased disclosure standard and 
increased monitoring from the host country’s laws and regulations, which bonding the 
less expropriation of firm resources by the controlling shareholders. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) draw a distinction between a 
commitment and a voluntary disclosure, explaining that a commitment decision is made 
before it observes the content of the disclosure, and a voluntary decision is made after it 
observes the content. For example, in the context of accounting standards, the Chinese 
cross-listed firms that adopt International Accounting Standard (IAS) amounts to a 
credible promise that it will disclosure all information, regardless of content, to all 
investors, regardless of nationality. Thus, this commitment effectively eliminates 
information asymmetry and increases the firm’s value. Therefore, the above perspective 
reveals the possibility that overseas listing for these Chinese firms no matter whether 
they are SOEs or private firms can produce bonding effects due to increased monitoring 
of foreign financial intermediaries. Previous literature about the law and finance (La 
Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999; Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999) 
also reveals that strong legal protection of minority shareholders generates higher firm 
valuation. In summary, the cross-listed Chinese firms increase information disclosure 
can still enjoy high valuations although under a poor legal environment, which leads to 
our first hypothesis as formally stated below: 
 
• Hypothesis 1: The firm values of Chinese firms listed in both international and 
domestic stock exchanges are higher than that of Chinese firms listed only 
locally in the Chinese stock exchange. 
 
Corporate governance mechanism includes exogenous and endogenous elements. The 
exogenous element includes political, legal and cultural framework, and the endogenous 
element includes the board of directors, management compensation, supervision or 
independent directors (Chen 2005). In the Chinese context, corporate governance 
improvements include the introduction of independent directors, the size of the board, 
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and the regulation of the role of the board of directors in listed firms. Auditing financial 
reports is another corporate governance practice for public offerings in jurisdiction 
adopted by Chinese firms (Cai 2007). However, poor corporate governance conducted 
by the listed firms in the Chinese stock exchange has been blamed for the poor 
performance of the Chinese stock market. The absence of strong legal enforcement 
procedures in China has provided the possibility for controlling shareholders and/or 
company management to manipulate financial reports, which is often assisted by some 
accounting and auditing service firms (Cai 2007). Therefore, there is no clear sign 
suggesting that these governance practices of locally listed Chinese firms would be 
eliminated in the near future, although the Chinese government has taken measures 
(such as implementing different financial and bank reforms, stock market reforms) with 
the aim to improve the corporate governance practices of Chinese firms listed in the 
Chinese stock exchange. 
 
Coffee (1999, 2002) suggests that firms in a weak corporate governance protection 
environment could bond themselves by cross-listing and voluntarily subjecting 
themselves to higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement. Chinese 
firms listing in the international stock exchanges are required to meet the corporate 
governance as regulated in each respective stock exchange. Following the logic of 
bonding hypothesis, this may provide investors with the hope that the Chinese firms’ 
cross-listing in stock exchanges that operate in an environment with an effective 
corporate governance mechanism may help the management of the Chinese firms to 
become disciplinary in their practice and act in the best interest of their shareholders. 
More importantly, the different degree of legal protection given provided for 
shareholders and creditors could be the single most important factor explaining 
differences in corporate governance across countries (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny 1999). It is expected that the cross-listed Chinese firms should adopt 
higher quality governance and disclosure practices, and therefore have better corporate 
governance relative to these non-cross-listed firms. Therefore, the investors may put 
higher value on firms that are cross-listed in international stock exchanges, which is 
then expected to yield a better firm performance when compared to the firms listed 
locally in the Chinese stock exchange. These theoretical arguments lead to the second   
hypothesis as formally stated below: 
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• Hypothesis 2: The corporate governance of Chinese firms listed in international 
stock exchanges exhibits bonding effects by adopting the relevant corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Lastly, Chinese firms listed in different stock exchanges do have specific characteristics 
regarding the corporate governance practices that are set up by different stock 
exchanges, although these Chinese firms are labelled by their own characteristics. For 
example, there is no strict rule that asks the company to have independent directors in 
London AIM market. However, it does ask that the board should consist of executive 
and non-executive directors to keep the balance of the board. Even under the same 
requirement for independent director system, sometimes, the number of independent 
directors does not comply with the code’s requirement that at least one-third of the 
board should be made up of independent directors, which brings a strong and 
independent element to the board. Most of the stock exchanges share one of the 
common corporate governance practices, which is the duty separation of the chairperson 
and CEO. Again, sometimes, the board has not adopted the recommendation of the code 
on the division of responsibilities between the chairperson and CEO with different 
reasons. For example, they might claim that the board is of the view that there is a 
sufficiently strong independent element on the board to enable the independent exercise 
of objective judgement on corporate affairs of the group, or there are sufficient 
safeguards in place to ensure that the management is accountable to the board as a 
whole. Meanwhile, most of the overseas Chinese listings do follow the stock exchange 
requirements, such as the adoption of the international accounting standard and have the 
international famous auditing firms to audit the financial statements. Therefore, 
corporate governance mechanisms along with the cross-listing location might have 
different effects on firm valuation, and the third hypothesis is followed as below: 
 
• Hypothesis 3: The relationship between the bonding corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm valuation is different with different listing locations. 
 
3.3 Multiple Listing and Informed Trading 
3.3.1 Dual-listing and Market Co-movement  
 
If international financial markets are perfectly integrated, stock price movement should 
not be affected by the trading location. However, prior studies including a country funds 
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study (Bodurtha, Kim & Lee1995), a twin stocks study (Froot & Dabora 1999), and an 
ADR study (Kim et al. 2000; Suh 2003) have suggested that stock price is very much 
influenced by the market where they are traded, which they interpret as market or 
investor sentiment. Chong and Su (2006) used intraday high-frequency data and 
examined the co-movements of Chinese A-share and H-shares listed in Hong Kong. The 
study found that only a small portion of these cross-listed stocks demonstrated a co-
movement in their A- and H-share prices, suggesting that China and Hong Kong are two 
segmented markets. Wei (2000), and Wang and Jiang (2004) specified that market 
sentiment may be an important factor explaining the price difference for the cross-listed 
China A-shares and Hong Kong H-shares. Wang and Jiang (2004) found that H-shares 
behave more like Hong Kong stocks, while Mainland China A-shares retain significant 
exposure to their domestic market. Bedi et al. (2003) tested excess co-movement for 
three Anglo-Australian dual-listed corporations. Their results confirm the excess co-
movement findings of Froot and Dabora (1999), implying that excess co-movement 
with aggregate market indices is a pervasive feature of the pricing of dual-listed 
corporations. 
 
3.3.2 Dual-listing and Market Cointegration 
 
Cointegration estimation techniques, since they were developed by Engle and Granger 
(1981), have been widely adopted by scholars of finance and economics to examine the 
interdependency of different equity markets (Chan et al. 1992; Chan et al. 1999; Huang 
et al. 2000; Worthington & Higgs 2004; Zhou et al. 2005; Luo et al. 2005; Aggarwal et 
al. 2005; Su et al. 2007; Shen et al. 2007), international bond markets (Mills et al. 1991; 
Clare et al. 1995), foreign exchange rate (AuYong et al. 2004), and international 
diversification (Chang & Caudil 2005; Chang 2001). The following sections review the 
related research in this aspect. 
 
Click and Plummer (2005) studied the five stock markets integration of the formal 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) using the time series technique of 
cointegration to extract long-run relationships. Their empirical results suggest that the 
ASEAN stock markets are cointegrated in the economic sense, but are far from 
complete, since there is only one cointegrating vector, leaving four common trends 
among the five variables. Wong et al. (2005) investigated the cointegration relationship 
between the Indian market and three developed markets (US, Japan and UK) by 
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employing a fractional cointegration approach. The researchers investigated the long-
run equilibrium relationship and short run dynamic inter linkages between these markets 
using the weekly data of the related indices of these markets. Their findings suggest that 
the India stock market is statistically significantly cointegrated with US, UK and Japan 
markets. 
 
Mo et al. (2005) studied the stock price cointegration of Taiwan market and its major 
trading partners of US and Japan markets using non-parametric cointegration test. The 
results suggest that the Taiwan market is pair-wise cointegrated with the markets of the 
Japan and the US during the examining period. Daly (2003) investigated the 
interdependence of the ASEAN stock markets and the advanced stock markets of 
Australia, Germany and the US pre- and post-October 1997 period. There was no 
evidence in support of cointegrating relationship between the stock markets of Australia, 
Germany and the US with the markets of South East Asia in either the pre- or post-crisis 
periods when adapting the multivariate cointegration technique. However, the only 
evidence to support the existence of a bi-variate long-run relationship between stock 
markets was the presence of one cointegrating vector between the stock markets of 
Thailand and Indonesia, and between Thailand and the Philippines, over both the pre- 
and post-1997 crisis periods. Chan et al. (1992) used unit root and cointegration tests to 
examine the relationships among the stock markets in Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and the US. The pair-wise and higher-order cointegration 
tests indicated that there was no evidence of cointegration among the stock prices. It 
also implied that international diversification among the markets is effective. Ostermark 
(2001) provided evidence on the cointegration between the Finnish and Japanese 
financial markets using multivariate cointegration analysis as well. 
 
Besides the cointegrated studies using market indices, cointegrated studies with stock 
prices have also been conducted. Agarwal and Kyaw (2005) documented that the equity 
prices in the three North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries (Canada, 
US and Mexico) were cointegrated for the post-NAFTA period with daily, weekly and 
monthly data. Lok and Kalev (2006) examined the intraday price behaviour of 
Australian stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and cross-listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange, as well as the dynamics of the New Zealand securities listed 
on the New Zealand Stock Exchange and cross-listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
Using two error correction models and unit root test and cointegration test in their study, 
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they found that the prices of the dual-listed securities were linked by the long-run 
equilibrium of equal prices, which also implied that arbitrage opportunities are not 
generally available in the trading of the cross-listed stocks across the two markets. 
Meanwhile, the Granger causality tests between the two markets during the trading 
overlap suggests that the two markets may be integrated as a whole, rather than just 
with respect to the dual-listed stocks. 
 
The studies about Chinese stock market integration have mainly focused on the 
relationship between the Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan markets by analysing 
the indices, price, volatility, stock returns and cointegration, which will be briefly 
reviewed in the discussion below. 
 
Zhu et al. (2004) examined the returns and volatility of a series of indices of Shanghai 
Composite Index, the Shenzhen Composite Sub-index and Hong Kong Hang Seng 
Index, they found that the index series were non-stationary and cointegration vectors 
and error correction do not exist. They also found an existence of a positive feedback 
relationship between Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Another study by Zhou et 
al. (2005) examined the cointegration among three markets (Shanghai, Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong) in China before and after Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997 by 
examining the stock returns, volatility and cointegration. The results showed that these 
three Chinese Stock markets were cointegrated over the entire sample period and 
became more closely related after Hong Kong’s return to China. 
 
Lin and Wu (2006) studied the linkage of China’s stock market with Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and the US by investigating the information flow direction among the A- and B-
share markets as well as Hong Kong H-share and Red Chips markets. Employing two 
methods of Bernanke-Sims decomposition and the impulse response analysis, and the 
Multivariate GARCH models, they concluded that the China’s stock markets have a 
weak linkage with the Hong Kong, Taiwan and US markets. Further, the Shanghai stock 
market appears to dominate the Shenzhen stock market. Su and Chong (2007) studied 
the interrelations between the cross-listed securities of Chinese companies listed and 
traded in Hong Kong and US, adapting two popular common factor models (the 
permanent-transitory model and information shares model) to investigate the price 
discovery. The empirical results suggested that the prices of the same stock listed in 
Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges were cointegrated with one common factor 
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and mutually adjusting, and Hong Kong made more contributions than New York to the 
price discovery process. 
 
The review of literature above mainly focuses on market integration with the application 
of cointegration techniques using market indices. Although interaction among markets 
could tell us the relationships between them, it is still worthwhile to investigate the 
behaviour of individual share prices and returns of the dual- or triple-listed shares issued 
by the same company, to explore the relationship among markets further. 
 
3.3.3 Information Transmission 
 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) argued that when a security is traded in several markets, 
informed traders have greater opportunities to exploit private information. They further 
explained that the expected return of informed traders is diminished by a timely 
transmission of pricing information to satellite markets—a phenomenon that may be 
caused by competing market makers who offer to the general public pricing information 
at reduced costs. A significant causal connection between home markets and US 
markets has also been found in other studies. Hauser et al. (1998) used data on several 
stocks listed on both the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ in order to 
investigate the information transmission between these two markets. Two alternative 
tests for causality, both based in essence on the Granger (1969) idea were used. The 
results showed that the stock price behaviour in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange affects 
the price in the US. However, price behaviour in New York affects prices in Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange too; the price causality in dual-listed stocks is unidirectional from the 
domestic to the foreign market. 
 
Most of the information flow studies have been based on aggregate market indices 
between or among different markets. The inter-market information flow based on the 
cross-listing has also been examined extensively. Adopting a modified GARCH 
modelling approach and taking into account the influence of different regulatory 
structures across stock exchanges where firms are cross-listed, Koulakiotis et al. (2006) 
examined the volatility effect for a sample of cross-listed firms in specific European 
markets of Brussels and Milan stock exchanges, and found that that information spill-
over effects were important across specific European markets for cross-listed securities 
and that different regulatory environments have a significant impact on information 
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spill-over. The magnitude and persistence of these information spill-over varies 
according to the location of cross-listings. 
 
Using the daily opening and closing stock prices of seven Japanese dual-listings that 
trading in New York Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange, Lau, Diltz and 
Apilado (1994) examined the information transmission between the two markets. The 
results showed that transmission of pricing information runs in both directions between 
New York and Tokyo, and the transmission of information is immediate when running 
from New York to Tokyo and both immediate and throughout the trading day when 
running from Tokyo to New York, suggesting that market imperfections inhibit 
information transfer between the dual-listed securities’ return are not apparent, and 
arbitrage opportunities is not available. 
 
Bae et al. (1999) provided further empirical evidence concerning the information 
transmission of dually listed securities. They examine 18 companies dual-listed in Hong 
Kong and London, using daily opening and closing prices, and found that transmission 
of pricing information occurs immediately and continuously throughout the trading day 
in both directions from Hong Kong to London, and vice versa. Wang et al. (2002) 
examined the integration of stock markets in terms of stock return and volatility 
transmission based on the 22 dual-listed securities trading in Hong Kong and London 
with GJR-GARCH model. They provided evidence of returns and volatility spill-over 
from Hong Kong to London, and vice versa. 
 
3.3.4 Price Discovery  
 
When a firm makes its decision to list securities on international stock exchanges, it 
faces a complex trading structure. Trading is taken among different markets; however, 
each market plays a different role. In an international capital market setting, one would 
expect the home market of multi-traded securities to be the dominant market because 
the markets around the world are more likely to be informationally segmented and 
information about the underlying company is more likely to stem from the home market 
(Licht 1998). Normally, the firm’s home market operates as a dominant market, 
capturing most of the trading volume and leading the process of price discovery 
(Garbade & Silber 1979). Price discovery is defined as the search for an equilibrium 
price and is a key function of a stock exchange (Karolyi 2006). 
  
40 
 
Multiple listing offers a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of price discovery 
across markets. Garbade and Silber (1979) were the first to document the contribution 
to the price discovery of different markets for dually listed stocks within the US. They 
were also the first who introduced the concept of dominant and satellite markets, and 
revealed that the New York Stock Exchange performs a dominant role in the price-
discovery process, regional exchanges are ‘satellites, but not pure satellites’ 7 . A 
significant number of studies have since conducted empirical studies with the attempts 
to provide more evidence for the price-discovery prediction. Neumark et al. (1991), Eun 
and Shim (1989), and Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990) supported that foreign market 
acts as a satellite to the domestic market. Neumark et al. (1991) studied a sample of US 
securities multiple listed on foreign markets and found that price movements fully 
reflected price volatility existing on the US domestic market, but that US price 
movements reflected only to a lesser extent the volatility on foreign markets. Harris et al. 
(1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) examined the relative contribution of the New York Stock 
Exchanges to the price discovery of US stocks trading on these exchanges. Harris et 
al.’s (1995) study employs the common-factor error correction estimation methods of 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to measure how much prices in different trading venues 
adjust due to cross-market information flows. Conversely, Hasbrouck (1995) employs 
the common-trends vector autoregression (VAR) representation and computes the 
fraction of long-term total variation in returns explained by each market from a 
variance-decomposition analysis, which he calls the ‘information share’. 
 
A number of studies of multi-market trading have applied these techniques. For 
example, Lieberman et al. (1999) also employ an error correction approach studying 
Israeli stocks multiply listed on the American Over the Counter (OTC) market. They 
found that the Israeli domestic market acted as the dominant market and the foreign 
market acted as a satellite market. Pascual et al. (2006) examined five Spanish stocks 
cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange using Hasbrouck’s (1995) information 
share model, and found that the contribution of the New York Stock Exchange to the 
price discovery only varies from one per cent to three per cent. Eun and Sabherwal 
(2003) applied Harris et al.’s error correction models, examined 62 Canadian companies 
dual-listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and US exchanges. They performed cross-
                                                 
7
 Garbade and Silber empirically examined five actively traded stocks that dually-traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange, and the other regional stock exchange such as the Midwest Stock Exchange and the 
Pacific Stock Exchange during August 1973 and September 1975. 
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sectional regressions of these estimated relative contributions of the two markets and 
found that the most important variable is the proportion of total trading volume in the 
US. That is, the higher the fraction of total trading taking place in the US, the higher is 
the contribution of the US market to price discovery. 
 
Gramming et al. (2005) also apply the Gonzalo-Granger error correction model to study 
the contributions of New York and Frankfurt for three blue-chip German firms during 
overlapping trading hours with high frequency quotes. Considering the exchange rate 
effects, they reported that price discovery occurs largely in the home market during the 
overlapping period. Hedvall et al. (1997) found a consistent result for Nokia’s New 
York Stock Exchange and Helsinki prices from 1994 to 1996. In this case, the New 
York Stock Exchange captures almost 60 per cent of the post-listing trading volume, so 
it is not surprising that the Gonzalo-Granger variance decomposition shows that the 
New York Stock Exchange plays the dominant price discovery role. Pascual et al. (2006) 
use this same technique for five Spanish stocks using two-hour overlapping periods for 
the year 2000. Menkveld et al. (2003) examined one year of transactions data on seven 
major Dutch firms, and extend the analysis to incorporate information from US trading 
during the overnight non-overlapping period as a benchmark period of activity. They 
uncovered important price and quote activity around the New York Stock Exchange 
opening for these stocks. 
 
Agarwal et al. (2007) examined price discovery for 17 stocks traded in Hong Kong and 
London using bid and asked for opening and closing prices. They investigated the 
dynamics of price transmission processes between these two markets, and the results 
were similar to that of Werner and Kleidon (1996) that London trades follow a free-
rider pattern in terms of cross-market price discovery. Agarwal et al. (2007) suggested 
that the London market plays only a limited role in price discovery in the Hong Kong 
market, and Hong Kong’s trading predominantly determines price discovery in London. 
They concluded that London trading is liquidity-driven but not information-driven. 
Adopting two main error correction models (unit root test and cointegration test), Lok 
and Kalev (2006) examined the intraday price behaviour of Australian stocks listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange and cross-listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, as 
well as the dynamics of the New Zealand securities listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange and cross-listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. They found that the prices 
of the dual-listed securities are linked by the long-run equilibrium of equal prices, 
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which also implies that arbitrage opportunities are not generally available in the trading 
of the cross-listed stocks across the two markets. Meanwhile, the Granger causality tests 
between the two markets during the trading overlap suggests that the two markets may 
be integrated as a whole, rather than just with respect to the dual-listed stocks. 
 
Su and Chong (2007) examined the price discovery for eight Chinese cross-listing 
securities trading in Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, adopting two popular 
common factor models (the permanent-transitory model and information shares model) 
using low-frequency data. The empirical results suggest that the prices of the same 
Chinese stock listed in Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges are cointegrated 
with one common factor and mutually adjusting, and Hong Kong makes more 
contributions than New York to the price discovery process. 
 
A few other studies on price discovery from emerging markets cross-listed on 
developed markets have been conducted. Ding et al. (1999) investigated the price 
discovery of a large Malaysian conglomerate traded in both the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange with Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
common long-memory factors model, and found that nearly 70 per cent of the price 
discovery occurs in the home country and that 26–32 per cent can be attributed to the 
Stock Exchange of Singapore. Kadapakkam et al. (2003) examined the Indian stocks 
dual-listed on the London Stock Exchange, and found that each market contributes 
almost equally to price discovery. Using intraday high-frequency data, Chong and Su 
(2006) investigated the co-movements of Chinese A-shares and H-shares listed in Hong 
Kong and discovered that there was only a small portion of these cross-listed stocks that 
had a co-movement in their A- and H-share prices, suggesting that that China and Hong 
Kong are two segmented markets. However, for those small portion co-movement 
stocks, the A-share market played a major role in the price discovery contribution. 
 
In general, most of the empirical studies of the price discovery process of securities that 
trade on multiple markets provide evidence that securities traded at the home market 
leads the price discovery. 
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3.3.5 Hypothesis Development 
 
The phenomenon of dual-listed Chinese shares trading at quite different prices is 
interesting, while these differences do not provide an opportunity for pure risk-free 
arbitrage or limited to arbitrage, they are nonetheless an anomaly. Although a very rich 
literature for the price disparity of the Chinese dual-listed securities (please refer to 
section 2.4.5) have been documented, Froot and Dabora (1999) find that the price 
differential is correlated with the relative performance of the markets in which the twins 
trade most. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether this price differential is correlated 
with the relative performance of the markets in which these dual-listed Chinese shares 
trade most, as proposed by Froot and Dabora (1999) that this co-movement is a 
reflection of prices in each market being influenced by market sentiment. Thus, we have 
the following hypothesis: 
 
• Hypothesis 4: The changes in the price differential are uncorrelated with the 
performance of the two markets on which the Chinese dual-listed securities trade. 
 
With enhanced globalization of financial markets, more and more Chinese firms are 
now cross-listing their securities overseas, but does this lead to a more integrated 
Chinese equity market? The market integration studies reviewed in section 2.3.2 are 
mostly conducted in the national equity markets level. These studies focus on the 
relationship among different international equity markets by analysing the behaviour of 
national market indices. Akdogan (1995) finds a growing degree of integration among 
certain markets, particularly in the developed countries. It is also documented that the 
Chinese equity market is segmented from the international equity markets (Tunaru et al., 
2006).  However, when Chinese securities cross-listed in different equity markets, does 
the integrated equity market such as Hong Kong and New York demonstrate the 
cointegration relationship in terms of these dual-listed securities? For the triple-listed 
Chinese security, the price of its Hong Kong listing and the price of its New York 
listing are very similar to each other after the exchange rate considered.  To examine the 
market cointegration by studying the dual- and triple-listed Chinese securities under the 
framework of the cointegration techniques, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
• Hypothesis 5: The Chinese equity market is cointegrated with the other 
international equity markets in terms of the dual-listed securities.  
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Many of the previous studies of information transmission across markets have focused 
exclusively on the effects of scheduled macroeconomic announcements on stock returns 
and volatility in another market by studying the stock price volatility (Jaiswal & 
Jithendranathan, 2009). In terms of dual-listing, information transmission study is 
examining when and where the transmission of pricing information occurs. To study the 
pricing information transmission for Chinese firms dual-listed in two or three markets, 
we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
• Hypothesis 6: For Chinese cross market dual-listings, the home market of China 
is where to release of public information takes place and is dominant for the 
information transmission. 
 
So far, the empirical evidence regarding where price discovery occurs has been mixed 
and conflicting. Studies of price discovery have examined the relative contribution of 
the U.S. stock exchanges and the other international stock exchanges to the price 
discovery of U.S. stocks trading on these exchanges, or foreign stocks cross-trading on 
U.S. stock exchanges. It is obvious that the home stock exchange is likely to contribute 
substantially to price discovery as it is the security’s home market where substantial 
information is expected to be produced. However, it is also expected that as among the 
largest and most liquid exchanges in the world, the dominance of the U.S. stock 
exchanges is also likely to contribute significantly to price discovery (Eun and 
Sabherwal, 2003). Whether or not all of the home and host stock exchanges contribute 
to the price discovery of a security cross-listed in multiple exchanges is an interesting 
issue. Further, the question becomes more interesting when the security listed on more 
than two stock exchanges, such as Chinese securities triple-listed on the China Shanghai 
stock exchange, Hong Kong stock exchange and New York stock exchange. Therefore, 
one of the objectives of this study is to examine the extent to which stock exchange 
contribute to the price discovery for the Chinese securities cross-listed on different 
stock exchanges. And we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
•  Hypothesis 7: The Chinese home stock exchange contributes to the price 
discovery when Chinese securities dual- and triple-listed in different 
international stock exchanges. 
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3.4 Price Disparity and Arbitrage 
3.4.1 Theoretic Foundation 
 
The Law of One Price (LOP) is a basic component of financial economic theorising 
(Ezzel, Miles & Mullherin 2003). It states that the identical goods must have identical 
prices barring transaction costs and foreign exchange rates; otherwise, goods with a 
lower price would flow from one place to another that has a higher price for the same 
goods (Lamont & Thaler 2003a, 2003b). Traditionally, economists thought that LOP 
should hold in financial markets as well (Lamont & Thaler 2003a). Recent studies on 
international market integration have developed a new measure of international 
financial integration following the principle of LOP. LOP suggests that the two markets 
on which a cross-listed security trades should be integrated, in a world where capital 
restrictions and trading barriers are increasingly minimal, same securities should sell at 
the same price in all market, adjusted for exchange rates (Jithendranathan et al. 2000; 
Lok & Kalve 2006). Therefore, based on LOP, market integration means that in an 
integrated financial market where there is no restriction to trade, then identical assets 
should be priced identically across borders adjusted for exchange rates (Lok & Kalve 
2006; Levy et al. 2006; Jithendranathan et al. 2000), that is, markets are said to be 
perfectly integrated if LOP holds across them (Chen & Knez 1995). However, violation 
of LOP does not mean that the capital markets are segmented because different trading 
hours across different markets might cause different closing prices. Akdogan (1995) 
also pointed out that the failure of LOP can be attributed to possible presence of barriers, 
regulations or controls for international capital movements. Similarly, Black (1978) and 
Solnik (1974) documented that the formal and informal barriers for the capital markets, 
which include exchange controls, differential taxation of portfolio income for investors 
in different countries, restrictions on ownership of securities according to the nationality 
of the investor, information cost, transaction costs and exchange rate risk. While the 
empirical evidence does not support the view of a completely integrated market, the 
findings of many prior studies have suggested that markets are at least to some extent 
integrated (Kryzanowski & Zhang 2002; Lowengrub & Melvin 2002; Werner & 
Kleidon 1996). In addition, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) investigated the information 
lags between different trading venues for these identical securities, and stated that this 
information lags produce short-term disparities in the prices at which the security trades 
at different locations at any given time. They also suggested that if more than one 
market is trading for one security, a dominant market will emerged. This is because 
  
46 
liquidity traders look for markets with the lowest trading costs. They also predicted that 
a cross-listing will not change return variance. Figure 3.1 presents the theoretical 
framework between market integration and LOP, and the detailed review of the theory 
and empirical studies are present at section 3.4.2. The studies of price disparity for 
Chinese dual-listed securities are reviewed section 3.4.5. 
 
Therefore, when LOP does not hold, arbitrage opportunities occur. Arbitrage, as one of 
the fundamental concepts in finance is defined as the simultaneous purchase and sale of 
the same or essentially similar security in two different markets for advantageously 
different prices (Sharpe & Alexander 1990), which results in immediate risk-free profit. 
For example, if a security’s price on the New York Stock Exchange is trading out of 
sync with its corresponding shares in another market, a trader could simultaneously sell 
(short) the more expensive of the two and buy the other, thus profiting on the difference. 
This type of arbitrage requires the violation of LOP. Arbitrage exists in different types. 
In the context of capital market integration without barriers to capital movements, LOP 
can be interested as that the identical security trading in different markets must have the 
identical prices, arbitrage would assure that the market price of a security in one country 
would be equal to the market price of the same security in the second country, expressed 
in the currency of the first country at the current exchange rate (Maldonado & Saunders 
1983; Lamont & Thaler 2003a). This section will provide a detailed review of LOP and 
arbitrage in the context of cross-listing. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Studies on Arbitrage 
 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the price discrepancy and arbitrage of 
the cross-listed securities. Maldonado and Saunders (1983), Kato et al. (1991), Park and 
Tavakkol (1994), Ding (2000), and Lok and Kalev (2006) found no significant price 
disparity between the cross-listing shares, they also suggested that no obvious arbitrage 
opportunities exist. In contrast, Wahab, Lashgari and Cohn (1992), Kaul and Mehrotra 
(2000) and Suarez (2005) did find arbitrage opportunities. Bailey et al. (1999) and 
Miller and Morey (1996) found price differences, but suggested that arbitrage is 
difficult. The details of the arguments are discussed in the following section. 
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The opportunity of arbitrage in financial markets is inconclusive. Karolyi and Stulz 
(1996), Kato, Linn and Schallheim (1991), Miller and Morey (1996), and Wahab, 
Lashgari, and Cohn (1992) investigated the arbitrage opportunity in ADR market, and 
found little evidence for profitable opportunities in this ADR market. Maldonado and 
Saunders (1983) examined the one-year price behaviour of 37 US multinational 
corporation stocks traded simultaneously on the London and New York Stock Exchange 
under the restricted and unrestricted periods of British investment controls. Their 
empirical results strongly supported LOP for internationally traded stocks after 
adjustment for exchange rates and transactions costs. They also suggested that LOP is 
not violated even under a one-sided government that imposes foreign exchange 
restriction on trade. Wahab et al. (1992) studied arbitrage between ADRs and their 
underlying stocks followed an implicit pairs trading strategy with two portfolios: one is 
ADR, the other is underlying home shares portfolio. They sell the ‘winner’ (portfolio 
with the highest return over a period of two weeks) and buy the ‘loser’ (portfolio with 
the lowest returns over the same two-week period), they found limited profits for their 
pairs trading strategy when about four per cent transaction costs considered and data 
limitations. Miller and Morey (1996) examined one of the most heavily traded British 
stock (Glaxo-Wellcome) that cross-listed in the US using intraday data to test arbitrage 
on European ADRs and also to investigate the intraday price difference pattern between 
ADRs and the underlying securities. The results showed that the price difference in 
these two markets was small and insignificant throughout their two-month sample 
period, suggesting the market is efficient with respect to arbitrage opportunities. Ding 
(2000) examined the cross-listed stocks that were traded on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, to see if the two markets are closely 
linked and the price parity is maintained from the same Malaysian stock traded on both 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the CLOB.8 The results showed that the two 
markets were well linked in terms of their returns and volatility. The markets of 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur also confirmed to the law of price reasonably but 
arbitrage opportunities appeared to exist when stock-broking houses trade for their own 
accounts. Meanwhile, arbitrage opportunities for other type of investors were 
significantly diminished due to their high transaction costs. 
 
                                                 
8
 In the Stock Exchange of Singapore and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, stocks were cross-listed 
and traded on both exchanges in their local currencies. However, on 1 January 1990, the cross-listing 
arrangement was abolished. To facilitate Singaporean investors to trade in Malaysian shares and other 
foreign shares and to keep the business in Singapore, the Stock Exchange of Singapore set up an over-the-
counter market known as CLOB International. 
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Many stock markets have different trading hours, suggesting that two closing prices 
must not be equal. A number of studies on LOP cannot be rejected because the cross-
listed stocks are indeed one security mainly using daily closing prices with non-
overlapping trading time (Maldonado & Saunders 1983; Kato et al. 1991; Park & 
Tavakkol 1994). Regarding the trading time issue, some of the studies focus on the 
overlap trading activities and concluded with the arbitrage opportunities. De Jong et al. 
(2004) evaluated a simple trading rules involving a long position in the relatively 
underpriced part of the twin shares and shorting an equal dollar amount in the relatively 
overprices part of the twin shares, they found that this rule produced an abnormal return 
of up to almost 10 per cent per annum adjusted for systematic risk, transaction costs, 
and margin requirements. 9  Suarez (2005) analysed the price disparity between the 
ADRs and their corresponding French stocks and US companies cross-listed in France 
using high frequency intra-daily datasets as well as the intra-daily French franc/US 
dollar exchange rates. The sample included top 10 companies that are extensively traded 
stocks in both markets. This price comparison examination was done on the 1.5 hour 
overlap of the trading day, when both markets were open. All possible transaction costs 
were taken into account, and the quotes data rather than trade data were used. The result 
showed that there was a large deviation from LOP10, suggesting that an arbitrage trading 
profits could be made on these large disequilibria. Suarez (2005) also asserts that these 
markets were disintegrated and not fully efficient as measured by a lack of arbitrage 
opportunities. Alves and Morey (2003) examined eleven most traded Brazilian ADRs 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange using the intraday quote price data and the 
reais/dollar exchange rate, which was taken on an intraday basis during the period when 
the two stock markets overlap over a one-month period in 2001. The transaction costs 
for different type of investors were also considered for the arbitrage possibilities. The 
results showed that there seemed to belittle arbitrage opportunities for the ordinary 
traders due to higher transaction costs. However, for the Brazilian financial institution, 
the result showed that there was a profitable arbitrage opportunity available, which the 
                                                 
9
 A twin share is also called Siamese twin, which involves two companies incorporated in different 
countries contractually agreeing to operate their businesses as if they were a single enterprise, while 
retaining their separate legal identity and existing stock exchange listings. From this sense, it is lightly 
different from cross-listing. A well-known example is Royal Dutch/Shell. The shares of the Siamese twin 
parents represent claims on exactly the same underlying cash flow (Froot & Dobora 1999; Bedi et al. 
2003; De Jong et al. 2007). 
10
 Suarez’s paper established a point estimate for the no-arbitrage band of ±0.563 per cent, inside which a 
mispricing cannot be profitably arbitraged due to transaction costs and foreign exchange risk. About 2.1 
per cent of the observations in their sample were outside this band and they were thus classified as 
arbitrage opportunities. 
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Table 3.1: Arbitrage Unavailable Among Cross-listing or ADRs 
 
Reference Methodology Sample Data used Findings
38 Australian and 25 
NZ stocks that trade 
concurrently on both 
markets 
May 2000 and 
December 2002
50 Malaysian 
companies listed on 
the CLOB
January 2, 1995 to 
November 30, 1996
Six Israel firms 
cross listed and 
traded both in the 
OTC market of 
USA and TASE 
(Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange) 
June 1988 to May 
1998
Ben-Zion et al. 
(1999)
Error Correction 
Model
5 Israeli stocks 
listed on the Tel 
Aviv stock 
Arbitrage opportunities are generally not available
Ding et al. (1999) a major Malaysian 
conglomerate, Sime 
Darby Berhad
transactions data and intraday 
foreign exchange rate data
The raw data appear to indicate the presence of 
arbitrage opportunities, but none exist after taking 
exchange rate changes into account.Three Siamese twin 
securities listed both 
in London SE and 
NYSE
January 1, 1980 to 
December 31, 1985
Miller and Morey 
(1996)
One British  security 
cross-listed in the 
US
Intraday data set The price difference pattern between ADRs and the 
underlying securities are small throughout their 2-
month sample period, which indicating that the market 
is efficient with respect to arbitrage opportunities
Lau and Diltz (1994) 7 Japanese dual 
listings traded in 
NYSE and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange
Arbitrage opportunities is not available
ADRs and the 
foreign stocks: 8 
from Australia, 7 
from England, and 8 
from Japan
1986-1988
37 U.S. 
multinational 
corporation stocks 
traded on London 
and NYSE
May 1,1979 to April 
30, 1980
Lok and Kalev 
(2006)
Error correction 
model
Intraday data set includes the 
best bid and ask quotes, volume 
traded, and the exchange rate 
(New Zealand/Australian 
dollar), at 5-min intervals. The 
ASX all ordinaries index, as 
well as the NZX40 index, are 
also obtained at 5-min intervals, 
price series used for this study 
are mid-quote series
Arbitrage opportunities are not generally available in 
the trading of the cross-listed stocks on both markets.
Lieberman et al. 
(1999)
Error correction 
model (ECM)
Daily closing prices Short term arbitrage opportunities are generally not 
available. There is very strong evidence that all the 
six pairs of series examined are cointegrated, 
morever, the estimates of the cointegrating vectors 
are approximately (1,-1), supporting the hypothesis of 
no arbitrage opportunities between the two markets.
Ding (2000) Closing stock prices and 
volume traded, bid and ask 
exchange rate
The two markets obey the law of one price 
reasonably but arbitrage opportunities still exist when 
stock broking houses trade for their own accounts.
Lead and lag daily opening and 
closing prices
Each company’s stock obeys the law of one price
Kato et al. (1992) Daily closing  prices No significant differences between the prices of these 
two identical types of claims, no obvious arbitrage 
opportunities exist between the international capital 
markets encompassed by this study. There is 
evidence to be supportive of the law of one price. 
However, the return correlations between the two 
identical types of claims, display some interesting 
patterns. The two returns are not near to being 
perfectly correlated. This result can be explained, in 
part, by overlapping time periods for the return 
calculations. Researchers should be aware of these 
timing differences that can lead to spurious return-
correlation results.
Froot and Dabora 
(1999)
Regression 
Maldonado and 
Saunders (1983)
Mean difference 
and t-ratios
240 daily closing prices in 
London and opening prices in 
New York
The law of one price is strongly supported after 
adjustment for exchange rates and transaction costs. 
But the governments’ proposing to use dual 
exchange rate mechanisms and foreign investment 
taxes on domestic residents in attempt to induce 
price differences seems failed, unless the foreign 
arbitrageurs are also restricted.
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Table 3.2: Arbitrage is Limited Among Cross-listing or ADRs 
 
 
researcher attributed to the special tax laws for financial institutions. Kaul and Mehrotra 
(2000) studied cross-listed Canadian stocks that were traded in US markets and found 
that infrequent arbitrage opportunities did exist there, particularly with stock pairs 
present a combination of relatively low spreads and low trading volume. Studies on 
arbitrage are summarised in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 list most of the related literature about the 
arbitrage issue for cross-listings or ADRs. 
 
3.4.3 Reasons Deterring or Limiting Arbitrage 
 
In a perfect capital market, pure arbitrage could exist in its purest form, risk-free and 
with no capital required. However, in the real world, arbitrage is not without cost. The 
literature has reported a number of factors that could stop arbitrage activities. The 
transaction and holding costs are well documented in the literature in relation to the 
mispricing and arbitrage. Pontiff (1996) argued that mispricing occurs when costs make 
arbitrage unprofitable using the framework of costly arbitrage to test the closed-end 
Reference Methodology Sample Price used Findings
12 dually listed 
companies (also 
called twins)
A large deviation from the theoretical price parity. 
Mean absolute price discrepancies for individual twins 
range from 4% to 12%. Deviations from parity reach 
values of over 15% up to 50% for every single dual 
listed company in the sample. Arbitrage strategies 
based on the premise that convergence to theoretical 
parity occurs after large price discrepancies, which 
produce substantial returns up to 10% per annum 
relative to Fama-French three-factor model.
Sample period starts 
at the date of the 
merger and ends 
either 20 days 
before the 
announcement date 
of the share 
unification or at the 
last date in the full 
sample period 
(October 3, 2002)
But noise traders may cause adverse price 
movements in the short run, arbitrageurs are not 
certain before the price convergence, in these 
situations, margin calls arrived, which force them to 
liquidate part of the position at a highly unfavourable 
moment and suffer a loss, therefore, they conclude 
that risk associated with the volatility of arbitrage 
returns deters arbitrage activity in those dually listed 
companies, which consistent with Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997)
6 locally 
Argentinean firms, 
14 locally Chilean 
firms and their 
respective NYSE 
ADRs
The return distributions of Chilean ADRs are 
significantly different from the distributions of the 
returns on their respective underlying Chilean shares. 
But Argentinean ADRs present the same distribution 
of returns. It is costlier to carry out arbitrage activities 
in Chile than Argentina.
1993 to 2001 But arbitrage activities that may lead to more 
efficiency were further impeded by the higher costs 
of transactions. The 1.37% of return must be added 
before arbitrage profits could be made in Chile, was 
20% higher than in Argentina.
Rabinovitch et al. 
(2003)
Threshold 
Autoregressive 
model
Daily returns
Jong et al. (2005) Daily stock prices, total returns 
in local currency, bid and ask 
prices, trading volume, number 
of shares outstanding
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Table 3.3: Arbitrage Available among Cross-listing or ADRs 
 
 
fund discounts. He found that four factors could affect arbitrage profitability, including 
the security’s fundamental risk that is unrelated to the risk of other securities, the 
transactions costs from trading the security and the holding cost, the security’s dividend 
yield, and interest rates. Merton’s study (1987) revealed that the uncertainty over the 
nature of an apparent mispricing increase cost, arbitrageurs might be reluctant to incur 
the potentially large fixed costs of entering the position to exploit the arbitrage 
opportunity. Lamont and Thaler (2003b) identified a number of technology stock carve-
outs in which the market value of the subsidiary was larger than the market value of the 
parent. They argued that shorting costs prevent rational arbitrageurs from exploiting 
profitable arbitrage opportunities in these situations. 
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Shleifer and Summers (1990), and Delong et 
al. (1989, 1990), noise trader risk may deter arbitrage in dual-listed companies if 
Reference Methodology Sample Price used Findings
10 heavily traded 
French stocks cross 
listed in US, and 
American 
companies cross-
listed in France
April 7, 1997 to 
March 24, 1998
11 most traded 
Brazilian ADRs 
listed on NYSE
As of January 2001
British data:23 
British stocks cross-
listed on the NYSE 
or AMEX
Us data: 28 British 
ADRs traded on the 
NYSE or AMEX
January 1, 1991 to 
December 31, 1991
45 dually traded 
securities on the 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange and 
NYSE
After consideration of commission costs and control 
for the bid-ask spread and non-synchronous trading 
effect, there are still apparent violations of price parity 
integration. Possible arbitrage opportunities remain 
even with the higher trading cost.
January 1984 to 
June 1984
But this result could come from inadequate control for 
non-synchronous trading and poor proxies for total 
transactions costs. Then violation of the law of one 
price would be observed even if the markets were 
integrated.
Wahab et al. 1992 Portfolio 
approach, 
controlling for 
risk differentials 
between the 
ADRs and the 
underlying assets
Arbitrage opportunities could be explored
Suarez (2005) Price difference 
and arbitrage 
band
Intradaily data sets, Price 
comparison is done on the 1.5h 
overlap trading period
A large deviation from the law of one price observed 
and an arbitrage trading profits could be made on 
these large disequilibria.
Werner and Kleidon 
(1996)
Intraday 
pattern(Volume, 
volatility and 
spread) analysis
Transaction and quote data on 
two hour overlapping trading 
period
The arbitrage activities set in motion as this new 
information is incorporated into prices on both sides of 
the Atlantic produces a relatively stronger 
concentration of volume toward the overlap for cross-
listed stocks
Alves and Morey 
(2003)
Intraday quote price data when 
two markets overlap with 9373 
cases of quote for Brazilian 
ADR and exchange rate during 
the same time
Little arbitrage opportunities for the ordinary traders 
are found since higher transaction costs. However, 
for the Brazilian financial institution, there is often a 
profitable arbitrage opportunities available.
Ip and Brooks 
(1996)
Daily closing stock prices
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arbitrageurs are specialised professional portfolio managers. In these models, 
arbitrageurs may be driven out of the market by the possibility of adverse price 
movements in the short-term, even though it is known that prices will convergence 
eventually for a number of reasons that relate to capital constraints, unhedgeable or 
undiversifiable risks, and transaction costs. Further, specialised, professional 
arbitrageurs may avoid extremely volatile arbitrage positions although such positions 
offer attractive average returns, the volatility also exposes arbitrageurs to risk of losses 
and the need to liquidate the portfolio under pressure from the investors in the fund, 
which also suggests a different approach to understanding persistent excess returns in 
security prices. 
 
Timing can be another significant issue that stops the arbitrage activity. Kim et al. (2000) 
suggested that uncertainty induced by non-synchronous trading hours of the ADRs and 
the underlying security may impede arbitrage activity. Consistent with Kim’s findings, 
Ip and Brooks (1996) also argued that non-synchronous trade phenomenon might be 
one of the factors that cause price disparity. If trading is thin in either market, the 
closing price differences can be arising from ‘last trades’ in each market that occur at 
different clock times. The observed differences in prices can come from a sale at bid 
price in one market and a buy at asked price in other market. 
 
Gagon and Karolyi (2010) examined the magnitude of the deviations from parity for 
581 pairs of cross-listed/home market shares of stocks from the 39 countries between 
1993 and 2002. For most stocks, the prices of the cross-listed shares and those of the 
home-market shares lie within a 20 to 85 basis point band of each other, but, for some 
stocks, they can range from a 66 per cent premium to an 87 per cent discount. The 
results revealed that returns on cross-listed stocks showed significantly higher 
systematic co-movements with US market indexes and significantly lower systematic 
co-movements with home market indexes than their equivalent home market shares. 
This co-movement, while related to country, industry, and firm-specific attributes that 
reflect institutional barriers to arbitrage, were also influenced by factors that reflect 
information-based barriers that can impede arbitrage activities.  
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3.4.4 Cause of Price Disparity 
 
ADRs and their underlying securities may not be perfect substitutes for each other for a 
number of important reasons. First, they trade in different markets with different trading 
hours (Rosenthal 1983). Within the paradigm of continuous price parity, it is evident 
that two closing prices are unlikely to be equal and a price deviation could not be 
distinguished from a simple price change in the time between the closing of the two 
markets (Karolyi and Stultz 1996). Meanwhile, according to Chowdhry and Nanda 
(1991), when a security is traded in different markets, information lags between 
different trading venues produce short-term disparities in the prices at which the 
security trades at different locations at any given time, which provides the informed 
investors with more opportunities to exploit their private information. Therefore, any 
systematic linkages between the prices of the dually listed stocks may suggest a 
potential for short-term arbitrage opportunities. Second, although ADRs have some 
similarities to the underlying securities, international market imperfections could result 
in some price difference vis-à-vis the underlying securities. There is little simultaneous 
trading between either European and US markets, or the Asian market and US markets. 
The ADRs trade in the market based on supply and demand when European markets (or 
US markets) close, and before the Asian markets open. Foreign ownership restrictions 
can create artificial supply shortages of ADRs when the ownership ceiling is reached. In 
addition, local owners of the underlying shares are often entitled to tax credits that 
reduce or eliminate the double taxation of dividends while foreigners cannot obtain 
these credits (Rosenthal 1983). Foreign companies frequently have rights offerings to 
raise new capital. SEC of US prevents US holders of ADRs to exercise their rights, 
which reduce their proportionate claim on the firm (Rosenthal 1983). 
 
Froot and Dabora (1999) suggested that none of those factors (cross-border tax rules, 
noise effect, country-specific sentiment shocks, discretionary uses of dividend income 
by parent companies, differences in parent expenditures, voting rights issues, currency 
fluctuations, ex-dividend-date timing issues, and tax induced investor heterogeneity) 
affect the twin prices, and stating that twin prices are highly correlated with relative 
stock-market indexes in the country where each stock is traded most actively. They 
argued that the mispricing can be a considerable extent to be explained by co-movement 
of the prices of a twin stocks with domestic stock market indices. For those twin stocks, 
the relative price of a twin rises (falls) when their domestic market rises (falls). The 
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price of the ADRs, as well as, the price of the underlying assets is more driven by US 
consumer sentiment rather than the consumer sentiment of the country of origin. 
Consistent with the findings, Suh (2003) found that ADR premiums and discounts co-
move with aggregate US market returns and not with the market returns in the country 
of the underlying asset. 
 
Grossmann et al. (2007) have provided some other factors that could cause the price 
disparity between identical securities traded in different markets. They examined the 
determinants of ADR mispricing by using a fixed-effects panel data approach. Their 
results suggested that ADRs with higher transactions costs and lower dividend 
payments are more likely to exhibit higher price disparity. Further, they find that the 
premiums on ADRs react in an opposite manner than those on country closed-end funds 
with respect to consumer sentiment differences between the US and the ADRs’ country 
of origin. That is to say, the more optimistic U.S. consumers are the lower the premiums. 
This puzzling result can be explained by the fact that both the price of the ADR and the 
price of the underlying asset are more driven by U.S. sentiment rather than the 
sentiment in the ADRs’ home country.  
 
3.4.5 China Syndrome 
 
It has been documented extensively that when price disparity exists between two classes 
of shares of the same stock market, the one accessible by foreign investors usually 
commands a premium over the one restricted only to domestic ownership (Bergstrom & 
Tang 2001). In the context of China, almost all H-shares, B-shares and N-shares, which 
are accessible to foreign investors, are traded at a discount to their counterparts in the A-
share market on the mainland. However, this should not be seen as an inconsistency 
because in most other emerging markets, shares accessible by foreign investors are also 
open to domestic investors, which leaves no opportunity for any discount to exist, while 
in China, foreign and domestic investors do not have access to each other’s market. 
After the regulatory changes, domestic investors were allowed to trade B-shares after 
March 2001, the A-share price premium has decreased, and information asymmetry 
between the two classes of shares (A and B) has decreased dramatically (Ahlgren et al. 
2003; Chan, Menkveld & Yang 2003). Regarding the price discount of Chinese 
overseas listing, five explanations emerged from prior studies. The first is substitute 
effect (demand and supply). Li et al. (2006) argued that the co-existence of Chinese H-
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shares and red chips as alternatives to Chinese B-shares for foreign investors makes the 
demand for B-shares quite price elastic, leading to low equilibrium prices of B-shares. 
Hence, unlike other markets, China actually has more than one market available for 
foreign investors to invest. If the H-share and red-chip markets are attractive enough to 
foreign capital, the demand for B-shares will then be quite elastic, leading to low 
equilibrium price of B-shares for a given share supply. Indeed, they find that when more 
H-shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger, 
which is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz 
and Wasserfallen (1992) who argued that price discrimination in the presence of 
differences in domestic and foreign investors’ demand elasticity explains the price 
premium observed for foreign-class shares in Switzerland. Domowitz, Glen and 
Madhavan (1998) confirmed that Stulz and Wasserfallen’s model also applies to the 
Mexican case. They further listed several factors that might explain the price discount 
phenomena, including currency risk, bond supply, share supply, liquidity, return 
volatility and expectation to firms’ growth rate. Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2003) 
argued the China A-share premium relative to its counterpart B-share is due to the 
relative scarcity of supply of A-shares. In an emerging market like China, there are 
limited alternative investments available to retail investors who are irrational and poorly 
informed, and have little understanding of the stock fundamental. Therefore, they will 
bid up the prices of the stocks that are in scarce supply (Chan and Kwok 1996). Yang 
and Lau (2005) extended the substitution effect of Sun and Tong (2000) and suggested 
that substitution effect on the China B-share market is not just present in Chinese stocks 
listed in Hong Kong, but also in Chinese stocks traded in the US market.11 With a small 
sample of Chinese firms with B-share cross-listed in both the US and China, Yang and 
Lau (2005) found the presence of counteracting effect as a result of such listing. The 
Chinese stocks traded in the US also provide good substitutes for the China B-shares 
markets. In comparing substitution effects for Hong Kong listings versus US listings, 
the effect was stronger from the US than Hong Kong, which may be attributed to the 
reasons of being familiarity with and proximity to a stock affecting investors’ 
investment behaviour. 
 
The second reason for Chinese cross-listing discounts is attributed to the ownership 
restrictions, trading location and investor (market) sentiment. In a recent study, Chan, 
                                                 
11
 Eight out of the 87 companies with both A- and B-shares listed on the same domestic stock exchanges 
are cross-listed in the US (when firm cross-lists in the US, it may use its B-shares to do ADR listing. 
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Hameed and Lau (2003) investigated the price behaviour and market activity of the 
Jardine Group companies after they were delisted from the Hong Kong and moved to 
Singapore. They found that the Jardine Group stocks are correlated less with the Hong 
Kong market and more with the Singapore market after the delisting, although their core 
business remained in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Therefore, the stock price 
fluctuations are affected by country-specific investor sentiment. There are several other 
studies that documented the effect of market or investor sentiments. Li, Yan and Greco 
(2006) presented a consistent result with Froot and Dabora’s (1999) finding on the 
examinations of price differentials between Chinese A-shares and H-shares trading in 
Mainland and Hong Kong that discounts of H-share prices relative to A-share prices are 
related to the contemporaneous movements of the H-share local market index relative to 
the A-share local market index, as well as the spread of savings rates between Hong 
Kong and Mainland China. Wang and Jiang (2004) examined Chinese companies issue 
A- and H-shares in both Mainland and Hong Kong China, and found that the H-share 
and A-share returns have different dynamic relations to their domestic and foreign 
markets. A-share returns were subject to market-specific risk and investor sentiment that 
is specific to Shanghai and Shenzhen. H-shares were to market-specific risk and 
investor sentiment in both Hong Kong and Shanghai and Shenzhen. The large time-
varying H-share price discount relative to A-shares was highly correlated with the 
domestic and foreign stock market indices and relative market illiquidity. In addition, 
they argued that due to market segmentation, ownership restrictions and exchange 
control in Mainland China, the H-share discount may not be easily arbitraged away, at 
least in short-term. Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) considered a two-country world in 
which foreign investors are constrained to own at most a fraction of the number of 
shares outstanding from domestic firms. When this constraint is binding, two different 
prices occur in the equity market, reflecting the premium offered by the domestic 
investors over the price under no constraints and the discount demanded by the foreign 
investors. Su (1999) formulated and tested a one-period Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) under ownership restrictions to explain the discounts on foreign-owned 
Chinese B-shares relative to the prices of domestic A-shares. Under this model, the 
price difference between A- and B-shares could be expressed by their expected excess 
returns’ difference. He found that the cross-sectional excess to A-share over B-share 
average return was positively related to A-share market betas and was negatively 
correlated to B-share market betas and betas with respect to Hong Kong Hang Seng 
market. He also found that variance of returns and firm size did not appear to affect 
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returns systematically. The evidence strongly supports market segmentation and price 
discrimination. Bailey (1994) proposed that the unseasoned or unduly optimism of 
domestic investors may drive the overpricing of Chinese A-share, which is called 
‘investor sentiment’. Therefore, the Chinese B-shares traded by foreign investors are 
sold at discounts relative to A-shares traded by domestic investors. In addition, the 
lower required returns of Chinese citizens due to the limited investment opportunities 
might have the discount effect. Bailey (1994) further suggested that since the political 
and macroeconomic risks peculiar to the B-share markets are undiversifiable to the 
primary foreign investors, which may add potential risk premiums on B-shares and 
discount the prices of B-shares heavily as compensation for this systemic risk. 
 
The third explanation lies on the factor of informational asymmetry. Chakravarty, 
Sarkar and Wu (1998) found evidence for their hypothesis of informational asymmetry 
in China stock markets using coverage in media as an explanatory variable for the price 
discrepancy after studying 39 dually listed firms both on Shanghai and Shenzhen. They 
developed a model that incorporated both informational asymmetry and market 
segmentation, and derived a relative pricing equation for A-shares and B-shares, and the 
model-based proxies for informational asymmetry (due to language barriers, different 
accounting standards, and the lack of reliable information about the local firms, foreign 
investors have an information disadvantage in trading B-shares relative to domestic 
investors trading A-shares, the returns on A-shares lead the returns on B-shares) explain 
a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B-share discounts. Bergströn 
and Tang (2001) extended the study of Chakravarty et al. (1998), and re-examined the 
price discount of B-shares to A-shares. They found that information asymmetry 
between domestic investors and foreign investors, illiquid trading of B-shares, 
diversification benefits from investing in B-shares, and clientele bias against stocks on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange are significant determinants in this discount phenomenon. 
Based on a sample of 76 dually listed A- and B-shares from 2000 to 2001, Chan, 
Menkveld and Yang (2003) examined the effect of information asymmetry on equity 
prices in the local A- and B-share market in China by constructing several measures of 
information asymmetry based on market microstructure models, and found that a 
common explanation for foreign share discount is informational disadvantage; i.e. 
foreign investors who trade B-shares have an informational disadvantage relative to 
domestic investors who trade A-shares. Further, the effect of the B-share market being 
opened to domestic investors in March 2001 has also been investigated to further test 
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the information asymmetry explanation, and the previous findings about the explanation 
of information asymmetric were confirmed. By allowing domestic investors to trade in 
the B-share market, there is less of information disadvantage in this market, and thus the 
B-share discount becomes relatively smaller. In addition to A-shares and B-shares, price 
disparity of H-shares and A-shares are examined. Li et al. (2001) found that H-shares 
lead A-shares because Hong Kong investors have access to market-wide information 
pertaining to the Chinese stock market ahead of Mainland Chinese investors. This lead-
lag relationship increases with the volatility of H-share returns. However, contrary to 
their findings, Chui and Kwok (1998) suggested that foreign investors receive news 
about China faster than do domestic Chinese investors because of information barriers 
in China, suggesting that the direction of information flow was mainly from the B-share 
market to the A-share market. As a result, the returns on B-shares lead the returns on A-
shares. Yet, Chen et al. (2001) suggested that information asymmetric information 
hypothesis does not provide a convincing explanation for the source of the B-share price 
discount. 
 
Li and Fleisher (2004) argued that heterogeneous expectations and neglect effect would 
cause the price discount of Chinese cross-listing. They extended the model of 
expectations to include multiple classes of investors, and found that heterogeneous 
expectations in the context of multiple investor classes has significant power in 
explaining the lower returns and relatively high prices exhibited by China’s A-shares. 
When they consider the role of the neglected share effect in the Chinese foreign-share 
discount, they identified foreign analysts ‘neglect’ of B-shares as a significant 
contributor to the high returns and price discount for these shares relative to their A-
share counterparts. Their evidence suggests that ‘neglect’ increases B-share returns is 
significant and robust. They also report that the higher the dispersion of domestic 
analysts’ forecasts, the lower are A-share returns, implying that the short-sales 
restriction is binding for trading in A-shares. 
 
The final reason is the differential risk hypothesis. Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) 
proposed the differential risk hypothesis, which states that domestic investors and 
foreign investors have different levels of risk aversion, and that the foreign share price 
discount relates to the ratio of the aggregate risk aversion of domestic investors to that 
of foreign investors. Based on this theoretical argument, Ma (1996) suggested that since 
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Table 3.4: China Syndrome: Price Disparity 
 
Note: A denotes Mainland China Shanghai and Shenzhen A Market, B denotes Mainland China Shanghai 
and Shenzhen B Market, H denotes Hong Kong Chinese Listing Market, N denotes New York Chinese 
Listing Market. 
 
China stock markets are speculative, and speculative investors can tolerate higher levels 
of risk than can foreign investors. Therefore, price discrepancy between the A- and B-
Reference Markets Sample Study Period Factors cause price disparity
Tong et al. (2007) A-B 90 dual listing A-B 1996-2003 Corporate governance practice
Darrat et al. (2007) A-B 67 dual listing A-B 1998-2003 Risk level, liquidity, corporate governance, firm size, 
and differential demand
Lee et al. (2007) A-B 68 dual listing A-B 1999-2003 Liquidity, relative risk level, supply
Li, Yan, & Greco 
(2006)
A-H 13 dual listing A-H 1997-2002 Market sentiment (the deviation in the systemic risk 
premiums of the local markets)
A-B 69 dual listing A-B
B-N 8 dual listing  B-N
A-H 13 dual listing A-H
A-B 41 dual listing A-B
Mei et al. (2005) A-B 75 dual listing A-B 1993-2001 Investors’ speculative motivation
Karolyi & Li 
(2004)
A-B 75 dual listing A-B 1999-2001 Asymmetric information and differential risk 
hypothese
Li (2004) A-B 71 dual listing A-B 1999-2003 Liquidity hypothesis and differential risk hypothesis
Li & Fleisher 
(2004)
A-B 76 dual listing A-B 1998-2002 Short sales restriction bind for trading in A shares, 
near- or total absence of non-domestic analysts’ 
forecasts for  a significant proportion of companies 
(neglect effects)
Wang & Jiang 
(2004)
A-H 16 dual listing A-H Start list to 2001 Market sentiment (both A an H exhibit significant 
exposure to local market factors), market illiqu  idity
Chan et al. (2003) A-B 76 dual listing A-B 2000-2001 Information asymmetry
Chen et al. (2001) A-B 68 dual listing A-B 1992-1997 Illiquid B-share market, relatively illiquid B-share 
stocks have a higher expected rate of return and are 
priced to compensate investors for increased trading 
costs; information asymmetry
Bergströn & Tang 
(2001)
A-B 79 dual listing A-B 1995-1999 information asymmetry between domestic investors 
and foreign investor, illiquid trading of B shares, 
diversification benefits from investing in B shares, 
and clientele bias
45 dual listing A-B
10 dual listing A-H
Su (1999) A-B 47 dual listing A-B 1994-1996 Market segmentation and price discrimination, A 
and B shares return depend on shares’ own market 
betas and betas with respect to the international 
equity markets, market liquidity
Su & Fleisher 
(1999)
A-B 24 dual listing A-B 1993-1997 Information asymmetry (less information arrives at B-
share markets than at A-share market), large 
number of investors participating in A-share market
Chakravarty et al. 
(1998)
A-B 39 dual listing A-B 1994-1996 Informational asymmetry, irrationally high domestic 
demand for A, foreign investors’ sentiment towards 
the Chinese stocks, interest rate difference between 
the domestic and foreign markets
Ma (1996) A-B 38 dual listing A-B 1992-1994 Regulatory changes, different attitude toward risks, 
speculative environment, B share market has lower 
liquidity, cost of capital for domestic citizen is lower 
than foreign investors
Bailey (1994) A-B 38 dual listing A-B 1992-1994 Market condition, Chinese deposit rate, systematic 
political risk
Chan & Kwok 
(2005)
1991-2000 Information asymmetry, scarce supply of A-share, 
irrational behavior
Sun & Tong (2000) A-B, A-H 1994-1998 Substitution effects, differential demand elasticity; 
bond supply, share supply, liquidity, and return 
volatility also have explanatory power but with less 
importance; currency risk, expectation to firm’s 
growth
Yang & Lau (2005) 1997-2001 Substitution effects (stock traded I the U.S. also 
provide good substitutes for the China B-shares)
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shares can be partially explained by the investors’ attitudes towards risks. The summary 
of Chinese studies is presented in Table 3.4. 
 
3.4.6 Hypothesis Development 
 
Arbitrage opportunities exist when the LOP is violated. There is a rich literature of the 
arbitrage studies on the dual-listed shares, however, trading time differences, transaction 
costs, and market restrictions seem deter the arbitrage opportunities. Regardless of the 
arbitrage restrictions in China A- and B-share market, many of the price disparity 
observations for the dual-listed Chinese securities in Hong Kong market and New York 
market contained arbitrage opportunities.  Despite of the time difference, foreign 
exchange rate risk is out of the question because Hong Kong is adopting the fixed 
exchange rate to US dollars. Therefore, the arbitrage opportunities we investigate in this 
study are obtained from deviations of prices for the Chinese securities that listed both in 
Hong Kong and New York. We develop our hypothesis as follow: 
 
• Hypothesis 8: There are arbitrage opportunities for Chinese securities dual-listed 
both in Hong Kong and New York markets. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The literature review presented in this chapter reviewed the cross-listing from three 
major perspectives: corporate governance, multiple listing and informed trading, and 
price discrepancy. Based on overall review of literature on international cross-listing, it 
is clear that such listings do not always deliver the exact results as predicted by theory, 
but in some cases, they are confirmed. However, international cross-listing is a very 
complex phenomenon, and it requires a deep understanding by government officials, 
market regulators, corporate CFOs, fund managers, and retail investors. 
 
The topic of corporate governance has been explored in a different context, which is the 
relationship between corporate governance and bonding theory. From the literature, it is 
clear that most of the studies about the relationship between bonding theory and 
corporate governance practice are focused on foreign shares cross-listed on the stock 
exchanges of US. In reality, foreign shares do also cross-listed in other markets rather 
than just in the US. This study attempts to deal with the great number of Chinese firms 
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cross-listed in Singapore, Hong Kong, London, the US, and even Frankfurt stock 
exchanges. The present study aims to extend bonding theory beyond US markets, and 
examine whether this bonding mechanism would be effective in the other international 
markets, in this case, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London. Therefore, Chapter 4 will 
empirically examine Chinese cross-listings in the different international markets from 
the perspectives of corporate governance, firm performance and bonding theory. 
 
The second part of the literature review examined the cross-listing phenomenon from 
the perspective of market cointegration, price discovery and information flow. Instead 
of using market indices to explore the market interaction based on the cross-listing, this 
study uses individual dual- or triple-listed Chinese shares to investigate the relationship 
between them, and further to the market at large. This is the major difference between 
this study and the other studies, and the related studies are presented in Chapter 5.  
 
This literature review also examined the price disparity for dual-listed securities in 
detail, exploring the reason why the price is different for identical securities, examining 
whether there is an arbitrage opportunity or not. This research will examine the issue of 
whether Chinese cross-listings that are traded in Hong Kong and New York bring any 
arbitrage opportunities, which will be demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4: Cross-listing, Firm Valuation and Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Bonding theory suggests that due to better and enforceable corporate governance 
mechanisms applied in the US stock exchanges, cross-listing on a US stock exchange 
can thus enhance the protection of minority investors for firms coming from the 
countries that have weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms 
(Coffee 2002; Fuerst 1998; Stulz 1999). Corporate governance as a set of mechanisms, 
both institutional and market-based, may induce the self-interested controllers of a firm 
(including both managers and controlling shareholders) to make decisions that 
maximise the value of the firm to its owners (Denis & McConnell 2003). While the 
literature generally supports the bonding hypothesis for US exchanges listings (Coffee 
2002), little is known about the application of bonding theory in the context of Chinese 
firms cross-listed on international stock exchanges. China is an emerging economy that 
is in the process of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy regime. A 
well-structured and enforceable legal system and a well functioning financial market are 
yet to be evident. As Li Rong Rong, the chief of the State Asset Commission of China 
has stated repeatedly, China will continue to list its large SOEs overseas as one of the 
strategies to establish modern Chinese corporations (Sun et al. 2006). This raises the 
question of whether the firms that cross-list their shares in a location that has better 
corporate governance practices, greater firm disclosure, more stringent financial 
disclosure level, and stronger minority shareholder rights would outperform those only 
listed on the Chinese stock exchanges that lack strong enforcement mechanisms to 
govern stock exchange practices. This research aims to answer this question and to 
contribute to the body of knowledge in the area of cross-listing in general. 
 
This study uses Chinese firms listed on US exchanges (the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ), the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (the Mainboard and Growth Enterprise 
Market [GEM]), the Singapore Stock Exchange, the London AIM, and both China A 
and B markets to study the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance as result of cross-listing. The thesis will first examine whether the cross-
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listed firms have a higher valuation than the firms listed locally (in A-share market), and 
then, whether cross-listed firms have bonding effects. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: firstly the variables used to test the 
hypotheses are described. Secondly, data and methods are present, followed by 
empirical findings. Finally, conclusion and implication are summarized.  
 
4.2 Measurement of Firm Value or Firm Performance 
4.2.1 Firm Value or Firm Performance 
 
According to the literature, one of the most extensively used performance measurement 
in assessing the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance 
factors is Tobin’s q (Morck et al. 1988; Hermalin & Weisbach 1988, 1991; Barclay 
1989; Lang & Stulz 1994; Zingales 1994; Yermack 1996; Loderer & Martin 1997; Cho 
1998; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Holdemess et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Bhagat & 
Black 2002). Hovey (2004) examined 38 studies regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance, and found that 21 studies used Tobin’s q, 
nine used return on asset (ROA) and eight used return on equity (ROE). In Tobin’s 
(1969, 1978) original formulation, Tobin’s q captures the ratio of market value to the 
replacement cost of production assets at the margin. Due to the difficulty of determining 
the replacement of cost of assets, the proxy for this is typically the book value of assets. 
 
Besides Tobin’s q, methods for accounting profit such as ROA and ROE as the 
measurement of firm performance have been used widely, and are also commonly used 
in the studies of Chinese corporate governance (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Xu & Wang 
1999; Haw et al. 1999; Abdel-Khalik et al. 1999). 
 
Both Tobin’s q and ROA or ROE tend to suffer from the affects of accounting practices. 
For Tobin’s q, as Demsetz (2001) points out, the market value of the firm partly reflects 
the value investors assign to a firm’s intangible assets, yet the estimated replacement 
cost of the firm’s tangible assets does not include investments the firm has made in 
intangible assets. The firm’s future revenue stream is treated as if it can be generated 
from investments made only in tangible capital. This distorts performance comparisons 
of firms that rely in differing degrees on intangible capital. Although the different firm 
performance measures are not without critics, Tobin’s q is one of the most commonly 
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used measurements in empirical research in corporate governance (Chung & Pruitt 1994; 
DaDalt et al. 2002). This study therefore uses Tobin’s q as the measurement of firm 
value or firm performance. The firm valuation for each listed Chinese firm was 
measured by Tobin’s q and was computed as in Doidge et al. (2004): 
 
′			 = 		–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     (4.1) 
 
Where it represents Chinese listed firm i at the end of December every year from 2003 
to 2008. Chinese listed firms include firms listed in China A and B market, HK 
Mainboard Market, HK GEM, London AIM, Singapore, NASDAQ and New York 
markets. 
 
All variables in the Tobin’s q calculation were denominated in the same currency, for 
example, the data for local Chinese firms are denominated with Renminbi. However, 
Chinese firms listed in China B market is denominated either with HK dollar or US 
dollar. And Chinese firms listed in other markets are denominated with Singapore dollar, 
US dollar and British Pound as well. To make firms across markets more comparable, 
we eliminated those in the financial sector such as banks, security and investment and 
insurance companies. The category of the locally listed Chinese firms includes the 
Chinese firms that only list their shares in China A-share market and the dual or triple-
listings are eliminated from this category. 
 
In this study, Tobin’s q is used as the dependent variable to examine its relationship to 
the corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
This study is focused on the bonding issue. Bonding practices include adopting stringent 
international accounting standards, having independent directors, having more directors 
on the board as the Hong Kong stock exchange regulates, and listing shares on foreign 
stock exchanges. Therefore, this section will discuss the corporate governance variables 
that should have bonding effects on Chinese overseas listed firms. Besides the bonding 
corporate governance practices (mechanisms), other corporate governance variables 
which have identified to have impacts on firm valuation are also examined.  The 
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variables for firm level and corporate governance mechanisms are restricted to those 
that have been used most often in the literature and details explained follow. 
 
4.2.2.1 Cross-listing 
 
According to the bonding theory, firm cross-lists in international markets especially in 
US markets to experience an increase in firm value. It should be noted that the Chinese 
capital market is categorised as a less developed market, and Hong Kong, Singapore, 
London and US markets as well developed. It is expected that Chinese firms listed in 
these developed market may enjoy higher firm valuation. A dummy variable is used to 
represent cross-listings. Following Cai (2007), the dummy variable takes the value of ‘1’ 
when the Chinese firms are cross-listed in other developed exchanges and the firms 
listed only on Chinese A-share market are represented by ‘0’.When the coefficient of 
this dummy variable is positive, it implies that Chinese firms cross-listed in 
international capital markets generate a higher Tobin q. 
 
4.2.2.2 Firm Size 
 
There is an extant literature that investigates that the relationship between firm size and 
corporate performance (Banz, 1981; Lang and Stulz 1994; Gilson 1997). The size of the 
company is used as a proxy to explain bureaucratic inefficiencies brought about due to 
firm size. Banz (1981) find that small firms generate higher returns than large firms. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a significant negative relationship between firm size and 
performance. Firm size could be measured by different ways, and Gilson (1997) states 
that alternative measures do not materially affect the inferences. The log book value of 
total asset would be adopted as a proxy for firm size in this study. Since this study is 
dealing with different markets with different currencies, all of the values are expressed 
by Chinese RMB. Given that there in an increase in the number of private Chinese firms 
and middle-sized firms listing in international markets, the likelihood of observing a 
small size effect is high. Most of these listed Chinese firms are SOEs and may be 
experiencing some management issues. Therefore, we expect firm size have a negative 
impact upon performance.  
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4.2.2.3 Growth Rate 
 
In an efficient market, firms with good growth prospects should be valued higher, but 
sales growth is also affected by a country’s institutions and business conditions (Doidge 
et al. 2007). La Porta et al. (2006), Doidge et al. (2004) use the two years of geometric 
annual sales growth as the measurement of the growth rate to firm performance. In this 
study, three-year sales or revenues growth rate is used to be the proxy for growth 
opportunities as provided by Datastream. And we expect this variable to have a positive 
impact upon corporate performance. 
 
4.2.2.4 Profitability 
 
Intuitively, a higher profitability rate should be viewed more favourably by the market, 
hence giving a higher Tobin’s q (Chen 2005). This study uses the same profitability 
variable as Chen’s (2005) study, which is computed as earnings before interest and tax 
divided by the total assets. It is expected that profitability has a positive impact upon 
Tobin’s q.  
 
4.2.2.5 Leverage 
 
The financial leverage could capture the value of corporate tax shields, which could 
cause higher values of Tobin’s q or other performance indicators (Morck et al. 1988). 
Further, the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984) states that debt is negatively 
correlated to the profitability of the firm. The higher the leverage, the greater the risk for 
the firm, hence the lower value of the firm’s value (Brealey et al. 1996). Conversely, as 
the level of debt increases so too does the incentive for the lender to monitor the firm, 
leading to better performance (Bebczuk, 2003). Leverage in this study is measured by 
total debt divided by total asset and is expected to have a positive impact upon Tobin’s 
q.  
 
4.2.2.6 Financial Disclosure 
 
Financial transparency and adequate information disclosure is very important for a 
listed firm as a mean of communication with their shareholders, as such, accounting 
disclosures are an important corporate governance tool. However, sometimes, managers 
hide the real story to secure their own interests. Therefore, a well-managed firm should 
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provide sufficient, accurate and timely information regarding the firm’s operating 
performance, and financial status. After three decades of reform for the Chinese 
economy, the government realises that the capital market is relying on accurate and 
complete accounting information to compete effectively with rivals and attract more 
foreign investors. During the whole process of the accounting reform, Chinese 
accounting standards are now generally consistent with IAS but with local elements 
included. Moreover, when a Chinese firm tends to list overseas, it would shift to IAS or 
another method of accounting and financial disclosure that is accepted by the host stock 
exchange where they are listing. This study takes a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
firm has adopted Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), International 
Accounting Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), Singapore Financial Reporting 
Standards (SFRS), and 0 for adopting the local Chinese Accounting Standard. It is 
expected that Chinese firms adopting international accounting standards have better 
firm performance than the companies that do not.  
 
4.2.2.7 Auditing 
 
Appointing independent auditing firms is regarded as an essential component of the 
corporate governance mosaic, and plays an external monitoring role on behalf of the 
shareholders (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Cohen et al. 2002). However, the utility of audit 
services depends upon the quality of auditing. In China, the issue of audit quality has 
become an immensely important part to the development of the stock markets (Lin & 
Liu, 2009). 
 
To help the Chinese listed firms improve corporate governance, the CSRC issued rules 
regarding the adoption of well-known international auditing firms. On 31 December 
2001, CSRC issued the Temporary Measure regarding the Additional Auditing 
Requirement for Listed A-Share Firms. The rule requires the listed firms have their 
Annual Reports audited by a world renowned accounting firm, which including the so-
called Big Five (Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, and PricewaterhouseCoopers). These five accounting firms are the only 
foreign accounting firms authorised by CSRC to provide auditing service for listed 
firms. Later, this Big Five became Big Four, since Arthur Andersen was connected to 
the Enron scandal. CSRC then certified several Chinese firms to provide the additional 
auditing service. 
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Since the introduction of the auditing system, the auditing practices have been improved 
greatly in China, as evidenced by the increasing frequency of the modified and qualified 
opinions, and more independent status (DeFond et al. 2000). In this study, if a firm has 
KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young as their 
auditing firm, we take the value of 1, otherwise 0. A positive relationship with Tobin’s 
q is expected. 
 
4.2.2.8 Controlling Shareholder 
 
Concentrated equity ownership can be regarded as a bad corporate governance 
mechanism since it gives the controlling shareholder more discretionary power to serve 
his or her own benefits. Prior research has found that controlling shareholders would try 
to maximise their self-interests through ‘tunnelling’ behaviours or benefit transfers, thus 
expropriating other shareholders and related parties’ interests (Bai et al. 2004; La Porta 
et al. 2002; Clasessens et al. 2000; Hess et al., 2010). Copley and Douthett (2002) state 
that high ownership retention would have an inverse effect on corporate governance 
because of the agency conflicts induced by this concentrated ownership. La Porta et al. 
(2002) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) also suggest that the ownership structure 
affects the efficiency of corporate governance and thus the intrinsic value of the firm, 
leading to different corporate performance. Chau and Leung (2006) and Claessens et al. 
(2000) support the idea that tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows 
controlling shareholder self-dealings to go unchallenged internally by the boards of 
directors or externally by takeover markets. However, Ang et al. (2000) argue that a 
controlling shareholder may introduce monitoring or bonding mechanisms that limit his 
or her ability to extract wealth from outside shareholders and hence mitigate the agency 
conflicts. 
 
In China, ownership concentration is somewhat higher than that in developed countries. 
Before 2006, almost 70 per cent of listed shares were in the hands of the government or 
related agencies. Since 2006, ownership reform taken in China has witnessed increased 
tradable shares in the market, but they still have a large proportion of shares that are 
held by the government or other state related firms. Liu (2006) states that ownership 
structure is crucial to the firm’s value maximisation, and he proposes that the 
controlling shareholders employ a feasible governance mechanism to tightly control the 
listed firms, which is commonly observed among the Chinese listed firms. In this study, 
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the largest fraction of shares held by one shareholder is used to represent the controlling 
shareholder. Based on the above, it is not clear at this stage whether the largest 
shareholder variable will have a positive or negative impact upon corporate 
performance, this remains to be established empirically.  
 
4.2.2.9 Second Largest Shareholder 
 
An another argument suggests that the degree of concentration of shares held by other 
large shareholders, excluding the largest one, positively affects firms’ performance and 
market valuation (Liu 2006). The argument of this statement is that when shares are 
concentrated in the hands of other large shareholders, they are more likely to monitor 
the largest shareholder and prevent tunnelling a firm’s resources. Bai et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that the concentration degree of shares by the largest shareholders is a 
good proxy for the likelihood of an emerging a corporate control market, which has 
been widely touted as an effective external governance mechanism. In this study, the 
largest proportion of the shares held by the second largest shareholder is obtained to see 
whether the monitoring effect existed for listed Chinese firms. A positive relationship is 
expected between the fraction of shares owned by the second shareholder and firm 
performance due to the motivation provided by this incentive. 
 
4.2.2.10 Duality of the Chairperson and the CEO 
 
Hemailin and Weisbach (2003) proposed that the board of directors is another internal 
mechanism through which shareholders can exert influence on the behaviour of 
managers to ensure that the firm is run in their interest. Fama and Jensen (1983) state 
the concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual 
reduces a board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. Later, Jensen (1993) 
confirms that agency problem would be higher when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
is also the chairperson of the board. Tam’s (1999) analysis of the administrative 
positions held by executive directors reveals the proportion of directors who combine 
the roles of chairperson and general manager. Ultimately, he argues that boards should 
be staffed by non-executive directors, because insider control would weaken the 
function of directors as monitors of the management and harm the long-term interests of 
shareholders. Goyal and Park (2002), Dahya et al. (2002), and Yermack (1996) find that 
firms would have higher valuation when the positions of CEO and chairperson are 
separated. Bai et al. (2004) also find that the CEOs being the chair of the board 
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negatively affects firm valuation, indicating that increasing the independence of boards 
of directors helps to enhance firm performance. In China, according to Article 50 of the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, the director may concurrently hold 
the post of the firm’s manager. It is very common to see that most chairpersons are also 
the general manager or CEO of a listed Chinese firm. To capture the effect of the 
concurrent position for the board of directors, we define CEO and chairperson duality as 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO (general manager) is also the chairperson of the 
board and zero otherwise. It is expected this variable has negative impacts on firm 
performance. 
 
4.2.2.11 Board Size 
 
A great number of studies have revealed that there is link between the size of the board 
and corporate performance. Limiting board size is believed to improve firm 
performance because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are 
outweighed by less effective coordination and poorer communication and decision-
making of larger groups (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993). Conversely, it is also 
believed that a larger board size may yield firm benefits by creating a network with the 
external environment and securing a broader resource base (Pfeffer 1973; Pearce & 
Zahra 1992). Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) document a negative 
relationship between board size and profitability of firms. However, Bhagat and Black 
(2002) state that the board size and firm performance is not robust to changes in the 
measurement of performance. 
 
It is well recognised that the Chinese firm have the characteristics of over-representation 
by the state on the board (Xu & Wang 1999), and the size of the board does not make 
too much difference. The Company Law of People’s Republic of China regulates that 
the board of directors established by a limited liability firm shall comprise three up to 
13 members. If a limited liability firm is established by two or more state-funded 
enterprises or other state-funded investors, the board of directors shall include the 
representatives of employees of this firm. Article 51 also prescribes that for a relatively 
small limited liability firm, it may have an acting director and no board of directors. In 
this study, the board size is measured by the number of the directors (independent 
directors are included) in the board. Yet, it is hard to expect whether this variable has 
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positive or negative impacts on firm performance and would depend on the empirical 
test.   
 
4.2.2.12 Independent Director 
 
Independent directors are often thought to play the monitoring role inside boards, 
therefore, the most widely discussed question is: do independent directors increase 
corporate performance? Prior studies make two arguments about the role of the 
independent directors in the board of directors and firm performance. Jensen (1993) 
argues that the existence of the independent directors could not reduce the agency costs. 
Denis and McConnell (2003), Bhagat and Black (2002), and Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) claim that a higher percentage of independent directors is not associated with 
superior firm performance. However, other studies find that markets do reward firms for 
appointing outside directors (Baysinger & Butler 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). 
Hermaliin and Weisbach (2003), Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that there is a 
positive relationship between firm profit and the number of independent directors. 
 
The Chinese government has established regulations related to corporate governance in 
accordance with advanced standards prevalent on an international level. The 
independent director system is one of them. The role of independent directors features 
prominently in corporate governance codes. The presence of independent 
representatives on the board, capable of challenging the decisions of the management, is 
widely considered a means of protecting the interests of shareholders and, where 
appropriate, other stakeholders. The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1993 regulated the shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors 
and special provisions on the organisational structure of a listed firm, but the 
independent director system was not included. In 1997, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) started to allow the listed firms to set up the independent director 
based on the firm’s own need. Starting from August 2001, CSRC has issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China and the Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Firms. By 3 June 2002, every 
listed firm in China was required to have at least two independent directors who were to 
constitute at least one third of the board by 30 June 2003. In this study, the percentage 
of the independent directors on the board of the firm is used to answer the question of 
whether establishing an independent director system in China would improve the firm 
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performance of firms. It is expected that the independent director system has a positive 
relationship to firm performance. The board of supervisors would be another variable to 
explain the firm performance and discussed below. 
 
4.2.2.13 Supervisor 
 
Besides the independent director system officially adopted since 2001, there is another 
mechanism used in Chinese listed firms, which is the board of supervisors. China’s 
Company Law prescribes a corporate governance system for the listed firms through an 
organisational structure comprising three main constituent bodies: the shareholders’ 
general meeting (or annual general meeting); the board of directors; and the board of 
supervisors. In China, the board of supervisors and the board of directors are parallel 
organisations for the listed firm, and responsible for the shareholder meetings 
simultaneously. This corporate governance structure is modelled after the German two-
tier system of an executive board and an oversight supervisory board, with mandatory 
employees’ representation on the supervisory board (Lin 2001). On paper, China’s 
Company Law provides for a comparatively strong and – in theory – effective system of 
corporate governance of listed firms (Lin 2001). 
 
The board of supervisors have neither resolution rights, nor the ability to appoint and 
dismiss directors, although the board of supervisors are endowed with supervisory 
responsibilities (Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1993). Section 4, 
Chapter 3 of the Company Law of People’s Republic of China regulates the related 
responsibilities and duties to the supervisors. The responsibilities of the supervisory 
committee include the monitoring of whether the directors and senior management have, 
in the performance of their duties, acted in contravention of any laws, administrative 
regulations, the Articles of Association or the resolutions passed at general meetings; 
and reviewing a company’s financial information. Supervisors can attend the board 
meetings. 
 
Since the Chinese regulators did not consider the independent director system while 
they constituted the Company Law in 1993, there is no supervisory limitation left for the 
other supervision system such as independent director system. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that there will be conflicts between the board of supervisors and 
the independent directors if a listed firm has both systems. The Company Law doesn’t 
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limit the numbers of the supervisors but it is stated that the board of supervisors shall 
comprises at least 3 person, which are the representatives of shareholders and the 
employees of the company at an appropriate ratio. Therefore, this study uses the number 
of the supervisors in the company to examine whether the existence of the supervisor 
system improve firm performance and expect a positive impact on Tobin’s q. Since 
most of the Chinese firms listed only in Singapore, London and NASDAQ don’t have 
supervisory panel, the examination of the supervisory panel is restricted to HK and 
China A and B markets. 
 
4.3 Data and Methods 
4.3.1 Data Description and Data Structure 
 
To implement the empirical analysis, a panel dataset is assembled referring to a broad 
cross-section of Chinese firms cross-listed in different markets for the period of 2003 to 
2008. The year 2003 was chosen as the base year based on two reasons. First, since 
2003 a significant number of Chinese firms have been listing in international stock 
markets.  Secondly, the corporate governance data for locally listed Chinese A firms 
and Chinese B firms before 2003 are not provided from the GTA database.   
 
Cross-listed Chinese firms’ data is obtained mainly from the relevant websites. The 
primary source of the company information is the stock exchange websites, including 
that of London AIM, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange, and 
CSRC. The Bank of New York has provided the information of Chinese firms that listed 
and traded in each exchange in the US, mainly at the New York Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, the American Stock Exchange and OTC markets in the form of ADRs. 
China B-shares information was obtained from the CSRC website, since the list of B-
shares on CSRC was not a complete one, the missing information and data about B-
shares were obtained from Datastream. Dual-listed, triple-listed, and cross-listed 
Chinese firms in China A- and B-share markets, New York, NASDAQ, OTC, Hong 
Kong and Singapore were eliminated from the whole Chinese listings database so that 
only the purely locally listed Chinese firms were included. The Chinese firms that are 
listed on American Stock Exchange were also included although there were only six 
Chinese listings on the exchange, and were categorised as the cross-listing group of 
New York Stock Exchange (Appendix 1 presents the detailed Chinese cross-listing 
information). 
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The final assembled dataset consists of four blocks of data, namely financial data, board 
structure, ownership data, and disclosure data which includes auditing firm information 
and financial disclosure information. The data structure is presented in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Data Structure 
 
4.3.2 Methodology and Model Specification 
 
Since the data was based on the different listing locations with varied cross-listings in 
different markets, there may be a possibility that the regression parameters are 
heterogeneous across these different locations. A simple cross-sectional least square 
regression of a straightforward pooling of all observations without considering 
heterogeneity could lead to biased or even meaningless results. Therefore, the use of 
panel data may be an appropriate way for a systematic and efficient analysis of the 
corporate governance and firm performance of Chinese cross-listed firms traded in 
different locations. This is because a panel dataset possesses several major advantages 
over conventional cross-section or time-series data, which provides more informative 
data with more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency (Hsiao 1986; Baltagi 1995). 
 
Financial Data Board Structure
* Leverage * CEO and Chairman
* Profitability * Board Size
* Growth Rate * Independent Directors
* Firm Size * Supervisors
Total Corporate Governance
Cross-listing Firms Data
507 Cross-Listing Firms
1,345 China A Firms
Maximum  of 11,112 firm-years 
Ownership Data Additional Data
* Controlling Shareholder * Auditing Firms
* Second Shareholder * Accounting Standard
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Based on the argument and discussion for Hypothesis 2 in previous section 3.2.1 
(literature review), the following statistical relationship is formulated: 
  		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Where i = 1, 2, …, N, which refers to a cross-section unit (Chinese listed firms), t = 1, 
2, …, T, which refers to time period (2003–2008). The coefficient β measure the 
sensitivity of the corporate governance of these variables.  
 
In the random effect model, itε  = itit ωυ + , with itυ  and itω  independently normal, 
var( itυ ) = 2iσ , var( itω ) = 2iθ . The error are assumed to be heteroskedastic, with firm- 
and time-specific components, but uncorrelated. The Hausman test tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are 
the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator and the consistent fixed effects estimator. If there is no 
difference, then use the random effects model, otherwise, the fixed effects model would 
be a better option. In determining whether a random or fixed model should be adopted 
for the regression analysis, we conducted a Hausman test (1978) to determine which 
specific regression model is more appropriate for this study. 
 
The analysis dataset in this study is a short panel with only six time periods and many 
individual companies of 1,852 Chinese securities, which would have its consequences 
for both estimation and inference. The estimators obtained from the fixed-effect model 
are usually based on the assumption that the idiosyncratic error ~ (0,ε2). However, this 
assumption is often not satisfied in panel applications. Therefore, for the short panels in 
this study, it is possible to obtain cluster-robust standard errors under the weaker 
assumptions that errors are independent across individual companies and that N→∞. 
This leads to a cluster-robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators (Gameron & Trivedi 2009). 
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Although ordinary least square standard errors will be consistent as long as the 
regression residuals are uncorrelated across both firms and years, such uncorrelatedness 
is unlikely to hold in a finance panel (Thompson 2009). Meanwhile, the usual standard 
errors approach does not adjust for correlation between observations with small 
standard errors that can lead to large t-statistics, and the researcher will see statistical 
significance even when it does not exist (Petersen 2009). One approach to solve this 
problem is to cluster along a single dimension. There have been several studies that use 
cluster robust standard error test to adjust standard errors for correlation along a single 
dimension (Albertazzi et al. 2009; Thompson 2009). This study clusters at individual 
Chinese firm level for all the panel data analyses. 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, we create an interaction term between the variable of cross-listing 
and the bonding corporate governance mechanisms, which the following equation is 
formulated: 
  		 = ! + #$%&'() + #*+&,	-. + #/)&0(ℎ	&2(. +#C4&+(2'(5 + #6'.7.&2). + #8+2%2'	9%':&. + #;2:9() +#<%(&'')	ℎ2&.ℎ'9.& + #=.%9	ℎ2&.ℎ'9.& +#$>%ℎ2&,2	29	?@A + #$$2&9	-. + #$*9.4.9.(	9&.%(& +#$/:4.&7& + #$C%&'() ∗ +2%2'	9%':&. + #$6%&'() ∗2:9() + #$8%&'() ∗ %ℎ2&,2	29	?@A + #$;%&'() ∗2&9	-. + #$<%%&'() ∗ 9.4.9.(	9&.%(& + #$=%&'() ∗:4.&7& + B         (4.3) 
 
However, if the interaction term is created by two dummy variables, there might be few 
1, which could create the problem of collinearity. For example, the interaction term of 
cross-listing and financial disclosure might have a collinearity issue to the dependent 
variable of Tobin’s q.  To overcome this problem, we focus on the interaction term with 
the dummy variables and the numeric variables, which formulates the following 
equation: 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, 
kurtosis and observation of each variable for Chinese firms that listed in different 
markets between the periods of 2003 to 2008. Some big numbers appeared when the 
dataset is constructed. For example, the profitability ratio for Shangdong Zhongrun is -
2093.75, and the growth rate is 4114.75 in year 2007. Such large numbers have been 
excluded from the data analysis12. Therefore, two non-cross-listed Chinese companies 
are dropped from the analysis because of the unusual large numbers. Eventually, data 
for the 1,345 non-cross-listed Chinese firms and 507 cross-listed firms are gathered 
based on the data availability. In terms of the firm size which is measured by the total 
assets (in Chinese RMB), cross-listed firms are smaller than non-cross-listed firms 
except the firms listed in Hong Kong Mainboard. For the firms listed in Hong Kong 
Mainboard, the mean of the total assets is the largest in all of the Chinese listed firms. 
For the firms listed in HK GEM, Singapore, New York, NASDAQ, and London, they 
have similar size. 
 
Chinese securities that listed on NASDAQ and New York exchanges have the highest 
Tobin’s q ratio with mean value of 3.294 (standard deviation=2.940) and 2.492 
(standard deviation=2.208), respectively, reflecting a high market valuation compared  
                                                 
12In this analysis, we excluded these large numbers due to the reason of uncertainty. We tracked down the 
annual reports and the database, wishing to find out whether there is any major acquisitions or some other 
big events happened, but there is little clue why there are such big numbers. Therefore, these numbers are 
deleted from the analysis. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
This table presents summary descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables of 
Chinese securities listed in eight different markets between the periods of 2003 to 2008. 
Dummy variables are not included. 
 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N
Tobin's Q 2.005 2.621 0.109 134.891 30.494 1399.320 7668
Firm Size 14.259 1.100 5.407 20.991 0.360 2.808 7675
Growth Rate 20.121 37.536 -100.000 973.100 7.622 141.977 6762
Profitability 0.060 0.481 -8.380 39.312 69.887 5783.114 7669
Leverage 0.530 1.028 0.000 82.558 67.691 5306.643 7667
Controlling Shareholder 39.295 16.113 4.490 98.860 0.331 -0.685 6523
Second Shareholder 8.862 7.836 0.003 41.740 0.959 0.163 6523
Board Size 9.540 2.078 1.000 19.000 0.849 1.795 6352
Independent Director 3.281 0.779 1.000 8.000 0.918 2.431 6344
Supervisor 4.121 1.421 0.000 13.000 1.267 2.334 6356
Tobin's Q 2.112 6.484 0.622 110.230 13.266 190.565 642
Firm Size 14.680 1.239 9.796 18.596 -0.111 0.547 639
Growth Rate 0.143 0.300 -1.000 2.340 1.294 8.257 642
Profitability 0.045 0.180 -2.491 1.823 -2.135 84.039 640
Leverage 1.017 5.285 0.054 96.960 14.107 217.654 642
Controlling Shareholder 38.891 16.689 6.470 82.120 0.175 -0.963 633
Second Shareholder 7.704 7.739 0.080 30.820 1.095 0.323 633
Board Size 9.708 2.230 5.000 18.000 1.086 1.187 627
Independent Director 3.376 0.723 2.000 6.000 1.150 1.054 627
Supervisor 4.172 1.414 2.000 9.000 0.907 0.232 627
Tobin's Q 1.875 4.642 0.442 65.080 12.966 176.831 198
Firm Size 12.887 0.900 10.896 15.664 0.485 -0.100 222
Growth Rate 0.224 3.039 -9.000 9.000 0.148 2.918 156
Profitability 0.067 0.114 -0.532 0.401 -1.134 4.004 219
Leverage 0.402 0.205 0.059 1.416 1.051 2.233 220
Controlling Shareholder 37.924 18.514 2.200 69.410 0.396 -1.281 201
Second Shareholder 12.756 7.360 1.770 35.990 0.468 -0.286 183
Board Size 9.356 1.947 6.000 17.000 1.174 2.304 202
Independent Director 3.040 0.497 2.000 5.000 0.331 2.010 202
Supervisor 3.950 1.099 3.000 9.000 0.921 1.020 201
Tobin's Q 1.404 0.788 0.375 9.562 3.828 26.653 536
Firm Size 16.595 1.991 12.625 23.000 0.899 0.814 651
Growth Rate 0.880 2.261 0.000 9.000 2.487 4.772 476
Profitability 0.177 3.280 -12.734 81.349 24.001 597.677 632
Leverage 0.531 0.237 0.028 1.234 0.200 -0.592 650
Controlling Shareholder 49.729 14.737 12.370 90.000 -0.091 -0.380 541
Second Shareholder 9.357 8.068 0.020 38.380 1.217 1.118 534
Board Size 11.171 2.581 5.000 20.000 0.540 0.233 545
Independent Director 3.765 0.943 1.000 8.000 0.827 1.289 545
Supervisor 4.811 1.887 1.000 12.000 0.935 0.440 545
Tobin's Q 1.667 4.578 0.157 103.919 21.248 474.566 528
Firm Size 12.561 1.657 5.849 18.495 0.330 0.397 693
Growth Rate 0.356 1.041 -0.854 17.081 11.013 161.239 428
Profitability 0.050 2.127 -55.297 1.215 -25.527 664.137 694
Leverage 0.420 0.279 0.021 3.136 2.601 20.220 696
Controlling Shareholder 41.463 15.319 10.577 78.410 0.291 -0.632 541
Second Shareholder 13.692 8.290 0.820 96.500 2.165 17.242 541
Board Size 6.622 1.534 3.000 11.000 0.803 0.103 542
Independent Director 2.782 0.712 1.000 7.000 0.960 3.086 542
Singapore
China A
China B
HKGEM
HKMainboard
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to the Chinese securities listed on Hong Kong and Singapore markets followed by 
Chinese securities listed on London AIM. In terms of the profitability, Chinese firms 
listed in Hong Kong Mainboard achieved the highest profitability ratio with a mean 
value of 17.7 per cent, which is followed by the shares listed in New York that generate 
an average profitability ratio of 15 per cent. Securities listed on China A- and B-share 
markets and Hong Kong GEM and Mainboard markets all recorded a relative higher 
leverage ratio (averagely 53 per cent for Chinese A-share listing, 101.7 per cent for 
Chinese B-share listings, and 53.1 per cent for Hong Kong Mainboard Chinese listings) 
compared to the rest. The result is expected as the SOEs dominate the stock exchanges 
in China and Hong Kong Mainboard, and it is well documented that SOEs are expected 
to have high leverage due to lower cost of borrowing. Chinese securities listed and 
traded on New York Stock Exchange demonstrated the higher growth rates with mean 
values of 1.024 after China A-shares. 
 
Chinese firms listed on Hong Kong Mainboard have the largest shareholder who is 
controlling 50 per cent of the shares of the listed company averagely. Moreover,  
  
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N
Tobin's Q 2.492 2.208 0.363 10.454 1.775 2.908 104
Firm Size 14.234 2.348 7.783 19.871 -0.072 -0.357 162
Growth Rate 1.024 2.374 0.000 9.000 2.528 5.275 83
Profitability 0.150 0.440 -1.536 5.121 9.183 109.256 154
Leverage 0.403 0.458 0.030 4.286 6.455 50.556 166
Controlling Shareholder 41.016 24.655 2.500 95.100 0.299 -1.174 85
Second Shareholder 10.431 5.492 1.160 30.440 0.670 1.933 59
Board Size 7.957 2.565 5.000 14.000 0.915 -0.160 94
Independent Director 3.457 1.301 0.000 6.000 -0.639 0.866 94
Tobin's Q 3.294 2.940 0.273 18.025 2.342 7.409 101
Firm Size 12.901 1.907 6.958 17.458 -0.171 0.197 159
Growth Rate 0.865 1.538 0.000 7.000 2.300 5.318 74
Profitability 0.046 0.345 -3.420 0.378 -7.537 70.631 153
Leverage 0.286 0.329 0.028 3.503 6.232 57.838 159
Controlling Shareholder 24.592 12.354 6.900 58.800 1.219 0.830 88
Second Shareholder 12.332 6.842 3.300 44.900 1.802 5.442 83
Board Size 6.849 1.769 4.000 13.000 0.811 0.926 93
Independent Director 3.247 1.039 0.000 6.000 0.316 1.327 93
Tobin's Q 2.142 3.672 0.275 37.524 7.765 72.395 122
Firm Size 12.229 2.577 5.049 17.660 -0.333 -0.326 182
Growth Rate 0.819 2.105 0.000 9.000 2.751 6.635 72
Profitability 0.006 0.715 -8.635 1.103 -9.951 117.699 186
Leverage 0.440 0.406 0.006 3.451 2.893 16.249 190
Controlling Shareholder 36.297 22.903 7.100 95.200 0.943 0.056 97
Second Shareholder 13.119 8.496 0.250 40.310 1.065 1.034 92
Board Size 6.363 1.699 4.000 11.000 0.759 0.123 102
London
New York
NASDAQ
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NASDAQ has the smallest controlling shareholder, as they only control 25 per cent of 
the shares on average. Regarding the board size, Chinese securities listed on Hong Kong 
Mainboard has the largest board size with the mean number of 11, and board size for 
London, NASDAQ and New York is relatively smaller with the number around 6 to 7. 
 
The number of independent directors for Chinese securities listed on any market is 
almost the same with the number of 3.5 regardless of the board size. In London market, 
since they use non-executive directors in the director board, therefore the non-executive 
are treated as the independent directors in this study. 
 
4.4.2 Correlation Coefficient of Variables 
 
Table 4.2 reports the correlations between the dependent and independent variables for 
all the listed Chinese firms. It shows that most of the correlation coefficients is smaller 
than 0.6. As Churchill (1991) suggests, a correlation coefficient above 0.6 is considered 
high. However, this does not guarantee that there is not serious multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. The correlation coefficient is further checked with 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) when performing the regression analysis procedures. 
The VIF signifies the degree to which each independent variable is explained by the 
other independent variables, and we found all variables were well below the suggested 
cut-off point of 10 (Hair et al. 1998). 
 
4.4.3 Cross-listing Premium Empirical Results 
 
Doidge et al. (2004) suggest that cross-listed firms have higher Tobin’s q than non-
cross-listed firms. In line with this argument, we used the information and data 
presented in Table 4.3 to test Hypothesis 1 by examining the difference of cross-listing 
premium in different stock exchanges. Table 4.3 reports the firm valuation from year 
2003 to year 2008, and the number of firms observed that cross-listed in different 
markets. The number of firms per stock exchange varies widely especially at the early 
stage of the cross-listing. For example, there is only two cross-listed Chinese firms in 
London in 2003, but there are 66 in Hong Kong Mainboard in the same year. There is 
considerable variation in Tobin’s q across stock exchanges as well, from a minimum 
0.990 in London to 6.570 in NASDAQ. 
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Table 4.3 shows a mixed outcome. The results show that the Hypothesis 1 is not 
rejected  for the Chinese securities listed in NASDAQ, New York, London, HK GEM, 
of which the non-cross-listed Chinese firms have averagely higher Tobin’s q than those 
non-cross-listed Chinese A-share firms through the entire period of 2003–2008. From 
the statistical point of view, the mean value of Tobin’s q for Chinese firms listed at 
NASDAQ and HK Mainboard is statistically different from the mean value of Tobin’s q  
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of Valuations of Chinese Firms That Do Not Cross-list and 
Cross-list by Markets from 2003 to 2008 
This table shows summary statistics and the Chinese firms that do and do not cross-list as of 31 
December 2003 to 31 December 2008. Financial firms that including banks, insurance 
companies, security companies, and investment companies are discarded. For Chinese firms 
listed in other markets, D(q) is the difference between the mean q for cross-listed Chinese firms 
and the mean q for Chinese firms that are not cross-listed. N is the number of Chinese firms. 
Paired t-statistics are reported between the China A non-cross-listings to the cross-listings in 
different markets. 
 
of the local Chinese A-share firms. The Chinese firms listed on Hong Kong Mainboard 
and Singapore markets have lower firm valuation than the firms listed on China A-share 
market. For all the Chinese overseas listings, investors seem to be willing to pay a 
higher average bonding premium for the securities that listed on NASDAQ. It has been 
reported that the best corporate governance of the Chinese firms are probably those non-
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 Mean T-statistics
N 1344 1337 1281 1252 1246 1208
Tobin's q 1.736 3.628 1.886 1.374 1.555 1.751 1.988
N 28 32 17 12 9 6
Tobin's q 1.290 3.430 3.055 2.863 1.855 1.710 2.367
D(q) -0.446 -0.198 1.169 1.489 0.300 -0.041 0.379 1.188
N 26 26 19 16 11 3
Tobin's q 1.603 3.130 4.173 3.282 5.287 6.570 4.007
D(q) -0.133 -0.498 2.287 1.908 3.731 4.819 2.019 2.367*
N 42 38 25 10 5 2
Tobin's q 0.990 1.973 4.120 1.998 3.576 1.983 2.440
D(q) -0.747 -1.656 2.234 0.624 2.021 0.232 0.451 0.727
N 111 103 99 82 75 66
Tobin's q 1.030 1.960 1.498 1.190 1.304 1.407 1.398
D(q) -0.707 -1.669 -0.388 -0.184 -0.251 -0.344 -0.590 -2.591**
N 37 37 35 34 31 24
Tobin's q 1.078 2.240 1.636 1.272 1.378 4.386 1.999
D(q) -0.659 -1.388 -0.250 -0.102 -0.177 2.635 0.010 0.018
N 131 130 101 79 61 27
Tobin's q 1.614 1.768 1.803 1.274 1.755 1.860 1.679
D(q) -0.123 -1.860 -0.083 -0.100 0.200 0.109 -0.310 -0.983
N 107 107 107 107 107 107
Tobin's q 2.321 3.478 2.310 1.592 1.359 1.612 2.112
D(q) 0.584 -0.150 0.424 0.218 -0.196 -0.139 0.123 0.907
Note: * denotes significant at 0.1 level, ** denotes significant at 0.05 level
HK GEM
Singapore
China B
China A Non-cross-listing
New York
NASDAQ
London
HK Mainboard
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state-owned-enterprises that went to public in the USA (Cai 2007). Most of the Chinese 
firms listed in NASDAQ have decent corporate governance practices and dispersed 
ownership according to the USA standard. Another possible explanation for the high 
value of NASDAQ Chinese firms may be based on the path they enter into the market. 
Most of these firms are funded by venture capital funds provided from venture 
capitalists in USA. Therefore, when a Chinese firm enters into USA, it is automatically 
bond itself by having its board, balancing the interests between shareholders and 
managers of the firm, and monitoring by its venture capitalists. As Cai (2007) suggested, 
by the time a firm goes public, it already knows how to play the game according to the 
rules and protecting shareholders’ interests, and this has become a part of ownership 
structure and corporate culture.  
 
However, if just focusing on the Tobin’s q in the latest two years (2007 and 2008) 
present in Table 4.3, the Hypothesis 1 is rejected in all of the markets which non-cross-
listed Chinese firms have higher Tobin’s q than those cross-listed Chinese firms in New 
York, NASDAQ, London, HK Mainboard, HK GEM, Singapore and China B (only in 
year 2007).  Therefore, Table 4.3 does not make it possible to evaluate the significance 
of the cross-listing premium for cross-listed Chinese firms. To evaluate this significance, 
the cross-listing premium model stated above (section 4.3.2) is applied to regress 
Tobin’s q on a dummy variable that takes value one for Chinese firms with international 
listing, which includes Chinese securities that listed in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and US markets. Further, the analysis also determines whether the firm valuation can be 
explained by firm specific variables and corporate governance mechanisms, which 
follows in the next section. 
 
4.4.4 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation Regression Results 
 
This study covers the Chinese firms listed in stock markets of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
New York, NASDAQ, and London AIM; China A- and B-share markets are also 
included. The analyses of Chinese cross-listed securities in each different stock market 
are performed first, followed by the overall analysis of these cross-listed Chinese 
securities in overseas markets as a whole. 
 
Hausman test is applied here to determine which model to choose. Since the p-value of 
chi-square test statistics for the coefficients of the fixed effects model and random 
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effects models are significant with a value of 0.0000, the null hypothesis is rejected by 
our data and fixed effects regression is preferred in this case. F-statistics also suggest 
that all the regression models are significant (p<0.001). The results for corporate 
governance practice testing for all the Chinese cross-listed firms are reported in Table 
4.4 and are interpreted accordingly. 
 
The fixed effect panel data analysis delivers similar results for the Chinese firms cross-
listed in all of the studied markets including China B, Singapore, New York, NASDAQ, 
Hong Kong GEM, Hong Kong Mainboard, and London AIM, with controlling the 
China A-share market (Regression 8 from the result table). The coefficients for the  
variable of cross-listing are negative and significant for China firms listed in Singapore, 
China B, HK GEM, London and Singapore, which indicates that the non-cross-listed 
Chinese firms do outperform the cross-listed Chinese firms in these markets. However, 
the coefficients of the cross-listing for Chinese firms listed in New York and NASDAQ 
are positive but insignificant, suggesting Chinese firms listed in NASDAQ might have 
better performance and corporate governance than those non-cross-listed Chinese firms. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 could not be rejected only in New York and NASDAQ markets, 
which states that Chinese firms cross-listed in New York and NASDAQ have 
insignificant better firm performance. But results from the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms such as supervisor panels, and 
international accounting standards are ineffective corporate governance mechanisms to 
increase firm performance. Overall, they do not show bonding effects for Chinese cross- 
listed securities in this case, therefore Hypothesis 2 is rejected. The detailed discussion 
is stated following. 
 
Results from the panel data analysis offer strong support that larger listed Chinese firms 
with more assets have lower Tobin’s q, the firm size is negatively and significantly 
correlated to the firm performance in all of the Chinese cases. Chinese firms have 
longer listing history have better firm performance. Previous studies such as that of 
Doidge et al. (2004) have identified that the sales growth rate has explanatory power for 
firm performance. However, in this study, growth rate has failed to explain firm 
performance. On the contrary, coefficients of the growth rate are negative to the firm 
performance for all the Chinese listed firms. 
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Panel Data Analysis Results 
Table 4.4 reports the corporate governance practice results for the Chinese firms listed in local 
China A market, and cross-listed in China B, Hong Kong GEM, Hong Kong Mainboard, 
London, New York, Singapore, and NASDAQ during the period of 2003 to 2008. For 
regression (1), the examined listed firms are Chinese firms listed in local A-share market and 
China B-share market. Regression 2 are Chinese firms listed in HK GEM and local A-share 
market; regression 3: HK Mainboard and local A-share market; regression 4: London and local 
A-share market; regression 5: New York and local A-share market; regression 6: Singapore and 
local A-share market; regression 7: NASDAQ and local A-share market; regression 8: All of the 
international cross-listings and local A-share listings. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q as the 
measurement of firm performance. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors 
in brackets (cluster at individual firm level). 
  
 
Both the profitability and leverage ratios have positive and significant relationship to 
the Chinese firms’ performance. The higher profitability ratio has been valued by the 
markets well, and gives rise to a higher Tobin’s q. The positive and significant 
coefficients for leverage ratio suggests that the increased leverage ratio does curb the 
agency problem or improve the management of the firm, as the management of the 
firms have no incentive to increase the firm value, but to avoid bankruptcy, which is 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A &
China B HKGEM HK Mainboard London New York Singapore NASDAQ All Cross-listing
Cross Listing -0.511*** -0.172*** -0.271 -1.258 0.672 -1.800*** 0.375 -0.939***
(-2.69) (-4.53) (-1.62) (-1.61) (1.08) (-5.25) (0.50) (-3.83)
Firm Size -1.122** -1.098** -1.052** -1.084** -1.098** -1.14** -1.091** -1.058**
(-2.09) (-2.08) (-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.10) (-2.26)
Growth Rate -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(-1.80) (-1.05) (-1.11) (-1.06) (-1.02) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-1.63)
Profitability 4.535** 5.208** 5.206** 5.191** 5.214** 4.349** 5.207** 3.760**
(2.18) (2.06) (2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.19) (2.06) (2.29)
Leverage 1.382*** 3.435** 3.439** 3.427** 3.435** 3.381** 3.438** 1.372***
(6.815) (2.26) (2.26) (2.25) (2.26) (2.20) (2.26) (6.73)
Financial Disclosure -0.3248** -0.377 -0.165 -0.546** -0.478* -0.776** -0.590** -0.352***
(-2.19) (-1.48) (-0.86) (-1.99) (-1.83) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-2.92)
Auditing 0.263* 0.215* 0.314** 0.364** 0.284* 0.263* 0.288** 0.263**
(1.93) (1.68) (2.24) (2.26) (1.93) (1.83) (2.02) (2.19)
Controlling Shareholder -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(-5.28) (-3.67) (-3.71) (-3.64) (-3.65) (-3.80) (-3.72) (-5.65)
Second Shareholder -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.031***
(-4.17) (-3.99) (-3.98) (-4.01) (-4.07) (-4.37) (-4.15) (-4.55)
Chairman and CEO -0.087 0.097 0.121 0.107 0.089 0.112 0.086 -0.067
(-1.22) (0.66) (0.84) (0.72) (0.60) (0.78) (0.58) (-1.03)
Board Size 0.012 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.011 -0.010 -0.016 0.002
(0.42) (-0.21) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.60) (0.10)
Independent Director 1.036 1.286 1.292* 1.660** 1.275 1.731** 0.893 1.259*
(1.41) (1.58) (1.81) (1.98) (1.59) (2.10) (1.09) (1.89)
Supervisor -0.009 0.003 -0.002
(-0.18) (0.05) (-0.04)
Adjusted R Square 0.3820 0.2900 0.2885 0.2882 0.2902 0.2724 0.2896 0.3641
Number of Observations 6499 6029 6368 5939 5921 6280 5948 7603
* notes significant at the 0.1 level, ** notes significant at 0.05 level, *** notes significant at 0.01 level.
T-Values are in parethesis
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consistent with the agency costs hypothesis. The agency costs hypothesis states that 
high leverage ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value 
by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). After the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a 
vast literature on agency theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed. As 
one example of the direction in which the literature has developed, it has been suggested 
that greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the 
threat of liquidation, causing personal loss (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Bolton & 
Scharfstein, 1990). Similarly, increased leverage may reduce the agency costs of outside 
equity, so the opposite effect may occur for the agency costs of outside debt arising 
from conflicts between debt holders and shareholders (Berger & Patti, 2006). Therefore, 
the empirical evidence on testing the agency costs hypothesis is mixed (See Harris & 
Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001 for reviews). However, the empirical result of the positive 
and significant relationship between leverage and firm performance provides the similar 
findings to the study of Bai et al. (2004) in China context.  
 
The coefficients of financial disclosure present a mixed result. First, all of the 
coefficients are insignificant. Overall, Chinese firms adopting the local accounting 
standard outperformed the Chinese firms cross-listed in international markets. This 
result might indicate that Chinese firms that adopt local accounting standard could 
manipulate the financial statement, which might be the reason why the non-cross-listed 
Chinese firms have better firm performance than those cross-listed Chinese firms. 
However, the manipulation of the financial statement is beyond this research and could 
be left for future study. However, hiring Big 4 auditing firms have positive effects on 
firm performance.  
 
Both the variable of the controlling shareholder and the second largest shareholder have 
negative and significant relationship with firm performance for all the cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed Chinese securities, which suggests that the more power the largest 
shareholder holds, the worse the firm will perform. The result is consistent with the 
argument that the controlling shareholder can create expropriation (tunnelling) problems 
(Bai et al. 2004; Clasessens et al. 2000). Moreover, the negative and significant 
coefficient for the second largest shareholder reflects an ineffective corporate 
governance mechanism of the Chinese firms; for example, the second largest 
shareholder could not effectively monitor the controlling shareholders’ tunnelling 
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activities or other possible misbehaviours. The variable of board size is negative or 
positive but not significant, which reveals that the larger board size might not 
effectively improve the corporate governance of the Chinese firms. Meanwhile, the 
duality role of CEO and chairperson has unclear influence to firm performance. 
 
The independent director practice shows no effects on firm performance. Several 
possible explanations are presented here for this result. First, the establishment of the 
system of independent directors in China is the product of the government force instead 
of the natural product of the market development (refer to page 73 for more detailed 
information of the independent director system in China). Secondly, based on the nature 
of Chinese independent directors, these independent directors cannot operate 
independently due to their various relationships with their listed firms (Bai et al. 2004). 
Under the Chinese cultural circumstances, they might treasure this personal relationship 
and maintain a harmonious working environment instead of honouring their fiduciary 
obligations. Lack of proper financial incentives for the independent directors and 
required knowledge of these independent directors (Such, compared to the more 
developed countries, they may lack legal knowledge) to the listed firm may have 
restricted them from making reasonable decisions. Further, the insiders in the firm limit 
their ability to play a role in the listed firm. 
 
The supervisory system as a supposedly corporate governance mechanism has no 
obvious effects on firm performance in China A- and B-share market and Hong Kong 
markets. This supervisory board is small and usually has labour union and major 
shareholder representation, but does not hold any authority to monitor operational and 
strategic firm behaviours (Tam 2002). This study indicates that this specific corporate 
governance mechanism plays no specific role in the Chinese context. Therefore, it 
remains unclear whether the supervisory board has any effective role in representing the 
interests of employees and other stakeholders, or other benefits. 
 
4.4.5 Interaction of Cross-listing, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation 
Regression Results 
 
Following the studies worked through earlier, Table 4.5 mainly presents the relationship 
between firm valuation and bonding corporate governance mechanisms via listing 
locations.  
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The interaction term between cross-listing and the different corporate governance 
mechanisms have different impacts on firm valuation. Clearly, Chinese firms listed in 
London with bigger firm size and board size have better firm performance. However, 
firms with higher profitability, higher growth rate and higher leverage ratio have lower 
firm performance in London market. Chinese firms listed in New York have a similar 
situation, with firms having higher growth rate and higher leverage ratio normally have 
lower performance. But bigger firms listed in New York with higher profitability have 
better firm performance. In addition to this, firms listed in New York with larger 
controlling and the second largest shareholders have better performance. Unlike the 
London market, firms with bigger board size listed in New York have lower firm 
performance.  
 
Chinese firms listed in NASDAQ tell another story. Firms with bigger second largest 
shareholder, less board members and less independent directors could have better 
performance. In the Singapore market, firms with high growth rate, larger controlling 
and second large shareholders have better performance. However, higher profitability, 
higher leverage ratio and more independent directors would lower the firm performance.  
The combined effect of cross-listing and corporate governance practices have no 
obvious effect on the Chinese firms listed on HK GEM. The positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term of cross-listing and the firm size, growth rate, 
controlling shareholder, and the second largest shareholder indicates that Chinese firms 
listed on HK Mainboard have better firm valuation than those non-cross-listed Chinese 
firms. The presence of a positive and significant interaction term between cross-listing 
and the board size in China B market indicates that the listed Chinese firms in China B 
markets have better firm valuation.   
 
Overall the most obvious interaction term is the cross-listing and the controlling 
shareholder and the second largest shareholders. For all of the overseas Chinese listings, 
the greater proportion of shares held by these two biggest shareholders the better the 
firm performance for these Chinese firms cross-listed in overseas markets. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 could not be rejected in most of the cases, which suggests that when 
Chinese firms cross-listed in international markets, different markets have different 
effective corporate governance practices to improve firm performance. 
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Table 4.5: Interaction Results for Cross-listing, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation 
Table 4.5 mainly reports the effects of interaction term between cross-listing and other bonding 
corporate governance mechanisms on Chinese firm performance during the period of 2003 to 
2008. For regression (1), the examined listed firms are Chinese firms listed in the local A-share 
market and China B-share market. Regression 2 are Chinese firms listed in HK GEM and local 
A-share market; regression 3: HK Mainboard and local A-share market; regression 4: London 
and local A-share market; regression 5: New York and local A-share market; regression 6: 
Singapore and local A-share market; regression 7: NASDAQ and local A-share market; 
regression 8: All of the international cross-listings and local A-share listings. The dependent 
variable is Tobin’s q as the measurement of firm performance. Parameter estimates are reported 
with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual firm level).   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A &
China B HKGEM HK Mainboard London New York Singapore NASDAQ All Cross-listing
Cross Listing -4.236 -5.981* -9.136*** -4.752 -10.582* -9.569*** 3.741 -8.384***
(-1.62) (-1.93) (-3.77) (-1.50) (-1.85) (-3.71) (0.47) (-3.31)
Firm Size -1.107** -1.106** -1.106** -1.096** -1.096** -1.095** -1.096** -1.096**
(-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.30)
Growth Rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.03) (-1.03) (-1.03) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.03)
Profitability 5.218** 5.214** 5.214** 5.213** 5.212** 5.213** 5.213** 5.217**
(2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06)
Leverage 3.432** 3.434** 3.435** 3.436** 3.436** 3.436** 3.436** 3.433**
(2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25)
Financial Disclosure -0.511*** -0.495* -0.221 -0.579** -0.581** -0.505** -0.581** -0.465***
(-4.03) (-1.94) (-1.18) (-1.98) (-1.97) (-2.35) (-1.97) (-4.64)
Auditing 0.285** 0.213 0.304** 0.300** 0.281* 0.273* 0.279* 0.249**
(1.97) (1.61) (2.22) (2.04) (1.93) (1.94) (1.93) (2.13)
Controlling Shareholder -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.65) (-3.64)
Second Shareholder -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(-4.04) (-3.99) (-4.03) (-4.03) (-4.02) (-4.03) (-4.02) (-4.06)
Chairman and CEO -0.086 0.093 0.107 0.094 0.090 0.085 0.083 -0.100
(-1.19) (0.63) (0.74) (0.64) (0.61) (0.59) (0.56) (-1.53)
Board Size -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014
(-0.30) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.51)
Independent Director 1.307 1.300 1.307 1.300 1.296 1.299 1.296 1.308
(1.61) (1.60) (1.61) (0.811) (1.60) (1.60) (1.60) (1.62)
Supervisor 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Cross-listing * Firm Size 0.591 0.703 0.914* 1.400** 20.849*** 0.385 -0.038 0.519
(1.06) (0.43) (1.68) (2.26) (44.17) (0.68) (-0.05) (0.96)
Cross-listing * Growth Rate -0.109 0.040 0.463* -3.986* -2.255*** 0.187* 0.934 0.147
(-0.46) (0.43) (1.81) (-1.92) (-117.22) (1.74) (1.26) (1.39)
Cross-listing * Profitability -2.385 -2.567 -2.862 -9.728** 124.771*** -4.860* -8.456 -4.214
(-0.90) (-0.92) (-1.03) (-2.26) (30.26) (-1.92) (-1.24) (-1.61)
Cross-listing * Leverage -2.210 -1.449 -2.507 -4.175* -46.710*** -2.178 2.532 -2.247
(-1.45) (-0.88) (-1.51) (-1.80) (-29.38) (-1.35) (0.70) (-1.47)
Cross-listing * Controlling Shareholder 0.038*** 0.011 0.022** -0.027 1.654*** 0.029*** -0.037 0.024***
(3.33) (0.60) (2.46) (-1.08) (55.31) (3.38) (-0.99) (2.85)
Cross-listing * Second Shareholder 0.061*** 0.040* 0.052*** -0.044 1.521*** 0.030** 0.069** 0.037***
(3.02) (1.76) (3.52) (-0.96) (49.12) (2.58) (2.37) (3.12)
Cross-listing * Board Size 0.168** -0.045 -0.018 0.607** -0.920*** 0.022 -0.570* 0.042
(2.00) (-0.78) (-0.51) (2.20) (-13.01) (0.30) (-1.95) (0.93)
Cross-listing * Independent Director 0.171 -1.976 -1.180 8.313 15.330*** -2.262** -12.727* -1.281
(0.10) (-1.12) (-1.15) (1.61) (11.99) (-2.09) (-1.69) (-0.96)
Cross-listing * Supervisor -0.110 0.206 -0.008
(-1.10) (0.71) (-0.10)
Adjusted R Square 0.4350 0.2903 0.2898 0.2911 0.2909 0.2896 0.2910 0.4279
Number of Observations 6499 6029 6368 5939 5921 6280 5948 7603
* notes significant at the 0.1 level, ** notes significant at 0.05 level, *** notes significant at 0.01 level.
T-Values are in parethesis
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4.4.6 Robustness Test 
 
A series of sensitivity tests are conducted to examine the robustness of the regression 
model and the empirical results. The examined period of this study covers 2003 to 2008, 
however, the global financial crisis occurs in 2008. When the crisis hit, firm 
performance might be affected. To avoid any bias due to the global financial crisis, we 
cut 2008 data from the whole data set and just focus on the period of 2003 to 2007 to 
conduct the robustness test. The same measurements of the variables are used, and the 
same panel data analysis is adopted as well as to check the robustness of the findings.  
 
Table 4.6 present the robustness test results. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the 
results present in Table 4.4. Although auditing variable from 2003 to 2007 loses its 
statistical significance, its economic significance is the same. And the independent 
director variable has stronger effects on firm performance before year 2008.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China’s equity market is labelled 
as a young capital market with short history and lack of quality of listed companies, 
weakness in enforcement of laws and rules, and a need for better corporate governance. 
Since 2000, more and more codes and guidelines are issued by the Chinese government 
and CSRC, aiming to develop the corporate governance practices in China. In addition 
to these new developments of corporate governance in China, encouraging the Chinese 
firms to cross-list their shares in international equity markets becomes an additional 
way to improve the corporate governance for listed Chinse firms.  
 
This study set out to examine the corporate governance and cross-listing in the context 
of Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong, US, Singapore, London, and the local B markets 
as well as the domestic China A-share market. It considers the extent to which these 
cross-listed Chinese firms can successfully borrow foreign corporate governance 
elements to improve their corporate governance system. The empirical results from the 
study reported in this study reveal a mixed result for Chinese securities listed in 
different stock exchanges. Chinese firms listed on NASDAQ show a higher valuation 
(Tobin’s q recorded as averagely 4.007 during the examined 6 years) when compared to 
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Table 4.6: Robustness Test 
Table 4.6 reports the robustness test for corporate governance practice results for the Chinese 
firms listed in local China A market, and cross-listed in China B, Hong Kong GEM, Hong Kong 
Mainboard, London, New York, Singapore, and NASDAQ during the period of 2003 to 2007. 
For regression (1), the examined listed firms are Chinese firms listed in local A-share market 
and China B-share market. Regression 2 are Chinese firms listed in HK GEM and local A-share 
market; regression 3: HK Mainboard and local A-share market; regression 4: London and local 
A-share market; regression 5: New York and local A-share market; regression 6: Singapore and 
local A-share market; regression 7: NASDAQ and local A-share market; regression 8: All of the 
international cross-listings and local A-share listings. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q as the 
measurement of firm performance. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors 
in brackets (cluster at individual firm level). 
 
 
the other markets and non-cross-listed Chinese firms. However, the corporate 
governance regression results indicate that the non-cross-listed Chinese firms have 
better firm performance compared to those cross-listed. Further, establishing the 
supervisory panel is not related to firm performance or corporate governance practices. 
The same is the case of adopting international financial accounting standards, and 
borrowing the independent director practice from the developed countries’ corporate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A & China A &
China B HKGEM HK Mainboard London New York Singapore NASDAQ All Cross-listing
Cross Listing -0.324 -0.663*** -0.224 -1.001 1.118 -1.892*** 0.915 -0.913***
(-1.17) (-3.29) (-1.13) (-0.91) (1.30) (-4.20) (1.02) (-3.74)
Firm Size -1.392 -1.246 -1.225 -1.290 -1.301 -1.208 -1.292 -1.121
(-1.56) (-1.50) (-1.42) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.45) (--1.50)
Growth Rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(-1.46) (-1.52) (-1.51 (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.53)
Profitability 4.711** 4.702** 5.426** 5.424** 5.425** 5.265** 5.423** 4.497**
(2.06) (2.07) (1.99) (1.98) (1.98) (2.03) (1.98) (2.11)
Leverage 1.489*** 1.501*** 3.466** 3.451** 3.453** 3.491** 3.456** 1.515***
(4.56) (4.55) (2.21) (2.20) (2.20) (2.21) (2.20) (4.51)
Financial Disclosure -0.833*** -0.749*** -0.335** -1.055** -1.079** -1.066** -1.078** -0.777***
(-4.20) (-4.08) (-1.99) (-2.27) (-2.25) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-4.60)
Auditing 0.262 0.222 0.335 0.307 0.266 0.246 0.280 0.221
(1.26) (1.26) (1.63) (1.42) (1.26) (1.22) (1.34) (1.33)
Controlling Shareholder -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.464*** -0.044***
(-4.67) (-4.75) (-3.94) (-3.89) (-3.95) (-4.25) (-3.99) (-5.32)
Second Shareholder -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.063***
(-5.55) (-5.52) (-5.20) (-5.04) (-5.13) (-5.42) (-5.17) (-5.81)
Chairman and CEO -0.122 -0.067 0.152 0.113 0.102 0.117 0.094 -0.103
(-1.10) (-1.04) (0.68) (0.49) (0.44) (0.51) (0.40) (-0.99)
Board Size 0.012 0.009 -0.008 -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 -0.003
(0.30) (0.27) (-0.23) (-0.48) (-0.56) (-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.08)
Independent Director 1.781* 1.774** 2.102** 2.274** 2.141** 2.112** 2.036* 1.859**
(1.77) (2.00) (2.27) (2.18) (2.05) (2.28) (1.95) (2.40)
Supervisor -0.061 -0.048 -0.029
(-1.01) (-0.87) (-0.46)
Adjusted R Square 0.3510 0.3468 0.3043 0.3061 0.3067 0.3014 4846 0.3402
Number of Observations 5316 5789 5179 4839 4828 5094 5948 6141
* notes significant at the 0.1 level, ** notes significant at 0.05 level, *** notes significant at 0.01 level.
T-Values are in parethesis
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governance system. However, having the Big Four auditing firms to monitor the 
financial statement does have an influential effect on firm performance. 
 
The study findings may generate some thoughts for the different stakeholders of the 
Chinese listed firms, especially the investors and market regulators. First, listing 
internationally for some Chinese firms (Such as Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and London) by adopting the related corporate governance 
mechanism does not mean that they improve their firm performance, although some of 
the rules and mechanisms required by the host exchange do have a significant effect on 
firm performance such as by hiring famous international auditing firms to monitor their 
financial disclosures. By looking at the combined effects of cross-listing and corporate 
governance mechanisms, we find that different stock markets have different effective 
corporate governance systems to improve firm performance. There is no single model of 
good corporate governance, and each system has their strengths, and weaknesses. 
Secondly, it is worthwhile to point out that the equity market environment in China has 
some distinct features compared to most developed countries. For instance, there are 
still a large number of cross-listing firms that are SOEs where the government exercises 
substantial control over the operations of these listed firms. In addition, the corporate 
governance practices from the developed culture may not be fully realized in a 
relatively less efficient capital market in China, which is why we see the cross-listed 
firms generally do not outperform those non-cross-listed. Therefore, the effects of 
different environmental factors should be taken into account when compared the 
corporate governance practices in China to the developed countries.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that improving corporate governance is not just 
borrowing or copying the corporate governance mechanisms from elsewhere. The 
effectiveness of different corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the 
countries’ legal and regulatory framework, historical and cultural factors. At the 
national level, it may be too early to judge the success of the financial market and 
corporate governance reforms undertaken by Chinese authorities. Nonetheless, in line 
with the continuing progress of the economic reforms and business environment 
changes, the corporate governance experiences for China firms should be further 
improved. 
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In summary, the corporate governance issue in China is complicated. China’s gradual 
corporatisation approach towards ‘a social market economy with Chinese characteristics’ 
has been proved an economic miracle. However, China’s corporate governance that 
emerged from these characteristics seems to be far from satisfactory. Cross-listing as a 
supposed effective way to improve firm performance by adopting the more stringent 
disclosure and having more enforceable market mechanisms lacks any consistent or 
powerful explanation for firm performance improvement. The empirical results 
presented above are consistent with Licht’s (2004) argument that, while cross-listing 
might erode some of the Chinese firms’ national features, it cannot eliminate them, 
adding a layer of foreign rules cannot remedy deeply-rooted deficiencies in firm 
governance. 
 
This chapter has examined the overall Chinese cross-listing issue from the perspective 
of corporate governance. The next chapter will shift focus from a macro-perspective to a 
micro-perspective by investigating the return and price behaviour of each dual- or triple-
listed Chinese security that traded in different markets. 
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Chapter 5: Market and Price Linkage for Dual-listing 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The financial market liberalisation and the opening of capital markets in China results 
an increasing international portfolio investment. Many empirical studies of international 
portfolio investment document the long-run benefits from international equity 
diversification (Taylor & Tonks 1989; Le 1991; Chan et al. 1992). According to these 
studies, asset prices in two different capital markets cannot be cointegrated, which 
means one stock price cannot be predicted from the other stock price; if it is, either there 
are no gains from international portfolio diversification, or the markets are not efficient 
or integrated. The China stock market as an emerging market gives international fund 
managers an opportunity for portfolio diversification. Under the current law, Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) with at least $10 billion in management have 
been allowed to buy up to 10 per cent of a Chinese company’s shares (still held in 
Chinese currency) from China A-share markets directly. There are also several other 
Chinese choices for fund managers for portfolio diversification, including B-shares, H-
shares, N-shares, and Chinese securities listed in other foreign markets, such as that of 
London, Frankfurt and Singapore. This provides academics with an interesting and 
significant research context to explore the interdependence of the different types of 
shares that are listed and traded in different capital markets. 
 
However, prior studies for international Chinese listings have focused on market 
segmentation, especially for China A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market 
(Chong & Su 2006; Lin & Wu 2006), interactions among China-related market indices 
(Kim & Shin 2000), cross-listed price discount for China B-shares to A-shares (Ma 
1996; Yang & Lau 2005), price discount of H-shares to A-shares (Wang & Jiang 2004) 
and price discovery process for H-shares to N-shares (Su & Chong 2007, Chen et al., 
2010). Little is documented on the interdependence of the dual or triple cross-listings 
among Mainland China, Hong Kong and the US. Due to the different classes of shares 
regime, shares issued by the same Chinese company could be traded in different 
markets and by different groups of investors. In the context of the dual-listed Chinese 
firm, since both of the A- and B-shares, or A- and H-shares, even A-, H-, and N-shares 
are issued by the same underlying Chinese firm, in an ideal environment in which 
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markets are efficient, any information regarding firm-specific and common market 
factors should be reflected in the prices of both A- and B-shares, A- and H-shares, or A-, 
H-, and N-shares, causing the same degree of price changes simultaneously (Kim & 
Shin 2000). Further, with the opening of the A-share market to the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors since the end of 2002, market information processing and 
transaction executing are assumed to be improved in China A-share market accordingly. 
 
Therefore, the study reported in this chapter is to test the Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
We will preliminary examine the return behaviour among Chinese dual-listings traded 
in Hong Kong, New York and Mainland China (A-share and B-share markets are 
included), further to study the market co-movement. Cointegration analysis, Granger 
causality test, and error correction model are also applied to investigate the price linkage. 
By conducting the cointegration analysis, we can discover whether there is any 
improvement about the market integration between Chinese markets and the other 
markets. By conducting causality or lead-lag relationship and error correction model 
among the multiple classes of Chinese shares, we can discover which market or group 
of investors is more efficient in obtaining and processing relevant information and 
trading upon it. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as following. We first present the data in section 5.2, 
followed by the descriptions of methodologies in section 5.3. In section 5.4, we present 
all of the empirical results; conclusions follow in section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Data Collection 
5.2.1 Chinese Dual and Triple Listing Introduction 
 
At the infant stage of the Chinese stock markets in 1990s, to attract international 
investors and to avoid the shortcomings of the domestic stock markets, the Chinese 
Government chose state-owned Chinese companies with the best financial integrity and 
corporate governance practices to list their shares on the New York Stock Exchange and 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Mak et al. 2005). Therefore, to issue foreign shares first 
with the attempt to extract beneficial information from foreign investors was seen as a 
strategy to foster the A-share markets and help firms better evaluate A-shares. 
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A Chinese firm could just list its share in the domestic A or B-share market, or it could 
list in international markets without listing domestically, or listing its shares both in 
domestic and international markets. Chinese cross-listing that occurred in the early 
1990s witnessed some reputable and large Chinese firms listed and traded in both the 
Hong Kong and New York markets. Along with China’s gradual liberalisation in the 
financial markets, these reputable firms returned to the China A-share market to 
improve the regulatory quality and maintain positive market sentiment (Megginson & 
Tian 2007). Since 2004, more and more Chinese companies have started to adopt a new 
model of listing, the A+H model, which is to dual-list their shares on the Mainland 
China domestic exchange as A-share and H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
simultaneously with the same IPO price. During the early period of 2000s, the large 
state-owned Chinese firms that previously listed and traded in overseas markets started 
to list back the domestic A-share market. One of the most successful dual-listing firms 
that adopted the model A+H was the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China that has 
the largest public listing in history with a $22 billion IPO in 2006. Appendix 2 presents 
these cross-listings’ company information including the name, industry, and the listed 
date. 
 
5.2.2 Data Collection 
 
In this study, we only focus and study the dual and triple-listed Chinese shares to the 
end of 2008, which includes dual-listed Chinese A- and B-shares, dual-listed Chinese 
A- and H-shares (Chinese shares listed in Hong Kong market), and triple listed Chinese 
A-, H-, and N-shares (Chinese shares listed in New York, Chinese shares traded on the 
OTC market are excluded) with a total number of 132 dual and triple Chinese listings. 
Daily total return index (RI) for all the dual and triple listed Chinese shares are collected 
from 1st January 1993 to 31st December, 2008.  Eventually, there are 77 pairs of Chinese 
A- and B-shares, 41 pairs of Chinese A- and H-shares, 11 triple-listings traded in China 
A, Hong Kong, and New York markets. There have another three dual-listed Chinese 
shares that are listed and traded only in the Hong Kong and New York markets in this 
category. In general, the sample period for each individual company started from the 
same trading date in their respective listed markets from 1993 through to the end of 
2008. Therefore, the sample periods are different for the Chinese companies listed and 
traded in different markets. The detailed information of these dual and triple listing 
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which includes listing date, industry and ADR ratio are shown in Appendix 2.1, 2.2, and 
2.3. 
 
To examine the market co-movement in terms of cross-listing, market indices including 
Shanghai SE Composite Index, Hang Seng Index, Shanghai A-Share Index, Shanghai 
B-Share Index, Shenzhen A-Share Index, Shenzhen B-Share Index, and S&P 500 Index 
are also obtained from Datastream. Datastream was also used to obtain the data for 
foreign exchange rates between Hong Kong to US dollars, US dollars and Chinese 
Yuan, and Hong Kong Dollars and Chinese Yuan. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Preliminary Return Analysis 
 
The company’s realised returns can be calculated using the daily time series data of 
their respective total return index (RI). Note that the RI is an accurate measure of the 
company’s over-all returns because it includes the market price appreciation, dividend 
returns and capitalisation changes related to the share, as opposed to the Price Index, 
which only takes into account market price appreciation, and the Accumulation Index, 
which only takes into account market value appreciation and dividend payouts. The 
continuously compounded rate of realised return of each company is computed by 
taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of ending period RI and beginning period RI of 
each company, as follows: 
 E = FG H IJKLIJKLMNO         (5.1) 
Where  E is daily return for the stock i on day t. EP is total return index of stock i on  day t. 
 
Following Ding’s (1999) study, the paired-sample T-test is used to compare the mean 
returns for the stocks dual-listed or triple-listed in the two or three different markets: 
New York, Hong Kong and Mainland China A-share markets. The pairs include China 
A-share to China B-share, China A-share to H-share, China A-share to Hong Kong H-
share, and New York N-share.  
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For dual-listed Chinese A- and B-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q>: there is no difference in the mean of the returns of A- and B-share (Q>: S = S) 
against Q$: there is difference in the mean of the returns of A- and B-share;  
 
For dual-listed Chinese A- and H-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q>: there is no difference in the mean of the returns of A- and H-share (Q>: S = SUV) 
against Q$: there is difference in the mean of the returns of A- and H-share;   
 
For triple-listed Chinese A-, H- and N-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q>: there is no difference in the mean of the returns of A-, H- and N-share (Q>: S =SUV = SWX	Y) against Q$: there is difference in the mean of the returns of A-, H- and N-share. 
 
To test the equality of variance between the return series, F test would be a useful one to 
compare the variances of two series.  
 
For dual-listed Chinese A- and B-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q>: there is no variance difference for A- and B-share (Q>: Z* = Z*) against Q$: there is variance difference for A- and B-share;  
 
For dual-listed Chinese A- and H-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q>: there is no variance difference for A- and H-share (Q>: Z* = ZUV*) against Q$: there is variance difference for A- and H-share;  
 
For triple-listed Chinese A-, H- and N-shares, we test the following hypothesis Q> : there is no variance difference for A-, H- and N-share ( Q>: Z* = ZUV* =ZWX	Y*)  against Q$: there is variance difference for A-, H- and N-share. 
 
In the above statement, a paired T-test and F-test were used to compare means and 
variance for dual-listed total return series of Chinese shares. However, for Chinese 
shares triple-listed in the China A, Hong Kong and New York markets, there are three 
return series for one Chinese share. When we have more than two groups, it is 
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inappropriate to simply compare each pair by using a t-test because of the problem of 
multiple testing (Godfrey, 1985). Therefore, it is better to use post hoc Tukey’s test 
(Tukey 1991) to examine the mean and variance difference for those triple-listed 
Chinese shares.   
 
Within the post hoc Tukey’s test, ANOVA is used because it possesses an advantage 
over a two-sample t-test. Doing multiple two-sample t-tests would result in an increased 
chance of committing a type I error. Welch’s t test is adopted by assuming that the two 
samples might have possible unequal variances (Welch, 1947). Both Levene and 
Brown-Forsythe tests for homogeneity of variances tests are used in the same 
circumstance suggest that the null hypothesis of mean difference could not be rejected 
either. Under Levene’s test (1960), an analysis of variance is performed on the absolute 
deviations of values from the respective group means. If the Levene test is statistically 
significant, then the hypothesis of homogeneous variances should be rejected. Later a 
more robust test that is very similar to the Levene test has been proposed by Brown and 
Forsythe (1974). This Brown and Forsyth test statistics is the F statistic resulting from 
an ordinary one-way analysis of variance on the absolute deviations from the median.  
The homogeneity of variance test is important since this is an assumption of ANOVA, 
but if this assumption turns out to be broken, the Brown-Forsythe and Welch options 
will display alternative versions of the F statistic. Therefore, the post hoc Tukey’s test in 
this study covers all of these variance tests. 
 
5.3.2 Market Co-movement 
 
The examination of the co-market movement of Chinese cross-listings is discussed in 
this section and this study focus on the Chinese shares that are traded on both the China 
A- and B-share markets, and the Hong Kong market, and New York market. Hypothesis 
4 is tested using the following regression equations for dual-listed shares, and a 
modified model of Froot and Dabora (1999) is employed. 
 E[\]	^[\]	, = ! + #$`ab + #*`ac + #/Edc/Qf$ + B  (5.2) E[\]	^[\]	, = ! + h$`Qb + h*`Qc + h/Edc/i`$ + B  (5.3) E[\]	^U, = ! + j$`Qb + j*Q2)	`.) + j/Edc/Qf$ + B  (5.4) 
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For the triple-listed Chinese shares that traded in the China A-share, Hong Kong, and 
New York markets, the model is modified by taking account of the non-synchronous 
trading time issue. If we measure the Chinese A-share and Hong Kong (H-share) returns 
on day t, and the US returns are measured on day t-1, the equation is shown as below: 
 E[\]	^U, = ! + k$`&m^$ + k*Q2)	`.) + k/`Qb + kCQf$/i`$ +k6Edc/i`$^$ + k8Edc/Qf$ + B       (5.5) E[\]	^W, = ! + n$`&m^$ + n*Q2)	`.) + n/`Qb + nCQf$/i`$ +n6Edc/i`$^$ + n8Edc/Qf$ + B       (5.6) EU^W, = ! + o$`&m^$ + o*Q2)	`.) + o/`Qb + oCQf$/i`$ +o6Edc/i`$^$ + o8Edc/Qf$ + B      (5.7) 
 
Where  E[\]	^[\]	, is the log returns of China A and China B dual-listed shares of firm i 
at time t. E[\]	^U, is the log returns of China A and Hong Kong dual-listed shares of firm i at 
time t. E[\]	^W, is the log returns of China A and New York dual-listed shares of firm i at 
time t. EU^W, is the log returns of Hong Kong and New York dual-listed shares of firm i at 
time t. 
 `Qb is the log returns of China Shanghai A market index at time t. `Qc is the log returns of China Shanghai B market index at time t. `ab is the log returns of China Shenzhen A market index at time t. `ac is the log returns China Shenzhen B market index at time t. Q2)	`.) is the log index returns of Hong Kong market at time t. `&m^$ is the log index returns of New York market at time t-1. Edc/i$ is the log return of RMB/US$ exchange rate at time t. Edc/Qf$ is the log return of RMB/HK$ exchange rate at time t. Qf$/i`$ is the log return of HK$/US$ exchange rate at time t. 
And the log return differentials for dual-listed shares (dual-listed Chinese A- and B-
share is used as an example) are calculated as: 
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E[\]	^[\]	,=	FG p IqrKst	u,KLIqrKst	u,KLMNv-	FG p IqrKst	w,KLIqrKst	w,KLMNv      (5.8) 
 
Where  E[\]	^[\]	, is daily return difference of firm i between dual-listed A and B shares 
at t. E[\]	, is firm i’s RI dual-listed on A-share market on day t. E[\]	,^$ is firm i’s RI dual-listed on A-share market on day t-1. E[\]	, is firm i’s RI dual-listed on B-share market on day t. E[\]	,^$ is firm i’s RI dual-listed on B-share market  on day t-1. 
 
Standard tests and residual diagnostics revealed no major concerns with the above 
econometric models. It should be noted that most of the residuals of the above 
regression models exhibited ARCH effects and as a result a GARCH (1,1) was used to 
estimate them. 
 
The null Hypothesis 4 in this context is that the international financial markets are 
integrated; that is, changes in the price differential are uncorrelated with the 
performance of the two markets in which the dual-listed securities are traded, but might 
be correlated with exchange rate movements since the dependent variable is the 
difference between price changes of securities traded in different currencies. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the markets are segmented and the returns of each dual-
listed share are subject to the investors’ sentiment so that the co-movement with the 
market depends on where the shares are traded. This hypothesis has been supported by 
the findings mostly from country funds studies (Bodurtha et al. 1995; Hardouvelis, La 
Porta & Wizman 1995). It is also expected that the coefficient to the local market will 
be positive and the foreign market would be negative. For example, a shock to the 
overall Chinese local market is expected to be associated with an increase (decrease) in 
the local currency price of the Chinese A-share relative to the local currency price of the 
Hong Kong H-share. The implication of this case is that the price differential is being 
driven to an extent by market-specific liquidity shocks or relative market sentiment. 
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5.3.3 Dual and Triple-listing and Cointegration 
 
Prior studies have suggested that the two markets in which a cross-listed security trades 
should be integrated according to the law of one price (Lok & Kalev 2006). Although 
the empirical evidence did not support that markets are completely integrated, the 
findings of many prior studies show that markets are at least to some extent integrated 
(Kryzanowski & Zhang 2002; Lowengrub & Melvin 2002; Werner & Kleidon 1996). 
However, market integration does not mean that market prices are cointegrated, as 
Lence and Falk (2005) suggested that the concepts of integrated markets, cointegrated 
prices, and market efficiency are independent of one another and any zero, one, two or 
three of these characteristics can emerge in equilibrium, depending upon taste, 
endowment, and technology parameters. Lence and Falk (2005) used a standard 
dynamic general equilibrium asset-pricing model to study the relationship among the 
concepts of efficient markets, integrated markets, and cointegrated prices. In particular, 
the results of tests of cointegration among asset prices have no implication without 
additional restrictions on the economy or economies. 
 
The concept of cointegration is viewed as a long-term equilibrium relationship that can 
be defined between non-stationary variables (Belkacem et al. 2005). According to Engle 
and Granger (1987), the non-stationary character of time series could be linked by a 
stationary linear association, which are described as being cointegrated, and the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the two price series is termed the cointegrating 
equation. 1  Cointegration provides a relevant and useful econometric model for 
analysing financial market data when there are either several markets or several assets 
(Low et al. 1999). The cointegration statistic technique is commonly employed to test 
the long-run equilibrium relationship between variables (Aggarwal et al. 2005; Su et al. 
2007; Shen et al. 2007), and is therefore used to test Hypothesis 5, examining the 
Chinese dual- and triple-listed securities that are listed and traded in China A- and B-
share market, China A-share and Hong Kong market, China A-share, Hong Kong, and 
New York markets. If the dual- or triple-listed securities are cointegrated, then a linear 
relationship between the natural logarithms of the prices is suggested. The test of 
cointegration of two variable series (let us say dual-listed Hong Kong and China A-
share) is shown as below: 
 
                                                 
1
 This cointegrating relationship can also be existed between more than two price series. 
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FGxEPUVy = !> + !$FGxEP[\]	y + B      (5.9) 
 
Where,  EPUV is the Chinese firm i’s RI series at Hong Kong market at time t; EP[\]	 is the 
Chinese firm i’s RI series at China A-share market at time t; and series HK and China A 
are the identical shares for Chinese firm i that dual-listed in two different markets. 
 
If the two RI series are cointegrated, the error term is expected to be stationary, and a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the two series should exist. If natural 
logarithms of the RI series are both non-stationary and their first differences are 
stationary, they are integrated of the order one I(1). When each RI is I(1) and there is a 
linear combination of RI that are stationary, the RI series are regarded as to be 
cointegrated and hence a form of long-run stock market integration can be revealed. It is 
of interest to see whether RI of identical assets traded in different markets have the 
property of being statistically close in the sense of being cointegrated as it should be 
according to the theories. 
 
5.3.3.1 Unit Root Test 
 
The first step in testing for cointegration involves determining the order of integration 
of each RI series. In this study, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is employed for 
testing the hypothesis 
 Q: RI series contains a unit root against Q$: RI series is stationary.   
 
We test the unit root effects with three different regression models, which are without 
drift and time trend (model 1), with drift (model 2) and with drift and time trend (model 
3). 
 
If the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected and the series are found to be I(1), 
a multivariate cointegration test would be applied. Intuitively, the returns of dual-
listings should be highly correlated with each other since they represent identical assets. 
If any of these dual-listing has unit roots, then all the usual regression results might be 
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misleading and incorrect, which is a spurious regression problem. To overcome this 
problem, cointegration analysis is greatly employed in this study. (Geweke et al. 2006).  
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the test statistic is smaller (more negative) 
than the ADF critical value. The decision rule is shown below: 
If t* > ADF critical value, ⇒ Accept Q>. That is, unit root exists, series is non-stationary. 
If t* < ADF critical value, ⇒ Reject Q> . That is, unit root does not exist, series is 
stationary. 
5.3.3.2 Cointegration Analysis 
 
Under the no-arbitrage conditions, there should be an equilibrium relationship among 
the series concerned. If there were no cointegration, there would be no long-run 
relationship binding the series together. In the context of dual-listings, since the dual-
listings are representative of  the identical assets in different markets, in time it is 
expected to be cointegrated, and will be affected in very similar ways by given 
information. Like purchasing power parity, the price difference between dual-listings 
should be cointegrated, otherwise, it would be profitable to buy the same assets from the 
lower price market and sell them in a higher price market assuming zero transactions 
costs (Bacchiocchi & Fanelli 2005). 
 
ADF unit root test for non-stationary is employed first. Unit root test is run for each of 
the RI series for 132 Chinese firms that have dual or triple listings. Following the 
standard procedures as suggested in the literature on unit root tests and cointegration 
analysis (Corbae & Ouliaris 1986; Baillie & Bolerslev 1989), all the data are 
transformed into natural logarithms before tests are performed. If the log return series is 
found to be non-stationary and integrated of the same order from the ADF test, the 
Engle-Granger cointegration test is performed to examine the long-run equilibrium 
relationship (Engle & Granger 1987). Given that the logs of the RI series to be I(1), it is 
appropriate to test for cointegration by forming a potentially cointegrating regression 
and testing its residuals for non-stationary. If the residuals of two RI series are 
cointegrated, for example, for the identical assets of the Hong Kong stock RI series and 
the US stock RI series; this means that these two RI series have a long-term relationship. 
To test for cointegration, the residuals of a regression of the log Hong Kong stock RI 
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series on the logged New York stock RI series are examined. To obtain the residual, the 
following cointegrating regressions are employed first: 
 {UV, = #> + #$|WX	Y, + S       (5.10) 
  
Where {UV, is the natural logarithm of stock i’s RI series in Hong Kong at time t. |WX	Y, is the natural logarithm of stock i’s RI series in New York at time t. 
S  is the residual and should be I(0) if the variables of {UV,   and |WX	Y,  are 
cointegrated. Thus it is necessary to test the residuals of (4.10) to see whether they are 
non-stationary or stationary. The ADF test can be used on ∆Ŝ, using a regression of 
the form 
∆Ŝ = !$Ŝ^$ + B         (5.11) 
with B an iid error term.  
 
If the stock RI series are found to be cointegrated then some linear combination of them 
will be stationary although they are non-stationary individually, which means there is a 
long-run equilibrium relationship among them. 
 
There are two popular approaches to examine cointegration namely Engle-Granger 
approach and Johansen Cointegration for estimating number of cointegrated vectors. 
Although the Engle-Granger approach is relatively easy to use, one of its major 
drawbacks is that it can estimate only up to one cointegrating relationship between the 
variables. In our dual-listing examples, there are only two variables in an equation, {UV,  and |WX	Y,, there can be at most only one linear combination of {UV,  and |WX	Y, that is stationary – i.e. at most one cointegrating relationship. However, in 
the triple-listing case of this study, there are three variables (stock RI series in market 
Hong Kong, New York, and Mainland China) in the system and therefore there could be 
potentially be up to two linearly independent cointegrating relationships. Thus, it is 
appropriate to examine the issue of cointegration within the Johansen Vector Auto 
Regression (VAR) framework (Brooks 2002) to see what the number of cointegrating 
vectors is for the triple-listed Chinese securities.  
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A VAR model describes a set of g variables over the same sample period (t=1,…,T) as a 
linear function of only their past evolution. The variables are collected in a g × 1 vector 5	, which has as the ith element 5$, the time t observation of variable 5	. In our triple-
listing case (China A, Hong Kong and New York), we have a set of 3 variables, i.e. 
three RI series for one Chinese firm, under consideration that are I(1) and which are 
suspected to be cointegrated. Therefore, a VAR with k lags containing these three 
variables could be set up: 
 5$, = #$,> + #$,$5$,^$ + #$,*5$,^* +⋯+ #$,5$,^ + S$,   (5.12) 5*, = #*,> + #*,$5*,^$ + #*,*5*,^* +⋯+ #*,5*,^ + S*,   (5.13) 5/, = #/,> + #/,$5/,^$ + #/,*5/,^* +⋯+ #/,5/,^ + S/,   (5.14) 
Or written as a compactly one: 
5	 = #> + #$5,^$ + #*5,^* +⋯+ #5,^ + S    (5.15) 
Where 5 =  5[\]	,5U]	V],5WX	Y,   
 
There are two test statistics for cointegration under the Johansen’s approach. If we want 
to test r + 1 cointegrating vectors against r cointegrating vectors we should use  
test. Or we can use trace test to test for zero cointegrating vectors. Since there are three 
variables in the system, i.e. g = 3, there can be at most 2 linearly independent 
cointegrating vectors, i.e. r ≤ 2. Therefore, the statistic is taken the form of: 
 &) = −∑ 'x1 − y$        (5.16) 
Or &, & + 1) = −'x1 − y       (5.17) 
 
Where 
r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis, and   is the 
estimated value for the ith ordered Eigen value from the П matrix. 
 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) provide critical values for these two statistics. If the test 
statistic is greater than the critical value from Johansen’s tables, reject the null 
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hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors in favour of the alternative that there are 
r+1 (for ) or more than r (for ). 
 
5.3.4 Granger Causality Test 
 
Granger (1969) causality framework is applied to test Hypothesis 6 in this study to 
examine the direction of information flows, and whether any market, China A-share 
market, Hong Kong or New York can be viewed as dominant in terms of information 
discovery. In general, if we denote the two time series under study as RI series of firm i 
dual-listed in China A and HK market, the model to be estimated takes the form as: 
 EP[\]	 = ![\]	 + ∑ #[\]	EP^[\]	$ + ∑ h[\]	EP^UV$ + B[\]	 
           (5.18) EPUV = !UV + ∑ #UVEP^[\]	$ + ∑ hUVEP^UV$ + BUV   
           (5.19) 
 
Where p is autoregressive lag length,  j = 1, 2,…, p.  EP[\]	 is firm i’s RI dual-listed on A-share market on day t.  EPUV is firm i’s RI dual-listed on Hong Kong market on day t. ∑ #[\]	EP^[\]	$  is the summation of all the lagged values of firm i’s RI dual-
listed on A-share market. ∑ h[\]	EP^UV$  is the summation of all the lagged values of firm i’s RI dual-listed 
on Hong Kong market. B[\]	 and BUV are independently distributed. 
 
and test the hypothesis that EP[\]	 (the China A-share’s RI for firm i) Granger-causes EPUV  (the Hong Kong share’s RI for firm i). According Granger (1969), EP[\]	 
Granger-causes EPUV  if the lagged values of EP[\]	  in the regression of EPUV  on 
lagged EPUV and EP[\]	 are statistically significant. Simply, EP[\]	 is said to cause 
another times series EPUV, if present EPUV can be predicted better using the value of EP[\]	.  
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Model 5.18 and Model 5.19 are used to examine the Granger causality between the 
dual-listed Chinese shares that listed in different markets, namely, dual-listed China A 
and China B-shares, dual-listed China A-shares and Hong Kong shares, dual-listed 
Hong Kong shares and New York shares, and dual-listed China A-shares and New York 
shares. Overall, the possible outcomes should be: two cases of unidirectional causality 
(P[\]	  causing EPUV or EPUV causing EP[\]	), no causality, and causality running 
both ways. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses of the Granger causality test are:Q> : EP[\]	 ⇏EPUV   (EP[\]	 does not granger-cause EPUV), and Q$ : EP[\]	 ⇒ EPUV  (EP[\]	 
does granger-cause EPUV). 
 
The RI series properties of each stock should have been checked by conducting the 
ADF test of stationary. When all the stock RI series are non-stationary in levels and 
their first differences turn out to be stationary, the causality test will be carried out in a 
framework of unrestricted reduced form vector autoregression in first difference 
variables. However, it is also noting that Granger causality does not mean that 
movements in one variable physically cause movements in another. In this case, a 
movement in the Hong Kong stock market for the cross-listings was not a direct result 
movement in the New York Stock market. Rather, this causality simply implies a 
chronological ordering of movements of the time series. 
 
5.3.5 Error Correction Model 
 
In addition to learning about a potential long-run relationship between the Chinese dual-
listings, error correction model is also implied to investigate the short-run dynamics in 
the relationship between the Chinese shares dual-listed and traded in two or three 
different markets, which is the test of Hypothesis 7. In view of the dual-listed Chinese 
securities, it is interesting to inquire whether the behaviour of the identical dual-listed 
securities can be modelled as a chase of long-run equilibrium plus error correction. 
Suppose the two dual-listed Chinese securities have long-run equilibrium relationship; 
we have the relationship in log form as: 
 EP[\]	 = % + EP[\]	        (5.20) 
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Where EP[\]	 and EP[\]	 are the RI series of the identical Chinese securities that 
traded on China A and B-share markets. If we take the lagged values of both EP[\]	 
and EP[\]	 , a general dynamic relationship between  EP[\]	  and EP[\]	 
becomes: 
 EP[\]	 = #> + #$EP[\]	 + #*EP^$[\]	 + !$EP^$[\]	 + S  (5.21) 
 
Next, if we want to keep the dynamic relationship equation consistent with the long-run 
equilibrium relationship, we need to zero out the changes in EP[\]	 and EP[\]	, 
and set up S = 0 to eliminate any divergence from equilibrium. Thus, we obtain: 
 EP[\]	 = #> + #$EP[\]	 + #*EP[\]	 + !$EP[\]	   (5.22) 
 
Rearrange the equation, and we obtain: 
 EP[\]	 = $^N + N$^N 	EP[\]	       (5.23) 
 
Corresponding this equation to the long-run equilibrium equation, we need to have: $^N = c	29	 N$^N = 1	         (5.24) 
 
Then, we have: #$ + #* = 1 − !$         (5.25) 
 
Let denote that: #$ + #* = 1 − !$ = h        (5.26) 
 
We have: #* = h − #$	29	!$ = 1 − h        (5.27) 
 
We plug #* and !$ into the dynamic equation, then the dynamic equation becomes: EP[\]	 = #> + #$EP[\]	 + h − #$)EP^$[\]	 + 1 − h)EP^$[\]	 + S (5.28) EP[\]	 = #> + #$EP[\]	 − #$EP^$[\]	 + hEP^$[\]	 − hEP^$[\]	 + S (5.29) 
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EP[\]	 − EP^$[\]	 = #> + #$xEP[\]	 − EP^$[\]	y + hEP^$[\]	 −EP^$[\]	) + S         (5.30) 
 
At the end, we have the error correction model as: ΔEP[\]	 = #> + #$∆EP[\]	 + hEP^$[\]	 − EP^$[\]	) + S  (5.31) 
 
Where ∆EP[\]	 = EP[\]	 − EP^$[\]	 , ΔEP[\]	 = EP[\]	 − EP^$[\]	  , #$  is the 
short run elasticity, and h is the short run adjustment response coefficient. 
 
The above model (5.31) based on Cottrell’s (2004) error correction model illustrates 
that the price changes in one of the dual-listed Chinese securities is related to change in 
another one, as well as the price gap between these two identical securities in the 
previous period. The validity of the assumed model can be tested when all the variables 
are I(1) and cointegrated, which should lead to a valid OLS estimation. 
 
Lieberman et al.’s (1999) modified model is adopted in this study by including the 
changes of the market index. However, the foreign market index is not incorporated in 
the model due to the insignificant effects in Lieberman’s study. Based on the market co-
movement study in section 5.4.2, both of the market indices are used in this analysis. 
Therefore the final estimated models for this examination are: 
 
For the dual-listings traded both in China A (both Shanghai and Shenzhen) and China B 
(both Shanghai and Shenzhen) markets: ΔEP[\]	 = #> + #$∆EP[\]	 + h*xEP^$[\]	 − EP^$[\]	y + h/Δ`Qb +hCΔ`Qc + S         (5.32) ΔEP[\]	 = #> + #$∆EP[\]	 + h*xEP^$[\]	 − EP^$[\]	y + h/Δ`ab +hCΔ`ac + S         (5.33) 
 
For the dual-listings traded both in China A-share and Hong Kong market: ΔEPUV =#> + #$∆EP[\]	 + h*xEP^$[\]	 − EP^$UV y + h/Δ`ℎ2)ℎ2	?,4(. +hCΔQ2)	`.) + S        (5.34) 
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ΔEP[\]	 =#> + #$∆EPUV + h*xEP^$UV − EP^$[\]	y + h/Δ`ℎ2)ℎ2	?,4(. +hCΔQ2)	`.) + S        (5.35) 
 
Since there is no overlap trading time for Chinese market and New York market, the 
time difference between China (and Hong Kong) and New York need to be adjusted for 
the time periods in which the terms in the error correction model. Therefore, the model 
for the dual-listings traded both in Hong Kong and New York are: ΔEPUV = #> + #$∆EPWY + h*xEP^$WY − EP^*UV y + h/Δ`&m500 + hCΔQ2).) +S           (5.36) ΔEPWY = #> + #$∆EPUV + h*xEP^*UV − EP^$WY y + h/Δ`&m500 + hCΔQ2).) +S           (5.37) 
 
Where EP represents RI of Chinese firm i listed in China A-share market. EP represents RI of Chinese firm i listed in China B-share market. EPUV represents RI of Chinese firm i listed in Hong Kong market. EPWY represents RI of Chinese firm i listed in New York market. `Qb represents China Shanghai A market index at time t. `Qc represents China Shanghai B market index at time t. `ab represents China Shenzhen A market index at time t. `ac represents China Shenzhen B market index at time t. 
Shanghai Composite represents China market index.  
S&P500 represents US market index.  
Hang Seng represents Hong Kong market Index. 
 
When dealing with error correction model methodology, daily return index and market 
index data in logarithmic form is used during the period examined. 
 
 
 
  
113 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Preliminary Return Analysis Results 
5.4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In general, several measures are commonly used to describe a particular return 
distribution: mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, excess kurtosis, skewness, 
and Jarque-Bera. Appendix 3.1 to Appendix 3.3 present these measures based on the 
continuously compounded daily returns of each Chinese company that is cross-listed in 
different markets. Total return index for 132 dual and triple Chinese listings are 
collected from 1st January 1993 to 31st December, 2008. The cross sectional summary 
descriptive statistics for the dual-listings in different market is reported in Table 5.1. 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 5.1 clearly show that a high excess kurtosis of the 
returns distribution prevails in our data set and it forces the rejection of normality of the 
distribution for all the Chinese firms in all of the markets under the traditional Jarque-
Bera normality test. The excess kurtosis also suggests that many observations lie in the 
tail of the distribution The results show that the standard deviation for return series is 
around three per cent, and most of the standard deviations are in the range of two per 
cent to 4 per cent over the period of 1993 to 2008, suggesting that there is a mild 
considerable variation in the daily returns over the period. The return series exhibit a 
positive skewness, indicating there have many positive numbers. Chinese firms dual-
listed in Hong Kong and China A-market, and Chinese firms triple-listed in China A-
market, Hong Kong and New York market have averagely negative daily returns, 
revealing that those Chinese firms have underperformed when compared to other 
markets. The daily maximum return is recorded as 132.93 per cent in China A market, 
and the daily minimum return also happens in China A market which was -69.31 per 
cent. The large maximum and minimum returns indicate that the prices of the Chinese 
shares could be extremely volatile within a day period. 
 
The summary descriptive statistics for 8 examined market indices are reported in Panel 
B of Table 5.1 during the period of 1993 to 2008. The daily mean returns for the 
examined 8 market indices are very similar to each other, around 0.02 percent. But the 
daily return of Hong Kong market measured by Hang Seng Index was 0.04 per cent. 
Unlike the individual share, the maximum daily market return was 30.85 per cent, and 
the minimum daily market return was -19.63 per cent. Again, the distribution exhibits 
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the characteristics of a non-normal distribution with larger excess kurtosis. A positive 
skewness for seven markets is observed except S&P 500 index. 
 
In summary, all of the return series for the analysed Chinese firms and market indices 
over the studied period do not exhibit characteristics of a normal distribution. Varying 
levels of excess kurtosis and skewness are observable in the sample Chinese firms. This 
is consistent with empirical studies that show that a typical return distribution, 
particularly those that are sampled over small intervals, tend to be asymmetric 
(positively or negatively skewed) and with observations lying at the tails of the 
distribution (Chan & Lakonishok 1992). Further, the Chinese firms listed and traded in 
local Chinese markets exhibit a similar statistic descriptive output. For the Chinese 
firms listed in the Hong Kong and New York markets, a similar characteristic of the 
statistical description is observed. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Descriptive Statistics for Chinese Dual-listings in Different 
Markets and Market Indices 
This table reports the summary statistics for daily returns on dual and triple traded Chinese 
shares in different markets, and the return statistics for market indices. The calculated statistics 
are the mean, the standard deviation, skewness coefficient, excess kurtosis, maximum, 
minimum and Jarque-Bera during the period of 1993 to 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera
A 0.0001 1.3293 -0.6931 0.0318 0.6830 26.5223 530040.1863
B 0.0001 0.8079 -0.7101 0.0313 0.3543 14.1430 56895.0872
Shares dual-listed on A and B markets
A -0.0009 0.5601 -0.5402 0.0336 0.0653 8.6593 8285.4086
H 0.0002 0.7360 -0.4643 0.0360 0.3931 13.2976 48894.9347
Shares triple-listed on A and B markets
A -0.0008 0.3246 -0.2365 0.0294 0.1005 7.3782 5959.1035
H 0.0005 0.5600 -0.3131 0.0311 0.3162 8.9769 5814.5571
N 0.0005 0.5049 -0.3279 0.0322 0.3460 9.0513 6164.8775
Panel B: Market Indices
 Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera
Shanghai Composite 0.0002 0.0886 -0.1791 0.0227 1.1294 22.4901 66936.2100
Shanghai A-share Index 0.0002 0.3085 -0.1843 0.0232 1.2339 24.3089 80010.4500
Shanghai B-share Index 0.0001 0.1218 -0.1309 0.0225 0.2222 7.7307 3925.5400
Shenzhen A-share Index 0.0002 0.2958 -0.1963 0.0227 0.7576 20.0909 51187.8500
Shenzhen B-share Index 0.0002 0.1380 -0.1670 0.0218 0.2077 9.9452 8417.0500
Hang Seng Index 0.0004 0.1725 -0.1474 0.0173 0.0714 13.1848 18038.1000
S&P 500 Index 0.0002 0.1096 -0.0946 0.0116 -0.2405 13.5742 19481.8500
Panel A: Chinese firms dual and triple-listings
Shares dual-listed on A and B markets
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5.4.1.2 Testing Equality of Mean Returns and Variances 
 
Table 5.2 presents the test statistics of equal means and variances for the dual-listed 
Chinese firms’ returns data during the period of 1993 to 2008. 
 
Panel A of Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics of the datasets employed to 
compare the daily stock returns of the dual and triple-listed Chinese stocks listed on the 
China A, China B, Hong Kong and New York markets. In all of the panel B section in 
the table, the low t-statistic values infer that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
means of the daily returns on either pairs are equal at the five per cent level of 
significance, indicating that all of these dual or triple-listings have the same return for 
the period we studied. When examining the Chinese dual-listed shares listed in both 
China A and China B market, F-statistic of 1.2221 leads to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the five per cent level that the return variance of the China A and China B 
are equal. However, dual-listed Chinese shares listed in China A and Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong and New York markets accept the null hypothesis, which indicates that the return 
variance is similar in these markets for the dual-listed Chinese shares with those F 
statistics are significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
A more detailed analysis for each return series are presented in Appendix 4.1 to 
Appendix 4.3. The results show that most of the pairs in these markets (China A and B, 
Hong Kong and New York) have similar variance. Yet, several sample pairs have the 
different variance in these markets. For the dual-listed shares traded in China A- and B-
shares markets, they exhibit higher correlation relationship, so do the pairs traded in the 
Hong Kong and New York Markets. The shares traded in both the Hong Kong and 
China A-share markets have lower correlation relationship (r = 0.34). Shares traded in 
both the China A-share and New York markets have the lowest correlation (r = 0.20) 
(please refer to Appendix 4.1 to 4.3). The low correlation relationship between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong, Mainland China and US among these dual-listed 
securities traded in three different markets suggest that some significant diversification 
benefits may exist. 
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Table 5.2: Comparison of Daily Stock Returns for Chinese Stocks Dual and Triple-
listed in China A, B-share Market, HK and New York Market 
  
 
Panel A: Sample Statistics
China A China B
Mean Returns 0.0001 0.0001
Variance of Returns 0.0010 0.0010
Standard Deviation of Returns 0.0318 0.0313
Panel B: comparison of Mean Returns
t-statistic p-value
Matched-pairs t-test 0.0502 0.8437
Panel C: Comparison of Return Variance
F-statistic p-value
F-test 1.2221 0.0381
Panel A: Sample Statistics
China A Hong Kong
Mean Returns -0.0009 0.0002
Variance of Returns 0.0011 0.0013
Standard Deviation of Returns 0.0336 0.0360
Panel B: comparison of Mean Returns
t-statistic p-value
Matched-pairs t-test -0.2620 0.7100
Panel C: Comparison of Return Variance
F-statistic p-value
F-test 0.6620 0.0740
Panel A: Sample Statistics
China A Hong Kong New York
Mean Returns -0.0008 0.0005 0.0005
Variance of Returns 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
Standard Deviation of Returns 0.0294 0.0311 0.0322
Panel B: comparison of Mean Returns
t-statistic p-value
Matched-pairs t-test -0.2180 0.8030
Panel C: Comparison of Return Variance
F-statistic p-value
F-test 0.7770 0.0810
Daily Stock Returns of Shares Traded on China A, and China B
Daily Stock Returns of Shares Traded on China A, and Hong Kong
Daily Stock Returns of Shares Traded on China A, Hong Kong, and New York
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In summary, by analysing daily return data for the Chinese dual-listed securities in 
China A- and B-share, Hong Kong and New York markets, it is found that the return 
series for dual- or triple-listed Chinese shares exhibit similar pattern although the 
observed share prices for the Chinese dual-listings are different, suggesting that the 
three markets (China, Hong Kong and New York) are closely linked. However, the 
variance of the return distribution for dual-listed China A and B-shares is significantly 
different from each pair combined at 5 per cent level, indicating that the risk in each 
market is different. Market risk effects of cross-listing on underlying securities have 
been extensively examined both theoretically and empirically in literature. Ideally, if the 
international capital markets were fully integrated, the dual-listed securities will be 
priced the same. Consequently, these securities will be priced with reference to both 
their domestic and foreign market risks (Eun and Janakiramanan, 1990). If the foreign 
and domestic markets are not perfectly correlated, which is likely to be the case for two 
segmented markets, a diversification effect should result from an international listing, 
causing a decrease in standard deviation of stock returns (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993). 
Since this study is not the study of risk factors, the risk differential of Chinese triple 
listings could be further explored in future studies. 
 
5.4.1.3 Post hoc Tukey’s Test 
 
There are only 11 Chinese companies that have shares triple-listed in China A, Hong 
Kong and New York market, the Tukey’s test results for these 11 triple-listed Chinese 
shares are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
The homogeneity variance is measured by Levene’s test is shown on the second column. 
Levene Statistics for these 11 Chinese companies are significant at five per cent for ten 
cases so the variances of the three return groups are significantly different. There is one 
exceptional case of the company of China Life Insurance, which presents a high p-value, 
indicating that the null hypothesis could not be rejected and there is no difference 
between the variance in the sample. However, the results from the ANOVA test indicate 
that the null hypothesis could not be rejected that there is no difference in the mean 
returns within different groups for ten cases (Petro China is exceptional). Lastly, the 
post hoc Tukey’s test results tell which groups are responsible for the difference. 
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Table 5.3: Tukey’s Test Results for Triple-Listed Chinese Shares 
 
Generally speaking, the null hypothesis could not be rejected for most of the Chinese 
shares that triple-listed in China A, Hong Kong and New York markets. The results 
indicate that the return and variance for these triple-listed shares are similar to one 
another. However, China Petro (the company) provides an exceptional example with p 
value less than 0.01, which suggests that returns and variance for shares listed in China 
and Hong Kong, China and New York are significant different at one per cent level. The 
results from post hoc Tukey’s test for the triple Chinese listings are very similar to the 
results from the paired T-test. 
 
 
 
Levene  Brown 
Statistic ANOVA Welch Forsythe
Sinopec Shanghai 83.145* 0.014 0.016 0.014 China-Hong Kong 0.000 (0.988)
(0.000) (0.986) (0.984) (0.986) China-New York 0.000 (0.989)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Yanzhou Coal 76.423* 0.206 0.255 0.206 China-Hong Kong -0.001 (0.845)
(0.000) (0.814) (0.775) (0.814) China-New York -0.001 (0.842)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Aluminum 5.750* 0.034 0.039 0.034 China-Hong Kong -0.001 (0.977)
(0.000) (0.966) (0.962) (0.966) China-New York -0.001 (0.968)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Chinese Eastern 63.580* 0.003 0.003 0.003 China-Hong Kong 0.000 (0.998)
(0.000) (0.997) (0.997) (0.997) China-New York 0.000 (0.998)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
China Life 2.190 0.222 0.225 0.225 China-Hong Kong -0.001 (0.842)
(0.112) (0.801) (0.799) (0.801) China-New York -0.001 (0.824)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
China Petro 13.760* 0.225 0.245 0.225 China-Hong Kong -0.001 (0.836)
(0.000) (0.799) (0.783) (0.799) China-New York -0.001 (0.825)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
China Southern 5.508* 0.024 0.026 0.024 China-Hong Kong 0.000 (0.978)
(0.004) (0.976) (0.974) (0.976) China-New York 0.000 (0.983)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
China United Telcom 29.394* 0.009 0.01 0.009 China-Hong Kong 0.000 (0.994)
(0.000) (0.991) (0.990) (0.991) China-New York 0.000 (0.991)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Guangshen Railway 4.625* 0.001 0.001 0.001 China-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
(0.010) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999) China-New York 0.000 (1.000)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Huaneng Power 4.763* 0.271 0.281 0.271 China-Hong Kong -0.001 (0.807)
(0.009) (0.762) (0.755) (0.762) China-New York -0.001 (0.792)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (1.000)
Petro China 6.077* 7.251* 6.047* 6.638* China-Hong Kong -0.006* (0.001)
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) China-New York -0.006* (0.001)
New York-Hong Kong 0.000 (0.999)
Note: p-values are in parenthesis, * denotes significant at 1 per cent level
Tukey's Test
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5.4.2 Market Co-movement 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.4 (detailed individual results are present 
at Appendices 5.1 to 5.4) for Chinese dual-listed shares traded in the China A- and B-
share markets, the China A-share and Hong Kong markets, and the China A-share, 
Hong Kong, and New York markets, respectively. When performing the regression 
analysis procedures, the correlation coefficient among independent variables are 
examined with the variance inflation factor (VIF). The lower values of all of the VIFs 
suggest there are fewer multicollenearity issues. The results strongly reject the 
Hypothesis 4. All the coefficients for the market returns are significantly different from 
zero at the one per cent level, suggesting that the relative price of the dual-listed shares 
is very substantially affected by the relative performance of their representative markets 
within the short-term horizon. For example, Aluminium is a Chinese Company dual-
listed in the China A-share and Hong Kong markets. The coefficients for Shanghai A-
share market is 1.21 (please refer to Appendix 5.4), implying that a 10 per cent increase 
in the China (Shanghai) benchmark index is associated with an increase in the relative 
price of the dual-listed Aluminium in China A and Hong Kong market of around 12.1 
per cent. Further, the insignificant coefficients of the foreign exchange rate indicate that 
the expected exchange rate does not play an important role in determining the price 
differences, which is different from the study of Arquette et al. (2008). The insignificant 
coefficient for the exchange rate indicates that the exchange rate that changes in the 
short-term has no significant effects on the price differential. This result is in line with 
the expected effect of the current exchange rate policy adopted by the Chinese 
government.  
 
In summary, the examination in this section reveals that share prices are affected by the 
location of trade not only for the twin shares (refer to Froot and Dabora’s study) but 
also for the dual-listed shares, and dual-listed Chinese shares that should be nearly 
identical for everything moves more like the markets where they trade most intensively. 
These results provide evidence of co-movement between dual-listed price differentials, 
and aggregate market index is a pervasive feature of the dual-listed Chinese shares for 
one-day horizon; therefore, the market co-movement phenomenon is a short-term 
phenomenon. Location of trade therefore appears to be matter to pricing in the short run. 
The results are also consistent with the work by Froot and Dabora’s (1999), Sosner and 
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Greenwood (2002) and Chan et al. (2003) that studied how the covariance of returns 
changes due to changes in the index composition or trading location. 
 
Table 5.4: Market Co-movement Regression Results 
This table reports the summary coefficients for the regression analysis. Occasionally, there 
might one or two exceptional cases that show the different coefficient signs in Hang Seng and 
New York market. Detailed individual analysis refers to Appendices 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). 
 
 
5.4.3 Cointegration 
5.4.3.1 Unit Root Results 
 
ADF unit root tests of the null hypothesis of non-stationary are performed on all of the 
dual-listed pairs in return level and return-differenced forms. In general, analysis of the 
return level series indicates non-stationary for the pairs that are traded in these four 
markets. Appendices 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 present the results of the ADF (Dickey & Fuller 
1981) unit root tests. The number of lags is selected according to the Akaike 
Information Criterion. The computed ADF test-statistics exceed the critical values at 
one per cent, five per cent, and 10 per cent significant level respectively. Therefore, the 
null hypotheses of unit roots in dual-listed return series cannot be rejected in all of the 
markets with Models 1, 2, and 3, suggesting that the Chinese dual-listings’ return series 
is a non-stationary series and there are unit roots in return series in all markets. 
Moreover, unit roots in the first difference of return series are rejected at one per cent, 
five per cent, and 10 per cent significant level, which suggests the changes in return 
series are stationary. Thus, the return series are I(1), implying that the return series level 
of the ith market at time t is solely dependent on the return series at t-1, plus an error 
term. The results are also consistent with the overall weak form efficient through the 
lens of dual-listings and all series follow I(1) processes. Since most of log return series 
Shen Zhen A Shen Zhen B Shang Hai A Shang Hai B Hang Seng S&P500 RMB/HK$ RMB/US$ HK/US$ 
A-B (38 pairs) + - no effect
(equation 4.2)
A-B (39 pairs) + - no effect
(equation 4.3)
A-H (42 pairs) + - no effect
(equation 4.4)
A-H (11 pairs) + - no effect no effect no effect no effect
(equation 4.5)
A-N (11 pairs) + - - no effect no effect no effect
(equation 4.6)
H-N (14 pairs) no effects + - no effect no effect no effect
(equation 4.7)
Note: + denotes positive and significant at 0.05 or 0.01 level.
- denotes negative and significant at 0.05 or 0.01 level.
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are found to be non-stationary and integrated of the first difference order from the ADF 
test, the Engle-Granger cointegration test is performed then. The results are presented in 
the following section. 
 
5.4.3.2 Engle-Granger Cointegration Test Results 
 
Table 5.5: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
Listed on China A-Share and B-Share Markets from 1993 to 2008 
 
 
The Engle-Granger cointegration tests are performed using the natural logarithm return 
series for all of the dual-listings with a pair-wise analysis. The results are presented in 
Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.  
 
 Pairs  Pairs
Anhui Guijing Distiller -4.138 *** Shanghai Baosight -4.765 ***
Bengang Steel Plate -3.843 ** Shanghai Chlor-Alkali -2.722
BOE Technology -6.088 *** Shanghai Diesel -4.834 ***
Changchai Company -4.966 *** Shanghai Dingli Technology -4.289 ***
China Fanda -4.558 *** Shanghai Erfangji -5.219 ***
China First Pencil  -4.436 *** Shanghai Friendship -4.505 ***
China Interational Marine Container -4.002 *** Shanghai Haixin Group -2.961
China Merchants Propert Development -3.436 ** Shanghai Highly Group -5.500 ***
China Textile Machinery -4.850 *** Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel -4.385 ***
China Vanke  -2.721 Shanghai Jinjiang International -4.593 ***
Congqing Changan Automobile -3.550 ** Shanghai Jinqiao  -4.401 ***
CSG Holding  -3.295 * Shanghai Kaikai  -7.297 ***
Dalian Referigerator -4.298 *** Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone -4.147 ***
Danhua chemical  -4.125 *** Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical -5.217 ***
Dazhong Transportation -4.742 *** Shanghai MRA Trading -3.076
Double Coin  -4.521 *** Shanghai Nine Dragon -5.135 ***
Eastern Communications -5.220 *** Shanghai Potevio -5.247 ***
Foshan Electrical -3.802 ** Shanghai Sanmao -4.637 ***
Guangdong Electric Power -2.261 Shanghai Wingsung -3.542 **
Guangdong Provincial Expressway -5.041 *** Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington -3.371 *
Guandgong Sunrise -2.450 Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery -4.231 ***
Hainan Airlines  -4.802 *** Shenzhen SEG  -4.586 ***
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism -3.405 * Shenzhen Special Economic Zone -3.876 **
Hainan Pearl River Holdings -4.903 *** Shenzhen Textile -4.487 ***
Hefei Meiling  -5.235 *** Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical -4.322 ***
Huadian Energy  -5.201 *** Shenzhen International Enterprise -4.112 ***
Huangshan Tourism  -4.280 *** Shenzhen Nanshan Power -3.449 **
Huaxin Cement  -4.323 *** Shenzhen Properties and Resources -5.381 ***
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica -2.788 Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial -5.029 ***
Jiangling Motors   -3.007 Shenzhen Tellus -4.507 ***
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle -4.717 *** Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile -4.578 ***
Jinshan Development  -2.294 Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa -4.872 ***
Jinzhou Port  -5.504 *** Shijianzhuang Baoshi -4.794 ***
Konka Group -3.838 ** SVA Electron  -3.432 **
Livzon Pharmaceutical -5.058 *** Weifu High Technology -3.274 *
Luthai Textile -3.620 ** Wuxi Littleswan  -4.414 ***
SGSB Group -5.585 *** Yantai Changyu -4.829 ***
Shangdong Chenming Paper -3.233 * Zhong Lu -4.277 ***
Shanghai Automation Instrument -4.589 ***
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
ADF Test Statistics ADF Test Statistics
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When examining the cointegration relationship between the Chinese shares listed in the 
China A-share and China B-share markets, Table 5.5 presents residuals ADF test 
statistics for 68 dual-listed A- and B-shares out of 77 cases are more negative than the 
critical value at statistical significance level at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
respectively, and hence the null hypothesis of a unit root in the returns is rejected. 
Therefore, the residuals of the cointegration regression for these 68 dual-listed China A- 
and B-shares are stationary and thus the two return series are cointegrated in long run. 
The results also support the Hypothesis 5 for the dual-listed China A- and B-shares, 
which the China A and B-share markets are cointegrated in terms of the dual-listed 
securities. 
 
Table 5.6: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
Listed on China A-Share and Hong Kong Markets from 1993 to 2008 
 
 
However, dual-listed Chinese A-shares and H-shares present a different story. Only 11 
dual-listed shares out of 41 dual-listings exhibit long run cointegrated relationship. 
When we use the Engle-Granger cointegration test to examine the relationship among 
the triple listed Chinese shares, all of the Chinese shares both listed in Hong Kong and 
New York are cointegrated at one per cent, five per cent and 10 per cent significant 
level respectively with the t values of the residuals are less than the asymptotic critical 
values for cointegration tests, which states that there is long-run equilibrium 
relationship between these dual-listed shares. On the contrary, there are fewer 
cointegrated pairs present in China A-share and H-share, China A-share and N-share. 
 Pairs  Pairs
Air China -4.652 *** Guangzhou Pharmaceutical -2.184
Angang Steel -2.313 Guangzhou Shipyard -2.420
Anhui Conch Cement -2.511 Hisense Kelon -2.307
Anhui Expressway -2.832 Huadian Power -3.447 **
Bank of China -2.153 Industrial and Commerce Bank -3.173 *
Bank of Communications -2.470 Jiangsu Expressway -2.174
Beijing North Star -2.430 Jiangxi Cooper -1.960
Beiren Printing and Machinery -2.351 Jingwei Textile -2.561
China Citic Bank -2.208 Maanshan Iron -2.025
China Coal Energy -2.169 Nanjing Panda -2.843
China Construction Bank -2.527 Northest Electric -2.951
China Cosco Holding -2.495 Ping An Insurance -3.959 **
China Merchants Bank -3.851 ** Shangdong Xinhua -2.873
China Oilfield Services -3.141 * Shenji Group -2.180
China Railway Construction -3.398 * Sinopec Yizheng -3.463 **
China Railway Group -3.135 Tianjin Capital Environment -2.787
China Shenhua Energy -3.444 ** Tsigtao Brewery -2.763
China Ship Container -1.775 Weichai Power -2.577
China Shipping Development -2.215 Zijin Mining -3.115
Datang International Power -3.245 * ZTE -4.138 ***
Dongfang Electric -3.050
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
ADF Test Statistics ADF Test Statistics
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Three out of 11 dual-listed China A-share and N-share are cointegrated, five out of 11 
dual-listed China A-share and H-share are cointegrated.  
 
Table 5.7: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
listed on China A-Share, Hong Kong and New York Markets From 1993 to 2008 
 
 
In summary, the results of cointegration tests suggest that the identical stocks that 
traded both in Hong Kong and New York have some degree of interdependence, so do 
the China A- and B-share markets, and Hypothesis 5 is not rejected in these two cases. 
The findings of long-run linkages between New York and Hong Kong for all of the 
dual-listings suggest that there exist no long-run diversification benefits for investors 
who invest in these securities. Therefore, the Hong Kong listing could be a good 
substitute of the New York listing for these dual-listed Chinese securities, but it is not a 
good idea to pursue an effective diversification of portfolios. However, the Mainland 
China listing could be included in portfolio to gain from international diversification 
since the identical listings in Mainland China and New York, or Mainland China and 
Hong Kong are less cointegrated markets in the context of cross-listing. The highly 
cointegrated dual-listings for China A- and B-shares also suggesting a more integrated 
China A- and B-share market. This more integrated phenomenon of the China A-share 
and B-shares might be attributed to the relaxation of the trading policy and other 
policies regulated by the Chinese government. Since 2002, the domestic investors 
holding foreign currency are allowed to trade B-share. Thus, funds managers should be 
aware of this when they choose the Chinese assets into their portfolio to gain 
diversification benefits. Overall, it is not surprising to see that to some extent the 
Chinese market is still maintained as a segmented market to the rest of the world. 
Regarding to the dual-listings in Mainland China and Hong Kong, more than ten 
Chinese firms dual-listed in these two markets present long term cointegration 
RI Series
Aluminum -2.637722 -2.632509 -21.04741 ***
China Eastern Airlines -2.40858 -3.446604 ** -17.79489 ***
China United Telecom -3.343515 * -3.061769 -39.05517 ***
China Life Insurance -4.279324 *** -2.202884 -31.57681 ***
China Petrol and Chemical -2.557852 -2.481381 -9.695143 ***
China Southern Airlines -3.724875 ** -3.462966 *** -18.37256 ***
Guangshen Railway -3.725396 ** -4.405306 *** -7.164495 ***
Huaneng Power -3.447375 ** -2.656165 -4.963942 ***
Petro China -2.297886 -2.172797 -9.130067 ***
Sinopec Shanghai -2.092308 -2.174753 -6.58175 ***
Yanzhou Coal -2.477349 -2.357655 -8.388517 ***
China Mobile -40.61757 ***
China Telecom -34.62838 ***
CNOOC -39.07958 ***
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
ADF Test Statistics ADF Test Statistics ADF Test Statistics
China A and Hong Kong Market China A and New York Market Hong Kong and New York Market
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relationship. However, the cointegration analysis in this study concludes there is less 
connection between them. 
 
5.4.3.3 Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
 
Johansen cointegration tests further confirm the results from the test of Engle-Granger 
pair-wise cointegration test for the triple-listed Chinese shares. The purpose of Johansen 
cointegration tests are used is to obtain the cointegration rank. Eigenvalues and trace  
 
Table 5.8: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Chinese Firms Cross-listed on 
China A, Hong Kong, and New York Markets 
 
Trace Critical Values Max-Eigen Critical Values
Pair Series r Test Statistics 5% Test Statistic 5%
Aluminum 0 102.766*** 29.797 94.085*** 21.132
1 8.681 15.495 8.673 14.265
2 0.009 3.841 0.009 3.841
China Eastern Airlines 0 249.620*** 29.797 239.346*** 21.132
1 10.274 15.495 6.837 14.265
2 3.437* 3.841 3.437* 3.841
China United Telecom 0 138.868*** 29.797 131.513*** 21.132
1 7.355 15.495 7.106 14.265
2 0.249 3.841 0.249 3.841
China Life Insurance 0 91.159*** 29.797 86.629*** 21.132
1 4.530 15.495 4.072 14.265
2 0.458 3.841 0.458 3.841
China Petrol and Chemical 0 172.245*** 29.797 160.789*** 21.132
1 11.456 15.495 8.853 14.265
2 2.603 3.841 2.603 3.841
China Southern Airlines 0 173.126*** 29.797 160.610*** 21.132
1 12.516 15.495 11.241 14.265
2 1.274 3.841 1.274 3.841
Guangshen Railway 0 65.292*** 29.797 52.374*** 21.132
1 12.918* 15.495 12.894* 14.265
2 0.024 3.841 0.024 3.841
Huaneng Power 0 50.498*** 29.797 37.300*** 21.132
1 13.198 15.495 8.328 14.265
2 4.870** 3.841 4.870** 3.841
Petro China 0 59.239*** 29.797 51.846*** 21.132
1 7.392 15.495 5.098 14.265
2 2.294 3.841 2.294 3.841
Sinopec Shanghai 0 63.355*** 29.797 53.572*** 21.132
1 9.783 15.495 7.125 14.265
2 2.659 3.841 2.659 3.841
Yanzhou Coal 0 50.386*** 29.797 41.533*** 21.132
1 8.853 15.495 6.748 14.265
2 2.105 3.841 2.105 3.841
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
r denotes the number of cointegration vectors under the null hypothesis
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test statistics are exhibited in Table 5.8. Overall, the null hypothesis that r = 0 is rejected 
in all cases in both the case of the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test, and the null 
of no cointegrating vectors is rejected at five per cent significance level. Moving on to 
test the null of at most 1 cointegrating vectors, and at most two cointegrating vectors, 
both the trace statistic and max-Eigen statistic is now well below the five per cent 
critical value, suggesting that the null should not be rejected indicating that there are at 
least one cointegrating vectors. Further, this cointegrating vector existed between Hong 
Kong and New York dual-listed Chinese shares, which also support the Hypothesis 5 in 
terms of the dual-listed Chinese H- and N-shares. 
 
5.4.4 Granger Causality Test 
 
Granger causality is applied to examine the information flows for Chinese dual- and 
triple-listings. The Akaide and Schwarz Bayes Information Criteria are used when 
choosing the optimal number of lags. Granger’s F-statistics for the null hypothesis are 
reported in Appendices 7.1 to 7.3. If we look at the short run information transmission 
by using the return series for China A- and B-shares, the null hypothesis of no causality 
from A-share to B-share or from B-share to A-share could not be easily rejected. 
However, approximately half of the observation pairs demonstrate one way information 
transmission either from China A to China B or China B to China A, and Granger 
causality runs one-way from China A to China B appears more.  The similar result also 
found for the dual-listed China A- and H-shares. Appendix 7.2 demonstrate strong uni-
directional causality from Hong Kong to China A. This result is further supported by the 
study of the triple-listed Chinese A-, H- and N-shares. Panel B of Appendix 7.3 shows 
that 9 out of 11 pairs show high rejection rates of the null hypothesis that there is no 
causality from Hong Kong to China A. Panel A of Appendix 7.3 also demonstrates that 
New York also takes the influential market position to dual-listed Chinese A-shares.  
 
It is generally thought that the US market will dominate most other markets around the 
world with little influence exerted by these markets to the US market (Yang et al. 2003). 
On the issue of the Chinese dual-listing, the Granger causality result shows that for the 
Chinese securities dual-listed in Hong Kong and New York market, the New York 
series affect Hong Kong series more with a larger F-statistics and the probability values 
are all lower than 0.05 or close to 0 although substantial information flows also found 
from Hong Kong to New York market. Unlike the other dual-listing series, the 
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information flow between Hong Kong and New York are mutually Granger cause each 
other.  
 
One implication derived from the Granger causality test suggests that the overseas part 
in the cross-listing securities have the price influence power more than their counterpart 
of China A-shares. Even the New York Chinese ADRs could affect the dual-listed 
Mainland Chinese securities to some extent. This result is not consistent with the 
argument of dominant-satellite proposed by Garbade and Silber (1979), while in the 
case of Chinese cross-listing, the foreign market acted as the dominate market while 
China domestic market as the satellite one. Hypothesis 6 is rejected under these 
empirical results. 
 
5.4.5 Error Correction Model 
 
Based on the unit root tests and cointegration tests in the series involved in all the 
Chinese dual-listed securities, the tests of them verify that 68 dual-listed China A-share 
and B-share cases,11 Hong Kong and China A dual-listed shares and  14 Hong Kong-
New York dual-listed Chinese shares are I(1) stationary and cointegrated. The return 
correction within these 93 dual-listed cases using error correction model is further 
examined. We examine the results by splitting them into three groups: China A-share 
versus China B-share, Hong Kong versus China A-share, and Hong Kong versus New 
York. The error correction model (equation 5.32, 5.33, 5.34, 5.35, 5.36, 5.37) then 
enables us to explore any systematic linkages between these dual-listed share returns. In 
general, variables of the short run elasticity term of ∆
 
and ∆5, and the market indices 
both home and abroad are highly significant in explaining the behaviour of share prices 
for all the 93 cases in the three groups. 
 
The coefficient of determination adjusted R square is larger for the Hong Kong-New 
York group. In all of the three groups, the error correction factor is sometimes 
insignificant. For the pairs that have significant error correction factor, this implies that 
the dual-listed Chinese shares contribute mutually to the price changes, and appear to be 
rather symmetric in terms of the error correction mechanism, Hypothesis 7 is rejected. 
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Table 5.9: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on China A- 
and B-share Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.32 when China B 
returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Anhui Guijing Distiller 0.000 0.434*** 0.008 -0.103*** 0.544*** 0.451 657.939 3197 2.010
(-0.156) (26.920) (0.545) (-3.364) (27.172)
Bengang Steel Plate 0.000 0.304*** -0.020 -0.050 0.695*** 0.563 922.050 2858 1.925
(0.570) (16.976) (-1.474) (-1.487) (35.951)
BOE Technology 0.000 0.524*** -0.037** -0.129*** 0.602*** 0.627 874.296 2077 1.994
(0.072) (34.404) (-2.126) (-3.339) (21.749)
Changchai Company 0.000 0.359*** 0.020 -0.064** 0.710*** 0.558 1014.012 3207 2.015
(-0.782) (22.332) (1.497) (-2.078) (36.796)
China Fanda 0.000 0.339*** -0.037*** -0.091*** 0.790*** 0.541 978.135 3316 1.989
(0.468) (21.699) (-2.901) (-2.893) (38.123)
China First Pencil  0.000 0.164*** 0.052*** -0.165*** 0.950*** 0.429 785.701 4172 2.103
(1.013) (8.777) (5.168) (-6.157) (49.150)
China Interational Marine Container 0.000 0.285*** -0.010 -0.131*** 0.632*** 0.385 601.147 3842 1.975
(1.239) (16.628) (-0.857) (-5.709) (35.677)
China Merchants Propert Development 0.000 0.251*** 0.047*** -0.111*** 0.674*** 0.345 536.664 4061 1.975
(1.056) (15.852) (4.192) (-4.624) (34.722)
China Textile Machinery 0.000 0.245*** 0.044*** -0.230*** 0.829*** 0.357 579.692 4172 2.063
(-0.297) (14.949) (4.256) (-9.100) (41.088)
Chongqing Changan Automobile 0.000 0.443*** -0.029** -0.245*** 0.758** 0.476 685.501 3015 1.948
(0.245) (21.710) (-2.020) (-5.968) (31.085)
CSG Holding  0.000 0.249*** -0.015 -0.073*** 0.699*** 0.404 706.844 4172 1.963
(0.354) (18.142) (-1.396) (-3.602) (38.767)
Dalian Referigerator 0.000 0.295*** -0.014 0.914*** -0.144*** 0.497 696.674 2812 1.954
(-1.052) (17.453) (-1.028) (32.271) (-6.196)
Danhua chemical  0.000 0.411*** 0.049*** -0.377*** 0.875*** 0.508 997.969 3862 2.005
(0.556) (32.564) (4.630) (-16.833) (47.213)
Dazhong Transportation 0.000 0.190*** 0.011 -0.220*** 0.996*** 0.540 1224.312 4172 2.016
(0.962) (12.457) (1.251) (-10.286) (61.649)
Double Coin  0.000 0.166*** 0.007 -0.193*** 1.080*** 0.556 1305.146 4172 2.139
(-0.482) (11.207) (0.775) (-8.693) (63.818)
Eastern Communications 0.000 0.319*** -0.028** -0.279*** 0.917*** 0.557 992.199 3155 1.977
(0.407) (19.113) (-2.247) (-8.353) (43.599)
Foshan Electrical 0.000 0.284*** 0.050*** -0.066*** 0.584*** 0.467 767.143 3495 2.025
(1.002) (17.102) (4.038) (-2.607) (35.819)
Guangdong Provincial Expressway 0.000 0.277*** 0.049*** -0.091*** 0.612*** 0.438 553.704 2832 2.053
(0.428) (13.404) (3.368) (-2.665) (29.247)
Hainan Airlines  0.000 0.446*** 0.041*** -0.371*** 0.889*** 0.669 1197.235 2373 2.086
(-0.571) (28.022) (2.875) (-10.693) (39.749)
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 0.000 0.436*** 0.013 -0.047 0.431*** 0.353 425.455 3110 2.007
(-0.627) (27.983) (0.898) (-1.337) (18.306)
Hainan Pearl River Holdings 0.000 0.460*** 0.134*** -0.144*** 0.626*** 0.304 384.634 3522 2.053
(-0.246) (22.870) (9.176) (-3.223) (19.971)
Hefei Meiling  0.000 0.341*** -0.028** -0.049 0.724*** 0.485 757.635 3219 1.998
(-0.390) (17.632) (-2.025) (-1.385) (32.790)
Huadian Energy  0.000 0.143*** -0.004 -0.197*** 1.043*** 0.699 1895.263 3261 2.039
(0.201) (9.431) (-0.397) (-7.955) (69.217)
Huangshan Tourism  0.000 0.280*** 0.026** -0.261*** 0.904*** 0.587 1079.231 3040 1.932
(0.628) (16.298) (2.184) (-8.565) (18.184)
Huaxin Cement  0.001 0.253*** 0.046*** -0.255*** 0.964*** 0.484 860.577 3667 2.011
(1.304) (14.082) (3.976) (-8.240) (46.196)
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 0.000 0.377*** 0.057*** -0.244*** 0.809*** 0.569 992.532 3010 2.026
(-0.488) (25.041) (4.542) (-8.422) (43.309)
Jinzhou Port  0.000 0.339*** -0.020* -0.256*** 0.942*** 0.756 1930.031 2494 1.966
(0.255) (24.475) (-1.704) (-9.318) (53.702)
Konka Group 0.000 0.203*** 0.008 0.674*** 0.059*** 0.453 863.489 4172 2.001
(-0.367) (14.786) (0.741) (43.980) (3.275)
Livzon Pharmaceutical 0.000 0.303*** 0.041*** -0.154*** 0.724*** 0.383 614.034 3958 2.041
(0.756) (18.406) (3.549) (-6.318) (36.291)
Luthai Textile 0.001 0.404*** -0.037** -0.107*** 0.590*** 0.594 766.293 2091 1.954
(1.619) (23.553) (-2.272) (-3.113) (25.607)
SGSB Group 0.000 0.165*** 0.031*** -0.153*** 1.016*** 0.493 938.304 3862 2.144
(-0.338) (11.379) (3.210) (-6.100) (52.060)
Shangdong Chenming Paper 0.000 0.343*** -0.019 -0.064* 0.638*** 0.603 804.478 2116 1.959
(1.033) (18.686) (-1.234) (-1.791) (27.697)
Shanghai Automation Instrument 0.000 0.356*** 0.044*** -0.375*** 0.959*** 0.524 1052.001 3827 2.051
(0.521) (24.105) (4.305) (-15.234) (51.655)
Shanghai Baosight 0.001 0.316*** 0.026** -0.291*** 0.882*** 0.296 406.626 3859 2.036
(1.0690 (15.139) (2.120) (-8.273) (32.656)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
2γ
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(continued) 
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Shanghai Diesel 0.000 0.215*** -0.012 -0.254*** 1.042*** 0.556 1208.156 3862 2.005
(0.196) (14.161) (-1.275) (-10.822) (59.663)
Shanghai Dingli Technology 0.000 0.220*** 0.023 -0.135*** 0.737*** 0.314 442.412 3862 2.108
(0.608) (13.431) (1.915) (-4.913) (33.267)
Shanghai Erfangji 0.000 0.238*** 0.076*** -0.248*** 1.070*** 0.541 1288.452 4172 2.116
(-0.279) (16.255) (8.213) (-10.871) (60.152)
Shanghai Friendship 0.000 0.115*** 0.043*** -0.106*** 0.898*** 0.518 1044.012 3887 2.131
(1.250) (7.756) (4.725) (-4.679) (56.041)
Shanghai Highly Group 0.000 0.200*** 0.035*** -0.198*** 0.991*** 0.503 1054.235 4161 2.073
(0.882) (12.625) (3.637) (-8.581) (56.117)
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel 0.000 0.254*** 0.075*** -0.308*** 0.964*** 0.635 1386.012 3187 2.100
(0.378) (15.953) (6.836) (-10.959) (56.792)
Shanghai Jinjiang International 0.000 0.135*** 0.049*** -0.117*** 0.941*** 0.486 938.996 3966 2.082
(0.934) (7.754) (4.955) (-4.504) (52.528)
Shanghai Jinqiao  0.000 0.257*** 0.070*** -0.245*** 0.977*** 0.576 1382.120 4066 2.027
(0.883) (16.843) (7.478) (-11.182) (62.420)
Shanghai Kaikai  0.000 0.239*** -0.032*** -0.154*** 0.949*** 0.663 1001.123 2044 1.928
(-0.508) (22.527) (-2.837) (-4.249) (35.722)
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 0.000 0.269*** 0.034*** -0.304*** 0.983*** 0.696 2106.231 3680 1.982
(1.001) (20.865) (3.781) (-15.192) (73.863)
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical 0.000 0.176*** 0.025** -0.157*** 0.944*** 0.481 896.763 3873 2.033
(0.864) (10.996) (2.456) (-6.290) (50.949)
Shanghai Nine Dragon 0.000 0.458*** 0.014 -0.329*** 0.717*** 0.594 738.438 2024 1.871
(0.087) (27.723) (0.837) (-8.241) (25.459)
Shanghai Potevio 0.000 0.270*** 0.030*** -0.265*** 0.953*** 0.562 1189.011 3703 2.096
(0.225) (19.397) (2.922) (-10.758) (54.196)
Shanghai Sanmao 0.000 0.309*** 0.021* -0.287*** 0.894*** 0.422 715.442 3911 2.090
(0.517) (18.511) (1.899) (-10.416) (42.181)
Shanghai Wingsung 0.000 0.283*** 0.060*** -0.177*** 0.799*** 0.319 488.717 4172 2.084
(-0.080) (16.279) (5.111) (-6.811) (34.916)
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington 0.000 0.191*** 0.049*** -0.226*** 0.931*** 0.486 919.999 3892 2.175
(-0.127) (12.540) (5.019) (-9.730) (52.848)
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery 0.001 0.393*** -0.009 -0.396*** 0.886*** 0.610 819.576 2093 1.883
(1.630) (20.422) (-0.591) (-10.436) (34.789)
Shenzhen SEG  0.000 0.379*** -0.023* -0.028 0.619*** 0.488 747.017 3133 2.003
(-0.674) (24.062) (-1.671) (-0.832) (28.929)
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 0.000 0.364*** 0.025** -0.135*** 0.741*** 0.442 773.132 3906 2.028
(-0.325) (24.062) (2.114) (-5.504) (36.087)
Shenzhen Textile 0.000 0.300*** 0.012 -0.133*** 0.742*** 0.331 463.845 3751 1.946
(0.184) (16.169) (0.952) (-4.015) (29.715)
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical 0.000 0.260*** 0.022* -0.085*** 0.712*** 0.308 448.305 4015 1.982
(0.719) (14.629) (1.846) (-3.014) (30.988)
Shenzhen International Enterprise 0.000 0.480*** 0.002 -0.248*** 0.650*** 0.425 598.088 3235 1.984
(0.193) (27.112) (0.107) (-6.361) (25.521)
Shenzhen Nanshan Power 0.000 0.358*** 0.066*** -0.150*** 0.648*** 0.379 561.081 3676 2.014
(0.634) (19.910) (5.105) (-4.983) (30.595)
Shenzhen Properties and Resources 0.000 0.396*** -0.001 -0.149*** 0.602*** 0.311 471.600 4172 1.984
(-0.446) (23.000) (-0.111) (-6.021) (27.561)
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial 0.000 0.276*** 0.071*** -0.045 0.537*** 0.207 272.441 4172 1.968
(-0.002) (15.221) (5.631) (-1.574) (20.597)
Shenzhen Tellus 0.000 0.403*** 0.101*** -0.245*** 0.563*** 0.221 286.236 5041 2.008
(-0.095) (20.390) (7.722) (-7.131) (19.576)
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile 0.000 0.232*** 0.060*** -0.072*** 0.649*** 0.200 260.915 4172 1.979
(-0.311) (11.558) (4.803) (-2.345) (23.589)
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa 0.000 0.228*** 0.033*** -0.093*** 0.579*** 0.200 261.262 4172 1.908
(-0.277) (15.203) (2.940) (-3.589) (23.759)
Shijianzhuang Baoshi 0.000 0.422*** -0.026* -0.079** 0.621*** 0.474 721.436 3199 1.952
(-0.516) (27.262) (-1.887) (-2.413) (28.543)
SVA Electron  0.000 0.274*** 0.081*** -0.259*** 0.922*** 0.479 960.880 4172 2.161
(0.150) (17.292) (8.233) (-10.801) (51.395)
Weifu High Technology 0.000 0.320*** 0.018 -0.013 0.631*** 0.502 676.879 2678 1.973
(-0.079) (16.818) (1.230) (-0.350) (26.989)
Wuxi Littleswan  0.000 0.357*** -0.010 -0.153*** 0.702*** 0.507 785.885 3067 2.044
(-0.396) (21.682) (-0.749) (-4.589) (34.172)
Yantai Changyu 0.001 0.291*** -0.025 -0.073* 0.581*** 0.409 370.450 2133 1.959
(2.384) (13.352) (-1.517) (-1.891) (21.598)
Zhong Lu 0.000 0.306*** -0.002 -0.218*** 0.725*** 0.336 493.738 3892 2.015
(0.036) (19.164) (-0.208) (-8.190) (33.783)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
2γ
  
129 
Table 5.10: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on China 
A- and B-share Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.33 when China 
A Returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Anhui Guijing Distiller 0.000 0.427*** 0.034** 0.696*** -0.198*** 0.412 559.797 3197 1.865
(-0.972) (26.920) (2.437) (25.079) (-9.121)
Bengang Steel Plate 0.000 0.302*** 0.005 0.981*** -0.199*** 0.509 740.144 2858 1.920
(-0.774) (16.976) (0.388) (36.641) (-8.708)
BOE Technology 0.000 0.694*** 0.043** 0.600*** -0.281*** 0.546 624.114 2077 1.972
(-0.723) (34.404) (2.159) (14.085) (-8.084)
Changchai Company 0.000 0.375*** 0.024* 0.893*** -0.165*** 0.501 805.223 3207 1.937
(-1.337) (22.332) (1.791) (32.426) (-7.050)
China Fanda 0.000 0.367*** 0.031** 0.896*** -0.152*** 0.464 717.801 3316 1.971
(-0.959) (21.699) (2.347) (31.011) (-5.912)
China First Pencil  0.000 0.111*** 0.001 1.029*** -0.044** 0.585 1471.012 4172 2.031
(0.008) (8.777) (0.085) (66.820) (-2.180)
China Interational Marine Container 0.000 0.236*** -0.002 0.797*** -0.049** 0.505 980.050 3842 1.973
(0.806) (16.628) (-0.203) (48.027) (-2.645)
China Merchants Propert Development 0.000 0.233*** -0.015 0.858*** -0.083*** 0.445 815.793 4061 1.928
(0.319) (15.852) (-1.405) (45.208) (-3.911)
China Textile Machinery 0.000 0.207*** -0.005 0.972*** -0.180*** 0.477 952.528 4172 1.935
(-0.461) (14.949) (-0.484) (54.048) (-8.235)
Chongqing Changan Automobile 0.000 0.305*** 0.013 1.005*** -0.232*** 0.485 709.241 3015 2.000
(-0.566) (21.710) (1.115) (34.765) (-10.336)
CSG Holding  0.000 0.294*** 0.011 0.725*** -0.042* 0.404 707.082 4172 1.931
(0.184) (18.142) (0.941) (38.350) (-1.858)
Dalian Referigerator 0.000 0.331*** 0.012 -0.155*** 0.718*** 0.533 801.568 2812 2.031
(0.185) (17.453) (0.855) (-4.428) (34.481)
Danhua chemical  0.000 0.524*** -0.030** 0.928*** -0.446*** 0.476 877.936 3862 1.955
(-0.286) (32.564) (-2.522) (43.110) (-17.616)
Dazhong Transportation 0.000 0.189*** 0.012 0.970*** -0.100*** 0.561 1331.234 4172 1.950
(0.559) (12.457) (1.301) (62.479) (-4.511)
Double Coin  0.000 0.176*** 0.021** 1.015*** -0.099*** 0.542 1233.235 4172 1.999
(-1.313) (11.207) (2.300) (60.242) (-4.063)
Eastern Communications 0.000 0.326*** 0.035*** 0.952*** -0.178*** 0.452 652.469 3155 1.918
(-0.960) (19.113) (2.760) (32.125) (-6.656)
Foshan Electrical 0.000 0.272*** -0.007 0.781*** -0.072*** 0.475 790.644 3495 1.953
(0.050) (17.102) (-0.543) (37.237) (-3.858)
Guangdong Provincial Expressway 0.000 0.216*** -0.001 0.771*** -0.061*** 0.432 539.316 2832 1.873
(-0.736) (13.404) (-0.089) (28.891) (-2.918)
Hainan Airlines  0.000 0.558*** -0.012 0.961*** -0.406*** 0.559 750.412 2373 2.014
(-0.385) (28.022) (-0.779) (27.931) (-13.027)
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 0.000 0.462*** -0.038** 0.603*** -0.244*** 0.318 363.239 3110 1.974
(-1.026) (27.983) (-2.556) (17.428) (-9.716)
Hainan Pearl River Holdings 0.000 0.282*** -0.029** 0.824*** -0.125*** 0.343 460.879 3522 1.889
(-0.163) (22.870) (-2.490) (25.644) (-4.847)
Hefei Meiling  0.000 0.259*** 0.021* 0.872*** -0.078*** 0.470 715.487 3219 1.937
(-1.403) (17.632) (1.746) (32.671) (-3.536)
Huadian Energy  0.000 0.186*** 0.016 0.937*** -0.121*** 0.474 735.263 3261 1.943
(-1064) (9.431) (1.503) (39.904) (-4.503)
Huangshan Tourism  0.000 0.288*** -0.003 0.855*** -0.195*** 0.419 549.425 3040 2.013
(-0.062) (16.298) (-0.284) (31.421) (-7.797)
Huaxin Cement  0.000 0.203*** -0.008 1.014*** -0.091*** 0.494 894.297 3667 1.974
(-0.222) (14.082) (-0.757) (45.267) (-3.857)
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 0.000 0.459*** -0.019 0.679*** -0.336*** 0.350 406.006 3010 1.897
(-1.043) (25.041) (--1.350) (22.718) (-13.132)
Jinzhou Port  0.000 0.572*** 0.043*** 0.890*** -0.430*** 0.544 741.559 2494 1.984
(-0.668) (24.475) (2.808) (28.209) (-13.301)
Konka Group 0.000 0.246*** -0.026** -0.097*** 0.581*** 0.325 505.545 4172 1.984
(0.176) (14.786) (-2.290) (-4.778) (32.928)
Livzon Pharmaceutical 0.000 0.261*** -0.009 0.806*** -0.077*** 0.450 808.858 3958 1.954
(0.318) (18.406) (-0.818) (42.795) (-3.589)
Luthai Textile 0.000 0.519*** 0.062*** 0.747*** -0.230*** 0.521 568.416 2091 1.952
(-0.059) (23.553) (3.408) (21.169) (-7.795)
SGSB Group 0.000 0.197*** 0.013 1.033*** -0.139*** 0.453 797.102 3862 1.962
(-0.871) (11.379) (1.257) (47.132) (-4.998)
Shangdong Chenming Paper 0.000 0.414*** 0.039** 0.846*** -0.171*** 0.543 629.768 2116 1.966
(-0.500) (18.686) (2.230) (24.642) (-5.823)
Shanghai Automation Instrument 0.000 0.371*** -0.029*** 1.049*** -0.297*** 0.544 1140.032 3827 1.913
(-1.040) (24.105) (-2.713) (53.695) (-12.279)
Shanghai Baosight 0.000 0.178*** 0.012 1.030*** -0.185*** 0.464 834.418 3859 1.969
(-0.846) (15.139) (1.303) (49.500) (-8.163)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
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(continued)
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Shanghai Diesel 0.000 0.230*** 0.007 1.004*** -0.169*** 0.522 1056.341 3862 1.891
(-0.798) (14.161) (0.664) (54.274) (-6.794)
Shanghai Dingli Technology 0.000 0.182*** 0.027*** 0.951*** -0.121*** 0.444 834.907 3862 1.918
(-0.394) (12.829) (2.744) (49.710) (-5.432)
Shanghai Erfangji 0.000 0.254*** -0.015 1.025*** -0.193*** 0.530 1176.453 4172 1.976
(-1.120) (16.255) (-1.514) (58.076) (-7.811)
Shanghai Friendship 0.000 0.133*** -0.023** 1.039*** -0.103*** 0.541 1146.231 3887 2.054
(0.176) (7.756) (-2.369) (58.770) (-4.467)
Shanghai Highly Group 0.000 0.184*** 0.014 0.989*** -0.089*** 0.551 1276.483 4161 1.938
(-0.810) (12.625) (1.500) (60.714) (-3.987)
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel 0.000 0.292*** -0.016 0.992*** -0.187*** 0.500 796.891 3187 1.955
(-0.388) (15.953) (-1.368) (39.406) (-7.288)
Shanghai Jinjiang International 0.000 0.110*** 0.006 1.057*** -0.040* 0.590 1426.412 3966 2.020
(-0.649) (7.754) (0.671) (64.333) (-1.908)
Shanghai Jinqiao  0.000 0.254*** -0.025*** 0.996*** -0.158*** 0.594 1485.021 4066 1.958
(-0.532) (16.843) (-2.728) (63.870) (-7.290)
Shanghai Kaikai  0.000 0.834*** -0.033 0.794*** -0.580*** 0.365 294.240 2044 2.013
(-0.331) (22.527) (-1.552) (12.122) (-9.343)
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 0.000 0.394*** -0.007 0.960*** -0.287*** 0.546 1108.001 3680 1.962
(-0.796) (20.865) (-0.662) (49.852) (-11.502)
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical 0.000 0.172*** -0.025** 1.012*** -0.120*** 0.510 1010.101 3873 1.925
(0.077) (10.993) (-2.489) (53.788) (-5.079)
Shanghai Nine Dragon 0.000 0.602*** 0.042** 0.920*** -0.337*** 0.554 629.969 2024 2.048
(-0.753) (27.723) (2.253) (22.054) (-9.278)
Shanghai Potevio 0.000 0.342*** 0.001 0.954*** -0.226*** 0.455 773.521 3703 2.002
(-0.824) (19.397) (0.082) (40.953) (-8.616)
Shanghai Sanmao 0.000 0.261*** -0.002 1.007*** -0.143*** 0.505 998.232 3911 2.010
(-0.594) (18.511) (-0.209) (50.445) (-6.115)
Shanghai Wingsung 0.000 0.211*** -0.011 0.779*** -0.087*** 0.382 645.592 4172 1.896
(-0.666) (16.279) (-1.108) (40.752) (-3.884)
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington 0.000 0.203*** -0.009 0.969*** -0.145*** 0.490 934.389 3892 1.877
(-0.754) (12.540) (-0.920) (52.004) (-6.148)
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery 0.000 0.424*** 0.013 0.904*** -0.261*** 0.521 569.258 2093 1.937
(0.800) (20.422) (0.779) (25.667) (-7.977)
Shenzhen SEG  0.000 0.412*** 0.024* 0.781*** -0.200*** 0.411 546.445 3133 1.922
(-0.829) (24.062) (1.678) (24.366) (-8.033)
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 0.000 0.355*** -0.015 0.792*** -0.107*** 0.461 836.981 3906 1.927
(-0.674) (24.062) (-1.276) (38.196) (-4.568)
Shenzhen Textile 0.000 0.218*** 0.023** 0.913*** -0.053** 0.422 684.094 3751 1.948
(-0.380) (16.169) (2.133) (38.161) (-2.235)
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical 0.000 0.195*** -0.014 0.865*** -0.065*** 0.420 727.354 4015 1.918
(0.198) (14.629) (-1.318) (42.532) (-2.927)
Shenzhen International Enterprise 0.000 0.387*** 0.021 0.900*** -0.159*** 0.452 669.068 3235 1.933
(-0.543) (27.112) (1.626) (28.552) (-6.394)
Shenzhen Nanshan Power 0.000 0.272*** -0.020* 0.860*** -0.113*** 0.452 760.182 3676 1.958
(-0.685) (19.910) (-1.814) (38.604) (-5.483)
Shenzhen Properties and Resources 0.000 0.285*** -0.033*** 0.642*** -0.050** 0.391 671.739 4172 1.942
(-0.776) (23.000) (-3.080) (35.896) (-2.483)
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial 0.000 0.191*** -0.027** 0.721*** 0.058** 0.346 553.757 4172 1.985
(-0.564) (15.221) (-2.543) (34.405) (2.547)
Shenzhen Tellus 0.000 0.231*** -0.042*** 0.891*** -0.043* 0.414 715.281 5041 1.904
(-0.734) (20.390) (-4.204) (40.302) (-1.903)
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile 0.000 0.134*** -0.022** 0.766*** 0.051** 0.356 578.249 4172 1.986
(-0.869) (11.558) (-2.289) (37.829) (2.272)
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa 0.000 0.231*** -0.013 0.702*** -0.090*** 0.254 355.370 4172 1.963
(-0.777) (15.203) (-1.154) (29.502) (-3.441)
Shijianzhuang Baoshi 0.000 0.447*** 0.031** 0.700*** -0.219*** 0.392 515.460 3199 1.975
(-0.709) (27.262) (2.211) (22.388) (-8.845)
SVA Electron  0.000 0.245*** -0.024*** 1.039*** -0.155*** 0.574 1404.234 4172 2.019
(-0.681) (17.292) (-2.623) (63.310) (-7.215)
Weifu High Technology 0.000 0.299*** -0.025* 0.913*** -0.115*** 0.483 627.431 2678 1.954
(0.037) (16.818) (-1.730) (27.863) (-4.506)
Wuxi Littleswan  0.000 0.373*** 0.027** 0.895*** -0.216*** 0.440 603.385 3067 1.986
(-1.000) (21.682) (1.984) (29.611) (-8.854)
Yantai Changyu 0.000 0.266*** 0.034** 0.615*** -0.115*** 0.326 258.700 2133 1.891
(0.979) (13.352) (2.111) (17.717) (-4.055)
Zhong Lu 0.000 0.283*** 0.005 0.913*** -0.201*** 0.423 714.626 3892 1.933
(-0.385) (19.164) (0.412) (43.032) (-8.645)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
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Table 5.11: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on China A 
and Hong Kong Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.34 when Hong 
Kong Returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
 
Table 5.12: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on China A 
and Hong Kong Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.35 when China 
A Returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Air China 0.000 0.333*** 0.000 1.142*** -0.113 0.543 184.485 618 1.975
(0.137) (8.576) (-2.31) (20.261) (-1.512)
China Merchants Bank 0.000 0.255*** 0.001 1.097*** -0.086* 0.737 416.092 593 1.925
(-0.093) (7.147) (0.249) (29.880) (-1.746)
China Oilfield Services 0.041 0.332*** 0.014 1.372*** -0.187* 0.639 145.995 328 1.987
(1.440) (4.569) (1.447) (18.789) (-1.630)
China Railway Construction 0.007** 0.681*** 0.094*** 0.616*** -0.321** 0.471 47.230 209 2.376
(2.453) (7.128) (3.465) (7.760) (-2.512)
China Shenhua Energy 0.028 0.355*** 0.014 1.292*** -0.271*** 0.701 188.141 321 2.028
(1.246) (5.419) (1.248) (21.615) (-2.938)
Datang International Power 0.005 0.136*** 0.005 1.123*** 0.024 0.476 121.154 530 1.822
(1.159) (2.996) (1.074) (17.738) (0.295)
Huadian Power 0.002 0.089*** 0.003 0.965*** 0.074 0.331 126.930 1019 1.952
(0.706) (2.705) (0.901) (18.648) (1.215)
Industrial and Commerce Bank 0.000 0.291*** 0.002 1.058*** -0.221*** 0.795 551.508 568 2.022
(0.267) (8.132) (0.494) (38.956) (-5.540)
Ping An Insurance 0.005 0.290*** 0.002 1.091*** -0.013 0.745 349.962 479 1.836
(0.835) (7.151) (0.653) (25.014) (-0.222)
Sinopec Yizheng -0.003** 0.217*** 0.003** 0.968*** -0.030 0.198 222.270 3581 1.891
(-2.545) (7.867) (2.322) (27.115) (-0.675)
ZTE -0.022*** 0.384*** 0.013*** 0.922*** -0.140*** 0.398 175.639 1059 2.045
(-2.769) (11.688) (2.776) (19.472) (-2.826)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
2γ
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Air China 0.002 0.322*** -0.003 -0.475*** 1.187*** 0.548 185.548 618 1.954
(0.790) (8.576) (-0.717) (-6.882) (21.133)
China Merchants Bank 0.007 0.314*** -0.009 -0.086 0.923*** 0.661 289.514 593 2.032
(1.450) (7.147) (-1.433) (-1.340) (23.561)
China Oilfield Services -0.037* 0.183*** -0.015* -0.237*** 1.070*** 0.593 120.048 328 1.886
(-1.740) (4.569) (-1.749) (-3.062) (17.431)
China Railway Construction -0.002 0.293*** -0.053*** -0.239*** 0.871*** 0.657 100.771 209 2.121
(-0.925) (7.128) (-2.951) (-4.162) (14.709)
China Shenhua Energy -0.036** 0.239*** -0.018** -0.232*** 0.950*** 0.701 188.141 321 2.028
(-1.996) (5.419) (-1.968) (-3.047) (17.283)
Datang International Power 0.001 0.124*** 0.000 -0.151** 1.101*** 0.615 128.670 530 1.759
(0.175) (2.996) (-0.017) (-1.981) (18.208)
Huadian Power -0.002 0.080*** -0.001 -0.189*** 1.094*** 0.400 170.446 1019 1.841
(-0.660) (2.705) (-0.497) (-3.340) (23.769)
Industrial and Commerce Bank 0.002* 0.361*** -0.010** -0.283*** 0.827*** 0.685 308.670 568 1.774
(1.831) (8.132) (-2.412) (-4.966) (28.075)
Ping An Insurance -0.007 0.336*** -0.005 -0.061 0.839*** 0.636 210.099 479 1.946
(-1.215) (7.151) (-1.150) (-0.852) (17.553)
Sinopec Yizheng 0.001 0.078*** -0.002** -0.161*** 1.041*** 0.450 734.573 3581 1.948
(1.786) (7.867) (-2.353) (-6.877) (52.063)
ZTE 0.002 0.299*** 0.000 -0.235*** 0.669*** 0.348 142.044 1059 1.893
(0.249) (11.688) (-0.234) (-4.886) (17.285)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
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Table 5.13: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on Hong 
Kong and New York Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.36 when 
New York Returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
 
 
Table 5.14: Price Linkage between Dual-Listed Chinese Stocks Traded on Hong 
Kong and New York Markets (with Error Correction Model Equation 5.37 when 
Hong Kong Returns as Dependent Variable) 
 
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Aluminum 0.000 0.708*** 0.030* 1.280*** -0.333*** 0.632 789.850 1840 2.615
(-0.584) (37.369) (1.850) (32.327) (-7.602)
China Eastern Airlines -0.015*** 0.679*** 0.146*** 0.819*** -0.204*** 0.571 1035.601 3105 2.719
(-13.964) (53.329) (15.336) (23.347) (-7.291)
China Life Insurance 0.001 0.828 -0.039 1.249 -0.529 0.642 590.679 1314 2.607
(1.976) (27.433) (-1.962) (31.728) (-10.786)
China Mobile 0.000 0.846*** 0.028** 1.154*** -0.485*** 0.609 1138.125 2919 2.516
(-1.292) (38.369) (2.004) (43.312) (-14.647)
China Petrol and Chemical 0.000 0.754*** 0.003 0.933*** -0.298*** 0.602 810.985 2139 2.748
(0.060) (37.813) (0.232) (30.382) (-8.560)
China Southern Airlines 0.001 0.724*** 0.098*** 0.990*** -0.223*** 0.613 1180.092 2978 2.653
(1.551) (56.126) (9.629) (28.516) (-8.054)
China Telecom 0.000 0.842*** -0.011 1.304*** -0.476*** 0.745 1167.859 1598 2.468
(-0.316) (41.156) (-0.768) (42.930) (-13.816)
China United Telecom 0.001 0.762*** -0.025* 1.323*** -0.441*** 0.667 1113.515 2224 2.444
(1.507) (39.671) (-1.707) (43.700) (-12.453)
CNOOC 0.001 0.640*** 0.009 -0.015 0.068** 0.381 334.059 2161 2.741
(0.637) (36.518) (0.470) (-0.359) (1.990)
Guangshen Railway 0.002*** 0.663*** 0.015*** 0.792*** -0.180*** 0.518 886.649 3296 2.503
(2.750) (49.869) (3.408) (27.884) (-8.019)
Huaneng Power 0.002*** 0.638*** 0.032*** 0.935*** -0.175*** 0.544 851.348 2855 2.559
(2.924) (45.075) (3.661) (30.581) (-6.723)
Petro China -0.001 0.681*** 0.018 0.864*** -0.226*** 0.570 756.195 2278 2.663
(-0.970) (36.375) (1.387) (32.062) (-7.764)
Sinopec Shanghai -0.002*** 0.721*** 0.031*** 0.946*** -0.240*** 0.619 1634.586 4026 2.591
(-4.371) (67.752) (5.749) (32.840) (-10.780)
Yanzhou Coal 0.005*** 0.715*** 0.063*** 0.720*** -0.135*** 0.588 1000.741 2804 2.648
(6.607) (51.612) (7.999) (20.878) (-4.389)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
2γ
Ajusted Durbin 
β0 β1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R square F N Watson
Aluminum 0.000 0.610*** 0.031*** -0.843*** 1.045*** 0.670 935.690 1840 2.430
(-1.322) (37.369) (2.049) (-20.253) (31.451)
China Eastern Airlines 0.009*** 0.705*** -0.094*** -0.601*** 0.658*** 0.585 1094.356 3105 2.478
(8.561) (53.329) (-9.467) (-16.148) (25.139)
China Life Insurance 0.000 0.441*** 0.040*** -0.573*** 1.042*** 0.762 1055.892 1314 2.318
(-0.988) (27.433) (2.786) (-16.501) (43.825)
China Mobile 0.000 0.397*** 0.004 -0.489*** 1.004*** 0.779 2573.142 2919 2.166
(0.266) (38.369) (0.393) (-22.690) (70.102)
China Petrol and Chemical -0.001 0.532*** 0.019 -0.493*** 0.857*** 0.377 1119.231 2139 2.416
(-1.350) (37.813) (1.607) (-17.012) (37.014)
China Southern Airlines 0.000 0.710*** -0.060*** -0.694*** 0.629*** 0.616 1193.346 2978 2.407
(-1.359) (56.126) (-5.940) (-18.930) (25.000)
China Telecom 0.000 0.612*** 0.013 -0.789*** 0.876*** 0.770 1336.145 1598 2.400
(0.644) (41.156) (1.009) (-24.260) (39.729)
China United Telecom -0.001*** 0.545*** 0.038*** -0.723*** 0.996*** 0.709 1354.465 2224 2.341
(-2.685) (39.671) (3.085) (-23.048) (44.125)
CNOOC 0.001 0.597*** 0.006 -0.001 -0.068*** 0.382 334.209 2161 2.582
(0.517) (36.518) (0.317) (-0.033) (-2.085)
Guangshen Railway -0.002*** 0.649*** -0.018*** -0.571*** 0.540*** 0.540 969.609 3296 2.485
(-3.224) (49.869) (-4.028) (-19.292) (26.453)
Huaneng Power 0.000 0.653*** -0.018** -0.616*** 0.597*** 0.536 825.772 2855 2.465
(-1.324) (45.075) (-1.957) (-18.289) (24.797)
Petro China 0.002 0.540*** -0.017 -0.485*** 0.748*** 0.631 972.779 2278 2.457
(1.695) (36.375) (-1.466) (-17.913) (35.650)
Sinopec Shanghai 0.002*** 0.739*** -0.028*** -0.734*** 0.657*** 0.646 1838.651 4026 0.465
(3.791) (67.752) (-5.122) (-23.896) (32.170)
Yanzhou Coal -0.003*** 0.682*** -0.041*** -0.481*** 0.652*** 0.615 1121.423 2804 2.431
(-4.117) (51.612) (-5.236) (-13.746) (23.745)
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, N presentate number of observations
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The error correction estimates also correspond to the above results of Granger causality, 
which suggested that new information is realised in both markets and thus there is no 
pure dominant-satellite market relationship between the dual-listed markets. In this case, 
both returns react to the pricing error and the coefficients are similar in magnitude. 
  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores the interactions among Chinese dual-listed stocks—A- and B-
shares listed in the local Chinese markets, H-shares listed in Hong Kong markets, and 
N-shares listed in New York stock market—using the price behaviour of individual 
stock return indices. By exploring how dual-listed securities process information, the 
empirical causality tests show that information processing mutually occurred on both 
sides in Hong Kong and New York, and there is no leading party. For the Chinese 
shares dual-listed in local China market and overseas markets, the information flow 
exhibits a uni-directional feature and overseas markets has influential power over price 
changes. The study of the dual-listed China A- and B-share provides moderate evidence 
showing a bi-directional causal relationship. However, the Chinese local stock market is 
still maintained as a segmented market to the other markets such as Hong Kong and 
New York. There are some new findings, for example, that China A-share and B-share 
markets are becoming more integrated in terms of the price linkage between dual-listed 
A-shares and B-shares. Despite the share price disparity between these dual-listed 
securities, the price movements are affected by the location of trade where they trade. 
The dual-listed shares do have the error correction mechanism in most of the cases. In 
summary, although China is still segmented to other markets, with the reforms further 
taken by the Chinese authorities, the development of the Chinese market would 
continue in a stable and healthy manner. 
 
An interesting and meaningful study about the relationship between Chinese dual-listed 
securities can be conducted in the future by studying the effect of short selling on the 
price changes of the dual-listed securities. However, since the Hong Kong and New 
York markets are free markets to an extent, and the dual-listed Chinese securities on 
these two markets are cointegrated and have very similar trends, which has been 
demonstrated in this chapter, it is still worthwhile to examine if there is an investment 
strategy that could be developed from the price discrepancy of the dual-listings. This is 
the subject of the following chapter.   
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Chapter 6: Cross-listing and Arbitrage 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The law of one price postulates that Chinese cross-border securities traded in Hong 
Kong and US in the form of ADRs are perfect substitutes, and that the price after 
exchange rate adjustments should be identical. When this law is violated, arbitrage 
opportunities exist which in turn ensures that the law of one price is upheld. The 
purpose of this chapter is to test whether arbitrage opportunities exists for Chinese 
securities traded in New York and Hong Kong, that is testing if the law of one price 
hold in this particular instance. Hong Kong and US are chosen because of the short 
selling potential which is not available in the Mainland China A and B markets. If the 
Hong Kong and US markets are integrated in terms of trading of cross-listed securities, 
the closing price in Hong Kong and the opening price in US for those cross-listings 
should not exhibit any exceptional levels of volatility, volume or spreads regarding the 
trading activity (Domowitz et al. 1998). However, the price disparity is readily observed 
for some of the dual-listed Chinese securities that are traded in both Hong Kong and 
New York markets. According to Malkiel (2007), H-shares and N-shares are reasonably 
priced relative to their growth rates, and yet the identical Chinese security traded in the 
local China A-share market is traded at a premium. The possible explanation to the 
identical Chinese securities sold at a premium in the local market but sold in the other 
market at a discount is called the reputational phenomenon (Cai 2007). Based on this 
phenomenon, issuers can piggyback on strong law enforcement and strong disclosure 
rules in these foreign jurisdictions, and sell their stocks in the home market at a 
premium (Cai 2007). One of the reasons for why arbitrageurs cannot profit from this 
mispricing is because of short selling restrictions.  
 
This chapter investigates the price disparity between these dual-listed or triple-listed 
Chinese securities and explores the arbitrage opportunities. Most of the dual-listed 
Chinese shares traded in the Hong Kong and New York markets also have their shares 
traded in the Mainland China market. As discussed above, since short selling is 
restricted in the Chinese mainland stock markets, the examination of the arbitrage 
opportunities focuses on the dual-listed Chinese securities that traded in Hong Kong and 
New York market in the form of ADRs. The empirical results suggest that arbitrage 
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opportunities do exist in these two markets before and after the consideration of 
transaction costs. This result is persistent after a number of robustness tests that includes 
executing the arbitrage strategy after a cut off rate, splitting the sample into two equal 
periods and controlling for autocorrelation. Although arbitrage opportunities exist for 
institutional investors, however, the non-trading time issue makes the arbitrage an 
uneasy task to execute. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 
describes a Chinese ADR, Section 5.3 explains the data and methodology used and 
Section 5.4 discusses the empirical findings. The chapter conclusion is in section 5.5. 
 
6.2 Chinese ADRs  
6.2.1 Time Difference among Different Markets 
Figure 6.1: Relative Timing of Trading Days on China (HK included) Stock 
Exchanges and New York Stock Exchange 
 
Sources: Mak, Billy S. C. and Asta M.S. Ngai, Market Linkage for Dual-listed Chinese 
Stocks, The Chinese Economy 38(2), pp.96, 2005. The trading time information is 
double checked from the respective stock exchange website, and Figure 5.1 is still valid. 
 
Figure 6.1 presents the timing of the trading day in two major markets in which Chinese 
companies are listed and traded in relation to the trading day on the Mainland China 
stock exchanges. The trading hours of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are from 10:00 
am to 3:30 pm with a two-hour (12:30–2:30 pm) lunch break. The trading hours of 
China’s Stock Exchanges are 09:30–11:30 am, then 1:00–3:30 pm. The trading hours of 
the New York Stock Exchange are 9:30 am to 4:00 pm (North American East Time 
Zone). New York is 12 hours behind the Hong Kong market. In this case, the trading 
hours do not overlap. 
 
10  P.M.          3 A.M.     9:30 A.M.          4 P.M.        10 P.M.
10   A.M.    3:30 P.M.     9:30 P.M.          4 A.M.        10 A.M.
Trading day t-1 Trading day t+1
Hong Kong
New York
Trading day t-1 Trading day t
Trading day t
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6.2.2 ADR Settlement  
 
To understand the ADR arbitrage operation requires an understanding of how to 
translate ADRs into underlying shares and vice versa. Since ADR represents a specific 
number of underlying shares kept aside in the home market, the depositary bank can 
create new receipts when the demand for the ADRs is greater than their supply. When 
the demand falls short of supply, the depositary bank can cancel ADRs by just simply 
reversing this process (Suarez, 2005). 
 
Chinese ADRs are traded on US exchanges or in the OTC ‘pink sheet’ market and are 
quoted in US dollars. The holder of Chinese ADRs has the right to redeem the receipt 
for the underlying stocks. Transaction costs include bid-ask spreads and fees paid to the 
depositary bank for ADR creation and cancellation (Amary & Ottoni 2006). Therefore, 
when an ADR is trading at a discount to the underlying security, a trader can make 
arbitrage profits by buying the ADR, converting it into the underlying security, and then 
selling them in the underlying market. If the ADR is selling at a premium, a trader can 
buy the underlying security and then request the custodian bank to issue ADRs based on 
the underlying security. In absence of transactions costs and restrictions to capital flows, 
perfect cross-market arbitrage should equate the price of the two securities. Since the 
holders of ADRs can convert the ADRs into foreign currency-denominated underlying 
shares subject to cancellation and conversion fees, the investors can earn a risk-free 
profit if the price differential between the price of the ADR and the price in dollars of 
the underlying shares is sufficiently large to cover the transaction costs. Therefore, 
dealing with the ADR arbitrage, the creation and cancellation of ADRs must be 
considered, which might impede the arbitrage. The depositaries of the ADR would 
charge the brokers who trade across the US and the home market for their clients to 
obtain a better price, and charge to arbitrage traders trying to benefit from price 
differences. 
 
The following example illustrates the steps involved in the creation and cancellation of 
ADR based on the illustrations from Gande’s (1997) study and the ADR process 
explained on the website of New York Bank. 
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A US investor instructs his or her broker to buy 100 ADRs: 
1. The broker has two options for executing this trade: a) purchase 100 existing 
ADRs in the US market; b) purchase 100 shares (it is assumed that the ADR 
ratio is 1:1 in this example) in the home market (Hong Kong in this case) and 
have new ADRs created. In this example, we assume that option b is the least-
cost alternative. 
2. The broker in US contacts the local broker in Hong Kong to purchase 100 shares 
of the issuer in the Hong Kong market. 
3. The local broker purchases issuer’s shares in the home market. 
4. The local broker deposits the shares with the depositary’s custodian in the Hong 
Kong market. 
5. The custodian notifies the depositary that it received the underlying shares for 
deposit and instructs the depositary to create 100 new ADRs and hand them to 
the investor’s broker. 
6. The depositary complies with the instructions and issues 100 new ADRs and 
delivers them to the investor’s broker. 
Figure 6.2: A US Investor Creates an ADR Process 
 
Sources: Gande, Amar, 1997, American Depositary Receipts: Overview and Literature 
Survey, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 6(5). Bank of New York Website 
Mellon website, accessed 2008. 
US Investor
US Broker HK Broker
Depositary Hong Kong Home Market
Custodian
1 7
3
2
45
6
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7. The broker credits the investor’s account with 100 ADRs and deducts the 
investor’s account for the dollar value of the transaction (including fees and 
brokerage commissions). 
In contrast, the steps involved in the cancellation of an ADR follow the reverse 
direction. During the entire process, several transaction costs must be considered as well, 
which include: foreign brokerage fees; local brokerage fees; custodian charge for 
conversion (local and global); bank charges for transfer fees; and fund manager charges. 
 
The cancellation of ADR is illustrated in Figure 6.3 as below: 
Figure 6.3: A US Investor Cancels an ADR Process 
 
 
Sources: Gande, Amar, 1997, American Depositary Receipts: Overview and Literature 
Survey, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 6(5). And Bank of New York 
Website Mellon website, accessed 2008. 
1. A US investor instructs his or her broker to sell 100 ADRs. 
The broker has too options for executing this trade: a) sell the ADRs in the US 
market; b) sell the underlying 100 shares (it is assumed that the ADR ratio is 1:1 
in this example) in the home market (Hong Kong in this case) and have ADRs 
cancelled. In this example, it is assumed that option b is the highest value 
alternative. 
2. The US broker delivers ADRs to the depositary for cancellation. 
US Investor
US Broker HK Broker
Depositary Hong Kong Home Market
Custodian
1 7
6
3
5
4
2
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3. The US broker contacts a local broker in Hong Kong to sell 100 shares of the 
issuer in the Hong Kong market. 
4. The depositary cancels the ADRs and instructs its custodian in the issuer’s home 
market (HK) to release the underlying shares to the local broker. 
5. The custodian complies with the instructions of the depositary. 
6. The Hong Kong (Home) broker sells the underlying shares and remits the cash 
proceeds in dollar terms to the investor’s broker. 
7. The broker debits the investor’s account with 100 ADRs and credits the 
investor’s account for the dollar value of the transaction (net of fees and 
brokerage commissions). 
6.2.3 Chinese ADRs and Arbitrage 
 
A cross-listed Chinese company involves one company issuing identical but differently 
labelled shares that are traded in different markets. Theoretically, in integrated and 
efficient financial markets, stock prices of the identical securities should move in 
lockstep (De Jong 2009). It can be observed that the prices of Chinese shares listed in 
Hong Kong are different from their ADRs listed in the US. Several reasons might cause 
this price discrepancy. The time difference between trading hours in Hong Kong and 
US might cause different valuation of the shares (Hsu & Wang 2008). Market news and 
sentiments might be other factors that are responsible for the phenomenon of price 
discrepancy. The price differences between different markets provide potential arbitrage 
activity (Han 2004). 
 
If there is no time issue, Chinese ADRs traded during Hong Kong market hours offering 
a live arbitrage opportunity offers very little risk in such trading and the gap between 
the ADRs and underlying stock is minimal (Hsu & Wang 2008). When share prices 
exhibit large deviation from theoretical parity, an arbitrage position could be then set up 
by obtaining a long position in the relatively underpriced shares and a short position in 
the relatively overpriced shares. However, this strategy may be difficult to execute 
between Chinese markets and foreign markets because of the extremely limited foreign 
access to mainland shares and limited local access to shares listed internationally. Thus, 
a foreigner holds a share of Sinopec, for example, that is trading at a 25 per cent 
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premium in Shanghai, could not explore the arbitrage profit from short sale in Shanghai 
while buying them in Hong Kong or New York; because she/he is not allowed to do so 
according to the trading policies (short selling restriction) regulated by the Chinese 
authorities.  
 
While Chinese ADRs are listed and traded in the New York market, their underlying 
securities are traded in the Hong Kong market to provide another opportunity for 
arbitrageurs. Since ADRs are exchangeable into the underlying security and should have 
the same value; practically, if there is a spread between the perceived values in the two 
markets, arbitrage can be extracted. If the ADR is trading at a value lower than what the 
underlying share is in the other market, one can purchase the ADR and expect to make 
money as its value converges, and vice versa. 
 
6.3 Data and Methods 
6.3.1 Data and Methods 
 
One way of addressing the time difference between Hong Kong and New York is to 
follow Lau and Diltz’s (1994) methodology whereby the closing price of each listing in 
Hong Kong and the opening price of each listing in New York are recorded for analysis. 
The second adjustment will be to convert both prices into a common currency. For the 
price comparison or price disparity examination, all the New York stock prices are 
adjusted for exchange rates and are converted into the Hong Kong dollar equivalent. 
Further adjustment for the ratio of the ADR is considered. All the data used for analysis, 
including the opening, closing prices, foreign exchange rate are obtained from 
Datastream from the 1st of January 1993 to 31st of December 2008. In Chapter Four, 77 
dual listed firms were identified in China A and China B market and 33 in China A and 
Hong Kong market. There were 11 companies that were triple listed and three more 
companies that were dually traded on China A, Hong Kong and New York.  As there 
are short selling restrictions between the two Chinese markets, there is no practical 
reason to conduct the strategy for the Chinese market and Hong Kong market. 
Consequently we are left with only the later 14 companies.  
 
Table 6.1 depicts the summary descriptive statistics of the daily price disparity returns 
for all the 14 Chinese dual-listed securities that are traded in both Hong Kong and New 
York. The table shows that Chinese ADRs take a relatively higher premium up to 32.14 
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per cent (see the maximum value for China Easter) and discount down to -18.83 per 
cent (see the minimum value for Yanzhou) during the examined period. These entire 14 
price premium series exhibit a low dispersion level with modest standard deviation of 
one per cent to two point five per cent; that is, most of the price disparity return series 
are near their mean value. The excess kurtosis for some of the price disparity series are 
high, suggesting that there could be some extreme observations that lie at the tail of the 
distribution. These extreme observations could be seen as potential arbitrage 
opportunities. The positive or negative skewness may suggest that these extreme 
observations could be either price premium or price discount. The exceptional case is 
China Eastern, the data reflects a relative higher standard deviation of 2.7 per cent, 
wider price premium range of 48.48 per cent, and larger excess kurtosis. Overall, the 
relative low standard deviation may imply that the significant premiums or discounts 
could not have existed for long as arbitrageurs close the gap immediately when the high 
price difference is observed.  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Price Disparity Returns for 14 Dual-
listings in Hong Kong and New York 
 
 
For a better visual observation of the price disparity returns, Figure 6.4 shows the daily 
price disparity return for CNOOC as a representative example. Appendix 8 presents the 
other 13 price disparity returns charts. Figure 5.4 shows that most of the price disparity 
returns fall in the (-0.01, +0.01) range. Some of the larger numbers are also recorded. 
For example, the minimum price discount of 0.1187 is occurred on 7th October 2008, 
and the maximum price premium of 0.063 is occurred on 16th September 2008. 
 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Range Observations
Aluminum 0.0001 0.0260 0.1106 2.8554 -0.1234 0.1634 0.2868 1679
Chinaeaster 0.0001 0.0270 1.1249 10.4086 -0.1634 0.3214 0.4848 2796
Chinalife -0.0008 0.0113 0.2939 3.6525 -0.0510 0.0653 0.1163 1267
Chinamobile 0.0007 0.0118 0.1113 9.9318 -0.0772 0.1075 0.1847 2813
Chinapetro -0.0011 0.0118 -0.1201 2.9374 -0.0739 0.0555 0.1294 2057
Chinasouthern -0.0016 0.0256 1.1581 9.1615 -0.1226 0.2335 0.3561 2830
Chinatelcom -0.0010 0.0104 -0.4550 8.4671 -0.0941 0.0593 0.1534 1537
Chinaunicom -0.0006 0.0128 -0.1793 5.2126 -0.0992 0.0731 0.1723 2139
CNOOC 0.0001 0.0105 -0.5695 11.5329 -0.1187 0.0633 0.1821 1969
Guangshen -0.0002 0.0220 0.3080 2.8880 -0.1146 0.1677 0.2823 3170
Huaneng -0.0020 0.0190 -0.6823 6.3690 -0.1347 0.0942 0.2289 2755
Petrochina 0.0002 0.0108 -0.3881 3.9388 -0.0689 0.0466 0.1155 2194
Sinopec -0.0003 0.0213 0.6576 5.3696 -0.1142 0.1592 0.2734 3855
Yanzhou 0.0012 0.0251 0.7141 9.7541 -0.1883 0.2000 0.3884 2516
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Figure 6.4: CNOOC Price Disparity Returns 
Figure 6.4 shows the price disparity returns from theoretical parity for CNOOC during 
the period of 23 February 2001 to 31 December 2008 with total 1969 observations.  
 
 
6.3.2 Methodology Used to Back Test for the Price Disparity Trading Strategy 
 
To test Hypothesis 8, a simple trading strategy is established as follow, which involves 
buy low and sell high, more specifically short sell high. On days when the closing Hong 
Kong market prices are higher than the opening prices in the New York market, the 
strategy will buy the stock in the New York market and will sell the company in the 
Hong Kong market. This will give rise to the following return: 
 
E| p%4UV > KL×LK v = ¡KL¢£ ^¤
¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K
ª      (6.1) 
 
Where E is the price disparity return for stock i at time t  %4UV	is the closing price in Hong Kong of stock i at time t. 4WY is the opening price in New York of stock i at time t. .  is the exchange rate of US dollar to Hong Kong dollar &2(	is the number of shares in one ADR for company i 
 
Conversely, on days when the New York opening prices are higher than the closing 
price in the Hong Kong market, an arbitrage strategy would entail buying on the Hong 
Kong and selling in New York market. Equation 5.1 will change to the following:  
0.063347475
-0.11873561-0.13
-0.11
-0.09
-0.07
-0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
CNOOC
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E| p%4UV < KL×LK v = ¡¤
¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©^KL¢£KL¢£ ª      (6.2) 
 
Hence the profitability of the strategy is given by either of these two equations on a 
given day and can be written as follows: 
 
E = ¬¤¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©^KL¢£KL¢£ ¬         (6.3) 
 
Using the daily returns generated from equation (5.3), the average daily price 
disparityE­­­­­) return for each of the 14 companies are calculated as shown below: 
 
E­­­­­ =
∑ ®®
¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K M¯¦KL¢£¯¦KL¢£ ®®sL°N
]         (6.4) 
 
Where n is the number of observations. 
 
According to Fama (1976) daily and monthly returns are not normal. To that end instead 
of using discrete returns as shown in the first four equations, the logarithmic returns are 
used. Equation 5.3 is thus converted into: 
 
FE = FG ¬¤¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©KL¢£ ¬        (6.5) 
 
To examine arbitrage possibilities, transaction costs are one of the important factors to 
influence the arbitrage decision. These transaction costs create a no-arbitrage band, 
therefore, the arbitrage opportunity must be sizeable enough to generate a profit that 
could cover and exceed the costs involved. Not all the misprised securities have the 
profitable arbitrage opportunities. This study examines whether arbitrage opportunities 
exist for Chinese based stocks traded in the New York market as ADR and the Hong 
Kong market when transaction costs are considered. The transaction costs structure 
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faced by each category of investors is significantly different from each other. These 
differences can affect the magnitude of profits that they can reap from arbitraging. The 
transaction costs to an investor can consist of several elements, including ADR 
conversion fee, brokerage fees, clearing fees, stamp duty, and foreign exchange cost.  
Investors pay a transaction cost of 0.23 per cent in Hong Kong (cHK) and 0.26 per cent 
in New York (cNY). The total transaction cost (c) used in this study is a combination of 
these two costs and amounts to approximately 0.5 per cent. Table 6.2 presents a list of 
the related transaction costs when buying or selling the Chinese ADRs and their 
underlying securities in two markets. 
 
Table 6.2: Computation of Transaction Costs 
 
Sources: transaction costs information is obtained from Guoyuan Securities Brokerage 
(Hong Kong) Limited 2008. 
 
 
Consistent with Ding (2000), the returns identified in the above equations are not 
adjusted for risk and thus shows the dollar amount of profit that can be earned from this 
strategy.  In an effort to calculate the actual return realised by investors, there is a need 
to consider transaction costs. Following Ding (2000), the profitability of the strategy 
after the transaction costs (c) and are re-written as follows: 
 
FE = FG ¬¤¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©KL¢£ ¬ − %        (6.6) 
 
It is expected that financial institutions have much lower transactions costs than an 
ordinary trader. In studying the arbitrage opportunities with transaction costs, this 
When the transaction is initiated in HK
ADR conversion fee US$0.05 per ADR
Stamp duty on stock transaction 0.10%
Foreign exchange rate fee 0.01%
Brokerage fee at NY market 0.10%
CCASS fee 0.01%
Custody fee Free
When the transaction is initiated in NY
ADR conversion fee US$0.05 per ADR
Foreign exchange rate fee 0.01%
Brokerage fee at HK market 0.25%
Custody fee Free
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examination focuses on one typical type of investors that are likely to be involved in 
arbitrage activities. This type of investors could be institutional investors such as 
stockbroking houses, banks and QFII.  
 
The implication of a 0.5% transaction cost is that traders will not execute this trading 
strategy when they observe that the profit is below 0.5%. This gives rise to another 
scenario analysis whereby the arbitrageur will only execute this strategy when the 
following condition holds  
 
FE = FG ¬¤¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©KL¢£ ¬ > 0.5%       (6.7) 
The returns used so far are not adjusted for risk. CAPM is used to calculate the risk 
adjusted returns. One of the challenge was to decide which country’s return was to be 
adopted. Given that all the returns are converted into Hong Kong dollar equivalent, the 
returns from Hong Kong were employed and this gave rise to the following model. 
 EUV = &+UV + #UVEUV − &+UV)       (6.8) 
 
Where 
 EUV is the asset i (the underlying asset of ADRs traded in Hong Kong) return in Hong 
Kong market at time t.  &+UV is the risk free rate in Hong Kong, here is the prime rate in Hong Kong market. #UV is the beta of the company showing the sensitivity of the asset i’s  returns to market 
returns at time t.  EUV is Hong Kong market returns at time t. 
 
The daily price disparity returns are adjusted accordingly. For instance the risk adjusted 
after transaction cost return is given by 
FE = ³FG ¬¤¥¦KL×§L¨tLK¥K ©KL¢£ ¬ − %´ − µ&+UV + #UVEUV − &+UV)¶    (6.9) 
 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehman (1990) point out that arbitrage strategies like momentum 
and contrarian may contain biases, like bid-ask bounce, price pressure and lagged 
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reactions. The solution proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) was to skip one 
period between the formation period and the holding period and checked for robustness 
by splitting the data set into two sub-periods.  If these measures are not controlled for, it 
will lead to autocorrelation which in turn distorts the mean and the t-statistics. The first 
approach of skipping one period between the formation and holding period is 
inadequate as this strategy is to execute in a one period environment. The other two 
measures are undertaken.  
 
To control for autocorrelation, the methodology of Ramiah et al (2010) is used: 
 FE = !> + #$FE^ + B        (6.10) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the daily logarithmic price disparity return for stock i at 
time t. ml stands for the major lagged factor, α0 represents the unbiased mean return of 
the portfolio and β1 represents the autocorrelation coefficient. Equation 10 controls for 
the major autocorrelation factor but does not control for other lags; consequently, we 
apply the Newey-West test, which allows us to generate more reliable means, standard 
errors and t-statistics. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
 
Table 6.3 provides detailed individual company’s daily return and overall returns of the 
trading strategy before transaction costs are considered. Before considering transaction 
cost, the profits is recorded for all of the companies. The maximum daily average return 
is 1.95 per cent which occurred for the company of China Easter, the minimum daily 
return is 0.73 per cent for the company of China Telcom. The higher return implies that 
the prices between the Chinese ADR and its underlying asset diverge considerably. The 
overall average daily return for these 14 companies is 1.3 per cent. The standard 
deviation is low, which suggests that the daily return is clustered to the mean return.  
 
The larger t-statistics show that all of the daily returns are statistically significant. In 
summary, the price disparity trading strategy works in this case. Further, the beta for 
each company is displayed in table 6.3. The individual beta and the portfolio beta are 
smaller than 1, implying that the assets are less risky when compared to the market risk. 
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Table 6.3: The Actual Price Disparity Returns  
This table presents average daily price disparity returns for the time period from 1st January 
1993 to 31st December 2008, where transaction costs are ignored. Standard deviation, t-
statistics, beta (return sensitivity to market) and total observations are reported. 
 
 
Table 6.4: The Price Disparity Returns when Transaction Costs Considered  
This table presents average daily price disparity returns for the time period from 1st 
January 1993 to 31st December 2008 when transaction costs are considered. Standard 
deviation, t-statistics and total observations are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation T-statistics Counts Beta
Aluminum 1.88% 0.0180 42.7706 1679 0.358
Chinaeaster 1.95% 0.0187 55.1501 2796 0.440
Chinalife 0.82% 0.0078 37.7641 1267 0.766
Chinamobile 0.80% 0.0086 49.4859 2813 0.859
Chinapetro 0.86% 0.0081 47.8080 2057 0.667
Chinasouthern 1.84% 0.0179 54.8449 2830 0.453
Chinatelcom 0.73% 0.0074 38.9755 1537 0.731
Chinaunicom 0.95% 0.0087 50.4770 2139 0.754
CNOOC 0.73% 0.0076 42.3817 1969 0.659
Guangshen 1.65% 0.0146 63.5548 3170 0.433
Huaneng 1.30% 0.0140 48.8671 2755 0.437
Petrochina 0.76% 0.0076 46.9535 2194 0.633
Sinopec 1.52% 0.0150 62.9840 3855 0.400
Yanzhou 1.55% 0.0199 39.0309 2516 0.495
Overall 1.30% 0.0145 164.3448 33577 0.270
Before transaction costs
Mean Std. Deviation T-statistics Counts
Aluminum 1.38% 0.0180 31.3697 1679
Chinaeaster 1.45% 0.0187 40.9757 2796
Chinalife 0.32% 0.0078 14.8019 1267
Chinamobile 0.31% 0.0086 18.7488 2813
Chinapetro 0.36% 0.0081 19.9408 2057
Chinasouthern 1.34% 0.0179 39.9730 2830
Chinatelcom 0.23% 0.0074 12.4257 1537
Chinaunicom 0.45% 0.0087 23.7683 2139
CNOOC 0.23% 0.0076 13.1716 1969
Guangshen 1.15% 0.0146 44.2755 3170
Huaneng 0.80% 0.0140 30.1148 2755
Petrochina 0.26% 0.0076 16.1997 2194
Sinopec 1.02% 0.0150 42.2342 3855
Yanzhou 1.05% 0.0199 26.3996 2516
Overall 0.80% 0.0145 101.1831 33577
After transaction costs
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The empirical results (see Table 6.3) are the daily returns when transaction costs are not 
considered. Table 6.4 reports the empirical results when transaction costs are considered. 
When transaction costs are incorporated into the analysis, the strategy is still profitable. 
The overall average daily return for these 14 companies decreases from 1.3 percent to 
0.80 percent. For individual company and the average daily returns decreased by a 
constant amount of 0.5 per cent which is just by the amount of the transaction cost. 
Although the daily arbitrage profits vary from 0.23 per cent to 1.45 per cent, the larger 
t-statistics suggesting the returns are still statistically significant. 
 
Table 6.5: The Price Disparity Returns when Profit is Greater than Transaction 
Cost  
This table presents average daily price disparity returns for the time period from 1st 
January 1993 to 31st December 2008 when arbitrageurs execute the trading strategy 
when the profit is greater than 0.005. Standard deviation, t-statistics and total 
observations are reported. The days of arbitrage and the frequency of arbitrage are 
recorded as well. 
 
 
 
Rational arbitrageurs will not engage in any arbitrage opportunity if the benefits are 
lower than the cost.  In this particular instance, it is assumed that arbitrageurs will only 
execute this trading strategy if the potential profit is higher than 0.5%. When both of the 
transaction costs and market risk sensitivity analysis are considered, the empirical 
results shown in Table 6.5 demonstrate that this simple trading strategy continues to 
work. Table 6.5 shows that the greatest frequency of profitable arbitrage, after 
transaction costs, occurs for Huaneng with arbitrage opportunities present for 99.93 per 
cent of the trading days. Even the least profitable arbitrage stock, such as China Telcom, 
Mean Std. Deviation T-statistics Days of Arbitrage Total Counts Frequency of Arbitrage
Aluminum 1.78% 0.0200 32.5014 1329 1681 79.06%
Chinaeaster 1.79% 0.0187 46.5951 2309 2798 82.52%
Chinalife 0.71% 0.0078 25.5896 741 1269 58.39%
Chinamobile 0.73% 0.0092 32.1618 1583 2815 56.23%
Chinapetro 0.76% 0.0081 33.6955 1230 2059 59.74%
Chinasouthern 1.75% 0.0178 47.0633 2237 2832 78.99%
Chinatelcom 0.65% 0.0079 24.9020 818 1539 53.15%
Chinaunicom 0.80% 0.0086 35.3934 1394 2141 65.11%
CNOOC 0.65% 0.0080 26.9665 1055 1971 53.53%
Guangshen 1.49% 0.0143 53.1424 2517 3172 79.35%
Huaneng 1.28% 0.0140 48.8671 2755 2757 99.93%
Petrochina 0.70% 0.0079 31.9381 1175 2196 53.51%
Sinopec 1.39% 0.0151 51.1345 2942 3857 76.28%
Yanzhou 1.67% 0.0216 32.4478 1685 2518 66.92%
Overall 1.28% 0.0153 129.0722 23770 33605 70.73%
Execute when profit>0.005 and market return risk controlled
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reveals an arbitrage opportunities for 53.15 per cent of the trading days. Overall, the 
arbitrage trading is possible for 70.73 per cent of the time in the whole sample. The 
average return for all of the 14 cross-listings is 1.28 per cent daily. For each company, 
statistically significant daily return from 0.65 per cent to 1.79 per cent after transaction 
costs are recorded and market risk is incorporated.  Standard deviation is still low which 
suggesting the daily return is close to the mean value. 
 
Table 6.6:  Robustness Test for the Price Disparity Strategy  
This table presents average daily price disparity returns for the time period from 1st 
January 1993 to 31st December 2008. Mean return and the t-statistics are reported. 
These daily returns are adjusted for autocorrelation. Robustness test in terms of splitting 
the sample into two equal samples is conducted, which is coded as sub period 1 and sub 
period 2.   
 
In addition, two tests on the robustness of the trading profitability are performed. The 
first controls for autocorrelation and therefore generates a new mean return and t-
statistics. The second robustness test is performed by sub-period analyses by splitting 
the whole sample period into two equal sub-periods. The empirical results are shown in 
Table 6.6. For example, the sample period for company Petro China ranged from July 
1993 to December 2008; October 2000 would be the break point. Section A and section 
B from Table 6.6 report the first robustness test results. Section C and D report the 
second robustness test results. Overall, the returns are reduced but still statistically 
significant, and the t-values are improved greatly. For instance, the average daily raw 
returns for company Yanzhou drops significantly from 1.47 per cent (see Table 6.5) to 
only 0.86 per cent (see Section B in Table 5.6). And both sub-periods show statistically 
significant trading profits with the highest profits of 1.65 per cent and 0.84 per cent (see 
Section C and D in Table 6.6). In summary, the empirical findings show that the price 
disparity strategy still generate positive returns, and Hypothesis 8 is not rejected. 
 Mean T-statistics Mean T-statistics Mean T-statistics Mean T-statistics
Aluminum 1.09% 18.2521 1.52% 16.5027 1.65% 14.6602 1.47% 11.1738
Chinaeaster 0.95% 20.0107 1.19% 18.1601 1.48% 14.9070 0.98% 12.1996
Chinalife 0.24% 10.3626 0.53% 11.1132 0.59% 12.1534 0.53% 8.2673
Chinamobile 0.22% 13.4001 0.53% 13.0424 0.60% 10.0012 0.47% 8.7546
Chinapetro 0.27% 12.2113 0.70% 17.8679 0.82% 14.3446 0.55% 11.0728
Chinasouthern 0.82% 10.5145 1.07% 8.4980 1.34% 6.4921 0.92% 12.7950
Chinatelcom 0.19% 7.3802 0.64% 11.7220 0.43% 9.2788 0.79% 9.2156
Chinaunicom 0.35% 15.4400 0.69% 15.9238 0.77% 15.7602 0.60% 7.8545
CNOOC 0.17% 8.5523 0.53% 12.6201 0.56% 10.4001 0.52% 6.5865
Guangshen 0.77% 19.2715 1.06% 19.3452 1.33% 18.0065 0.97% 16.6117
Huaneng 0.45% 11.9742 0.73% 12.7933 0.94% 10.2929 0.68% 16.0927
Petrochina 0.20% 10.2860 0.58% 12.6069 0.66% 10.4807 0.48% 7.1502
Sinopec 0.65% 15.1283 0.93% 12.5504 1.11% 9.9469 0.81% 12.5443
Yanzhou 0.43% 9.1507 0.86% 8.6039 1.24% 7.6303 0.77% 11.3046
Overall 0.40% 12.24046 0.55% 11.6302 0.63% 11.1820 0.57% 12.8047
A B C D
After transaction costs
Execute when profit>0.005
Sub period 1 Sub period 2and market risk controlled
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study was to test if the law of one price holds between the dual-
listed Chinese shares traded in Hong Kong and New York.  Using a simple testing 
mechanism, this chapter shows that that arbitrage profits do exist. The mere existence of 
such profits implies a violation of the law of one price and as a result, it is fair to 
conclude that there is price disparity for dual listed stocks, in particular Chinese firms 
listed in both New York and Hong Kong. On average an arbitrageur can earn an ex-post 
daily return up to 1.79 per cent after transaction costs by investing in only one company. 
A portfolio of 14 dual listed stocks earns an average daily return of 1.28 per cent over 
the period studied.  After a number of robustness test, this strategy continues to be 
profitable. Informal discussions with traders in Hong Kong reveal that such a strategy is 
in place. At this point, it might be asked why there are so many profitable disequilibria 
appeared in such two developed Hong Kong and US markets. The possible explanation 
is the non-overlapping trading time. The overnight risk makes the arbitrage hard. But 
when the price disparity becomes greater, it is found that the large price difference gap 
would be arbitraged away immediately. So the price disparity returns are a puzzle. 
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Chapter 7: Micro-analysis of the Bank of China 
 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
The globalization of financial markets has been accelerated in the past two decades. As 
more and more Chinese firms have the opportunities to benefit from fund raising, 
increased shareholder base, international reputation and prestige by cross-listing, a 
significant slowdown in the international cross-listing and trading activity has occurred 
in the past 10 years (Karolyi, 2006). Some of the attributing factors for this trend 
include corporate governance issues, information asymmetries, and liquidity issues 
when shares are traded in multiple markets (Karolyi, 2006). To demonstrate a more 
complete picture of Chinese cross-listing, the Bank of China (hereafter the Bank) has 
been chosen as a case to study the implications of the findings so far in this thesis. 
 
7.2 Analysis 
7.2.1 Bank of China Background 
 
As the oldest bank and one of four largest banks in China, Bank of China was founded 
in 1912. By amounting assets of approximately RMB 69 trillion, operating a network 
consisting of 12,000 branches and offices in 26 countries and nearly 200,000 employees, 
the Bank is ranked 10th among the world’s top 1,000 banks by The Banker magazine in 
20082.   
 
After founding of the People’s Republic of China, with a long history in acting as the 
state-designated specialist foreign exchange bank, Bank of China became China’s 
important window to the world and the key foreign exchange financing channel. 
Transformed from a specialist foreign exchange bank into a state-owned commercial 
bank in 1994, Bank of China began a joint stock restructuring in 2003, which resulted in 
Bank of China Limited being incorporated in August 2004 and listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in June and July 2006 respectively, 
becoming the first Chinese commercial bank listed in domestic and overseas capital 
markets (Bank of China Annual Report, 2008). 
                                                 
2
 Numbers are extracted from the Bank of China’s Annual Report 2008. 
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7.2.2 Corporate Governance of Bank of China 
 
Since the restructure of Bank in 2003, in compliance with the (People’s Republic of 
China) PRC Company Law, PRC Commercial Banking Law and regulatory 
requirements promulgated by regulatory authorities and based on its actual experience, 
the Bank promoted sound corporate governance and the improvement of its corporate 
governance framework as a modern joint-stock company, which is composed of the 
Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors, and the Audit 
Committee, and Senior Management. The posts of the Chairman and the President are 
assumed by two persons, to avoid undue concentration of power. By following the 
responsibilities set forth in the Articles, all parties functioned independently in 
compliance with the relevant laws and exercised their rights and obligations 
respectively. 
 
In 2006, after the Bank listed its shares in the Hong Kong market, the Bank adopted 
measures to enable it to observe the Code on Corporate Governance Practices (the Code) 
as set out in Appendix 14 of the Hong Kong Listing Rules. The Bank has complied with 
the Code provisions and most of the recommended best practices set out in the Code. 
The Bank also observes the laws and regulations, as well as the various provisions and 
guidelines, of the local regulatory authorities where it has business operations. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers becomes the independent auditor for the Bank. Followed by the 
Code, the Bank of China also adopts the international accounting standards, and having 
Hong Kong directors’ presence.  
 
7.2.3 Company Valuation 
 
In Chapter 4, Tobin’s q has been used as the proxy for firm’s valuation, served as a 
dependent variable when exploring the relationship between firm valuations with 
corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results presented in Chapter 4 
revealed that the non-cross-listed Chinese firms have a better firm performance than 
those cross-listed. Supposedly effective corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
international accounting standards, independent director system, supervisor system, 
separation of CEO and Chairperson, and the board size, have little effect in improving 
firm’s valuation. In this section, the valuation of Bank of China provides additional 
specific information to the discussion present in Chapter 4. Table 7.1 reports the firm 
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valuation of the Bank of China from year 2006 to year 2008 comparing with the mean 
firm valuation of the non-cross-listed Chinese firms during the same period. 
 
Table 7.1: Tobin’s q Comparison 
 
 
By looking at these numbers shown in Table 7.1, the valuation of the Bank of China is a 
far from satisfactory in comparison to the non-cross-listed domestic companies with a 
lower Tobin’s q value around 1. The null hypothesis of cross-listing associated with 
increased firm valuation is rejected in this simple case. Although, one single company 
could not draw the whole cross-listing picture, this single case should shed light on the 
corporate governance issue for both of the non-cross-listed and cross-listed Chinese 
firms.  
 
It is well known that progress in the capital market and in the area of corporate 
governance has been slower in China than in several other East Asian countries 
(Solomon et al. 2004). However, during the last two decades, China has kept moving 
toward a more liberal market system and a more transparent and developed corporate 
governance system. For example, more and more listed Chinese firms are not chiefly 
owned by the Government. The ownership reforms have initiated extensive 
privatization of the SOEs, creating a separation between company management and 
Government. However, institutional effects and the long term corporate culture in China 
cannot be changed overnight to achieve a satisfactory corporate governance framework. 
Although the Bank of China adopts more stringent financial disclosures, following the 
listing rules regulated by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and other market in terms 
of corporate governance, the real reform involves a long and difficult process that takes 
many years, even when the systems and structures are in place. 
 
7.2.4 Return Analysis of the Bank of China 
 
Table 7.2 reports the summary statistics of the daily return series for the Bank of China 
that traded in both the China A and Hong Kong market from 1st of June 2006 to 31st 
December 2008. The daily return of this dual-listing has the same trend but with a 
2006 2007 2008
China A Non-cross-listing 1.886 3.628 1.736
Bank of China 1.133 1.080 1.001
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different magnitude. The Hong Kong market recorded the highest daily return for the 
Bank of China with 20.06 per cent, while China A market has a maximum daily return 
of 9.68 per cent. The standard deviation for the two return series is around 2.5 per cent 
on average. The positive skew indicates many positive numbers. Overall, the return 
series for the Bank of China in two markets exhibits a similar characteristic of the 
statistical description but with different magnitude. 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics on Returns of the Bank of China A and Hong 
Kong Markets for the Period 01/06/2006 to 31/12/2008 
 
 
To compare the mean returns and variance for the Bank of China dual-listed in China A 
and Hong Kong markets, paired T-test and F-distribution were used. Table 7.3 reports 
the test statistics of equal means and variances for the Bank of China’s return data 
during the period of 2006 to 2008. First, this pair shows a lower correlation relationship 
with (r = 0.3891). The higher t-statistic value indicates that this pair has the same return 
for the period studied.  The F-distribution also indicates that the return variance is 
similar in these two markets for the Bank of China’s share. 
China A market Hong Kong Market
Mean -0.0003 -0.0006
Maximum 0.0968 0.2006
Minimum -0.1048 -0.1616
Std. Dev. 0.0243 0.0267
Skewness 0.2855 0.6506
Kurtosis 6.4011 13.3429
Jarque-Bera 322.1244 3051.778
Observations 650 674
Bank of China
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Table 7.3: Paired Comparison of Daily Stock Returns for the Bank of China Dual-
listed in China A and Hong Kong Markets  
 
 
7.2.5 Price Difference of the Bank of China 
 
Table 7.4 depicts the descriptive statistics of the daily price disparity returns for the 
Bank of China that is traded in both Hong Kong and the China A markets. The table 
shows that the Bank of China traded in China A market takes a relatively higher 
premium up to 63.53 per cent and discount down to 12.16 per cent during the examined 
period, along with a high standard deviation of 17.65 per cent. This extreme value 
suggests possible arbitrage opportunities by trading the share in China A and the Hong 
Kong market. However, due to short selling and capital control restrictions, arbitrage in 
these two markets is impossible. The examination of the price disparity for the Bank of 
China also supports the idea that the China A market is still segmented from the Hong 
Kong market. 
Paired Correlation 0.3891
Paried Difference
Mean 0.0004
Standard deviation 0.0284
T-statistic 0.3625
P-value 0.7171
F-distribution
F-value 0.8064
P-value 0.0062
Bank of China Paired T-Test
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Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Price Disparity Returns for the Bank of 
China during the Period 01/06/2006 to 31/12/2008  
 
 
 
7.2.6 Market Co-movement and Cointegration Analysis 
 
The empirical study of the market co-movement extracted from Chapter 5 reveals that 
the share prices of the Bank of China traded in both the China A and the Hong Kong 
markets are affected by the location, which supports the market segment hypothesis. 
The cointegration analysis of the Bank of China indicates that there is no long run 
cointegrated relationship between these two return series, which also supports the 
market segment hypothesis. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
The examination of the Bank of China that dual-listed in the China A and the Hong 
Kong markets supports the empirical findings in this thesis from a micro-dimension. 
From the point view of corporate governance, the Bank of China appears to be 
following all of the rules and regulations set up by the markets where it is traded. The 
reason of the lower firm valuation proxies by Tobin’s q could be contributed to different 
factors. Clearly it sends out one message that cross-listing doesn’t guarantee higher firm 
valuation or performance. In addition to this, the finding also extends the arguments of 
previous studies on the segmented China A-share and the Hong Kong market in terms 
of the cross-listing. One interesting issue derived from the findings is that cross-listed 
Chinese stocks, with the same underlying stocks, have constantly shown long-run 
separated prices in different markets. Furthermore, short selling restrictions, strict 
foreign exchange controls, trading restrictions and the changing regulations governing 
Mean 0.2136
Standard Deviation 0.1765
Minimum -0.1216
Maximum 0.6353
Kurtosis -1.1922
Skewness 0.1075
Range 0.7569
Observation 650
Bank of China Price Disparity Return
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the Chinese financial markets are all possible factors that may deter arbitrage and long 
run cointegration from happening. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research  
 
 
This chapter summarises the major research findings of this study based on the 
empirical test results in the previous chapters. The contributions and limitations of this 
research are also addressed, and several directions for future research are proposed. 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
 
During the last two decades, the Chinese stock markets have been undergoing a 
significant amount of change, including changes in rules, regulations and trading 
policies. For example, CSRC recently announced that the short selling of stocks and 
market index future contracts would be launched soon and made on a trial basis by a 
small number of brokerage firms (Yi 2010). These changes are expected to develop a 
more improved market, and strengthen the market’s finance function in China. 
 
8.1.1 Conclusion of the First Empirical Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine Chinese cross-listing from different angles. It 
is commonly believed that, as an emerging economy, China lacks a well-developed 
financial and money market, and its legal system is often labelled as weak. It is also 
commonly believed that the corporate governance mechanisms for investor protection 
and shareholder rights in the US are the benchmark for others. However, the Enron and 
WorldCom debacles have shaken the superiority of US investor protection and 
shareholder rights, which calls into question the corporate governance of US companies. 
Therefore, the first empirical study of this research examined whether the overseas 
Chinese listings do outperform non-cross-listed Chinese firms under the theoretical 
framework of bonding theory. This study is actually the consistent estimation of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, by taking into 
account both domestic and overseas Chinese listings.  By looking at the different 
measures of governance, empirical results showed that CEO-Chairperson separation, 
international accounting standards, board size, and supervisory panel fail to explain firm 
performance of those cross-listed Chinese firms, which is especially relevant in light of 
the prominence that board independence and financial disclosure have received in the 
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recent NYSE and NASDAQ corporate governance listing requirements (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008). Further, to explore the inter-relationship between cross-listing and 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, this study revealed that 
different markets have different combined effects of cross-listing and corporate 
governance practices. For example, Chinese firms with bigger board sizes have better 
firm performance in the London market; however, Chinese firms with bigger board size 
have lower firm performance in the New York market. Overall, the results revealed that 
the non-cross-listed Chinese firms outperform cross-listed Chinese firms in all of the 
foreign markets with the one exception of the cross-listings on the NASDAQ market.  
 
The above findings have important implications for senior policy makers and corporate 
boards. With more and more Chinese firms listing their shares in international markets, 
the purpose of this cross-listing must be clear. From this study, cross-listing doesn’t 
guarantee improving firm performance by adopting more stringent disclosures and more 
effective corporate governance practices. However, this study provides useful 
information to the policy makers to design best practice codes tailored to both the 
Chinese institutional background and the current level of capital market development in 
China. For corporate boards, this study also provides useful guidance in designing 
corporate governance mechanisms to enhance firm valuations.   
 
On the contrary, this study indirectly supports the arguments put forward in the 
literature by Licht (2004) who questioned whether foreign elements can be neatly 
‘plugged-in’ to an existing corporate governance system and produce the expected 
improvements. He argues that the cultural uniqueness of people, firms or nations could 
create ‘cultural distance’ between the two different systems, which may lead to a 
situation in which the cross-listing and bonding may not lead to corporate governance 
improvements. Since the institutional and cultural setting in China may be significantly 
different from that in developed countries and more advanced economies, it is not 
surprising to see that the non-cross-listed Chinese firms could perform the same or even 
better than the cross-listed Chinese firms. 
 
This result could be attributed to different factors. China has continued to make 
improvements to stock markets over the last two decades. Since 1992, more than 300 
laws, regulations, rules, standards and guidelines concerning the securities and futures 
of markets have been stipulated by the Chinese legislative and administrative authorities, 
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which form the basis of the legal framework for securities and futures markets (CSRC 
report 2000). Rules on information disclosure, accounting standards and regulations for 
listed firms are in place. Auditing standards, separation of the Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA) firms from the state system, internal control systems, and monitoring 
of related party transactions are established. The role of the board of directors, 
supervisory committees and auditors in information disclosure are identified (CSRC 
report 2000). All these actions could create a better corporate governance system and 
market environment for the listed companies at the country level. Therefore, it was not 
surprising to see that the second empirical study (chapter 4) revealed an improved 
integrated market condition between China A and China B-share markets. 
 
8.1.2 Conclusion of the Second Empirical Study 
 
With more and more Chinese securities dual and triple-listed in several international 
markets, investors and researchers might be interested in looking at the inter-
relationship of those cross-listings. The second empirical study examined market co-
movement, price linkage, causality relationship and dynamic price adjustment between 
dual-listed Chinese securities by using different econometric methods.  
 
Although the price disparity of Chinese dual-listed securities are readily observed, the 
return analyses of the Chinese dual and triple listings present a similar return and 
variance pattern. However, the identical shares traded both in Hong Kong and China A 
markets, China A and New York markets have a lower correlation relationship, which 
present some significant diversification benefits in portfolio management. Further, 
cross-listing share prices are affected by the location of trade. 
 
The empirical results of cointegrating analysis revealed a future cointegrated trend for 
the Chinese local stock markets. Most of the previous studies suggest that China A, 
China B and Hong Kong are segmented markets, which this thesis supports to some 
extent. However, by examining the individual dual-listed securities, we can see that 
most of the dual-listed China A- and B-shares have a long-run equilibrium relationship, 
and some of the dual-listed China A and Hong Kong shares have also long-run 
equilibrium relationship. This result suggests that the reforms to the China stock market 
are working gradually. The long run cointegration relation between two price series of 
China A and New York are also examined by using Engle-Granger’s cointegration 
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analysis (1987) and Johansen’s (1991) cointegration analysis. The cointegration test 
results suggest there is no long run relationship between the two price series. 
 
The empirical evidence in terms of information transmission and price discovery has 
been mixed so far. Some studies suggest that home market plays a dominant role in 
price discovery; other studies support a significant role in price formation both at home 
and in the U.S. market. This study not only extends the literature by examining how, but 
also provides a differentiation from other studies by examining information 
transmission and price discovery for dual and triple listings from emerging markets of 
China to developed countries like the U.S. The Granger Causality test showed that most 
of the dually listed stocks in China A Granger Cause the stock in China B, China A 
Granger Cause Hong Kong. However, for the Chinese securities triple listed in China A, 
Hong Kong, and New York, Granger Causality runs one way from Hong Kong to China 
A, and New York from China A. This result indicates that triple-listed Chinese 
securities that cross-listed in Hong Kong and New York appear to play a more 
significant role in information transmission in the pricing process, and the home market 
of China seems to be a satellite market. The reasons behind this finding could be 
attributed to the emerging characteristics of the China stock market.  
 
In summary, the Chinese A-share market is still segmented from the U.S. market and 
the Hong Kong market for its cross-listed shares as of December 2008. However, the 
Chinese A-share market is gradually integrating with the Chinese B-share market and 
the Hong Kong market in terms of the cross-listings.  
 
8.1.3 Conclusion of the Third Empirical Study 
 
Lastly, the arbitrage opportunities in the Hong Kong and New York markets for 
Chinese dual-listed securities were examined. By using a very simple trading strategy of 
buying low and selling high, considering the market risk and transaction costs, the third 
empirical study examines the possible arbitrage profits for a portfolio of 14 dual listed 
stocks that are traded in both the Hong Kong and New York markets. It reports that an 
average daily return of 1.28 per cent over the period studied could be earned. However, 
the non-overlap of trading time could deter arbitrage opportunities and increase risks. In 
other words, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
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8.2 Contributions of This Research 
 
This research is an empirical study relating to the Chinese cross-listing phenomenon. At 
the conceptual level, this study contributes to the literature on bonding theory by 
shifting the focus from the conventional cross-listing by developed country firms to the 
newly emerging unconventional cross-listing of Chinese listed firms. At the frontline of 
this new stream of research, this study is the first to provide an empirical test of the 
bonding theoretical framework with a much broader dataset (covering more markets) 
under the Chinese context. The findings of this study confirm that prior studies cannot 
fully explain the corporate governance practice of Chinese listed firms. This study has 
made a unique contribution to the literature in the research of cross-listing and bonding 
theory. 
 
The purpose of the study of the interaction of Chinese dual-listings (refer to Chapter 4) 
is to extend the literature by examining how and to what extent the trading of the cross-
listed Chinese securities in the two local markets, the U.S. and Hong Kong markets, 
contributes to information flow and short term price correction for the corresponding 
stocks traded in China as of December 2008. Previously, some of the studies treated 
Hong Kong as a “pseudo home” market for Chinese dual-listings (Xu & Fung 2002). 
However, these dual-listed Chinese companies have headquarters located in Mainland 
China. Therefore, one of the contributions of this study is that we distinguish home 
market (Mainland China) from pseudo home market (Hong Kong) as the essential factor 
to examine the price interaction effects. Another contribution of the study is that we 
differentiate our study from previous studies that examine price interaction for cross-
listings from developed and developing countries in the U.S., but also from studies that 
examine Chinese cross-listing in local two markets (A and B share market) with capital 
control restrictions. 
 
Specifically, the findings of this study contribute to the knowledge of the Chinese cross-
listing phenomenon. In addition, a relatively straight forward arbitrage trading strategy 
was tailored specifically for dual-listed Chinese securities in Hong Kong and New York, 
and was empirically tested. It was found that this investment strategy for dual-listings 
could work in most of the cases, and perhaps might work in other markets.  
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8.3 Limitations of This Research 
 
This study shifts the focus of academic research on the China stock market and 
securities from locally listed Chinese securities to internationally listed Chinese 
securities. As with all research in its early stage, this study is not without limitations. 
 
Firstly, a limitation of this thesis is that the Chinese financial market is constantly 
changing. Therefore, the results revealed in this study might be different to those of 
future studies. Whilst a great deal of effort has been made to produce a timely work, this 
is an unavoidable limitation of this study. 
 
Secondly, the sample size of the empirical test in regards to corporate governance is not 
large. Although there are over 500 Chinese securities listed overseas, some of the data 
are missing. Another concern about the data is the quality; especially in regards to the 
Chinese dual-listed securities data provided by GTA Company (see Chapter 3). The 
ownership data for the Chinese securities dual-listed in Mainland China and the Hong 
Kong market provided by GTA is less accurate than the data obtained directly from 
annual reports. Thus, a great deal of effort was put into reading thousands of annual 
reports to sort out the exact ownership data for those cross-listed Chinese firms. This 
also sheds some light for future researchers when they need to deal with Chinese data. 
 
8.4 Future Research 
 
The following aspects have been identified as potential directions for future research. 
 
In relation to the corporate governance issue, since the independent director system and 
the domestic Chinese supervisory system seem to have little effect on performance 
enhancement, another research question might be: ‘why is the explanatory power of the 
independent director system and supervisory system somewhat unconvincing?’ 
Alternatively, foreign ownership in these cross-listed Chinese securities could be added 
to examine the explanatory power of firm performance for those cross-listed Chinese 
firms. Questionnaires and interview techniques could be adopted to further explore the 
corporate governance issue in the Chinese context. 
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This thesis also explored the flow of information in an international multi-market 
setting and the relationship between market integration and LOP based on individual 
securities. The cointegration analysis was based on the assumption that the relationship 
between the dual-listed securities is linear. However, this is not always the case. In the 
future, we might explore the causality relationship between the dual-listed securities in 
different periods with a non-linear causality test. Meanwhile, the identical stocks listed 
in various markets bring out one phenomenon known as dominant and satellite markets, 
which concludes that foreign listings might have some impact on securities markets’ 
microstructures. However, arbitrage activities do not create a single market for each 
stock. Future study on cross-listing could be focused on market microstructure. Since 
the short selling rules are likely to be loosened in the Chinese market soon, future 
studies could address the question of whether arbitrage could bring the Chinese asset 
price to equilibrium. 
 
As an emerging economy, Chinese authorities play a major part in activities of stock 
markets, and keep shaping the domestic financial markets. It is reported that China may 
launch an international board as soon as this year (2011) or next year (2012) in 
Shanghai as the country wants to boost the global profile of the RMB currency and 
further liberalize its capital markets3. Global firms, including HSBC, who has prepared 
to raise five under the Chinese international board, Standard Chartered, Unilever and 
Coca-Cola Co have already expressed interest for a listing on the international board. 
Since there is shortage of supply of high-quality stocks in China, the launch of the 
international board would be greatly welcomed by industry leaders. In addition to the 
Growth Enterprise Board established in Shenzhen a few years ago, these newly 
established markets will offer a worthwhile opportunity for researchers to study and 
examine these markets. 
 
Lastly, other techniques could be used to seek arbitrage profits between cross-listed 
securities. Vidyamurthy (2004) provides a detailed theoretical cointegration technique 
for pairs trading strategy. This could be empirically tested with cross-listed securities in 
future.  
                                                 
3
 7th July, 2011, The Wall Street Journal Digital Network. 
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Appendix 1: Chinese Cross-listing Information 
 
Appendix 1.1: Chinese Firms Listed on New York Stock Exchange 
 
Name Symbol Listing Date ADR Ratio Industry
Acorn International, Inc. ATV 3-May-07 1:3 General Retailers
Agria Corporation GRO 7-Nov-07 1:2 Food Producers
Aluminum Corp. of China Ltd. ACH 11-Dec-01 1:25 Industrial Metals
American Dairy, Inc. ADY 18-Apr-05 1:1 Food Products
American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc. AOB 18-Dec-06 1:1 Food Products
China Digital TV Holding STV 5-Oct-07 1:1 Software & Computer Services
China Distance Education DL 4-Feb-09 1:4 Support Services
China Eastern Airlines CEA 4-Feb-97 1:100 Travel & Leisure
China Life Insurance LFC 17-Dec-03 1:40 Life Insurance
China Mass Media International Adve CMM 4-Aug-08 1:30 Media
China Mobile Limited CHL 22-Oct-97 1:5 Mobile Telecom.
China National Offshore Oil-CNOOC CEO 20-Feb-01 1:100 Oil & Gas Producers
China Nepstar Chain Drugsotre NPD 9-Nov-07 1:2 Food &Drug Retailers
China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited CN 16-Nov-04 1:20 Mobile Telecom.
China Petroleum & Chemical SNP 18-Oct-00 1:100 Oil & Gas Producers
China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. CSR 29-Oct-07 1:1 Oil & Gas Producers
China South Airlines ZNH 30-Jul-97 1:50 Travel & Leisure
China Telecom CHA 14-Nov-02 1:100 Fixed Line Telecom.
China Unicom Limited CHU 21-Jun-00 1:10 Mobile Telecom.
E-House (China) Holding EJ 8-Aug-07 1:1 Real Estate
General Steel Holdings, Inc. GSI 8-Aug-08 1:1 Industrial Metals
Giant Interactive Group GA 1-Nov-07 1:1 Tech.Hardware & Equipment
Guangshen Railway GSH 13-May-96 1:50 Travel & Leisure
Gushan Environmental Energy Limited GU 19-Dec-07 1:2 Specialty Chemicals
Huaneng Power International HNP 6-Oct-94 1:40 Electricity
LDK Solar LDK 1-Jun-07 1:1 Electron.&Electric Equipment
Longtop Financial Technologies LFT 24-Oct-07 1:1 Software&ComputerSvc
Mindray Medical International MR 26-Sep-06 1:1 HealthCareEquip.&Ser
New Oriental Education & Technology EDU 7-Sep-06 1:4 General Retailers
Noah Education Holdings NED 19-Oct-07 1:1 Software & Computer Services
PetroChina PTR 6-Apr-00 1:100 Oil & Gas Producers
Qiao Xing Mobile Communication Co., Ltd. QXM 3-May-07 1:1 Telecommunications Equipment
ReneSola SOL 29-Jan-08 1:2 Alternative Energy
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation SMI 17-Mar-04 1:50 Semiconductors
Simcere Pharmaceutical SCR 20-Apr-07 1:2 Pharma. & Biotech.
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical SHI 26-Jul-93 1:100 Chemicals
Suntech Power STP 14-Dec-05 1:1 Electron .& Electric Equipment
Tongjitang Chinese Medicines TCM 16-Mar-07 1:4 Pharma. & Biotech.
Trina Solar TSL 19-Dec-06 1:100 Electron. & Electric Equipment
Vanceinfo Technologies, Inc. VIT 12-Dec-07 1:1 Software & Computer Services
WSP Holdings Limited WH 6-Dec-07 1:2 OilEquip.Serv. & Distribution
WuXi Pharmatech WX 9-Aug-07 1:8 Pharma. & Biotech.
Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd. XIN 12-Dec-07 1:2 Real Estate
Yanzhou Coal Mining YZC 31-Mar-98 1:50 Mining
Yingli Green Energy YGE 8-Jun-07 1:1 Electron. & Electric Equipment
Sources: New York Stock Exchange Website, and New York Bank ADR Website, by 30 April 2009
New York Stock Exchange
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Appendix 1.2: Chinese Firms Listed on NASDAQ 
 
Name Symbol Listing Date ADR Ratio Industry
3SBIO SSRX 07-Feb-07 1:7 Pharma. & Biotech.
51job JOBS 29-Sep-04 1:2 Support Services
Actions Semiconductor ACTS 30-Nov-05 1:6 Tech. Hardware & Equipment
Airmedia AMCN 07-Nov-07 1:2 Media
ATA Inc ATAI 28-Jan-08 1:02 General Retailers
Baidu.com BIDU 08-May-05 1:1 Software & Computer Services
Changyou.com CYOU 07-Apr-09 1:02 Software & Computer Services
China Finance Online JRJC 15/10/2004 1:5 Software & Computer Services
China GrenTech GRRF 19/01/2005 1:25 Tech. Hardware & Equipment
China Medical Technologies CMED 10-Aug-05 1:10 Health Care Equipment & Services
China Sunergy CSUN 17-May-07 1:6 Electricity
China Techfaith Wireless Communication CNTF 06-May-05 1:15 Tech. Hardware & Equipment
ChinaEdu CEDU 11-Dec-07 1:3 General Retailers
CNInsure CISG 31-Oct-07 1:20 Nonlife Insurance
CTrip.com International CTRP 09-Dec-03 1:2 Travel & Leisure
eLong LONG 28-Apr-04 1:2 Travel & Leisure
Focus Media FMCN 13-Jul-05 1:10 Media
Home Inns & Hotels Management HMIN 26-Oct-06 1:2 Travel & Leisure
Hurray! HRAY 04-Feb-05 1:100 Mobile Telecom.
JA Solar JASO 07-Feb-07 1:3 Electron. & Electric Equipment
Jinpan International Ltd JST 06-Feb-98 Common Stock Manufacturing: High Technology
KongZhong KONG 09-Jul-04 1:40 Mobile Telecom.
Linktone LTON 04-Mar-04 1:10 Mobile Telecom.
Netease.com NTES 30-Jun-00 1:25 Software & Computer Services
Ninetowns Internet Technology NINE 03-Dec-04 1:1 Software & Computer Services
Perfect World (B) PWRD 26-Jul-07 1:5 Software & Computer Services
Shanda Interactive Entertainment SNDA 13-May-04 1:2 Leisure Goods
Solarfun Power SOLF 20-Dec-06 1:5 Electron. & Electric Equipment
Spreadtrum Communications SPRD 27-Jun-07 1:3 Tech. Hardware & Equipment
Sina SINA 2001 1:01 Software & Computer Services
The9 NCTY 15-Dec-04 1:1 Leisure Goods
Vimicro International VIMC 15-Nov-05 1:4 Tech. Hardware & Equipment
VisionChina Media VISN 06-Dec-07 1:1 Media
Xinhua Finance Media XFML 09-Mar-07 1:2 Media
Sources: New York Bank ADR Website, by 30 April, 2009
NASDAQ
 196 
Appendix 1.3: Chinese Firms Listed on Over-the-Counter Market 
 
Name Symbol Effective Date ADR Ratio Industry
Air China AIRYY Jun 30, 2006 1:20 Travel & Leisure
Angang Steel ANGGY Dec 06, 2002 1:40 Indust.Metals&Mining
Anhui Conch Cement Company AHCHY Nov 03, 2008 1:5 Food &Drug Retailers
Anton Oilfield Services ATONY Jan 12, 2009 1:200 OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist
Asia Cement China AACEY Jan 12, 2009 1:20 Construct.&Materials
Bank of China BACHY Oct 20, 2008 1:25 Banks
Bank of Communications BCMXY Apr 10, 2009 1:25 Financial Services
Beijing Beida Jade Bird Universal Sci-Tech BJBJY Dec 20, 2005 1:40 Software&ComputerSvc
Beijing Capital International Airpo BJCHY Nov 03, 2008 1:5 Travel & Leisure
Brilliance China Automotive BCAHY Jul 26, 2007 1:100 Automobiles & Parts
BYD BYDDY Oct 10, 2008 1:10 Tech.Hardware&Equip.
China Bluechemical CBLUY Jan 12, 2009 1:50 Chemicals
China Coal Energy CCOZY Apr 02, 2009 1:20 Mining
China Communications Construction CCCGY Nov 10, 2008 1:20 IndustrialTransport.
China Construction Bank Corporation CICHY Oct 20, 2008 1:50 Banks
China COSCO Holdings CICOY Oct 10, 2008 1:5 IndustrialTransport.
China Foods CHFHY Oct 10, 2008 1:20 Food Producers
China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd.CHAOY Nov 03, 2008 1:20 Construct.&Materials
China National Materials Company CASDY Mar 06, 2009 1:20 Construct.&Materials
China Oilfield Services CHOLY Mar 26, 2004 1:20 OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist
China Railway CRWOY Nov 03, 2008 1:25 Construct.&Materials
China Railway Construction CWYCY Nov 03, 2008 1:10 Construct.&Materials
China Shenhua Energy CSUAY Oct 20, 2008 1:10 Alternative Energy
China Shineway Pharmaceutical CSWYY Oct 10, 2008 1:20 Pharma. & Biotech.
China Shipping Development CSDXY Mar 01, 1996 1:50 IndustrialTransport.
China South Locomotive CSRGY Jan 12, 2009 1:25 IndustrialTransport.
China Vanke CVKEY Nov 03, 2008 1:20 Real Estate Inv&Serv
China Wireless Technologies CHWTY Sep 12, 2006 1:20 Tech.Hardware&Equip.
ChinaCast Communication CCHYY Dec 06, 2004 1:30 Software&ComputerSvc
Datang International Power Generation DIPGY Sep 04, 2001 1:20 Electricity
Dongfeng Motor Group DNFGY Jan 27, 2009 1:50 Automobiles & Parts
Double Coin DCHLY Oct 01, 1995 1:10 Automobiles & Parts
Far East Pharmaceutical Technology FEPTY Mar 02, 2004 1:100 Pharma. & Biotech.
Fosun International FOSUY Nov 03, 2008 1:25 Pharma. & Biotech.
Foxconn International Holdings FXCNY Oct 20, 2008 1:20 Tech.Hardware&Equip.
Golden Meditech GMDTY Jan 12, 2009 1:20 HealthCareEquip.&Ser
Guangzhou Investment GUAZY Dec 09, 1999 1:20 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical GZPHY Jun 21, 2002 1:20 Pharma. & Biotech.
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co., Ltd. GZUHY Nov 03, 2008 1:20 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Guangzhou Shipyard International GSHIY Jul 13, 1995 1:10 Industrial Engineer.
Hopewell Highway Infrastructure HHILY Apr 26, 2004 1:10 Construct.&Materials
Huadian Power International HPIFY Jan 12, 2009 1:30 Electricity
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China IDCBY Oct 20, 2008 1:50 Banks
Jiangsu Expressway JEXYY Dec 23, 2002 1:20 IndustrialTransport.
Jiangxi Copper JIXAY Oct 07, 2003 1:40 Mining
Jutal Offshore Oil Services JUTOY Jan 12, 2009 1:250 Oil & Gas Producers
Kingdee International Software Group KGDEY Nov 10, 2008 1:100 Software&ComputerSvc
Lianhua Supermarket Holdings LHUAY Jan 12, 2009 1:50 Food &Drug Retailers
Parkson Retail PKSGY Apr 02, 2009 1:30 General Retailers
Ping An Insurance Company of China PNGAY Mar 28, 2005 1:2 Life Insurance
Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery SHANY Jan 12, 2009 1:1000 OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali Chemical SLLBY Mar 01, 1994 1:10 Chemicals
Shanghai Electric SIELY Jan 13, 2009 1:20 General Industrials
Shanghai Erfangji SHFGY Dec 01, 1993 1:10 Industrial Engineer.
Shanghai Forte Land SGFTY Jan 27, 2009 1:100 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Shanghai Jin Jiang Intl Hotel SJJIY Dec 15, 2006 1:100 Leisure Goods
Shanghai Jinqiao Processing Dev SJQIY Jul 01, 1996 1:10 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone DevelopmentSLUJY Jul 01, 1996 1:5 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Shanghai Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone SGOTY May 01, 1995 1:5 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery SZPMY Oct 10, 2008 1:10 Industrial Engineer.
Shenzhen S.E.Z. Real Estate and Properties SZPRY Aug 01, 1994 1:10 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Sino-Ocean Land SIOLY Apr 02, 2009 1:20 Real Estate Inv&Serv
SINOTRUK (HONG KONG) SHKLY Nov 03, 2008 1:50 General Industrials
Synear Food SYNRY Oct 10, 2008 1:50 Food Producers
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection TCEPY Dec 23, 2003 1:20 Gas,H20&Multiutility
Tingyi (Cayman Islands) TCYMY Jan 23, 2006 1:20 Food Producers
TravelSky Technology TSYHY Dec 27, 2002 1:10 Software&ComputerSvc
Tsingtao Brewery TSGTY Feb 01, 1996 1:10 Beverages
Weichai Power WEICY Jan 12, 2009 1:10 Automobiles & Parts
Xinao Gas Holdings XNGSY Nov 03, 2008 1:25 Oil & Gas Producers
Zhejiang Expressway ZHEXY Feb 14, 2002 1:30 IndustrialTransport.
Zijin Mining Group ZIJMY Apr 10, 2009 1:20 Mining
ZTE ZTCOY Oct 10, 2008 1:2 Mobile Telecom.
Sources: New York Bank ADR Website, by 30 April, 2009
Over the Counter Market
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Appendix 1.4: Chinese Firms Listed on American Stock Exchange and 
Other 
 
 
 
Company Name Symbol Listing Date Industry
China Architectural Engineering RCH 28-Sep-07 Construction and Contracting
China Shen Zhou Mining & Resources, Inc SHZ 11-Apr-97 Metals Mining
China Shenghuo Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc KUN 14-Jun-07 Health Services, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Diagnostics
New Dragon Asia Corp NWD 28-Apr-00 Manufacturing: Consumer
Sinovac Biotech Ltd SVA 26-Sep-03 Health Services, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Diagnostics
Tiens Biotech Group (USA), Inc TBV 14-May-03 Health Services, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Diagnostics
Sources: American Stock Exchange Website, by 30 April, 2009
American Stock Exchange
Name Symbol Effective Date ADR Ratio Industry
China Shipping Development - 144A Nov 01, 1994 1:100 Industrial Transportation
Harbin Power Equipment - 144A HPECYP Dec 14, 1994 1:100 Industrial Engineering
Jiangling Motors - Reg. S -- Sep 29, 1995 1:100 Industrial Engineering
Maansham Iron & Steel - 144A MAAPP Nov 01, 1993 1:100 Industrial Metals
Ping An Insurance Company of China - 144APINGYP Jun 17, 2004 1:20 Life Insurance
Qingling Motor - 144A QIGPP Aug 11, 1994 1:50 Industrial Engineering
Qingling Motor - Reg. S -- Aug 11, 1994 1:50 Industrial Engineering
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre YIRPP Mar 25, 1994 1:100 Chemicals
Suntech Power - 144A N/A Feb 12, 2007 1:1 Electron.&Electric Equipment
Tingyi (Cayman Islands) - 144A TINGYP Feb 01, 1996 1:100 Food Producers
Zhejiang Southeast Electric Power - 144A ZHJGYP Sep 11, 1997 1:50 Electricity
Sources: New York ADR Website, by 30 April, 2009
Other Issues
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Appendix 1.5: Chinese Firms Listed on Hong Kong Mainboard 
 
Company Listing Date Stock Code Industry
Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation Ltd 7/04/2006 3355 Semiconductors
Air China Ltd 15/12/2004 753 Travel & Leisure
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd 12/12/2001 2600 Industrial Metals & Mining
Angang Steel Co Ltd 24/07/1997 347 Industrial Metals & Mining
Anhui Conch Cement Co Ltd 21/10/1997 914 Construction and Material
Anhui Expressway Co Ltd 13/11/1996 995 Industrial Transportation
Anhui Tianda Oil Pipe Co Ltd 24/12/2007 839 Industrial Supplier
AviChina Industry & Technology Co Ltd 30/10/2003 2357 Industrial Engineering
Bank of China Ltd 1/06/2006 3988 Banks
Bank of Communications Co, Ltd 23/06/2005 3328 Banks
Baoye Group Co Ltd 30/06/2003 2355 Industrial Construction
Beijing Capital International Airport Co Ltd 1/02/2000 694 Travel and Leisure
Beijing Capital Land Ltd 19/06/2003 2868 Real Estate Investment & Service
Beijing Jingkelong Co Ltd 26/02/2008 814 Personal Goods
Beijing Media Corporation Ltd 22/12/2004 1000 Media
Beijing North Star Co Ltd 14/05/1997 588 Real Estate Investment & Service
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd 6/08/1993 187 Industrial Engineering
BYD Co Ltd 31/07/2002 1211 Industrial Products
CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Ltd 29/09/1997 161 General Retailer
Chengdu PUTIAN Telecommunications Cable Co Ltd 13/12/1994 1202 Technology Hardware & Equipment
China BlueChemical Ltd 29/09/2006 3983 Chemicals
China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd 27/04/2007 998 Banks
China Coal Energy Co Ltd 19/12/2006 1898 Mining
China Communications Construction Co Ltd 15/12/2006 1800 Industrial Transportation
China Communications Services Corporation Ltd 8/12/2006 552 Telecommunications Equipment 
China Construction Bank Corporation 27/10/2005 939 Banks
China COSCO Holdings Co Ltd 30/06/2005 1919 Industrial Transportation
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd 5/02/1997 670 Travel and Leisure
China Life Insurance Co Ltd 18/12/2003 2628 Life Insurance
China Merchants Bank Co, Ltd 22/09/2006 3968 Banks
China Molybdenum Co, Ltd 26/04/2007 3993 Mining
China National Building Material Co Ltd 23/03/2006 3323 Industrial Engineering
China National Materials Co Ltd 20/12/2007 1893 Industrial Engineering
China Oilfield Services Ltd 20/11/2002 2883 Oil Equipment & Services
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 19/10/2000 386 Oil & Gas Producers
China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd 13/03/2008 1186 Construction & Materials
China Railway Group Ltd 7/12/2007 390 Construction & Materials
China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd 15/06/2005 1088 Electricity
China Shipping Container Lines Co Ltd 16/06/2004 2866 Industrial Transportation
China Shipping Development Co Ltd 11/11/1994 1138 Industrial Transportation
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Ltd 21/08/2008 1766 Industrial Machinery
China Southern Airlines Co Ltd 31/07/1997 1055 Travel and Leisure
China Telecom Corporation Ltd 15/11/2002 728 Fixed Line Telecommunications
Chongqing Iron & Steel Co Ltd 17/10/1997 1053 Industrial Metals & Mining
Chongqing Machinery & Electric Co Ltd 13/06/2008 2722 Industrial Machinery
Dalian Port (PDA) Co Ltd 28/04/2006 2880 Logistics Services
Datang International Power Generation Co, Ltd 21/03/1997 991 Electricity
Dongfang Electric Corporation Ltd 6/06/1994 1072 Industrial Engineering
Dongfeng Motor Group Co Ltd 7/12/2005 489 Automobile and Parts
First Tractor Co Ltd 23/06/1997 38 Industrial Machinery
Great Wall Motor Co Ltd 15/12/2003 2333 Automobile and Parts
Great Wall Technology Co Ltd 5/08/1999 74 Technology Hardware & Equipment
Guangdong Nan Yue Logistics Co Ltd 26/10/2005 3399 Logistics Services
Guangshen Railway Co Ltd 14/05/1996 525 Travel & Leisure
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 30/10/1997 874 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co, Ltd 14/07/2005 2777 Equity Investment
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co Ltd 6/08/1993 317 Industrial Transportation  
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Mainboard
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Appendix 1.5: Chinese Firms Listed on Hong Kong Mainboard (cont.) 
 
Company Listing Date Stock Code Industry
Hainan Meilan International Airport Co Ltd 18/11/2002 357 Industrial Transportation
Harbin Power Equipment Co Ltd 16/12/1994 1133 Electricity
Hisense Kelon Electrical Holdings Co Ltd # 23/07/1996 921 Household Goods & Home Construction
Huadian Power International Corporation Ltd 30/06/1999 1071 Electricity
Huaneng Power International, Inc 21/01/1998 902 Electricity
Hunan Nonferrous Metals Corporation Ltd 31/03/2006 2626 Industrial Metals & Mining
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd 27/10/2006 1398 Banks
IRICO Group Electronics Co Ltd 20/12/2004 438 Electronic Equipment
Jiangsu Expressway Co Ltd 27/06/1997 177 Travel and Leisure
Jiangxi Copper Co Ltd 12/06/1997 358 Industrial Metals & Mining
Jilin Qifeng Chemical Fiber Co Ltd 21/06/2006 549 Industrial Supplier
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co Ltd 2/02/1996 350 Industrial Engineering
Lianhua Supermarket Holdings Co Ltd 27/06/2003 980 General Retailer
Lingbao Gold Co Ltd 12/01/2006 3330 Mining
Luoyang Glass Co Ltd 8/07/1994 1108 General Retailer
Maanshan Iron & Steel Co Ltd 3/11/1993 323 Industrial Metals & Mining
Nanjing Panda Electronic Co Ltd 2/05/1996 553 Electronic Equipment
Northeast Electric Development Co Ltd 6/07/1995 42 Electronic Equipment
PetroChina Co Ltd 7/04/2000 857 Oil & Gas Producers
PICC Property and Casualty Co Ltd 6/11/2003 2328 Insurance
Ping An Insurance (Group) Co of China Ltd 24/06/2004 2318 Insurance
Qingling Motors Co Ltd 17/08/1994 1122 Automobile and Parts
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd 18/06/2008 1812 Forestry & Paper
Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery Co Ltd 7/02/2007 568 Industrial Machinery
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 31/12/1996 719 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog
Shanghai Electric Group Co Ltd 28/04/2005 2727 Electronic Equipment
Shanghai Forte Land Co Ltd 6/02/2004 2337 Real Estate Investment & Service
Shanghai Jin Jiang Int'l Hotels (Group) Co Ltd 15/12/2006 2006 Travel and Leisure
Shanghai Prime Machinery Co Ltd 27/04/2006 2345 Industrial Machinery
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co Ltd 7/12/1993 300 Industrial Engineering
Shenyang Public Utility Holdings Co Ltd # 16/12/1999 747 Gas, Water & Multiutilities
Shenzhen Expressway Co Ltd 12/03/1997 548 Industrial Transportation
Sichuan Expressway Co Ltd 7/10/1997 107 Industrial Transportation
Sichuan Xinhua Winshare Chainstore Co Ltd 30/05/2007 811 General Retailer
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co Ltd 26/07/1993 338 Chemicals
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co Ltd 29/03/1994 1033 Chemicals
Sinotrans Ltd 13/02/2003 598 Logistics Services
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Co Ltd 17/05/1994 1065 Gas, Water & Multiutilities
TravelSky Technology Ltd 7/02/2001 696 Travel and Leisure
Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 15/07/1993 168 Beverages
Weichai Power Co Ltd 11/03/2004 2338 Mining
Weiqiao Textile Co Ltd 24/09/2003 2698 General Retailer
Xiamen International Port Co Ltd 19/12/2005 3378 Industrial Transportation
Xinjiang Tianye Water Saving Irrigation System Co Ltd 24/01/2008 840 Gas, Water & Multiutilities
Xinjiang Xinxin Mining Industry Co Ltd 12/10/2007 3833 Mining
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd 1/04/1998 1171 Mining
Zhaojin Mining Industry Co Ltd 8/12/2006 1818 Mining
Zhejiang Expressway Co Ltd 15/05/1997 576 Industrial Transportation
Zhejiang Glass Co Ltd 10/12/2001 739 General Retailer
Zhengzhou Gas Co Ltd 29/06/2007 3928 Oil & Gas Producers
Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Co Ltd 20/12/2006 3898 Electronic Equipment
Zijin Mining Group Co, Ltd 23/12/2003 2899 Mining
ZTE Corporation 9/12/2004 763 Technology Hardware & Equipment
Sources: Hong Kong Stock Exchange website, by April 30, 2009
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Appendix 1.6: Chinese Firms Listed on Hong Kong GEM 
 
Name Listing Date Stock Code Industry
Beijing Beida Jade Bird Universal Sci-Tech Co Ltd 27/07/2000 8095 Industrial Engineering
Biosino Bio-Technology and Science Incorporation 27/02/2006 8247 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Capinfo Co Ltd 21/12/2001 8157 Software and Computer Services
CCID Consulting Co Ltd 12/12/2002 8235 Consulting
Changan Minsheng APLL Logistics Co Ltd 23/02/2006 8217 Logistics Services
Changmao Biochemical Engineering Co Ltd 28/06/2002 8208 Pharmaceutical
Dahe Media Co Ltd 13/11/2003 8243 Media
EVOC Intelligent Technology Co Ltd 10/10/2003 8285 Industrial Supplier
Jiangsu Nandasoft Technology Co Ltd 24/04/2001 8045 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Jilin Province Huinan Changlong Bio-pharmacy Co Ltd 24/05/2001 8049 Pharmaceutical
Launch Tech Co Ltd 7/10/2002 8196 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Nanjing Sample Technology Co Ltd 9/06/2004 8287 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Ningbo Yidong Electronic Co Ltd 14/11/2003 8249 Electronic Equipment
Northeast Tiger Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 28/02/2002 8197 Pharmaceutical
Powerleader Science & Technology Group Ltd 12/12/2002 8236 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Sanmenxia Tianyuan Aluminum Co Ltd 13/07/2004 8253 Industrial Metal and Mining
Shaanxi Northwest New Technology Industry Co Ltd 3/07/2003 8258 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Shandong Luoxin Pharmacy Stock Co Ltd 9/12/2005 8058 Pharmaceutical
Shandong Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co Ltd 27/02/2004 8199 Medical Equipment
Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Co Ltd 4/08/2000 8102 Electronic Equipment
Shanghai Fudan-Zhangjiang Bio-Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 13/08/2002 8231 Pharmaceutical
Shanghai Jiaoda Withub Information Industrial Co Ltd 31/07/2002 8205 Software and Computer Services
Shanghai Qingpu Fire-Fighting Equipment Co Ltd # 30/06/2004 8115 Industrial Machinery
Shanghai Tonva Petrochemical Co Ltd 13/07/2005 8251 Chemicals
Shanxi Changcheng Microlight Equipment Co Ltd 18/05/2004 8286 Industrial Machinery
Shenzhen Dongjiang Environmental Co Ltd 29/01/2003 8230 Environment Products and Services
Shenzhen Mingwah Aohan High Technology Corp Ltd 7/07/2004 8301 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Shenzhen Neptunus Interlong Bio-Technique Co Ltd 12/09/2005 8329 Pharmaceutical
Tianjin Binhai Teda Logistics (Group) Corporation Ltd 30/04/2008 8348 Logistics Services
Tianjin TEDA Biomedical Engineering Co Ltd 18/06/2002 8189 Medical Equipment
Tianjin Tianlian Public Utilities Co Ltd 9/01/2004 8290 Gas, Water & Multiutilities
Tong Ren Tang Technologies Co Ltd 31/10/2000 8069 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Wumart Stores Inc 21/11/2003 8277 General Retailer
Xi'an Haitian Antenna Technologies Co Ltd 5/11/2003 8227 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Yantai North Andre Juice Co Ltd 22/04/2003 8259 Beverage
Zheda Lande Scitech Ltd 3/05/2002 8106 Technolodgy Hardware and Equipment
Zhejiang Prospect Co Ltd 18/02/2004 8273 Automobile and Parts
Zhejiang Shibao Co Ltd 16/05/2006 8331 Industrial Products
Zhejiang Yonglong Enterprises Co Ltd 8/11/2002 8211 Chemicals
Sources: Hong Kong Stock Exchange Website, by 30 April, 2009
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Appendix 1.7: Chinese Firms Listed on Stock Exchange of Singapore 
 
Name Listing Date Industry Country of Incorporation
8TELECOM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGSLTD July 23, 2004 Telecommunications Equipment
ACE ACHIEVE INFOCOM LTD November 18, 2004 Telecommunications Equipment Bermuda
ASIA DEKOR HOLDINGS LTD November 15, 1999 General Retailers Bermuda
ASIA ENVIRONMENT HOLDINGS LTD December 11, 2003 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
ASIA POWER CORP LTD November 9, 1999 Electricity Singapore
ASIA SILK HOLDINGS LTD May 26, 2005 Personal Goods Singapore
ASIA TIGER GROUP LTD January 27, 2005 Industrial Machinery Singapore
ASIA WATER TECHNOLOGY March 4, 2005 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
ASIAPHARM GROUP LTD May 5, 2004 Pharmaceuticals Bermuda
AUTOMATED TOUCHSTONE MACHINES LTD November 17, 2003 Industrial Machinery Singapore
BEAUTY CHINA HOLDINGS LTD November 17, 2003 General Retailers Cayman Islands
BIO-TREAT TECHNOLOGY LTD February 16, 2004 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
BRIGHT ORIENT (HOLDING) LTD November 18, 2003 Personal Goods Bermuda
BRIGHT WORLD PRECISION MAC LTD April 27, 2006 Industrial Supplier Singapore
C & O PHARM TECH (HLDGS) LTD October 17, 2005 Pharmaceuticals
CACOLA FURNITURE INTL LIMITED November 7, 2007 Personal Goods Cayman Islands
CELESTIAL NUTRIFOODS LTD January 9, 2004 Food Products Bermuda
CG TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS LTD April 22, 2005 Personal Goods Bermuda
CHANGTIAN PLASTIC & CHEMICAL LIMITED November 9, 2007 Industrial Supplier Bermuda
CHINA ANGEL FOOD LIMITED July 13, 2007 Food Products Singapore
CHINA ANIMAL HEALTHCARE LTD December 16, 2001 Healthcare Product and Service Bermuda
CHINA AUTO ELECTRONICS GROUP LIMITED October 20, 2006 Electronic Equipment Bermuda
CHINA AVIATION OIL CORP LTD January 8, 1998 Oil and Gas Producer Singapore
CHINA BEARING (SINGAPORE) LTD October 20, 2006 Industrial Engineering Singapore
CHINA DAIRY GROUP LTD January 8, 1998 Food Products Singapore
CHINA ENERGY LIMITED December 21, 2006 Electricity Singapore
CHINA ERATAT SPORTS FASHION LIMITED April 17, 2008 General Retailers Singapore
CHINA ESSENCE GROUP LTD August 8, 2000 Food Products Cayman Islands
CHINA FARM EQUIPMENT LIMITED February 9, 2006 Industrial Machinery Singapore
CHINA FASHION HOLDINGS LTD December 1, 2004 Personal Goods Singapore
CHINA FLEXIBLE PACKAGING HOLDINGS LTD November 11, 2004 Industrial Supplier Bermuda
CHINA FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD September 25, 2003 Food Products Singapore
CHINA GREAT LAND HOLDINGS LTD February 16, 2005 Real Estate Singapore
CHINA HAIDA LTD November 24, 2004 Industrial Supplier Singapore
CHINA HEALTHCARE 2002 Healthcare Product and Service Singapore
CHINA HONGCHENG HOLDINGS LTD August 8, 2007 Personal Goods Bermuda
CHINA HONGXING SPORTS LIMITED November 14, 2005 General Retailers Bermuda
CHINA INFRASTRUCTURE HOLDINGS LTD November 26, 1999 Service Bermuda
CHINA KANGDA FOOD COMPANY LIMITED October 9, 2006 Food Products Bermuda
CHINA LIFESTYLE F&B GROUP LTD August 26, 2005 Food Products Bermuda
CHINA MERCHANTS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT July 24, 1995 Real Estate China
CHINA MILK PRODUCTS GROUP LIMITED March 13, 2006 General Retailers Cayman Islands
CHINA NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY November 14, 2007 Real Estate British Virgin Islands
CHINA OILFIELD TECHNOLOGY October 17, 2006 Environmental Products & Service Cayman Islands
CHINA PAPER HOLDINGS LTD July 14, 2004 General Retailers Bermuda
CHINA PETROTECH LTD June 25, 1905 Software and Computer Service Singapore
CHINA POWERPLUS LIMITED September 3, 2004 Industrial Machinery Singapore
CHINA PRECISION TECHNOLOGY LIMITED May 8, 2006 Electronic Equipment Singapore
CHINA PRINTING & DYEING HOLDING LIMITED September 7, 2006 General Retailers Singapore
CHINA SKY CHEM FIBRE CO. October 3, 2005 General Retailers Cayman Islands
CHINA SPORTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED July 18, 2007 General Retailers Bermuda
CHINA SUN BIO-CHEM TECHNOLOGY GROUP COMPANY LTD November 8, 2004 Food Products Cayman Islands
CHINA SUNSINE CHEM HLDGS LTD July 5, 2007 Industrial Supplier Singapore
CHINA WHEEL HOLDINGS LTD October 10, 2004 Industrial Supplier Singapore
CHINA XLX FERTILISER LTD June 21, 2007 Chemicals Singapore
CHINA YUANBANG PROP HLDGS LTD May 9, 2007 Real Estate Bermuda
CHINA ZAINO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED April 18, 2008 Maturaturing Bermuda
CHINACAST COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS May 14, 2004 Telecommunications Equipment Bermuda
CHT HOLDINGS LTD September 24, 2003 Industrial Supplier Bermuda
CMZ HOLDINGS LTD July 16, 2007 General Retailers Singapore
CONTEL CORPORATION December 27, 2005 Telecommunications Equipment Bermuda
DELONG HOLDINGS LTD April 8, 1999 Industrial Metal Singapore
DEVOTION ENERGY GROUP LTD August 1, 2003 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
DUTECH HOLDINGS LTD August 2, 2007 General Retailers Singapore
EAGLE BRAND HOLDINGS LTD February 8, 1999 General Retailers Bermuda
EPURE INTERNATIONAL LTD October 6, 2006 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
FABCHEM CHINA LIMITED April 17, 2006 Chemicals Singapore
FALMAC LTD February 21, 1994 Industrial Engineering Singapore
FERROCHINA LIMITED May 19, 2005 Industrial Supplier Bermuda
FIBRECHEM TECHNOLOGIES LTD April 21, 2004 Chemicals Bermuda
FM HOLDINGS LIMITED May 24, 2005 General Retailers Bermuda
FORELAND FABRICTECH HOLDINGS LIMITED April 26, 2007 General Retailers Bermuda
Singapore Stock Exchange 
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Name Listing Date Industry Country of Incorporation
FUJIAN ZHENYUN PLAS IND CO LTD August 3, 2007 General Retailers China
FULL APEX HOLDINGS LTD June 20, 2003 General Retailers Bermuda
FUNG CHOI MEDIA GROUP LTD October 20, 2004 General Retailers Bermuda
FURAMA LTD Travel and Leisure Singapore
FUXING CHINA GROUP LIMITED September 24, 2007 General Retailers Bermuda
GUANGZHAO IND FOREST BIOGRP LTD July 5, 2004 General Retailers Singapore
HENGXIN TECHNOLOGY LTD May 11, 2006 Telecommunications Equipment Singapore
HONGGUO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD June 5, 2003 Personal Goods Bermuda
HONGWEI TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED October 24, 2005 Chemicals Bermuda
JISHAN HOLDINGS LTD May 10, 2004 General Retailers Singapore
JIUTIAN CHEMICAL GROUP LIMITED May 4, 2006 Chemicals Singapore
JOINN HOLDINGS LIMITED Software and Computer Service Bermuda
JUNMA TYRE CORD COMPANY LTD November 25, 2004 Chemicals China
JURONG CEMENT LTD Equity Investment Singapore
KEDA COMMUNICATIONS LTD July 25, 2005 Telecommunications Equipment Bermuda
KXD DIGITAL ENTERTAINMENT LTD October 27, 2003 Telecommunications Equipment Singapore
LI HENG CHEM FIBRE TECH LTD March 12, 2008 Chemicals Bermuda
LINK HI HOLDINGS LIMITED May 22, 2006 Industrial Engineering Singapore
LONGCHEER HOLDINGS LIMITED May 13, 2005 Software and Computer Service Bermuda
LUXKING GROUP HOLDINGS LTD August 22, 2005 Industrial Supplier Bermuda
LUZHOU BIO-CHEM TECHNOLOGY LTD February 24, 2006 Food Products Singapore
MEMSTAR TECHNOLOGY LTD September 3, 2007 Industrial Supplier Singapore
MEMTECH INTERNATIONAL LTD July 22, 2004 Industrial Supplier Singapore
MIDAS HOLDINGS LTD February 23, 2004 Industrial Supplier Singapore
MIDSOUTH HOLDINGS LTD Industrial Supplier Singapore
NEW LAKESIDE HOLDINGS LTD March 24, 2004 Food Products Singapore
OCEAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD January 28, 2005 Food Products Singapore
ORIENTAL CENTURY LIMITED June 1, 2006 General Retailers Singapore
ORIENTAL FOOD HOLDINGS LTD November 19, 2004 Food Products Singapore
OUHUA ENERGY HOLDINGS LIMITED November 3, 2006 Oil and Gas Producer Bermuda
PEOPLE'S FOOD HOLDINGS LTD March 14, 2001 Food Products Bermuda
PHARMESIS INTERNATIONAL LTD October 6, 2004 Pharmaceuticals Singapore
PINE AGRITECH LIMITED May 12, 2005 Food Products Bermuda
R H ENERGY LTD July 11, 2007 Industrial Engineering Singapore
REYOUNG PHARM LTD September 8, 2005 Pharmaceuticals Bermuda
REYPHON AGRICEUTICAL LIMITED August 1, 2007 Chemicals Singapore
SHANGHAI ASIA HOLDINGS LTD October 1, 2004 General Retailers Singapore
SHANGHAI TURBO ENTERPRISES LTD January 16, 2006 Industrial Engineering Cayman Islands
SIHUAN PHARMA HLDGS GROUP LTD March 23, 2007 Pharmaceuticals China
SINO TECHFIBRE LIMITED October 20, 2006 Chemicals Bermuda
SINOBEST TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD November 18, 2004 Media Bermuda
SINO-ENVIRONMENT TECH GRP LTD April 28, 2006 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
SINOMEM TECHNOLOGY LTD June 18, 2003 Industrial Supplier Singapore
SINOPIPE HOLDINGS LTD December 16, 2005 IndustrialSupplier Singapore
SINOSTAR PEC HOLDINGS LTD September 26, 2007 Industrial Supplier Singapore
SINOTEL TECHNOLOGIES LTD November 12, 2007 Software and Computer Service Singapore
SKY CHINA PETROLEUM SVCS LTD November 10, 2005 Industrial Supplier Singapore
SOUTHERN PACKAGING GROUP LTD November 12, 2004 Industrial Engineering Singapore
SP CHEMICALS LTD August 6, 2003 Chemicals Singapore
STAR PHARMACEUTICAL LTD February 15, 2005 Pharmaceuticals Singapore
STRACO CORPORATION LTD February 20, 2004 Travel and Leisure Singapore
SUNMART HOLDINGS LIMITED August 15, 2007 Industrial  Supplier Singapore
SUNPOWER GROUP LTD March 16, 2005 Environmental Products & Service Bermuda
SUNRAY HOLDINGS LTD November 5, 2003 Pharmaceuticals Bermuda
SUNSHINE HOLDINGS LIMITED March 31, 2006 Real Estate Cayman Islands
SUNVIC CHEMICAL HOLDINGS LTD February 5, 2007 Chemicals Singapore
SYNEAR FOOD HOLDINGS LIMITED August 18, 2006 Food Products Bermuda
TIANJIN ZHONG XIN PHARMACEUTICAL June 27, 1997 Pharmaceuticals China
UNIONMET SINGAPORE LIMITED January 31, 2007 Chemicals Singapore
UNITED ENVIROTECH LTD April 22, 2004 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
UNITED FOOD HOLDINGS LTD March 26, 2001 Food Products Bermuda
WANXIANG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED July 19, 2007 Food Products Singapore
YAAN SECURITY TECHNOLOGY LTD March 26, 2001 Electronic Equipment Singapore
YANGZIJIANG SHIPBLDG HLDGS LTD April 18, 2007 Industrial Transportation Singapore
YANLORD LAND GROUP LIMITED June 22, 2006 Real Estate Singapore
YONGMAO HOLDINGS LIMITED February 21, 2008 Industrial Machinery Singapore
YONGXIN INTL HOLDINGS LTD July 31, 2007 Industrial Supplier Singapore
YOUCAN FOODS INTERNATIONAL LTD November 22, 2004 Food Products Singapore
ZHONGGUO JILONG LTD September 30, 2004 Food Products Singapore
ZHONGHUI HOLDINGS LTD October 29, 2004 Environmental Products & Service Singapore
Z-OBEE HOLDINGS LIMITED November 21, 2007 Telecommunications Equipment Bermuda
Sources: The Stock Exchange of Singapore, by 30 April, 2009
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Appendix 2: Chinese Dual and Triple Cross-listing 
Information 
Appendix 2.1: Chinese Firms Dual-Listed on China A and B Market 
 
COMPANY NAME China A China B Industry
ANHUI GUJING DISTILLERY COMPANY LIMITED 27/09/1996 12/06/1996 Beverages
BENGANG STEEL PLATES COMPANY LIMITED 15/01/1998 8/07/1997 Industrial Metals & Mining
BOE TECHNOLOGY GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 12/01/2001 10/01/1997 Technology Hardware & Equipment
CHANGCHAI COMPANY LIMITED 1/07/1994 13/09/1996 Industrial Engineering
CHINA FANGDA GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 15/04/1996 4/03/1996 Construction & Materials
CHINA FIRST PENCIL COMPANY LIMITED 14/08/1992 28/07/1992 Personal Goods
CHINA INTERNATIONAL MARINE CONTAINERS GROUP CO LIMITED 8/04/1994 23/03/1994 General Industrials
CHINA MERCHANTS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED 7/06/1993 7/06/1993 Real Estate Investment & Service
CHINA TEXTILE MACHINERY COMPANY LIMITED 5/08/1992 28/07/1992 Industrial Engineering
CHINA VANKE CO LIMITED 26/08/1991 28/05/1991 Real Estate Investment & Service
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTOMOBILE CO LIMITED 10/06/1997 8/11/1996 Automobiles & Parts
CSG HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED 28/02/1992 28/02/1992 Construction & Materials
DALIAN REFRIGERATION COMPANY LIMITED 8/12/1993 20/03/1998 Industrial Engineering
DANHUA CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY CO.LTD 11/03/1994 29/12/1993 Chemicals
DAZHONG TRANSPORTATION (GROUP) COMPANY LIMITED 7/08/1992 22/07/1992 Travel & Leisure
DOUBLE COIN HOLDINGS LTD. 4/12/1992 28/08/1992 Automobiles & Parts
EASTERN COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LIMITED 26/11/1996 9/08/1996 Technology Hardware & Equipment
FOSHAN ELECTRICAL AND LIGHTING COMPANY LIMITED 23/11/1993 8/08/1995 Household Goods & Home Construction
GUANGDONG ELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED 26/11/1993 28/06/1995 Electricity
GUANGDONG PROVINCIAL EXPRESSWAY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED 20/02/1998 15/08/1996 Industrial Transportation
GUANGDONG SUNRISE HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED 4/10/1993 5/10/1993 Support Services
HAINAN AIRLINES COMPANY LIMITED 25/11/1999 27/06/1997 Travel & Leisure
HAINAN DADONGHAI TOURISM CENTRE (HOLDING) COMPANY LIMITED 28/01/1997 8/10/1996 Travel & Leisure
HAINAN PEARL RIVER HOLDINGS COMPANY LTD 21/12/1992 30/06/1995 Real Estate Investment & Service
HEFEI MEILING COMPANY LIMITED 18/10/1993 28/08/1996 Household Goods & Home Construction
HUADIAN ENERGY COMPANY LIMITED 1/07/1996 22/04/1996 Electricity
HUANGSHAN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED 6/05/1997 22/11/1996 Travel & Leisure
HUAXIN CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED 3/01/1994 9/12/1994 Construction & Materials
INNER MONGNIA EERDUOSI CASHMERE 26/04/2001 20/10/1995 Personal Goods
JIANGLING MOTORS CORPORATION LIMITED 1/12/1993 29/09/1995 Automobiles & Parts
JINAN QINGQI MOTORCYCLES 6/12/1993 17/06/1997 Automobiles & Parts
JINSHAN DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION CO LTD 8/10/1993 19/11/1993 Leisure Goods
JINZHOU PORT COMPANY LIMITED 9/06/1999 19/05/1998 Industrial Transportation
KONKA GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 27/03/1992 27/03/1992 Leisure Goods
LIVZON PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP INCORPORATED 28/10/1993 20/07/1993 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog
LUTHAI TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED 25/12/2000 19/08/1997 Personal Goods
SGSB GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 11/03/1994 18/01/1994 Industrial Engineering
SHANDONG CHENMING PAPER HOLDINGS LIMITED 20/11/2000 26/05/1997 Forestry & Paper
SHANGHIA CHLOR-ALKALI CHM 13/11/1992 20/08/1992 Chemicals
SHANGHAI BAOSIGHT SOFTWARE COMPANY LIMITED 11/03/1994 16/03/1996 Software & Computer Services
SHANGHAI DIESEL ENGINE COMPANY LIMITED 11/03/1994 29/12/1993 Industrial Engineering
SHANGHAI DINGLI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (GROUP) CO.LTD 28/08/1992 28/07/1992 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
SHANGHAI ERFANGJI COMPANY LIMITED 10/04/1992 1/07/1992 Industrial Engineering
SHANGHAI FRIENDSHIP GROUP INCORPORATED COMPANY 4/02/1994 5/01/1994 General Retailers
SHANGHAI HAIXIN GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 4/04/1994 9/12/1993 Personal Goods
SHANGHAI HIGHLY GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 16/11/1992 18/01/1993 Industrial Engineering
SHANGHAI JIN JIANG INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED7/06/1993 18/10/1993 Industrial Transportation
SHANGHAI LUJIAZUI FINANCE & TRADE ZONE DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 28/06/1993 22/11/1994 Real Estate Investment & Service
SHANGHAI POTEVIO COMPANY LIMITED 18/10/1993 20/10/1994 Technology Hardware & Equipment
SHANGHAI SANMAO ENTERPRISE (GROUP) COMPANY LIMITED 8/11/1993 3/01/1994 Personal Goods
SHANGHAI WINGSUNG DATA TECHNOLOGY COMPANY LIMITED 20/08/1992 22/07/1992 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
SHANGHAI YAOHUA PILKINGTON GLASS COMPANY LIMITED 28/01/1994 13/12/1993 Construction & Materials
SHANGHAI ZHENHUA PORT MACHINERY (GROUP) COMPANY LIMITED 21/12/2000 5/08/1997 Industrial Engineering
SHANGHAI AUTOMATION INSTRUMENTATION COMPANY LIMITED 24/03/1994 29/04/1994 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
SHANGHAI DAJIANG (GROUP) STOCK COMPANY LIMITED 22/11/1993 16/12/1993 Food Producers
SHANGHAI JINJIANG INTERNATIONAL HOTELS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED11/10/1996 15/12/1994 Travel & Leisure
SHANGHAI JINQIAO EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED26/03/1993 31/03/1993 Real Estate Investment & Service
SHANGHAI KAIKAI INDUSTRIAL CO LTD 28/02/2001 8/01/1997 Personal Goods
SHANGHAI MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED 24/02/1994 31/01/1994 Industrial Engineering
SHANGHAI MRA TRDG 4/02/1994 30/01/1994 Industrial Metals & Mining
SHANGHAI NINE DRAGON 28/03/2001 18/01/1999 Personal Goods
SHENZHEN PROPERTIES & RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT (GROUP) LIMITED 30/03/1992 30/03/1992 Real Estate Investment & Service
SHENZHEN SEG CO LTD 26/12/1996 22/07/1996 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE REAL ESTATE AND PROPERTIES (GROUP) COMPANY LIM  ITED15/09/1993 10/01/1994 Real Estate Investment & Service
SHENZHEN TEXTILE (HOLDINGS) COMPANY LIMITED 15/08/1994 15/08/1994 Personal Goods
SHENZHEN ACCORD PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY LIMITED 9/08/1993 10/08/1993 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE COMPANY LIMITED 6/08/1996 13/12/1995 General Retailers
SHENZHEN NANSHAN POWER STATION COMPANY LIMITED 1/07/1994 28/11/1994 Electricity
SHENZHEN SHENBAO INDUSTRIAL COMPANY LIMITED 12/10/1992 2/01/1991 Beverages
SHENZHEN TELLUS (HOLDINGS) COMPANY LIMITED 21/06/1993 21/06/1993 General Retailers
SHENZHEN VICTOR ONWARD TEXTILE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY LIMITED 16/06/1992 16/06/1992 Personal Goods
SHENZHEN ZHONGHENG HUAFA CO., LIMITED. 28/04/1992 28/04/1992 Electronic & Electrical Equipmect
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELECTRONIC GLASS COMPANY LIMITED 25/09/1996 8/07/1996 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
SVA ELECTRON COMPANY LIMITED 2/01/1991 21/02/1992 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
WEIFU HIGH-TECHNOLOGY COMPANY LIMITED 24/09/1998 11/09/1995 Automobiles & Parts
WUXI LITTLE SWAN CO LIMITED 28/03/1997 18/07/1996 Household Goods & Home Construction
YANTAI CHANGYU PIONEER WINE COMPANY LIMITED 26/10/2000 23/09/1997 Beverages
ZHONGLU COMPANY LIMITED 28/01/1994 15/11/1993 Leisure Goods
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Appendix 2.2: Chinese Firms Dual-Listed on China A and Hong Kong 
Market 
 
 
Company Name Hong Kong China A Industry
ANHUI CONCH CEMENT 21/10/1997 7/02/2002 Construction & Materials
ANHUI EXPRESSWAY 13/11/1996 7/01/2003 Industrial Transportation
BANK OF CHINA 1/06/2006 5/07/2006 Banks
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS 23/06/2005 15/05/2007 Banks
BEIJING NORTH STAR 14/05/1997 16/10/2006 Real Estate Investment & Services
BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY 06/08/1993 06/05/1994 Industrial Engineering
CHINA CITIC BANK CORPORATION LIMITED 27/04/2007 27/04/2007 Banks
CHINA COAL ENERGY COMPANY LTD 19/12/2006 1/02/2008 Mining
CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK CORP 27/10/2005 25/09/2007 Banks
CHINA COSCO HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED 30/06/2005 26/06/2007 Industrial Transportation
CHINA MERCHANTS BANK CO LTD 22/09/2006 9/04/2002 Banks
CHINA MOBILE 15/11/2002 14/11/2002 Telecommunications
CHINA RAILWAY GROUP 7/12/2007 3/12/2007 Construction & Materials
CHINA SHENHUA ENERGY 15/01/2005 9/10/2007 Mining
CHINA TELECOM CORP LTD 23/10/1997 22/10/1997 Fixed Line Telecommunications
CHONGQING IRON AND STEEL 17/10/1997 28/02/2007 Industrial Metals & Mining
DONGFANG ELECTRIC CORPORATION LIMITED 06/06/1994 18/10/1995 Industrial Engineering
GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INTERNATIONAL 6/08/1993 28/10/1993 Industrial Engineering
HISENSE KELON ELECT. 13/07/1999 23/07/1996 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
HUADIAN POWER INTERNATIONAL 30/06/1999 3/02/2005 Electricity
INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LTD 27/10/2006 27/10/2006 Banks
JINGWEI TEXTILE MACHINERY 02/02/1996 10/12/1996 Industrial Engineering
MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL COMPANY 03/11/1993 06/01/1994 Industrial Metals & Mining
NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS COMPANY 02/05/1996 18/11/1996 Technology Hardware & Equipment
NORTHEAST ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 06/07/1995 13/12/1995 Electronic & Electrical Equipment
SHANDONG CHENMING PAPER HOLDINGS 18/06/2008 20/11/2000 Forestry & Paper
SHANDONG XINHUA PHARMACEUTICAL 31/12/1996 08/08/1997 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
SHANGHAI ELECTRIC GROUP 28/04/2005 5/12/2008 Industrial Engineering
SHENJI GROUP KUNMING MACHINE TOOL 7/12/1993 3/01/1994 Industrial Engineering
SINOPEC YIZHENG CHEMICAL FIBRE 29/03/1994 11/04/1995 Chemicals
WEICHAI POWER CO., LTD. 11/03/2004 30/04/2007 Industrial Engineering
ZIJIN MINING 25/04/2008 23/12/2003 Mining
ZTE CORP 9/12/2004 18/11/1997 Technology Hardware & Equipment
Sources: New York Stock Exchange Website, Hong Kong Stock Exchnage Website on April 2009
Listing Date
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Appendix 2.3: Chinese Firms Triple-Listed on China A, Hong Kong, 
and USA Market 
 
 
 
Company Name Hong Kong New York (ADR) China A Industry
ALUMINUM CORPORATION OF CHINA LIMITED 12/12/2001 11/12/2001 30/04/2007 Industrial Metals & Mining
CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES CORPORATION LIMITED 5/02/1997 4/02/1997 5/11/1997 Travel & Leisure
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD 17/12/2003 18/12/2003 9/01/2007 Life Insurance
CHINA NETCOM GROUP 16/11/2004 16/12/2004 16/12/2004 Fixed Line Telecommunications
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION 19/10/2000 18/10/2000 8/08/2001 Oil & Gas Producers
CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES COMPANY LIMITED 31/07/1997 30/17/1997 25/07/2003 Travel & Leisure
CHINA UNITED TELECOMMUNICATION 22/06/2000 21/06/2000 9/10/2002 Wireless Communication
GUANGSHEN RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED 14/05/1996 13/05/1996 22/09/2003 Travel & Leisure
HUANENG POWER INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED 21/01/1998 6/10/1994 6/12/2001 Electricity
PETROCHINA CO LTD 7/04/2000 6/04/2000 5/11/2007 Oil & Gas Producers
SINOPEC SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY LIMITED 26/07/1993 26/07/1993 8/11/1993 Chemicals
YANZHOU COAL MINING COMPANY 1/04/1998 31/03/1998 1/07/1998 Mining
CHINA TELECOM CORP LTD 23/10/1997 22/10/1997 Fixed Line Telecommunications
CHINA MOBILE 15/11/2002 14/11/2002 Wireless Communication
CNOOC-CHINA NATIONAL OFFSHORE OIL 28/02/2001 27/02/2001 Energy
Hong Kong OTC US (ADR) China A
AIR CHINA LIMITED 15/12/2004 24/08/2006 18/08/2006 Travel & Leisure
ANGANG STEEL COMPANY LIMITED 24/07/1997 13/10/2003 26/12/1997 Industrial Metals & Mining
CHINA OILFIELD SERVICES 20/11/2002 8/02/2005 28/09/2007 Oil Equipment & Services
CHINA RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 13/03/2008 10/07/2008 103/2008 Construction & Materials
CHINA SHIPPING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED 11/11/1994 2/02/2006 23/05/2002 Industrial Transportation
CHINA SHIPPING CONTAINER LINES 16/06/2004 23/07/2004 12/12/2007 Industrial Transportation
DATANG INTERNATIONAL POWER GENERATION COMPANY LIMITED21/03/1997 19/08/2003 20/12/2006 Electricity
GUANGZHOU PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. 30/10/1997 8/03/2007 6/02/2001 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog
JIANGSU EXPRESSWAY COMPANY LIMITED 27/06/1997 27/08/2003 22/09/2003 Industrial Transportation
JIANGXI COPPER COMPANY LIMITED 12/06/1997 10/11/2003 16/07/2002 Industrial Metals & Mining
PING AN INSURANCE (GROUP) COMPANY OF CHINA LTD 24/06/2004 10/02/2006 1/03/2007 Life Insurance
TIANJIN CAPITAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION GROUP COMPANY LIMITED17/05/1994 16/12/2005 30/06/1995 Gas, Water & Multiutilities
TSINGTAO BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED 15/07/1993 15/07/1993 27/08/1993 Beverages
ZHEJIANG EXPRESSWAY COMPANY LIMITED 15/05/1997 22/09/2006 12/08/2005 Industrial Transportation
HOPEWELL HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 6/08/2003 21/01/2005 Industrial Transportation
BRILLANCE CHINA AUTOMOTIVE 22/10/1999 9/10/1992 Auto Manufacturers
CHINA NETCOM GROUP 16/11/2004 16/12/2004 Wireless Communication
Sources: Hong Kong Stock Exchange Website, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Websites, New York Stock Exchange Website, Datastream on April 2009
Listing Date
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Appendix 3: Distribution of Realised Return 
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Appendix 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Returns of Dual-Listing 
Chinese Firms Traded on China A and B Markets for the Period 
01/01/1993 to 31/12/2008 
 
Company Market  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Observations
Anhui Guijing Distiller A 0.0001 0.1823 -0.1447 0.0290 0.1908 6.7010 1888.9570 3275
B -0.0003 0.1395 -0.3035 0.0276 -0.3362 10.5939 7744.5150 3198
Bengang Steel Plate A -0.0001 0.0961 -0.2297 0.0257 -0.1222 8.2579 3300.3300 2859
B 0.0002 0.0997 -0.1072 0.0278 0.1866 6.0972 1214.8880 2996
BOE Technology A -0.0005 0.0970 -0.2901 0.0325 -0.7454 9.8899 4302.5850 2078
B 0.0001 0.2231 -0.1077 0.0331 0.1247 5.3072 676.7362 3016
Changchai Company A 0.0002 0.3403 -0.3173 0.0328 0.5335 15.3046 24044.4700 3783
B -0.0003 0.1368 -0.1799 0.0309 0.0169 5.6384 930.6340 3208
China Fanda A 0.0000 0.1715 -0.2415 0.0320 -0.1778 6.5207 1730.6080 3317
B 0.0004 0.2123 -0.1991 0.0331 0.0492 6.1045 1345.4650 3347
China First Pencil  A 0.0003 0.3468 -0.2112 0.0322 0.7780 11.8996 14192.2600 4173
B 0.0005 0.7348 -0.2876 0.0334 2.5456 63.4383 639635.4000 4173
China Interational Marine ContainerA 0.0006 0.2754 -0.1696 0.0280 0.5941 11.1176 10777.4400 3843
B 0.0007 0.1351 -0.1456 0.0276 -0.0546 6.9696 2532.9910 3855
China Merchants Propert DevelopmentA 0.0006 0.1753 -0.2456 0.0303 0.0585 7.7753 3861.7730 4062
B 0.0003 0.4381 -0.1811 0.0317 0.9723 16.8644 33173.2000 4062
China Textile Machinery A 0.0000 0.3552 -0.2545 0.0336 0.6232 11.5019 12838.3100 4173
B -0.0001 0.2830 -0.3117 0.0329 0.0886 10.7246 10380.3600 4173
China Vanke  A 0.0007 0.2583 -0.2007 0.0290 0.4674 9.3527 7168.8850 4173
B 0.0008 0.4021 -0.3540 0.0331 0.4785 17.6692 36629.2600 4068
Congqing Changan Automobile A 0.0003 0.2830 -0.2136 0.0343 0.2654 6.6026 1750.4100 3168
B -0.0001 0.0962 -0.1459 0.0277 -0.0688 5.6350 874.9430 3016
CSG Holding  A 0.0003 0.4061 -0.1947 0.0329 0.6516 11.5880 13119.0900 4173
B 0.0003 0.1674 -0.2412 0.0302 -0.1634 7.6768 3821.6200 4173
Dalian Referigerator A 0.0001 0.1552 -0.1109 0.0279 0.0773 6.6647 1576.9080 2813
B 0.0001 0.2998 -0.2350 0.0305 0.5401 12.7417 15730.9100 3930
Danhua chemical  A 0.0002 0.8261 -0.2113 0.0355 4.2717 88.9815 1201684.0000 3863
B 0.0002 0.7068 -0.1612 0.0324 2.5735 62.0450 573025.4000 3915
Dazhong Transportation A 0.0005 0.3248 -0.2777 0.0316 0.6425 13.2925 18706.4600 4173
B 0.0005 0.2956 -0.2553 0.0310 0.1628 9.4578 7269.6560 4173
Double Coin  A -0.0003 0.3083 -0.2239 0.0336 0.4447 10.3789 9604.6960 4173
B -0.0001 0.3412 -0.1774 0.0331 0.3648 8.1210 4652.3170 4173
Eastern Communications A -0.0002 0.0968 -0.3003 0.0301 -0.2912 8.1583 3543.5180 3156
B 0.0002 0.6423 -0.1070 0.0330 2.3471 48.8534 286196.9000 3233
Foshan Electrical A 0.0002 0.2202 -0.2555 0.0258 0.0395 14.3610 21195.6000 3941
B 0.0005 0.1600 -0.1542 0.0247 0.1216 8.7072 4753.3390 3496
Guangdong Electric Power A 0.0003 0.1780 -0.1823 0.0263 0.0839 7.9028 3534.6630 3525
B 0.0003 0.2089 -0.2060 0.0263 0.0497 9.3107 6536.1720 3938
Guangdong Provincial ExpresswayA -0.0001 0.0961 -0.2398 0.0226 -0.5109 11.8942 9461.2300 2833
B 0.0002 0.1665 -0.1823 0.0277 0.0193 7.8326 3142.2430 3229
Guandgong Sunrise A -0.0003 0.4979 -0.4923 0.0352 0.5543 31.5800 135523.2000 3976
B -0.0004 0.4287 -0.2429 0.0314 1.1421 21.6342 58404.3200 3977
Hainan Airlines  A -0.0002 0.0967 -0.1660 0.0289 -0.0692 6.1434 979.3089 2374
B -0.0001 0.0980 -0.1059 0.0327 -0.0030 5.2431 629.5775 3003
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism A -0.0001 0.2666 -0.2531 0.0317 0.0207 9.3359 5337.6860 3191
B -0.0006 0.6825 -0.2624 0.0299 3.2786 94.6433 1094228.0000 3111
Hainan Pearl River Holdings A 0.0000 0.7885 -0.6931 0.0419 0.6715 72.0644 700444.3000 3523
B -0.0001 0.3006 -0.2026 0.0346 0.3464 7.7521 3771.7350 3925
Hefei Meiling  A -0.0001 0.2625 -0.2473 0.0305 0.2428 10.7995 10094.0100 3967
B -0.0001 0.2016 -0.1687 0.0328 0.0831 5.7680 1031.6510 3220
Huadian Energy  A -0.0001 0.1335 -0.2646 0.0255 -0.4116 9.6728 6144.0130 3262
B 0.0003 0.1682 -0.1725 0.0293 0.1063 6.7894 1987.8440 3312
Huangshan Tourism  A 0.0006 0.1771 -0.1124 0.0299 -0.0208 6.1343 1292.8450 3158
B 0.0001 0.0958 -0.3028 0.0251 -0.6062 12.5405 11719.3300 3041
Huaxin Cement  A 0.0002 0.3184 -0.2089 0.0325 0.6190 11.0006 10683.4500 3912
B 0.0007 0.2893 -0.1510 0.0335 0.1915 6.8875 2332.1480 3668
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica A 0.0005 0.2791 -0.1505 0.0306 0.3103 8.0900 3771.9580 3443
B -0.0001 0.0961 -0.1057 0.0282 -0.0976 5.8060 660.6289 2004
Jiangling Motors   A 0.0001 0.3478 -0.2005 0.0326 0.8901 13.2726 17821.6300 3935
B 0.0004 0.2113 -0.2179 0.0311 0.0887 7.6507 3120.8630 3458
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle A -0.0001 0.2851 -0.5595 0.0299 -1.0835 40.7621 234392.3000 3932
B -0.0003 0.0977 -0.1340 0.0285 -0.0196 4.7856 400.2060 3011
Jinshan Development  A 0.0000 0.2625 -0.1970 0.0349 0.1448 6.6701 2226.7020 3943
B -0.0001 0.2969 -0.3279 0.0347 0.2820 11.8304 12961.0100 3973
A represents shares listed in China A-share market, B represents shares listed in China B-share market
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Company Market  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Observations
Jinzhou Port  A -0.0001 0.0964 -0.1181 0.0270 -0.2233 5.7771 822.4733 2495
B 0.0003 0.1221 -0.1060 0.0291 0.0201 5.8844 960.7502 2771
Konka Group A 0.0001 0.2937 -0.2093 0.0276 0.2253 10.4999 9815.3870 4173
B 0.0001 0.2373 -0.2585 0.0279 0.0673 10.0265 8587.5480 4173
Livzon Pharmaceutical A 0.0004 0.4075 -0.1745 0.0310 1.0926 18.5535 40692.8200 3959
B 0.0005 0.2503 -0.2045 0.0312 0.2996 9.7664 7750.2440 4031
Luthai Textile A 0.0003 0.0958 -0.1057 0.0262 -0.0582 7.1233 1483.1230 2092
B 0.0008 0.0989 -0.1060 0.0282 0.1802 6.1876 1271.7440 2966
SGSB Group A -0.0002 0.3509 -0.5266 0.0354 -0.4165 21.4123 54678.8500 3863
B -0.0001 0.3622 -0.2674 0.0337 0.1778 12.5379 14807.2500 3901
Shanghai Baosight A 0.0006 1.3293 -0.2928 0.0395 9.7640 336.7198 17973168.000 3860
B 0.0001 0.4395 -0.3199 0.0342 0.9863 19.3238 43516.3500 3863
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali A 0.0001 0.5653 -0.1823 0.0327 1.3335 26.8965 100526.6000 4173
B -0.0002 0.3271 -0.2066 0.0339 0.6787 11.3762 12519.4900 4173
Shanghai Dingli Technology B 0.0002 0.2344 -0.2875 0.0331 -0.3576 11.2281 11860.4000 4173
A 0.0001 0.3464 -0.4531 0.0346 0.0257 16.1450 30044.3200 4173
Shanghai Erfangji B -0.0003 0.2630 -0.3846 0.0347 0.0913 11.3270 12062.2100 4173
A -0.0001 0.3343 -0.2412 0.0342 0.4085 9.1359 6662.2140 4173
Shanghai Friendship B 0.0004 0.1444 -0.1213 0.0285 0.1535 6.2253 1710.0970 3910
A 0.0003 0.4487 -0.2238 0.0313 1.3896 23.5651 69764.8600 3888
Shanghai Haixin Group B 0.0001 0.2580 -0.1746 0.0300 0.3389 9.8814 7664.0480 3847
A 0.0004 0.3834 -0.3102 0.0335 0.3653 16.4999 29922.9200 3929
Shanghai Highly Group B 0.0000 0.2923 -0.2840 0.0328 0.3564 11.4664 12551.6500 4173
A 0.0003 0.5960 -0.1635 0.0324 1.5039 32.6756 154287.2000 4162
Shanghai Jinjiang International B 0.0004 0.4897 -0.2775 0.0310 1.0937 24.2994 75777.5300 3967
A -0.0001 0.4109 -0.2683 0.0315 1.0865 20.2779 51324.9000 4062
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade ZoneA 0.0003 0.1365 -0.1065 0.0277 0.0724 6.4202 1797.3130 3681
B 0.0002 0.3365 -0.1403 0.0297 1.0780 14.0271 21288.0000 4047
Shanghai Potevio A 0.0000 0.3758 -0.3666 0.0324 0.3260 15.5919 26278.1600 3967
B 0.0001 0.1502 -0.1846 0.0308 0.0490 6.2859 1667.8320 3704
Shanghai Sanmao A 0.0002 0.6698 -0.3777 0.0344 1.4079 46.2973 306861.8000 3912
B 0.0000 0.3610 -0.2591 0.0342 0.3968 10.9616 10541.4200 3952
Shanghai Wingsung A 0.0000 0.5719 -0.5563 0.0362 0.3772 48.2775 356552.2000 4173
B -0.0001 0.1939 -0.3238 0.0328 -0.1788 8.4661 5217.3410 4173
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington A -0.0001 0.1571 -0.1570 0.0303 -0.0435 6.4266 1922.4610 3927
B -0.0001 0.4104 -0.1895 0.0313 0.8191 15.5442 25959.9300 3893
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery A 0.0008 0.0968 -0.1072 0.0318 0.0570 5.3134 665.2101 2976
B 0.0007 0.0957 -0.1054 0.0265 -0.0127 5.5611 572.3609 2094
Shangdong Chenming Paper A 0.0003 0.0968 -0.1245 0.0291 0.0183 5.8081 994.7049 3027
B -0.0001 0.0956 -0.1917 0.0262 -0.3473 7.4587 1796.1700 2117
Shanghai Automation Instrument A 0.0002 0.2406 -0.2405 0.0328 0.2615 7.4510 3203.4860 3828
B -0.0002 0.3435 -0.3815 0.0345 0.1334 13.7712 18642.1300 3854
Shanghai Diesel A -0.0001 0.2923 -0.2263 0.0319 0.5024 10.3455 8847.2680 3863
B 0.0001 0.5734 -0.1221 0.0320 1.5198 31.2306 131512.6000 3915
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel A 0.0004 0.1400 -0.1376 0.0288 0.0527 6.0287 1402.1280 3664
B 0.0001 0.0962 -0.1677 0.0273 -0.1268 5.8122 1059.0490 3188
Shanghai Jinqiao  A 0.0003 0.5527 -0.1395 0.0304 1.5298 32.1801 145876.5000 4067
B 0.0002 0.3341 -0.1742 0.0318 0.9554 12.8304 17186.7600 4113
Shanghai Kaikai  A -0.0005 1.2193 -0.1060 0.0420 11.9086 350.2323 10321927.0000 2045
B 0.0001 0.0976 -0.1069 0.0324 -0.0182 5.3145 697.7103 3125
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical A 0.0004 0.5148 -0.1647 0.0316 1.1287 23.7404 70584.8700 3892
B 0.0003 0.2924 -0.3303 0.0322 0.4999 14.6197 21955.2500 3874
Shanghai MRA Trading A 0.0002 0.2233 -0.2233 0.0310 0.2292 7.9399 3948.3080 3850
B -0.0001 0.3503 -0.2278 0.0327 0.5229 11.1369 10903.0200 3888
Shanghai Nine Dragon A -0.0006 0.0961 -0.3256 0.0311 -0.7503 10.6311 5103.4270 2025
B 0.0005 0.0969 -0.1068 0.0299 0.2030 6.1428 1086.6250 2597
Shenzhen Nanshan Power A 0.0003 0.3650 -0.2713 0.0304 0.5687 16.4125 28559.8900 3783
B 0.0003 0.3830 -0.3330 0.0311 0.0715 18.0110 34525.7900 3677
Shenzhen Properties and ResourcesA -0.0002 0.3567 -0.4134 0.0342 0.0393 18.0516 39392.7300 4173
B -0.0002 0.2304 -0.2053 0.0308 0.3674 7.2357 3213.4580 4173
A represents shares listed in China A-share market, B represents shares listed in China B-share market
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Shenzhen SEG  A -0.0003 0.2427 -0.3958 0.0296 -0.5602 15.8763 21814.4300 3134
B 0.0000 0.2516 -0.2047 0.0316 0.2001 6.5886 1764.0040 3247
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone A -0.0003 0.2652 -0.1993 0.0336 0.3115 7.6595 3673.9480 3990
B -0.0002 0.2624 -0.2087 0.0336 0.1097 6.7075 2245.4470 3907
Shenzhen Textile A 0.0001 0.3530 -0.3450 0.0331 0.2930 14.4584 20579.3200 3752
B 0.0001 0.2292 -0.5008 0.0361 -0.8824 19.8892 45080.1200 3752
Shijianzhuang Baoshi A -0.0003 0.1290 -0.2813 0.0306 -0.2387 6.6874 1843.3540 3200
B -0.0001 0.1959 -0.1960 0.0318 0.1138 5.5438 885.2065 3257
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical A 0.0004 0.3629 -0.1613 0.0329 0.7909 10.9990 11128.0600 4017
B 0.0005 0.3318 -0.3147 0.0346 0.1237 10.2277 8751.6810 4016
Shenzhen International Enterprise A 0.0004 0.3409 -0.1919 0.0364 0.2274 8.1693 3820.5340 3405
B 0.0000 0.1224 -0.1339 0.0330 -0.1857 4.8970 503.8301 3236
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial A -0.0001 0.3219 -0.3814 0.0348 0.1838 11.6895 13152.2700 4173
B 0.0000 0.3102 -0.3102 0.0380 0.2737 11.5979 12905.7100 4173
Shenzhen Tellus A -0.0002 0.3391 -0.2375 0.0358 0.3801 8.5928 5378.5800 4052
B -0.0001 0.8079 -0.7101 0.0410 0.5990 70.9863 780613.2000 4052
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile A -0.0002 0.5211 -0.4645 0.0400 0.5897 28.6428 114573.6000 4173
B -0.0002 0.3608 -0.3504 0.0340 0.3784 12.5642 16004.6100 4173
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa A -0.0003 1.1422 -0.2018 0.0371 7.4705 220.7235 8281101.0000 4173
B -0.0001 0.4058 -0.3267 0.0356 0.5556 20.1182 51165.9000 4173
SVA Electron  A 0.0000 0.3359 -0.2668 0.0339 0.6183 11.3242 12313.9400 4173
B 0.0001 0.2411 -0.2111 0.0324 0.0979 7.3592 3310.7160 4173
Weifu High Technology A 0.0002 0.0974 -0.1063 0.0273 -0.0184 5.9232 954.0079 2679
B 0.0002 0.1480 -0.1625 0.0309 -0.0258 6.1603 1445.2440 3472
Wuxi Littleswan  A -0.0004 0.0984 -0.4374 0.0284 -1.1324 23.4049 53880.5000 3068
B 0.0001 0.1339 -0.1234 0.0297 0.0591 5.9467 1177.3500 3249
Yantai Changyu A 0.0010 0.1015 -0.1066 0.0278 0.1372 6.0329 1136.4590 2941
B 0.0006 0.0955 -0.1054 0.0222 0.2024 7.2931 1653.3440 2134
Zhong Lu A 0.0000 0.2777 -0.3285 0.0335 0.2692 11.4564 11646.7300 3893
B 0.0000 0.3438 -0.2837 0.0328 0.1805 12.5528 15029.2200 3947
A represents shares listed in China A-share market, B represents shares listed in China B-share market
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Appendix 3.2: Descriptive Statistics on Returns of Dual-Listing 
Chinese Firms Traded on China A, Hong Kong and New York 
Markets for the Period 01/01/1993 to 31/12/2008 
  
Company Market  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Observations
Aluminum A -0.0025 0.0959 -0.1060 0.0419 -0.0588 3.4370 3.7299 437
H 0.0007 0.2771 -0.2202 0.0356 0.3630 7.9294 1903.3090 1840
N 0.0007 0.2205 -0.1646 0.0363 0.3650 6.5742 1020.7950 1841
China Eastern Airlines A -0.0002 0.0974 -0.1059 0.0266 0.1460 6.8304 1789.3220 2910
H -0.0001 0.5600 -0.3131 0.0396 1.2754 21.7350 46252.3300 3105
N -0.0001 0.5049 -0.2129 0.0383 1.5094 22.3613 49692.4400 3106
China Life Insurance A -0.0014 0.0955 -0.1053 0.0358 0.0529 3.6575 9.5337 516
H 0.0013 0.1490 -0.1741 0.0273 0.0447 8.2207 1492.6610 1314
N 0.0013 0.1665 -0.1297 0.0305 0.3414 6.9625 885.8744 1315
China Mobile H 0.0007 0.1561 -0.1652 0.0272 0.3033 7.0542 2043.8180 2919
N 0.0007 0.1860 -0.1577 0.0298 0.2832 6.7121 1715.5110 2920
China Petrol and Chemical A 0.0003 0.0967 -0.2365 0.0250 -0.2016 10.3050 4304.2950 1930
H 0.0007 0.1625 -0.1797 0.0273 0.1385 7.3792 1716.0330 2139
N 0.0006 0.1871 -0.1689 0.0293 0.2107 8.4141 2629.4860 2140
China Southern Airlines A 0.0001 0.0963 -0.1055 0.0320 -0.1123 5.0205 244.1846 1418
H -0.0003 0.3576 -0.2054 0.0391 0.6119 9.1832 4931.4780 2979
N -0.0003 0.2636 -0.3279 0.0394 0.3443 8.2873 3528.8620 2979
China Telecom H 0.0005 0.1867 -0.1527 0.0269 0.1961 9.3518 2696.5920 1598
N 0.0005 0.2098 -0.1631 0.0300 0.4279 9.9579 3274.2310 1599
China United Telecom A 0.0004 0.0964 -0.1231 0.0247 0.1219 7.1924 1194.1060 1625
H -0.0002 0.1477 -0.1596 0.0289 0.0083 6.2400 972.8005 2224
N -0.0002 0.2033 -0.1616 0.0320 0.2320 7.7535 2114.7470 2225
CNOOC H 0.0011 0.2017 -0.1537 0.0267 0.1177 7.8027 2081.8990 2161
N 0.0011 0.2221 -0.1705 0.0277 0.0951 8.7081 2938.3670 2162
Guangshen Railway A -0.0009 0.0955 -0.1058 0.0300 -0.2871 4.6709 68.6806 528
H 0.0001 0.1902 -0.1616 0.0298 0.2118 7.7864 3170.9190 3296
N 0.0002 0.2688 -0.2063 0.0294 0.3189 9.3289 5558.4090 3297
Huaneng Power A 0.0001 0.0959 -0.2102 0.0252 -0.3798 8.2438 2151.1970 1839
H 0.0005 0.2365 -0.1681 0.0313 0.3387 7.4573 2417.9880 2855
N 0.0004 0.1684 -0.1749 0.0301 0.1526 6.8231 2276.2510 3714
Petro China A -0.0048 0.0948 -0.0946 0.0278 0.2846 4.7176 41.1983 302
H 0.0010 0.1817 -0.1625 0.0246 0.1874 10.3662 5163.5710 2278
N 0.0009 0.1443 -0.1488 0.0256 -0.0340 8.5416 2916.5920 2279
Sinopec Shanghai A 0.0002 0.3246 -0.1959 0.0281 1.6569 20.9021 54581.2800 3952
H 0.0002 0.2710 -0.1945 0.0344 0.4005 8.2587 4747.7860 4027
N 0.0002 0.2427 -0.2667 0.0361 0.2787 8.3456 4846.8940 4027
Yanzhou Coal A 0.0002 0.0959 -0.1432 0.0267 -0.1165 6.1826 1162.6110 2740
H 0.0006 0.2632 -0.1897 0.0373 0.2301 6.9112 1812.6150 2805
N 0.0006 0.2383 -0.2022 0.0369 0.3193 7.9486 2909.8260 2805
A represents shares listed in China A-share market, H represents shares listed in Hong Kong market, N represents shares traded 
in New York market
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Appendix 3.3: Descriptive Statistics on Returns of Dual-Listing 
Chinese Firms Traded on China A and Hong Kong Markets for the 
Period 01/01/1993 to 31/12/2008 
 
Company Market  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Observations
Air China A 0.0006 0.1350 -0.1059 0.0417 -0.1933 3.5812 12.5476 618
H -0.0003 0.2058 -0.2134 0.0349 0.2504 9.8530 2075.4820 1055
Angang Steel A 0.0003 0.0966 -0.1124 0.0255 0.1961 6.0872 1159.3530 2873
H 0.0008 0.3083 -0.3390 0.0436 0.4986 8.2726 3580.0850 2984
Anhui Conch Cement A 0.0008 0.0957 -0.1638 0.0284 -0.0259 6.0145 681.3412 1799
H 0.0011 0.2844 -0.2515 0.0398 0.2435 7.9389 2997.6520 2921
Anhui Expressway A 0.0000 0.0961 -0.2611 0.0241 -1.0268 14.3623 8671.2820 1561
H 0.0003 0.1871 -0.2877 0.0304 0.0119 9.5140 5595.8480 3165
Bank of China A -0.0003 0.0968 -0.1048 0.0243 0.2855 6.4011 322.1244 650
H -0.0006 0.2006 -0.1616 0.0267 0.6506 13.3429 3051.7780 674
Bank of Communications A -0.0024 0.0963 -0.1032 0.0313 -0.1332 4.2519 29.0796 426
H 0.0008 0.1775 -0.1471 0.0289 0.4411 9.4964 1645.8510 919
Beijing North Star A -0.0004 0.0960 -0.1060 0.0444 -0.3050 3.2605 10.5761 577
H -0.0003 0.2609 -0.2712 0.0376 0.3613 8.4104 3767.8130 3035
Beiren Printing and Machinery A -0.0001 0.3509 -0.3022 0.0343 0.3250 12.3563 14011.8700 3823
H -0.0002 0.2799 -0.3031 0.0365 0.0928 10.7195 9982.2530 4018
China Citic Bank A -0.0024 0.0962 -0.1054 0.0315 -0.1511 4.5016 42.8156 438
H -0.0021 0.2256 -0.0987 0.0348 1.1114 9.8534 947.3519 438
China Coal Energy A -0.0052 0.0953 -0.1055 0.0385 -0.0971 3.4553 2.4297 238
H 0.0006 0.2001 -0.2183 0.0478 -0.4656 5.9066 206.1095 531
China Construction Bank A -0.0023 0.0954 -0.1065 0.0281 0.1235 4.9848 55.1727 331
H 0.0008 0.2093 -0.1319 0.0292 0.7335 10.4391 1985.8730 829
China Cosco Holding A -0.0019 0.0956 -0.1055 0.0434 0.1058 3.2388 1.6793 396
H 0.0006 0.3463 -0.2606 0.0445 0.2345 10.8766 2371.1120 914
China Merchants Bank A 0.0005 0.0956 -0.1054 0.0243 0.1709 6.4440 876.3830 1756
H 0.0005 0.1894 -0.1450 0.0349 0.2835 6.9243 388.4545 593
China Oilfield Services A -0.0037 0.0955 -0.1057 0.0388 -0.0366 3.6205 5.3345 328
H 0.0008 0.2348 -0.2313 0.0364 0.1945 8.7277 2190.3000 1595
China Railway Construction A -0.0007 0.0959 -0.1051 0.0347 -0.1970 3.8256 7.3926 212
H -0.0002 0.1842 -0.2088 0.0426 -0.5277 8.9053 313.3834 209
China Railway Group A -0.0014 0.0964 -0.1063 0.0338 0.1395 4.4853 26.8368 282
H -0.0011 0.2059 -0.2304 0.0441 0.0631 8.9244 406.7382 278
China Shenhua Energy A -0.0043 0.0954 -0.1057 0.0357 0.1260 4.0232 14.8510 321
H 0.0009 0.2623 -0.2685 0.0349 0.1482 14.2057 4843.0110 925
China Ship Container A -0.0053 0.0961 -0.1068 0.0365 0.0418 3.9739 10.9475 275
H -0.0002 0.2231 -0.1812 0.0363 0.3983 8.3468 1442.8760 1185
China Shipping Development A 0.0004 0.0962 -0.1516 0.0292 -0.3026 5.3776 432.4020 1724
H 0.0005 0.3323 -0.4144 0.0441 0.0450 12.1921 12985.3900 3688
Datang International Power A 0.0004 0.2505 -0.2195 0.0360 0.1199 8.4564 3819.4540 3073
H 0.0003 0.0957 -0.1055 0.0414 -0.0555 3.5519 6.9979 530
Dongfang Electric A 0.0002 0.1500 -0.1267 0.0297 -0.0285 5.4663 873.5503 3445
H 0.0006 0.3562 -0.4643 0.0418 -0.1415 12.6908 14889.8900 3802
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical A -0.0004 0.0955 -0.1193 0.0267 -0.2435 5.7905 689.0507 2061
H 0.0003 0.2584 -0.1743 0.0332 0.3827 7.9855 3088.9310 2914
Guangzhou Shipyard A 0.0003 0.2951 -0.2427 0.0340 0.7478 10.9372 10761.1500 3959
H 0.0004 0.2797 -0.2400 0.0421 0.4678 8.3827 4997.2370 4018
Hisense Kelon A -0.0003 0.3484 -0.2968 0.0339 0.2157 13.7622 15690.5400 3246
H -0.0009 0.5517 -0.1082 0.0256 4.0302 91.8432 819350.8000 2471
Huadian Power A -0.0001 0.0967 -0.4139 0.0342 -1.8613 24.9319 21011.2800 1019
H 0.0002 0.1802 -0.2762 0.0308 0.1131 9.4131 4255.1210 2480
Industrial and Commerce Bank A 0.0003 0.1521 -0.1178 0.0301 0.5958 7.5077 514.4875 568
H 0.0002 0.0958 -0.1054 0.0271 0.1342 5.4382 142.3956 568
Jiangsu Expressway A -0.0001 0.0962 -0.1488 0.0213 -0.3001 8.0484 2235.6860 2076
H 0.0004 0.2059 -0.2135 0.0304 -0.0364 9.0649 4603.1900 3003
Jiangxi Cooper A 0.0004 0.2534 -0.2718 0.0437 0.3366 7.2618 2337.9330 3014
H 0.0005 0.2554 -0.1055 0.0322 0.2444 7.0970 1289.5750 1818
Jingwei Textile A -0.0006 0.0970 -0.4017 0.0295 -1.1723 16.2450 23716.3500 3146
H -0.0001 0.3221 -0.2411 0.0399 0.5770 10.4807 8040.0430 3368
Maanshan Iron A 0.0000 0.3436 -0.3513 0.0299 0.8779 21.0002 53274.9000 3909
H 0.0000 0.3132 -0.3594 0.0387 0.5508 10.5620 9623.2910 3955
Nanjing Panda A -0.0004 0.0966 -0.3340 0.0314 -0.5453 8.7129 4456.6290 3162
H -0.0002 0.3677 -0.3604 0.0468 0.1665 10.6348 8039.9590 3304
Northest Electric A -0.0003 0.5158 -0.5402 0.0488 0.3023 17.6052 31330.2400 3519
H -0.0003 0.7360 -0.2790 0.0322 3.2306 85.4404 970164.4000 3405
Ping An Insurance A -0.0011 0.0954 -0.1054 0.0364 -0.2009 3.7342 13.9813 479
H 0.0011 0.1734 -0.1577 0.0298 0.0713 8.4617 1466.3880 1179
Shangdong Xinhua A -0.0001 0.2810 -0.2007 0.0352 0.3367 8.9032 4605.2610 3131
H -0.0003 0.0965 -0.1065 0.0276 -0.1602 6.1744 1260.9820 2973
Shenji Group A 0.0002 0.5601 -0.2474 0.0370 1.4482 21.3585 56304.1700 3912
H 0.0000 0.3932 -0.2532 0.0439 0.8620 11.8897 13430.6400 3931
Sinopec Yizheng A -0.0002 0.3310 -0.2991 0.0401 0.8169 11.0175 10742.6900 3851
H 0.0000 0.3683 -0.2059 0.0296 0.9097 14.3054 19564.4400 3581
Tianjin Capital Environment A 0.0001 0.3522 -0.3243 0.0415 0.6389 10.7652 9846.9040 3816
H 0.0001 0.2499 -0.2375 0.0301 0.0565 8.2531 4052.6200 3523
Tsigtao Brewery A 0.0002 0.3230 -0.2440 0.0285 1.1420 17.5219 36044.1300 4003
A 0.0005 0.3516 -0.4419 0.0352 0.2271 16.8307 32187.2600 4034
Weichai Power A -0.0018 0.0956 -0.1056 0.0332 -0.0898 4.2727 30.0793 437
H 0.0005 0.1846 -0.1890 0.0349 0.2053 7.1173 894.5804 1254
Zijin Mining A -0.0059 0.0964 -0.1055 0.0421 0.0500 3.3164 0.8167 178
H 0.0017 0.2614 -0.1781 0.0393 0.0576 6.5313 681.8846 1311
ZTE A 0.0007 0.1460 -0.1055 0.0253 0.2833 5.9993 1126.2000 2901
H 0.0002 0.2307 -0.2809 0.0331 -0.7100 13.7379 5176.6610 1059
A represents shares listed in China A-share market, H represents shares listed in Hong Kong market
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Appendix 4: Mean and Variance of Return Distribution 
 
Appendix 4.1: Paired T-Test, Variance Results for Chinese Dual-
Listed Firms on China A and Hong Kong Markets 
 
Paired Paired P Value No. of  
Company Name Correlation Mean Std. Deviation T Statistic  (2-tailed) F Value P Value (2-tailed) Observations
Air China 0.4511 0.0009 0.0441 0.4841 0.6285 0.9719 0.7231 618
Angang Steel Plate 0.2684 -0.0007 0.0422 -0.9385 0.3481 0.3818 0.0000 2873
Anhui Conch Cement 0.4365 -0.0008 0.0353 -0.9821 0.3262 0.5980 0.0000 1799
Anhui Expressway 0.1119 -0.0004 0.0322 -0.5088 0.6109 0.5980 0.0000 1561
Bank of China 0.3891 0.0004 0.0284 0.3625 0.7171 0.8064 0.0062 650
Bank of Communications 0.5506 -0.0015 0.0330 -0.9378 0.3489 0.7015 0.0003 426
Beijing North Star 0.5182 0.0006 0.0424 0.3232 0.7467 1.1272 0.1510 577
Beiren Printing and Machinery 0.1630 0.0001 0.0458 0.1647 0.8692 0.8883 0.0003 3823
China Citic Bank 0.3792 -0.0004 0.0370 -0.2044 0.8381 0.8193 0.0375 438
China Coal Energy 0.4744 -0.0006 0.0509 -0.1772 0.8595 0.4708 0.0000 238
China Construction Bank 0.6091 -0.0009 0.0319 -0.5106 0.6100 0.4935 0.0000 331
China Cosco Holding 0.4664 -0.0001 0.0566 -0.0473 0.9623 0.4915 0.0000 396
China Merchants Bank 0.5785 -0.0001 0.0317 -0.0596 0.9525 0.9537 0.5646 593
China Oilfield Services 0.4498 -0.0005 0.0515 -0.1751 0.8611 0.4881 0.0000 328
China Railway Construction 0.5359 -0.0007 0.0379 -0.2529 0.8006 0.6635 0.0032 209
China Railway Group 0.5227 -0.0005 0.0390 -0.1960 0.8447 0.5830 0.0000 278
China Shenhua Energy 0.4872 -0.0012 0.0446 -0.4803 0.6313 0.5233 0.0000 321
China Shipping Development 0.3275 -0.0006 0.0394 -0.5982 0.5498 0.5990 0.0000 1724
China Shipping Container 0.4596 0.0003 0.0498 0.1086 0.9136 0.4481 0.0000 275
Datang International Power 0.3305 0.0001 0.0495 0.0549 0.9563 0.8863 0.1654 530
Dongfang Electric 0.1906 -0.0005 0.0473 -0.5863 0.5577 0.4783 0.0000 3445
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical 0.2997 -0.0010 0.0334 -1.3679 0.1715 0.8152 0.0000 2061
Guangzhou Shipyard 0.1788 0.0000 0.0491 0.0493 0.9607 0.6531 0.0000 3959
Huadian Power 0.2278 0.0001 0.0424 0.0456 0.9636 1.0016 0.9791 1019
Industrial and Commercial Bank 0.4931 -0.0001 0.0289 -0.1083 0.9138 0.8064 0.0105 568
Jingwei Textile 0.1436 -0.0006 0.0465 -0.6866 0.4924 0.5298 0.0000 3146
Jiangsu Expressway 0.1899 -0.0009 0.0304 -1.4050 0.1602 0.6610 0.0000 2076
Jiangxi Cooper 0.3739 -0.0006 0.0389 -0.6251 0.5320 0.7587 0.0000 1818
Maanshan Iron 0.1593 0.0000 0.0450 0.0397 0.9683 0.5934 0.0000 3909
Nanjing Panda 0.1811 -0.0003 0.0520 -0.3599 0.7189 0.4360 0.0000 3162
Northest Electric 0.1878 -0.0001 0.0537 -0.0687 0.9453 0.4244 0.0000 3405
Ping An Insurance 0.6359 -0.0014 0.0329 -0.9101 0.3632 0.8138 0.0245 479
Shandong Chengming 0.4669 0.0015 0.0441 0.3909 0.6964 0.8617 0.3814 140
Shangdong Xinhua 0.1855 -0.0001 0.0405 -0.1282 0.8980 0.6110 0.0000 2973
Shenji Group 0.1709 0.0002 0.0524 0.2736 0.7844 0.7099 0.0000 3912
Sinopec Yizheng 0.1725 0.0003 0.0461 0.4011 0.6884 0.5264 0.0000 3581
Tianjin Capital Environment 0.1599 -0.0001 0.0478 -0.0989 0.9212 0.5094 0.0000 3523
Tsigtao Brewery 0.1130 -0.0002 0.0427 -0.2343 0.8148 0.6578 0.0000 4003
Weichai Power 0.3838 -0.0004 0.0432 -0.1762 0.8602 0.5890 0.0000 437
Zijin Mining 0.4095 -0.0033 0.0582 -0.7566 0.4503 0.4758 0.0000 178
ZTE 0.4043 0.0002 0.0337 0.1514 0.8797 0.7178 0.0000 1059
Paired Differences F-Distribution
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Appendix 4.2: Paired T-Test, Variance Results for Chinese Dual-
Listed Firms on China A and China B Markets 
 
 
Paired P Value
Company Name Correlation Mean Std. Deviation T Value (2-tailed) F Value P Value (2-tailed)
Anhui Guijing Distiller 0.7250 -0.0001 0.0211 -0.2300 0.8180 0.7268 0.000
Bengang Steel Plate 0.6870 -0.0001 0.0206 -0.1640 0.8700 1.3877 0.000
BOE Technology 0.7600 0.0002 0.0220 0.3840 0.7010 1.1993 0.000
Changchai Company 0.7410 0.0000 0.0218 0.0920 0.9270 1.2401 0.000
China Fanda 0.7640 0.0000 0.0226 -0.0740 0.9410 1.4371 0.000
China First Pencil  0.6710 0.0000 0.0228 0.0460 0.9630 1.3311 0.000
China Interational Marine Container 0.6400 -0.0002 0.0220 -0.3280 0.7430 1.0719 0.138
China Merchants Property 0.6780 0.0000 0.0226 0.0860 0.9320 1.3783 0.000
China Textile Machinery 0.5930 0.0004 0.0252 0.6410 0.5220 1.0305 0.521
China Vanke  0.6740 -0.0002 0.0225 -0.3510 0.7250 0.9464 0.239
Congqing Changan Automobile 0.6900 0.0001 0.0232 0.2030 0.8390 1.1091 0.027
CSG Holding  0.7010 -0.0001 0.0231 -0.1560 0.8760 1.4780 0.000
Dalian Referigerator 0.6920 0.0000 0.0196 -0.0040 0.9970 0.7399 0.000
Danhua chemical  0.7430 0.0002 0.0246 0.3850 0.7000 1.2125 0.000
Dazhong Transportation 0.7200 0.0001 0.0208 0.2080 0.8350 1.3053 0.000
Double Coin  0.6300 0.0000 0.0263 -0.0550 0.9560 1.2539 0.000
Eatern Communications 0.7080 0.0001 0.0238 0.1410 0.8880 1.2686 0.000
Foshan Electrical 0.6920 -0.0001 0.0182 -0.2130 0.8320 1.5089 0.000
Guangdong Electric Power 0.6100 0.0001 0.0206 0.2440 0.8070 1.3643 0.000
Guangdong Provincial Expressway 0.6610 -0.0001 0.0180 -0.2130 0.8320 1.2463 0.000
Guangdong Sunrise 0.5530 0.0000 0.0254 -0.0430 0.9660 0.7270 0.000
Hainan Airlines 0.7240 0.0001 0.0221 0.2390 0.8110 1.1119 0.024
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 0.5890 -0.0001 0.0264 -0.2020 0.8400 1.3166 0.000
Hainan Pearl River Holdings 0.8130 -0.0003 0.0198 -0.5870 0.5570 0.8392 0.000
Hefei Meiling 0.6920 0.0000 0.0221 -0.0750 0.9400 1.0779 0.109
Huadian Energy 0.6320 0.0001 0.0216 0.1660 0.8680 1.0813 0.095
Huangshan Tourism 0.6310 0.0001 0.0219 0.1510 0.8800 1.2166 0.000
Huaxin Cement 0.6490 -0.0001 0.0251 -0.1880 0.8510 0.9683 0.492
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica 0.6720 0.0002 0.0223 0.3010 0.7640 0.8053 0.000
Jiangling Motors 0.6670 0.0000 0.0233 0.0350 0.9720 1.3782 0.000
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 0.6520 0.0003 0.0223 0.5670 0.5710 1.3565 0.000
Jishan Development 0.6290 -0.0002 0.0285 -0.2570 0.7970 1.2831 0.000
Jinzhou Port 0.7250 0.0001 0.0202 0.2860 0.7750 1.1832 0.000
Konka Group 0.7300 -0.0002 0.0192 -0.4220 0.6730 0.8136 0.000
Livzon Pharmaceutical 0.7190 0.0001 0.0202 0.1350 0.8930 1.2176 0.000
Luthai Textile 0.6970 0.0000 0.0199 -0.0580 0.9540 1.3438 0.000
SGSB Group 0.6060 0.0001 0.0289 0.2050 0.8380 1.4208 0.000
Shandong Chengming 0.6770 -0.0001 0.0210 -0.1920 0.8470 1.2163 0.000
Shanghai chlor-alkali 0.6370 -0.0002 0.0255 -0.2710 0.7870 1.2163 0.000
Shanghai Baosight 0.6430 0.0000 0.0240 0.0250 0.9800 1.1300 0.009
Shanghai Diesel 0.6400 0.0001 0.0253 0.1940 0.8460 1.3139 0.000
Shanghai Dingli Technology 0.6320 0.0000 0.0263 0.0710 0.9430 1.4855 0.000
Shanghai Erfangji 0.6260 0.0002 0.0267 0.3080 0.7580 1.2170 0.000
Shanghai Friendship 0.5810 -0.0001 0.0236 -0.1260 0.9000 1.2468 0.000
Shanghai Haixin Group 0.7200 -0.0001 0.0224 -0.2410 0.8090 1.0307 0.518
Shanghai Highly Group 0.6590 0.0000 0.0242 -0.0610 0.9510 1.4389 0.000
Shanghai Jinjiang International  0.6430 -0.0001 0.0220 -0.2370 0.8130 1.4031 0.000
Shanghai Lujiazui 0.6890 0.0000 0.0217 -0.0800 0.9360 1.3391 0.000
Shanghai Potevio 0.6770 0.0000 0.0247 -0.0070 0.9950 1.4738 0.000
Shanghai Sanmao 0.7150 0.0003 0.0248 0.4360 0.6630 1.2848 0.000
Shanghai Wingsung 0.6300 -0.0001 0.0273 -0.0950 0.9240 1.1680 0.001
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington 0.6220 0.0000 0.0245 -0.0440 0.9650 1.4315 0.000
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery 0.6230 0.0000 0.0240 -0.0300 0.9760 0.9751 0.591
Shanghai Automation Instrument 0.7580 0.0000 0.0219 0.0380 0.9700 1.2660 0.000
Shanghai Dajiang  0.6740 0.0002 0.0237 0.2840 0.7770 1.2513 0.000
Shanghai Jinjiang Inernational Hotels 0.6550 0.0001 0.0213 0.1410 0.8880 1.4332 0.000
Shanghai Jinqiao  0.7200 0.0001 0.0214 0.1960 0.8450 1.5097 0.000
Shanghai Kaikai  0.5780 0.0001 0.0363 0.0980 0.9220 2.0251 0.000
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical 0.6420 0.0001 0.0235 0.1430 0.8860 1.2103 0.000
Shanghai MRA Trading 0.6380 0.0000 0.0247 0.0570 0.9540 0.7523 0.000
Shanghai Nine Dragon 0.6740 -0.0001 0.0247 -0.2330 0.8160 1.2191 0.000
Shenzhen Properties and Resources 0.7160 0.0002 0.0210 0.3720 0.7100 0.8776 0.005
Shenzhen SEG  0.7010 -0.0001 0.0230 -0.1570 0.8760 1.3457 0.000
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 0.7700 0.0001 0.0222 0.1940 0.8460 1.3318 0.000
Paired Differences F-Distribution
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(cont.) 
 
Paired P Value
Company Name Correlation Mean Std. Deviation T Value (2-tailed) F Value P Value (2-tailed)
Shenzhen Textile 0.7140 0.0001 0.0228 0.1280 0.8980 1.2987 0.000
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical 0.7150 0.0001 0.0208 0.2780 0.7810 1.2018 0.000
Shenzhen International Enterprise 0.7610 0.0000 0.0236 -0.0730 0.9410 0.8271 0.000
Shenzhen Nanshan Power 0.6440 0.0001 0.0219 0.2820 0.7780 0.8226 0.000
shenzhen Shenbao Industrial 0.7300 0.0001 0.0232 0.1720 0.8630 1.4042 0.000
Shenzhen Tellus 0.7710 0.0002 0.0222 0.3460 0.7290 1.1885 0.000
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile 0.6250 0.0003 0.0257 0.4710 0.6370 1.0841 0.085
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa 0.5240 -0.0001 0.0324 -0.0980 0.9220 2.1227 0.000
Shijianzhuang Baoshi 0.7320 0.0003 0.0224 0.5240 0.6000 1.2580 0.000
SVA Electron  0.7030 0.0000 0.0224 -0.0780 0.9380 1.2731 0.000
Weifu High Technology 0.6640 0.0001 0.0224 0.2550 0.7990 1.1573 0.002
Wuxi Littleswan  0.7160 0.0000 0.0227 0.0220 0.9820 1.4839 0.000
Yantai Changyu 0.4720 -0.0001 0.0238 -0.1830 0.8550 0.9292 0.117
Zhong Lu 0.6630 0.0001 0.0249 0.1910 0.8480 1.3060 0.000
Paired Differences F-Distribution
  
216 
Appendix 4.3: Paired T-Test, Variance Results for Chinese Triple-
Listed Firms on China A, Hong Kong and New York Markets 
Paired Paired P Value No. of  
Company Name Pairs Correlation Mean Std. Deviation T Statistic (2-tailed) F Value P Value (2-tailed) Observations
Aluminum Corporation A-H 0.408 -0.000673 0.0505 -0.2786 0.7807 0.7005 0.0002 436
A-N 0.218 -0.000796 0.0599 -0.2780 0.7811 0.6277 0.0000 436
H-N 0.544 -0.000124 0.0492 -0.0525 0.9581 0.8961 0.2523 436
China Eastern Airline A-H 0.259 -0.000054 0.0409 -0.0712 0.9432 0.4697 0.0000 2909
A-N 0.204 -0.000058 0.0416 -0.0757 0.9397 0.4937 0.0000 2909
H-N 0.677 -0.000004 0.0308 -0.0075 0.9940 1.0512 0.1784 2909
China Life Insurance A-H 0.574 -0.001266 0.0325 -0.8840 0.3771 1.0649 0.4756 515
A-N 0.284 -0.001345 0.0446 -0.6850 0.4936 0.8576 0.0816 515
H-N 0.527 -0.000079 0.0358 -0.0501 0.9601 0.8053 0.0141 515
China Petrol and Chemical A-H 0.355 -0.000501 0.0297 -0.7402 0.4593 0.8353 0.0001 1929
A-N 0.247 -0.000519 0.0336 -0.6798 0.4967 0.7198 0.0000 1929
H-N 0.637 -0.000018 0.0243 -0.0328 0.9738 0.8618 0.0011 1929
China Southern Airline A-H 0.384 0.000262 0.0372 0.2652 0.7909 0.8394 0.0010 1417
H-N 0.717 -0.000030 0.0270 -0.0417 0.9668 0.9044 0.0586 1417
A-N 0.277 0.000232 0.0415 0.2108 0.8331 0.7591 0.0000 1417
China United Telecom A-H 0.273 -0.000107 0.0324 -0.1335 0.8938 0.7385 0.0000 1624
A-N 0.175 -0.000125 0.0364 -0.1389 0.8896 0.6190 0.0000 1624
H-N 0.634 -0.000018 0.0259 -0.0282 0.9775 0.8383 0.0004 1624
Guangshen Railway A-H 0.286 0.000009 0.0371 0.0055 0.9956 0.8713 0.1142 527
A-N 0.173 -0.000062 0.0425 -0.0334 0.9734 0.7006 0.0000 527
H-N 0.503 -0.000071 0.0340 -0.0477 0.9619 0.8040 0.0124 527
Huaneng Power A-H 0.207 -0.000539 0.0320 -0.7219 0.4704 0.9729 0.5561 1838
A-N 0.146 -0.000562 0.0346 -0.6964 0.4863 0.8335 0.0001 1838
H-N 0.642 -0.000023 0.0226 -0.0441 0.9649 0.8567 0.0009 1838
PetroChina A-H 0.423 -0.001655 0.0387 -0.7423 0.4585 0.4571 0.0000 301
A-N 0.182 -0.001896 0.0465 -0.7088 0.4790 0.4265 0.0000 301
H-N 0.516 0.000000 0.0221 -0.1010 0.9190 0.9329 0.5472 301
Sinopec Shanghai Petro A-H 0.127 0.000109 0.0429 0.1603 0.8727 0.6010 0.0000 3951
A-N 0.104 0.000107 0.0420 0.1605 0.8725 0.6679 0.0000 3951
H-N 0.713 -0.000002 0.0268 -0.0049 0.9961 1.1112 0.0005 3951
Yanzhou Coal Mining A-H 0.175 -0.000507 0.0418 -0.6343 0.5259 0.5121 0.0000 2739
A-N 0.136 -0.000513 0.0425 -0.6320 0.5274 0.5213 0.0000 2739
H-N 0.716 -0.000006 0.0279 -0.0115 0.9908 1.0179 0.3215 2739
China Telecom H-N 0.665 -0.000022 0.0234 -0.0377 0.9700 0.8053 0.0000 1597
China Mobile H-N 0.588 0.000001 0.0260 0.0016 0.9988 0.8291 0.0000 2918
CNOOC H-N 0.625 -0.000037 0.0230 -0.0720 0.9420 0.9557 0.3054 2045
Paired Differences F-Distribution
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Appendix 5: Market Co-movement Test Results 
Appendix 5.1: Regression output for Chinese shares dual-Listed on 
China A and China B (Shenzhen) markets 
 
Shenzhen A Shenzhen B RMB/HK$ R Square Adjusted R Square DW
Anhui Guijing Distiller 0.768*** -0.743*** -0.300 0.2943 0.2930 2.047
(39.69) (-52.54) (-0.65)
Bengang Steel Plate 0.961*** -0.918*** -0.249 0.4574 0.4563 2.072
(44.02) (-58.90) (-0.56)
BOE Technology 0.841*** -0.815*** 0.201 0.2442 0.2420 1.963
(28.94) (-30.28) (0.34)
Changchai Company 0.946*** -0.910*** 0.541 0.3768 0.3756 2.045
(45.50) (-57.70) (1.03)
China Fanda 0.989*** -0.932*** 0.650 0.3839 0.3827 1.960
(52.90) (-58.19) (1.15)
China Interational Marine 0.923*** -0.840*** 0.715 0.4240 0.4231 2.030
(77.32) (-60.47) (1.34)
China Merchants Property 1.051*** -0.902*** -0.090 0.4051 0.4042 2.093
(95.29) (-66.21) (-0.17)
China Vanke  0.809*** -0.756*** -0.452 0.2908 0.2896 2.089
(42.02) (-44.05) (-0.73)
Congqing Changan Automobile 1.051*** -1.067*** 0.694 0.4128 0.4116 2.087
(38.80) (-54.56) (1.16)
CSG Holding  0.893*** -0.913*** 0.189 0.4166 0.4157 2.033
(92.80) (-82.09) (0.32)
Dalian Referigerator 0.954*** -0.900*** -0.414 0.4038 0.4025 2.113
(46.55) (-57.22) (-1.02)
Foshan Electrical 0.813*** -0.704*** 0.203 0.3920 0.3909 2.130
(57.57) (-61.81) (0.66)
Guangdong Electric Power 0.865*** -0.866*** -0.681 0.3892 0.3882 2.059
(50.55) (-63.48) (-1.55)
Guangdong Pear River 0.865*** -0.825*** 0.258 0.3428 0.3414 2.155
(36.65) (-44.76) (0.49)
Guandgong Sunrise 0.637*** -0.704*** -1.161 0.1981 0.1968 2.076
(35.58) (-33.25) (-1.32)
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 0.463*** -0.475*** 0.262 0.1154 0.1137 2.122
(19.67) (-33.83) (0.51)
Hainan Pearl River Holdings 0.927*** -0.876*** 0.268 0.1862 0.1849 2.367
(30.06) (-38.04) (0.28)
Hefei Meiling  0.968*** -0.900*** 0.700 0.3110 0.3097 2.021
(42.06) (-50.16) (-1.24)
Jiangling Motors   0.864*** -0.806*** 1.024* 0.2712 0.2700 2.090
(40.94) (-48.58) (1.90)
Konka Group 0.897*** -0.705*** -1.152** 0.3864 0.3854 2.090
(63.47) (-54.63) (-2.54)
Livzon Pharmaceutical 0.841*** -0.857*** 0.555 0.3457 0.3447 2.197
(64.09) (-55.75) (1.06)
Luthai Textile 0.842*** -0.808*** 0.032 0.3530 0.3512 1.956
(32.09) (-36.74) (0.06)
Shangdong Chenming Paper 0.941*** -0.912*** -0.165 0.3861 0.3843 2.063
(35.42) (-43.73) (-0.46)
Shenzhen SEG  0.844*** -0.827*** -0.341 0.2816 0.2802 1.989
(36.76) (-49.06) (-0.58)
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 0.996*** -0.943*** -0.803 0.4025 0.4015 2.167
(59.37) (-68.75) (-1.28)
Shenzhen Textile 0.995*** -0.954*** -0.822 0.3220 0.3209 2.065
(45.32) (-45.33) (-0.87)
Shenzhen Accord 0.892*** -0.939*** -0.376 0.3233 0.3222 2.107
(41.00) (-45.00) (-0.62)
Shenzhen International Enterprise 1.010*** -0.911*** 0.808 0.2649 0.2635 2.034
(40.56) (46.51) (1.42)
Shenzhen Nanshan Power 0.920*** -0.864*** 0.789 0.3571 0.3560 2.273
(52.05) (-59.41) (1.22)
Shenzhen Properties 0.783*** -0.837*** -0.678 0.3045 0.3033 2.111
(55.37) (-58.04) (-1.43)
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial 0.808*** -0.718*** -0.852 0.1921 0.1908 2.228
(55.92) (-38.28) (-1.16)
Shenzhen Tellus 0.718*** -0.438*** -0.008 0.1812 0.1800 2.323
(55.92) (-33.46) (-0.009)
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile 0.940*** -0.939*** -1.165* 0.2663 0.2651 2.239
(48.01) (-52.38) (-1.82)
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa 0.879*** -0.834*** -0.016 0.2180 0.2167 2.106
(56.80) (-50.89) (-0.02)
Shijianzhuang Baoshi 0.872*** -0.887*** -1.215* 0.2492 0.2478 2.058
(33.29) (-48.01) (-1.89)
Weifu High Technology 0.990*** -0.913*** -0.920** 0.3028 0.3012 2.148
(39.10) (-40.71) (-1.98)
Wuxi Littleswan  1.001*** -0.898 -0.016 0.2987 0.2973 2.014
(56.69) (-56.52) (-0.03)
Yantai Changyu 0.835*** -0.884 0.315 0.3018 0.3000 1.974
(28.50) (-40.40) (0.60)
t statistics is shown in parenthesis, * denotes rejection at 10% significant level,
 ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
  
218 
Appendix 5.2: Regression output for Chinese shares dual-Listed on 
China A and China B (Shanghai) Markets 
 
Shanghai A Shanghai B RMB/US$ R Square Adjusted R Square DW
China First Pencil  1.073*** -0.952*** 0.170*** 0.3726 0.3717 2.152
(70.41) (-58.39) (2.86)
China Textile Machinery 0.825*** -0.773*** 0.011 0.3121 0.3111 2.149
(53.40) (-46.69) (0.04)
Danhua chemical  0.802*** -0.800*** -0.096 0.3308 0.3298 2.133
(47.02) (-47.47) (-0.29)
Dazhong Transportation 0.951*** -0.885*** -0.222 0.4277 0.4269 2.000
(72.42) (-59.22) (-1.02)
Double Coin  0.973*** -0.977*** 0.063 0.4175 0.4167 2.057
(72.35) (-62.42) (0.21)
Eastern Communications 0.855*** -0.743*** 0.238 0.2527 0.2513 1.903
(34.20) (-42.01) (0.81)
Hainan Airlines  0.887*** -0.767*** -0.058 0.2773 0.2755 2.109
(30.51) (-45.60) (-0.15)
Huadian Energy  0.930*** -0.924*** 0.017 0.4017 0.4006 1.970
(39.17) (-59.96) (0.04)
Huangshan Tourism  0.904*** -0.823*** -0.598* 0.3017 0.3003 2.049
(32.36) (-49.61) (-1.67)
Huaxin Cement  1.082*** -0.939*** -0.182 0.2891 0.2879 2.097
(10.12) (-16.78) (-0.45)
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica 0.908*** -0.812*** 0.114 0.2154 0.2130 1.979
(28.38) (-38.09) (0.99)
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 0.594*** -0.334*** -0.116 0.2630 0.2615 2.106
(25.22) (-41.09) (-0.25)
Jinshan Development  0.923*** -1.100*** -0.012 0.3484 0.3474 2.125
(57.81) (-64.11) (-0.03)
Jinzhou Port  0.649*** -0.641*** -0.052 0.2200 0.2181 1.839
(28.35) (-32.72) (-0.14)
SGSB Group 0.797*** -0.697*** -0.326 0.1852 0.1840 2.058
(39.88) (-34.41) (-1.00)
Shanghai Automation 0.694*** -0.610*** 0.603 0.2292 0.2280 2.149
(40.60) (-34.79) (1.52)
Shanghai Baosight 0.124*** -0.281*** -4.198*** 0.0469 0.0455 2.005
(7.22) (-20.22) (-20.85)
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali 0.806*** -0.740*** 0.602*** 0.1820 0.1808 2.036
(55.71) (-42.78) (5.17)
Shanghai Diesel 1.049*** -1.026 0.852*** 0.4005 0.3995 1.975
(76.38) (-67.16) (3.20)
Shanghai Dingli Technology 0.873*** -0.734*** -0.160 0.2540 0.2530 2.047
(63.66) (-37.78) (-0.43)
Shanghai Erfangji 0.696*** -0.646*** 0.167 0.1771 0.1759 2.116
(32.34) (-36.93) (0.70)
Shanghai Friendship 0.719*** -0.631*** -0.567 0.2287 0.2274 2.141
(38.12) (-33.43) (-1.54)
Shanghai Haixin Group 0.648*** -0.881*** 0.027 0.3108 0.3098 2.106
(53.36) (-68.51) (0.09)
Shanghai Highly Group 0.926*** -0.914*** -0.131 0.3878 0.3870 2.074
(47.37) (-52.87) (-0.36)
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel 1.038*** -0.882*** -0.162 0.3499 0.3487 2.168
(42.55) (-53.03) (-0.40)
Shanghai Jinjiang International 0.951*** -0.840*** -0.137 0.3754 0.3744 2.127
(67.16) (-73.82) (-0.70)
Shanghai Jinqiao  0.976*** -0.883*** -0.046 0.4350 0.4342 2.133
(25.29) (-66.54) (-0.26)
Shanghai Kaikai  0.970*** -0.816*** 0.331 0.0972 0.0946 2.079
(41.46) (-39.55) (1.02)
Shanghai Lujiazui 1.016*** -0.917*** -0.416* 0.4461 0.4452 2.061
(64.29) (-67.29) (-1.66)
Shanghai Mechanic 0.799*** -0.741*** 1.639*** 0.2101 0.2089 2.123
(40.08) (-42.52) (5.01)
Shanghai MRA Trading 0.931*** -0.833*** 0.468 0.3174 0.3163 2.179
(48.04) (-47.52) (1.20)
Shanghai Nine Dragon 0.734*** -0.441*** -0.222 0.1126 0.1100 1.950
(21.80) (-17.14) (-0.64)
Shanghai Potevio 0.964*** -0.855*** -0.389 0.3193 0.3182 2.097
(61.14) (-46.85) (-1.20)
Shanghai Sanmao 0.979*** -0.800*** 0.040 0.3049 0.3039 2.131
(46.79) (-38.62) (0.29)
Shanghai Wingsung 0.745*** -0.710*** -0.050 0.2041 0.2030 2.158
(47.42) (-44.95) (-0.23)
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington 0.987*** -0.910*** 0.917*** 0.3634 0.3624 2.126
(56.49) (-53.37) (2.91)
Shanghai Zhenhua Port 0.734*** -0.655*** -0.007 0.1534 0.1510 1.956
(21.96) (-24.30) (-0.01)
SVA Electron  0.980*** -0.850*** -0.104 0.3914 0.3910 2.270
(56.79) (-54.24) (-0.40)
Zhong Lu 0.762*** -0.753*** 0.200 0.2362 0.2350 2.029
(38.28) (-69.65) (0.41)
t statistics is shown in parenthesis, * denotes rejection at 10% significant level,
 ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
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Appendix 5.3: Regression output for Chinese shares dual-Listed on 
China A and Hong Kong markets 
 
Shanghai A Hang Seng RMB/HK$ R Squre Adjusted R Square DW
Air China 0.972*** -1.203*** -0.420 0.3782 0.3721 2.069
(14.66) (-19.70) (-0.30)
Angang Steel Plate 0.774*** -1.098*** -0.943 0.2171 0.2154 1.960
(22.04) (-32.97) (-1.02)
Anhui Conch Cement 0.678*** -0.918*** 0.491 0.2006 0.1980 2.093
(18.47) (-21.992) (0.56)
Anhui Expressway 0.904*** -0.751*** 0.544 0.2370 0.2340 2.119
(21.90) (-19.29) (0.669)
Bank of China 0.798*** -0.899*** -0.531 0.6118 0.6082 2.238
(31.05) (-28.91) (-0.98)
Bank of Communications 0.821*** -0.968*** 0.082 0.5984 0.5927 2.190
(22.03) (-26.47) (0.11)
Beijing North Star 0.831*** -0.930*** 1.078 0.2698 0.2622 1.939
(11.96) (-16.21) (0.77)
Beiren Printing and Machinery 1.001*** -0.715*** 1.040 0.2263 0.2251 2.087
(43.95) (-24.99) (1.08)
China Citic Bank 0.931*** -0.829*** 1.392 0.4170 0.4089 2.260
(20.91) (-19.23) (1.43)
China Coal Energy 0.969*** -1.479*** 0.225 0.5671 0.5559 2.272
(12.16) (-19.00) (0.15)
China Construction Bank 0.757*** -1.061*** 0.187 0.7034 0.6979 1.925
(19.83) (-37.14) (0.29)
China Cosco Holding 0.945*** -1.478*** 1.840 0.4300 0.4213 1.915
(10.81) (-22.35) (1.08)
China Merchants Bank 0.817*** -0.906*** 0.436 0.4467 0.4410 2.185
(19.75) (-21.93) (0.49)
China Oilfield Services 0.905*** -1.334*** 0.530 0.4706 0.4607 2.123
(11.33) (-22.18) (0.29)
China Railway Construction 0.670*** -0.719*** -0.603 0.2548 0.2327 2.494
(7.70) (-7.30) (-0.26)
China Railway Group 0.759*** -0.794*** 2.501* 0.3681 0.3541 1.803
(13.89) (-11.82) (1.68)
China Shenhua Energy 0.861*** -1.173*** -0.651 0.5180 0.5088 2.031
(12.91) (-20.37) (-0.58)
China Shipping Development 0.946*** -1.365*** 0.509 0.5241 0.5135 2.089
(11.09) (-19.77) (0.25)
China Shipping Container 1.058*** -1.322*** -0.563 0.3470 0.3447 2.060
(25.51) (-29.05) (-0.62)
Datang International Power 1.106*** -1.222*** -0.322 0.3003 0.2923 1.814
(12.69) (-15.83) (-0.26)
Dongfang Electric 0.853*** -0.824*** 0.490 0.1600 0.1584 2.038
(27.01) (-34.12) (0.44)
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical 0.803*** -0.627*** -0.078 0.1592 0.1567 2.060
(23.97) (-17.51) (-0.08)
Guangzhou Shipyard 0.935*** -0.795*** 2.591*** 0.2100 0.2088 2.054
(30.27) (-22.94) (3.34)
Huadian Power 1.176*** -1.200*** 0.615 0.2327 0.2282 1.974
(24.84) (-21.89) (0.71)
Hisense Kelon 0.635*** -0.323*** -0.538 0.0676 0.065 1.883
(10.10) (-5.50) (-0.31)
Industrial and Commercial Bank 0.784*** -0.942 -0.716 0.6238 0.6197 2.020
(23.65) (-29.13) (-1.17)
Jingwei Textile 0.964*** -0.815*** 1.727** 0.1742 0.1726 2.058
(29.93) (-27.38) (2.27)
Jiangsu Expressway 0.730*** -0.861*** -0.034 0.2515 0.2494 2.009
(26.60) (-28.05) (-0.05)
Jiangxi Cooper 1.008*** -1.310 0.546 0.3296 0.3274 2.132
(26.61) (-29.14) (0.65)
Maanshan Iron 0.791*** -1.083*** 1.426 0.2576 0.2564 2.037
(37.82) (-35.93) (1.44)
Nanjing Panda 0.855*** -0.978*** -0.413 0.1359 0.1342 1.941
(19.22) (-25.99) (-0.31)
Northest Electric 0.624*** -0.889*** 1.613 0.1177 0.1161 2.032
(17.46) (-24.57) (1.19)
Ping An Insurance 0.688*** -0.841*** -0.337 0.3721 0.3641 2.042
(13.01) (-13.48) (-0.30)
Shandong Chengming 0.919*** -0.766*** 2.982 0.2614 0.2281 1.739
(7.60) (-7.23) (1.35)
Shangdong Xinhua 0.786*** -0.741*** -0.214 0.1722 0.1705 2.145
(22.85) (-25.21) (-0.22)
Shenji Group 0.999*** -0.7.7*** 1.095 0.1639 0.1625 2.019
(36.86) (-19.54) (1.08)
Sinopec Yizheng 0.938*** -1.034*** 1.019 0.2284 0.2271 1.965
(46.26) (-33.25) (0.99)
Tianjin Capital Environment 0.830*** -0.885*** 0.511 0.1775 0.1761 2.045
(27.44) (-25.35) (0.46)
Tsigtao Brewery 0.786*** -0.667*** 0.810 0.2296 0.2283 2.068
(33.32) (-25.64) (1.19)
Weichai Power 0.518*** -0.638*** 1.200 0.1188 0.1065 2.094
(6.72) (-11.19) (0.68)
Zijin Mining 1.044*** -1.342*** 3.408 0.4283 0.4083 2.008
(7.52) (-12.43) (1.50)
ZTE 0.502*** -0.814*** -0.812 0.2190 0.2145 2.100
(10.27) (-16.61) (-0.76)
t statistics is shown in parenthesis, * denotes rejection at 10% significant level,
 ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
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Appendix 5.4: Regression output for Chinese shares dual or triple-
listed on China A, Hong Kong and New York markets 
 
Adjusted
S&P Hang Seng Shanghai A HK$/US$ RMB/US$ RMB/HK$ R Square  R Square DW
Aluminum A-H 0.077 -1.426*** 1.210*** -4.094 -4.200** 3.878** 0.5060 0.4956 2.139
(0.84) (-22.56) (17.09) (-1.10) (-2.48) (2.19)
A-N -1.724*** -0.502*** 1.092*** 6.561 -2.810* 2.456 0.5609 0.5516 2.156
(-22.28) (-6.77) (12.69) (1.48) (-1.92) (1.37)
H-N -1.023*** 0.601*** -0.079*** 1.422 -0.082 1.046* 0.3770 0.3739 2.745
(-25.79) (17.92) (-3.15) (1.22) (-0.17) (1.73)
China Eastern Airlines A-H -0.131*** -1.075*** 0.752*** -2.20 -0.437 0.643 0.1897 0.1872 2.135
(-2.85) (-34.47) (18.43) (-1.06) (-0.45) (0.63)
A-N -0.666*** -0.584*** 0.777*** -1.747 -0.627 0.443 0.1977 0.1952 2.138
(-16.42) (-18.59) (24.77) (-1.04) (-1.37) (0.52)
H-N -0.892*** 0.659*** 0.089*** 7.412*** 0.223 0.184 0.1670 0.1646 2.636
(-30.74) (37.42) (4.90) (19.94) (0.98) (0.296)
China United Telecom A-H 0.031 -1.404*** 0.965*** -1.693 -0.089 0.314 0.4078 0.4045 2.045
(0.58) (-35.97) (33.27) (-1.17) (-0.20) (0.43)
A-N -1.297*** -0.691*** 0.957*** 0.579 -0.463 -0.400 0.4625 0.4595 2.077
(-24.92) (-16.31) (29.38) (0.41) (-1.22) (-0.53)
H-N -1.261*** 0.684*** -0.043** 2.522** -0.490*** -0.537 0.4970 0.4950 2.560
(-50.31) (30.04) (-2.31) (2.17) (-2.68) (-1.21)
China Life Insurance A-H 0.089* -1.004*** 0.868*** -1.442 -0.200 -0.060 0.5586 0.5508 1.936
(1.84) (-30.25) (23.83) (-0.63) (-0.24) (-0.07)
A-N -1.367*** -0.174*** 0.825*** 5.828* 1.124 -2.800* 0.5068 0.4981 2.147
(-22.03) (-3.07) (13.82) (1.89) (0.93) (-1.80)(-22.03
H-N -1.094*** 0.584*** -0.014 0.584 -0.942*** 0.105 0.4814 0.4778 2.755
(-33.13) (26.49) (-0.69) (0.66) (-4.05) (0.32)
China Petrol A-H 0.001 -1.141*** 0.877*** -0.725 -0.259 -0.114 0.4255 0.4229 1.990
(0.02) (-36.20) (29.40) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.16)
A-N -0.945*** -0.533*** 0.871*** -2.294 -0.661* 0.247 0.3840 0.3811 2.238
(-24.49) (-14.31) (25.99) (-1.45) (-1.78) (0.29)
H-N -0.751*** 0.470*** 0.008 -1.191 -0.808*** 0.879* 0.3315 0.3284 2.845
(-31.98) (20.52) (0.40) (-1.17) (-3.25) (1.96)
China Southern Airlines A-H -0.069 -0.893*** 0.812*** 1.456 0.250 0.915 0.1950 0.1898 2.158
(-1.15) (-16.34) (16.61) (0.82) (0.30) (0.94)
A-N -1.260*** -0.346*** 0.823*** -1.874 -0.836 1.518 0.2716 0.2670 2.174
(-16.19) (-5.85) (16.28) (-0.93) (-1.41) (1.60)
H-N -0.781*** 0.440*** -0.010 -1.987** -0.564* 0.380 0.2204 0.2181 2.620
(-26.40) (23.77) (-0.42) (-2.30) (-1.93) (0.83)
Guangshen Railway A-H 0.429*** -0.830*** 0.858*** 2.660 -1.156 1.426 0.3551 0.3439 2.142
(7.22) (-16.40) (16.26) (1.02) (-0.93) (1.17)
A-N -1.087*** -0.212*** 0.784*** 10.111*** -0.153 0.822 0.4329 0.4231 2.197
(14.83) (-4.28) (14.29) (3.72) (-0.12) (0.68)
H-N -0.594*** 0.345*** 0.010 1.267*** -0.251 0.477 0.2070 0.2048 2.647
(-26.80) (21.99) (0.62) (3.62) (-0.83) (1.09)
Huaneng Power A-H 0.058 -0.933*** 0.873*** 0.058 -0.209 1.465** 0.2946 0.2911 1.943
(1.20) (-23.36) (27.01) (0.04) (-0.34) (2.54)
A-N -0.740*** -0.424*** 0.860*** 2.35* -1.01* 2.493*** 0.3173 0.3139 2.018
(-14.79) (-9.74) (23.75) (1.84) (1.85) (3.41)
H-N -0.0688*** 0.389*** -0.017 1.475* -0.856*** 1.393*** 0.2360 0.2336 2.731
(-28.76) (19.30) (1.09) (1.87) (-5.11) (4.51)
Petro China A-H 0.073 -1.328*** 0.809*** -0.253 0.125 -1.362 0.7620 0.7546 2.037
(1.44) (-29.48) (14.39) (-0.10) (0.16) (-1.54)
A-N -1.258*** -0.510*** 0.730*** 3.702 0.069 0.094 0.6919 0.6824 2.230
(-26.00) (-8.62) (11.163) (1.32) (0.08) (0.07)
H-N -0.626*** 0.402*** -0.011 -0.170 -0.255 1.354*** 0.3244 0.3217 2.836
(-26.18) (18.94) (-0.57) (-0.20) (-0.66) (2.79)
Sinopec Shanghai A-H 0.062 -1.083*** 0.827*** -0.621 0.192* -0.086 0.3024 0.3008 1.972
(1.40) (-38.05) (43.55) (-0.40) (1.96) (-0.58)
A-N -0.781*** -0.580*** 0.840*** 5.026*** 0.030* -0.086 0.2783 0.2767 2.033
(-19.23) (-21.15) (40.87) (7.41) (1.65) (-0.24)
H-N -0.670*** 0.419*** -0.009 -0.202 -0.090 -0.011 0.2381 0.2364 2.676
(-26.42) (26.86) (-0.71) (-0.49) (-1.64) (-0.07)
Yanzhou Coal A-H 0.046 -1.046*** 0.921*** 1.363 -0.776 -1.137 0.2364 0.2339 2.006
(0.97) (-27.36) (26.24) (0.81) (-1.02) (-0.16)
A-N -0.468*** -0.592*** 0.875*** 3.541 -0.583 1.045 0.2055 0.2029 2.116
(-10.20) (-14.95) (22.49) (1.51) (-0.75) (1.34)
H-N -0.617*** 0.397*** -0.052** 0.088 -0.046 1.052** 0.1532 0.1500 2.664
(-19.15) (15.75) (-2.41) (0.11) (-0.10) (2.16)
China Telecom H-N -0.512 0.268*** -0.368 1.231 0.363 4.235 0.3356 0.3214 2.142
(-0.468) (23.14) (-1.02) (1.01) (0.59) (1.41)
China Mobile H-N -1.095*** 0.540*** -0.020 0.909 -0.339*** 0.335 0.4670 0.4654 2.570
(-55.09) (38.03) (-1.29) (1.13) (-2.67) (0.96)
CNOOC H-N 0.040 -0.017 0.050** 0.513 0.563 0.747 0.0031 0.0011 2.865
(1.36) (-0.62) (2.08) (0.35) (0.54) (-1.40)
t statistics is shown in parenthesis, * denotes rejection at 10% significant level,
 ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
A presents shares listed in China A-share market, H represents shares listed in Hong Kong market, N represents New York market
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Appendix 6: Unit Root Test Results 
 
Appendix 6.1: Unit Root Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-Listed 
on China A- and B-Share Markets during the Period 1st January 1993 
to 31st December 2008 
 
 
 
Price Series Market 
Anhui Guijing Distiller A -0.750 -50.715 *** -1.540 -50.712 *** -1.866 -50.704 ***
B -0.258 -25.304 *** -1.992 -25.300 *** -2.016 -25.299 ***
Bengang Steel Plate A -0.360 -51.784 *** -1.874 -51.775 *** -1.986 -51.767 ***
B 0.255 -52.552 *** -1.191 -52.547 *** -1.766 -52.541 ***
BOE Technology A -0.863 -29.134 *** -1.847 -29.138 *** -1.847 -29.131 ***
B -0.163 -50.907 *** -1.541 -50.899 *** -1.341 -50.901 ***
Changchai Company A 0.146 -58.894 *** -2.489 -58.888 *** -2.822 -58.941 ***
B -0.698 -54.132 *** -1.761 -54.128 *** -1.789 -54.120 ***
China Fanda A -0.157 -57.076 *** -2.034 -57.067 *** -3.967 *** -57.095 ***
B 0.324 -53.279 *** -3.606 -53.277 *** -3.634 ** -53.319 ***
China First Pencil  A 0.291 -66.074 *** -2.348 -66.070 *** -2.303 -66.074 ***
B 0.728 -65.051 *** -1.591 -65.059 *** -1.806 -65.059 ***
China Interational Marine Container A 1.046 -60.831 *** -1.621 -60.852 *** -1.589 -60.868 ***
B 1.217 -58.408 *** -1.151 -58.435 *** -1.578 -58.435 ***
China Merchants Propert Development A 0.523 -62.267 *** -1.133 -62.267 *** -2.443 -62.260 ***
B 0.907 -60.601 *** -1.221 -60.613 *** -2.016 -60.606 ***
China Textile Machinery A -0.274 -62.746 *** -2.663 * -62.754 *** -2.815 -62.761 ***
B -0.383 -61.172 *** -1.559 -61.165 *** -1.776 -61.157 ***
China Vanke  A 1.425 -63.796 *** -0.234 -63.821 *** -2.010 -63.824 ***
B 1.417 -61.833 *** -0.047 -61.859 *** -2.485 -61.867 ***
Congqing Changan Automobile A -0.315 -52.763 *** -1.419 -52.754 *** -1.791 -52.746 ***
B 0.221 -49.575 *** -1.632 -49.571 *** -1.500 -49.576 ***
CSG Holding  A 0.386 -63.256 *** -1.656 -63.254 *** -2.165 -63.247 ***
B 0.229 -28.037 *** -1.572 -28.038 *** -2.090 -28.035 ***
Dalian Referigerator A 0.065 -46.131 *** -1.778 -46.126 *** -1.631 -46.129 ***
B 0.122 -51.641 *** -1.519 -51.634 *** -1.592 -51.630 ***
Danhua chemical  A 0.090 -59.112 *** -1.580 -59.106 *** -1.615 -59.099 ***
B 0.155 -38.275 *** -1.348 -38.265 *** -1.638 -38.257 ***
Dazhong Transportation A 0.690 -41.917 *** -2.425 -41.908 *** -2.527 -41.905 ***
B 0.686 -41.185 *** -1.970 -41.183 *** -2.566 -41.176 ***
Double Coin  A -0.759 -44.287 *** -2.595 -44.301 *** -2.816 -44.292 ***
B -0.467 -40.413 *** -1.903 -40.406 *** -1.949 -40.419 ***
Eastern Communications A -0.472 -42.934 *** -1.335 -42.939 *** -1.835 -42.964 ***
B 0.165 -41.797 *** -1.970 -41.792 *** -1.854 -41.785 ***
Foshan Electrical A 0.315 -34.177 *** -1.646 -34.170 *** -2.423 -34.165 ***
B 0.957 -45.234 *** -1.370 -45.242 *** -2.065 -45.278 ***
Guangdong Electric Power A 0.542 -42.339 *** -1.404 -42.334 *** -1.306 -42.326 ***
B 0.555 -45.288 *** -1.645 -45.277 *** -1.261 -45.317 ***
Guangdong Provincial Expressway A -0.319 -43.255 *** -1.962 -43.257 *** -1.907 -43.249 ***
B 0.305 -44.650 *** -1.720 -44.643 *** -2.084 -44.663 ***
Guandgong Sunrise A -0.979 -39.956 *** -1.402 -40.003 *** -1.690 -40.023 ***
B -0.711 -36.465 *** -1.839 -36.462 *** -1.910 -36.460 ***
Hainan Airlines  A -0.518 -43.514 *** -1.413 -43.514 *** -1.703 -43.504 ***
B -0.395 -41.485 *** -1.735 -41.477 *** -1.754 -41.482 ***
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism A -1.299 -41.889 *** -1.301 -41.904 *** -1.771 -41.897 ***
B -0.373 -23.631 *** -1.699 -23.628 *** -1.693 -23.632 ***
Hainan Pearl River Holdings A -0.453 -22.059 *** -2.045 -22.058 *** -2.028 -22.078 ***
B -0.222 -18.269 *** -1.740 -18.265 *** -1.834 -18.260 ***
Hefei Meiling  A -0.492 -43.485 *** -2.095 -43.488 *** -2.360 -43.479 ***
B -0.397 -42.136 *** -2.257 -42.126 *** -2.272 -42.122 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; B represents shares listed and traded on China B market
* denotes rejection at 10% significant level, ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
First Difference First Difference First Difference
Model 1 Model 2
(No drift no trend) (With drift) (With drift and trend)
Model 3
LevelLevel Level
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 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price Series Market 
Huadian Energy  A -0.369 -44.454 *** -1.734 -44.469 *** -2.282 -44.458 ***
B 0.288 -42.081 *** -2.537 -42.072 *** -2.019 -42.100 ***
Huangshan Tourism  A 0.053 -34.732 *** -1.247 -34.726 *** -2.045 -34.739 ***
B 0.964 -44.739 *** -1.518 -44.741 *** -1.620 -44.731 ***
Huaxin Cement  A 0.171 -43.053 *** -1.767 -43.044 *** -2.709 -43.046 ***
B 1.079 -40.285 *** -0.753 -40.294 *** -1.884 -40.284 ***
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica A -0.303 -33.246 *** -1.454 -33.238 *** -1.863 -33.254 ***
B 0.763 -43.535 *** -0.879 -43.546 *** -1.757 -43.550 ***
Jiangling Motors   A -0.028 -45.514 *** -1.876 -45.505 *** -3.151 * -45.496 ***
B 0.510 -43.505 *** -1.681 -43.508 *** -2.063 -43.543 ***
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle A -0.336 -40.428 *** -1.458 -40.425 *** -1.449 -40.420 ***
B -0.852 -39.124 *** -1.704 -39.116 *** -1.698 -39.108 ***
Jinshan Development  A -0.420 -39.906 *** -1.710 -39.905 *** -1.730 -39.897 ***
B -0.372 -39.670 *** -1.393 -39.661 *** -1.965 -39.660 ***
Jinzhou Port  A -0.390 -43.851 *** -2.027 -43.848 *** -2.315 -43.838 ***
B 0.351 -41.979 *** -1.653 -41.969 *** -1.076 -41.993 ***
Konka Group A -0.049 -45.561 *** -1.636 -45.561 *** -1.598 -45.572 ***
B 0.104 -44.136 *** -2.485 -44.128 *** -2.445 -44.118 ***
Livzon Pharmaceutical A 0.637 -42.273 *** -1.192 -42.264 *** -2.010 -42.278 ***
B 0.840 -43.763 *** -1.094 -43.774 *** -2.214 -43.766 ***
Luthai Textile A 0.298 -41.958 *** -1.236 -41.952 *** -1.646 -41.942 ***
B 1.401 -43.620 *** -1.254 -43.646 *** -1.502 -43.671 ***
SGSB Group A -0.538 -43.946 *** -2.834 * -43.948 *** -2.814 -43.938 ***
B -0.537 -41.756 *** -1.399 -41.749 *** -1.930 -41.755 ***
Shangdong Chenming Paper A -0.366 -44.366 *** -1.590 -44.355 *** -1.726 -44.348 ***
B 0.394 -32.860 *** -1.142 -32.866 *** -2.179 -32.919 ***
H -2.065 ** -10.428 *** -1.140 -10.648 *** -1.097 -10.655 ***
Shanghai Automation Instrument A -0.554 -39.890 *** -2.412 -39.888 *** -2.406 -39.888 ***
B 0.108 -38.277 *** -1.627 -38.268 *** -1.994 -38.259 ***
Shanghai Baosight A -0.121 -43.523 *** -2.340 -43.513 *** -3.465 ** -43.506 ***
B 0.609 -40.138 *** -1.267 -40.132 *** -2.120 -40.128 ***
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali A -0.579 -43.432 *** -2.283 -43.445 *** -2.590 -43.438 ***
B -0.044 -40.528 *** -1.775 -40.520 *** -1.806 -40.525 ***
Shanghai Diesel A -0.332 -43.298 *** -3.485 *** -43.290 *** -3.580 ** -43.280 ***
B -0.049 -40.874 *** -1.674 -40.864 *** -2.027 -40.875 ***
Shanghai Dingli Technology A -0.149 -40.179 *** -2.505 -40.182 *** -2.510 -40.182 ***
B 0.164 -38.201 *** -1.106 -38.192 *** -1.666 -38.185 ***
Shanghai Erfangji A -0.649 -42.208 *** -2.283 -42.215 *** -2.319 -42.205 ***
B -0.403 -40.620 *** -1.488 -40.616 *** -1.497 -40.629 ***
Shanghai Friendship A 0.481 -44.280 *** -1.680 -44.270 *** -2.663 -44.260 ***
B 0.801 -42.675 *** -0.714 -42.677 *** -2.343 -42.686 ***
Shanghai Haixin Group A -0.093 -41.059 *** -1.748 -41.050 *** -1.868 -41.068 ***
B 0.478 -41.083 *** -1.382 -41.073 *** -1.593 -41.097 ***
Shanghai Highly Group A -0.172 -44.877 *** -3.151 ** -44.875 *** -3.229 * -44.864 ***
B 0.417 -43.213 *** -1.648 -43.203 *** -1.841 -43.212 ***
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel A 0.058 -44.253 *** -2.389 -44.242 *** -2.701 -44.233 ***
B 0.642 -43.823 *** -1.342 -43.819 *** -1.812 -43.831 ***
Shanghai Jinjiang International A -0.525 -45.730 *** -3.334 ** -45.721 *** -4.284 *** -45.711 ***
B 0.620 -32.758 *** -1.109 -32.760 *** -1.863 -32.769 ***
Shanghai Jinqiao  A 0.213 -44.591 *** -3.641 *** -44.582 *** -3.516 ** -44.571 ***
B 0.488 -43.107 *** -1.852 -43.098 *** -1.881 -43.112 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; B represents shares listed and traded on China B market
* denotes rejection at 10% significant level, ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
First Difference First Difference First Difference
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(No drift no trend) (With drift) (With drift and trend)
Level Level Level
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(cont.) 
 
 
Price Series Market First Difference
Shanghai Kaikai  A -0.809 -44.636 *** -1.880 -44.632 *** -1.847 -44.625 ***
B -0.051 -40.938 *** -1.481 -40.930 *** -1.435 -40.922 ***
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone A 0.286 -43.453 *** -2.533 -43.443 *** -2.475 -43.436 ***
B 0.477 -42.145 *** -1.565 -42.140 *** -1.936 -42.136 ***
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical A 0.425 -43.716 *** -1.909 -43.705 *** -2.511 -43.696 ***
B 0.515 -42.288 *** -1.177 -42.283 *** -1.862 -42.283 ***
Shanghai MRA Trading A -0.478 -45.196 *** -2.797 * -45.199 *** -2.786 -45.188 ***
B 0.211 -41.950 *** -1.151 -41.940 *** -1.580 -41.938 ***
Shanghai Nine Dragon A -1.040 -44.328 *** -1.545 -44.331 *** -1.414 -44.328 ***
B 0.512 -42.417 *** -2.047 -42.407 *** -1.793 -42.400 ***
Shanghai Potevio A -0.191 -43.621 *** -2.429 -43.632 *** -2.280 -43.623 ***
B -0.066 -41.640 *** -1.642 -41.632 *** -1.779 -41.632 ***
Shanghai Sanmao A -0.280 -45.209 *** -2.318 -45.205 *** -2.367 -45.201 ***
B 0.070 -41.260 *** -1.442 -41.251 *** -1.660 -41.248 ***
Shanghai Wingsung A -0.454 -44.068 *** -2.457 -44.074 *** -2.391 -44.063 ***
B -0.300 -40.225 *** -1.534 -40.216 *** -2.099 -40.210 ***
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington A -0.369 -43.000 *** -2.555 -42.994 *** -2.616 -42.984 ***
B -0.394 -41.234 *** -1.311 -41.224 *** -1.791 -41.237 ***
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery A 1.001 -44.570 *** -0.794 -44.585 *** -1.220 -44.575 ***
B 1.045 -42.870 *** -0.786 -42.908 *** -1.881 -42.932 ***
Shenzhen SEG  A -0.659 -40.469 *** -1.085 -40.490 *** -1.909 -40.483 ***
B -0.283 -41.840 *** -2.156 -41.838 *** -2.374 -41.850 ***
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone A -0.721 -44.604 *** -2.152 -44.612 *** -2.116 -44.605 ***
B -0.606 -42.390 *** -2.012 -42.383 *** -2.020 -42.401 ***
Shenzhen Textile A 0.018 -44.701 *** -2.744 * -44.697 *** -2.681 -44.686 ***
B -0.001 -42.054 *** -1.856 -42.044 *** -2.329 -42.055 ***
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical A 0.554 -42.833 *** -1.284 -42.824 *** -1.845 -42.880 ***
B 0.713 -42.414 *** -1.206 -42.409 *** -1.878 -42.400 ***
Shenzhen International Enterprise A -0.197 -41.476 *** -2.571 -41.471 *** -2.914 -41.465 ***
B 0.350 -41.516 *** -2.351 -41.506 *** -2.326 -41.498 ***
Shenzhen Nanshan Power A 0.316 -41.822 *** -2.477 -41.825 *** -1.604 -41.843 ***
B 0.335 -19.177 *** -1.236 -19.173 *** -0.687 -19.286 ***
Shenzhen Properties and Resources A -0.699 -40.732 *** -2.277 -40.735 *** -2.338 -40.725 ***
B -0.688 -40.198 *** -2.524 -40.189 *** -2.527 -40.212 ***
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial A -0.387 -42.702 *** -1.974 -42.702 *** -2.046 -42.692 ***
B -0.217 -41.150 *** -1.823 -41.140 *** -2.348 -41.146 ***
Shenzhen Tellus A -0.605 -40.434 *** -2.322 -40.435 *** -2.318 -40.426 ***
B -0.415 -38.301 *** -2.300 -38.292 *** -2.400 -38.308 ***
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile A -0.645 -42.741 *** -2.170 -42.756 *** -2.155 -42.747 ***
B -0.594 -41.380 *** -2.185 -41.379 *** -2.168 -41.397 ***
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa A -0.738 -42.451 *** -1.676 -42.476 *** -1.660 -42.467 ***
B -0.547 -38.360 *** -1.811 -38.360 *** -1.824 -38.374 ***
Shijianzhuang Baoshi A -0.695 -42.523 *** -2.020 -42.524 *** -2.442 -42.519 ***
B -0.427 -24.264 *** -1.642 -24.261 *** -1.624 -24.270 ***
SVA Electron  A -0.221 -25.568 *** -1.667 -25.588 *** -1.444 -25.585 ***
B -0.055 -24.790 *** -1.322 -24.790 *** -1.630 -24.800 ***
Weifu High Technology A 0.166 -44.332 *** -2.064 -44.326 *** -1.535 -44.320 ***
B 0.170 -42.174 *** -1.635 -42.164 *** -1.574 -42.222 ***
Wuxi Littleswan  A -0.974 -32.559 *** -1.724 -32.560 *** -1.791 -32.564 ***
B -0.083 -41.989 *** -2.084 -41.979 *** -2.157 -41.969 ***
Yantai Changyu A 1.317 -43.700 *** 0.035 -43.733 *** -2.198 -43.748 ***
B -0.238 -42.373 *** -0.238 -42.467 *** -2.450 -42.466 ***
Zhong Lu A -0.162 -43.482 *** -2.929 ** -43.474 *** -3.169 * -43.476 ***
B -0.263 -41.852 *** -1.478 -41.842 *** -2.591 -41.837 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; B represents shares listed and traded on China B market
* denotes rejection at 10% significant level, ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
First Difference First DifferenceLevel Level Level
Model 1 Model 2
(With drift and trend)
Model 3
(No drift no trend) (With drift)
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Appendix 6.2: Unit Root Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-Listed 
on China A Share Market and Hong Kong Market during the Period 
1st January 1993 to 31st December 2008 
 
  
RI Series Market Level
Air China A 0.179 -22.197 *** -1.405 -22.184 *** -0.645 -22.542 ***
H -0.333 -30.063 *** -1.017 -30.050 *** -0.513 -30.070 ***
Angang Steel A 0.437 -52.232 *** -0.816 -52.229 *** -1.875 -52.223 ***
H 0.772 -50.799 *** -0.620 -50.807 *** -3.140 * -50.806 ***
Anhui Conch Cement A 0.960 -39.468 *** -1.009 -39.486 *** -1.177 -39.479 ***
H 1.419 -51.846 *** -0.198 -51.875 *** -2.922 -51.879 ***
Anhui Expressway A -0.084 -41.588 *** -2.147 -41.575 *** -1.698 -41.607 ***
H 0.350 -54.958 *** -0.982 -54.954 *** -1.979 -54.945 ***
Bank of China A -0.384 -26.556 *** -0.814 -26.540 *** -0.786 -26.656 ***
H -0.659 -28.402 *** -1.118 -28.400 *** -1.763 -28.457 ***
Bank of Communications A -1.567 -21.720 *** -0.069 -21.827 *** -1.873 -21.859 ***
H 0.695 -30.693 *** -1.979 -30.701 *** -0.853 -30.808 ***
Beijing North Star A -0.291 -22.184 *** -0.606 -22.166 *** -1.783 -22.493 ***
H -0.714 -50.928 *** -2.076 -50.922 *** -2.980 -50.919 ***
Beiren Printing and Machinery A -0.420 -62.243 *** -2.391 -62.236 *** -2.281 -62.236 ***
H -0.504 -63.150 *** -1.669 -63.144 *** -1.691 -63.137 ***
China Citic Bank A -1.650 * -23.374 *** -0.362 -23.482 *** -2.649 -23.499 ***
H -1.307 -21.489 *** -0.879 -21.542 *** -2.329 -21.531 ***
China Coal Energy A -2.088 ** -15.372 *** -0.314 -15.665 *** -2.421 -15.631 ***
H 0.013 -18.944 *** -1.479 -18.927 *** -1.456 -19.066 ***
China Construction Bank A -1.503 -17.930 *** -0.109 -18.025 *** -4.178 *** -18.050 ***
H 0.672 -29.303 *** -2.181 -29.309 *** -1.617 -29.372 ***
China Cosco Holding A -0.842 -17.973 *** 0.414 -17.993 *** -2.369 -18.298 ***
H 0.180 -26.852 *** -1.109 -26.841 *** -0.383 -26.871 ***
China Merchants Bank A 0.738 -41.554 *** -0.816 -41.560 *** -0.982 -41.551 ***
H 0.249 -22.617 *** -1.838 -22.603 *** -1.250 -22.778 ***
China Oilfield Services A -1.780 -16.969 *** -0.700 -17.087 *** -2.499 -17.062 ***
H 0.711 -38.956 *** -1.203 -38.963 *** -1.791 -38.955 ***
China Railway Construction A -0.355 -16.806 *** -2.641 * -16.780 *** -2.847 -16.787 ***
H -0.132 -16.049 *** -3.122 ** -16.009 *** -3.351 *** -15.973 ***
China Railway Group A -0.763 -17.279 *** -0.970 -17.275 *** -2.186 -17.248 ***
H -0.505 -14.768 *** -1.290 -14.754 *** -4.040 *** -14.726 ***
China Shenhua Energy A -2.145 ** -16.297 *** -0.154 -16.521 *** -3.420 * -16.498 ***
H 0.549 -27.533 *** -1.677 -27.535 *** -0.792 -27.597 ***
China Ship Container A -2.518 ** -17.019 *** -0.932 -17.337 *** -3.160 * -17.307 ***
H -0.338 -32.076 *** -1.095 -32.063 *** -0.772 -32.088 ***
China Shipping Development A 0.450 -39.464 *** -1.463 -39.462 *** -0.637 -39.497 ***
H 0.462 -58.323 *** -0.950 -58.322 *** -2.604 -58.317 ***
Datang International Power A 0.041 -22.056 *** -1.196 -22.037 *** -1.286 -22.231 ***
H 0.498 -34.686 *** -1.056 -34.689 *** -2.739 -34.689 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; H represents shares listed and traded on Hong Kong market, 
* denotes rejection at 10% significant level, ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
Level Level
Model 1 Model 3
(No drift no trend) (With drift and trend)
Model 2
(With drift)
First DifferenceFirst Difference First Difference
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(cont.) 
 
 
 
 
  
RI Series Market 
Dongfang Electric A 0.298 -31.693 *** -0.812 -31.693 *** -2.952 -31.715 ***
H 0.649 -58.538 *** -0.388 -58.541 *** -1.740 -58.560 ***
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical A -0.861 -34.704 *** -1.665 -34.709 *** -1.659 -34.702 ***
H 0.330 -52.045 *** -1.244 -52.040 *** -2.263 -52.031 ***
Guangzhou Shipyard A 0.289 -62.549 *** -1.267 -62.545 *** -1.974 -62.538 ***
H 0.194 -60.177 *** -0.902 -60.173 *** -1.509 -60.178 ***
Hisense Kelon A -1.813 * -46.146 *** -1.111 -46.190 *** -1.665 -46.181 ***
H -0.724 -40.413 *** -1.116 -40.413 *** -2.640 -40.411 ***
Huadian Power A -0.221 -30.892 *** -1.156 -30.863 *** -1.365 -30.863 ***
H 0.214 -36.959 *** -1.678 -36.955 *** -2.198 -36.952 ***
Industrial and Commerce Bank A 0.084 -22.247 *** -1.730 -22.228 *** -1.927 -22.444 ***
H 0.164 -24.166 *** -2.529 -24.147 *** -2.299 -24.186 ***
Jiangsu Expressway A -0.240 -34.771 *** -1.785 -34.764 *** -2.174 -34.764 ***
H 0.541 -34.717 *** -0.803 -34.722 *** -3.785 -34.731 ***
Jiangxi Cooper A 0.469 -18.072 *** -1.325 -18.076 *** -1.243 -18.088 ***
H 0.201 -51.190 *** -0.875 -51.185 *** -3.232 -51.186 ***
Jingwei Textile A -1.422 -54.190 *** -2.419 -54.204 *** -2.631 -54.197 ***
H -0.345 -56.769 *** -1.519 -56.761 *** -1.701 -56.756 ***
Maanshan Iron A -0.134 -63.040 *** -2.030 -63.032 *** -3.154 * -63.024 ***
H -0.252 -59.448 *** -1.279 -59.441 *** -2.102 -59.455 ***
Nanjing Panda A -0.809 -54.016 *** -1.788 -54.014 *** -2.173 -54.008 ***
H -0.503 -54.553 *** -2.248 -54.545 *** -2.365 -54.537 ***
Northest Electric A -0.695 -58.439 *** -2.857 * -58.434 *** -2.882 -58.429 ***
H -0.668 -43.511 *** -1.937 -43.507 *** -2.747 -43.503 ***
Ping An Insurance A 1.119 -20.947 *** -1.310 -20.944 *** -0.701 -21.156 ***
H -0.688 -32.652 *** -0.067 -32.683 *** -1.881 -32.703 ***
Shangdong Xinhua A -0.779 -53.242 *** -1.245 -53.238 *** -2.045 -53.233 ***
H -0.431 -58.627 *** -2.058 -58.619 *** -2.438 -58.610 ***
Shenji Group A 0.140 -61.290 *** -1.617 -61.284 *** -2.185 -61.277 ***
H -0.398 -60.166 *** -1.374 -60.159 *** -2.480 -60.184 ***
Sinopec Yizheng A -0.102 -57.905 *** -2.605 * -57.897 *** -2.520 -57.898 ***
H -0.587 -34.415 *** -3.082 ** -34.412 *** -3.081 -34.408 ***
Tianjin Capital Environment A -0.035 -32.906 *** -2.175 -32.902 *** -2.128 -32.899 ***
H -0.048 -61.659 *** -1.687 -61.652 *** -2.529 -61.644 ***
Tsigtao Brewery A 0.281 -64.985 *** -1.123 -64.980 *** -3.954 ** -64.991 ***
H 0.683 -47.281 *** -0.691 -47.288 *** -1.747 -47.294 ***
Weichai Power A -1.145 -19.453 *** 0.058 -19.486 *** -2.429 -19.572 ***
H 0.224 -30.544 *** -1.663 -30.536 *** -1.613 -30.539 ***
Zijin Mining A -2.122 ** -12.347 *** -2.429 -12.494 *** -1.053 -12.691 ***
H 1.149 -32.301 *** -1.031 -32.340 *** -1.299 -32.335 ***
ZTE A 1.235 -52.030 *** -1.834 -52.058 *** -2.790 -52.060 ***
H 0.052 -31.761 *** -2.118 -31.747 *** -2.410 -31.743 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; H represents shares listed and traded on Hong Kong market, 
* denotes rejection at 10% significant level, ** denotes rejection at 5% significant level, *** denotes rejection at 1% significant level
Level Level Level
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(No drift no trend) (With drift) (With drift and trend)
First Difference First Difference First Difference
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Appendix 6.3: Unit Root Test Results for Chinese Firms Dual or 
Triple-Listed on China A, Hong Kong, and New York Markets during 
the Period 1st January 1993 to 31st December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RI Series Market 
Aluminum A -1.150 -19.989 *** 0.558 -20.033 *** -2.101 -20.301 ***
H 0.543 -39.276 *** -1.539 -39.279 *** -0.802 -39.309 ***
N 0.595 -42.419 *** -1.476 -42.424 *** -0.657 -42.454 ***
China Eastern Airlines A -0.513 -49.274 *** -1.916 -49.267 *** -1.999 -49.259 ***
H -0.325 -54.567 *** -1.956 -54.559 *** -2.320 -54.550 ***
N -0.362 -54.427 *** -1.892 -54.418 *** -2.320 -54.409 ***
China United Telecom A 0.561 -42.546 *** -1.153 -42.546 *** -1.355 -42.534 ***
H -0.568 -35.209 *** -1.985 -35.203 *** -2.329 -35.215 ***
N -0.508 -38.029 *** -1.819 -38.022 *** -2.171 -38.036 ***
China Life Insurance A -0.913 -23.051 *** -0.438 -23.066 *** -1.599 -23.105 ***
H 1.537 -37.287 *** -0.975 -37.355 *** -1.104 -37.350 ***
N 1.624 -41.825 *** -0.957 -41.897 *** -1.069 -41.891 ***
China Petrol and Chemical A 0.453 -44.603 *** -0.965 -44.599 *** -1.653 -44.588 ***
H 0.972 -44.987 *** -1.006 -45.001 *** -2.159 -44.993 ***
N 0.973 -50.549 *** -0.950 -50.565 *** -2.254 -50.555 ***
China Southern Airlines A 0.009 -34.492 *** -1.035 -34.480 *** -0.872 -34.476 ***
H -0.708 -51.788 *** -2.304 -51.782 *** -3.142 * -51.776 ***
N -0.707 -54.432 *** -2.228 -54.426 *** -3.092 -54.420 ***
Guangshen Railway A -0.784 -25.390 *** -0.176 -25.392 *** -2.706 -25.510 ***
H 0.106 -57.039 *** -1.089 -57.032 *** -2.358 -57.032 ***
N 0.238 -43.270 *** -0.956 -43.267 *** -2.364 -43.270 ***
Huaneng Power A 0.120 -41.343 *** -1.726 -41.333 *** -1.812 -41.324 ***
H 0.718 -34.236 *** -0.851 -34.245 *** -2.431 -34.239 ***
N 0.680 -59.446 *** -0.900 -59.449 *** -2.540 -59.443 ***
Petro China A -3.194 *** -18.079 *** -2.169 -18.545 *** -3.253 * -18.590 ***
H 1.753 -29.855 *** -1.258 -29.939 *** -1.015 -29.956 ***
N 1.788 -36.857 *** -1.280 -36.936 *** -1.082 -36.950 ***
Sinopec Shanghai A 0.308 -61.461 *** -1.555 -61.457 *** -2.255 -61.449 ***
H 0.154 -61.639 *** -1.920 -61.634 *** -2.222 -61.627 ***
N 0.184 -63.815 *** -1.746 -63.810 *** -2.111 -63.802 ***
Yanzhou Coal A 0.335 -52.489 *** -1.588 -52.485 *** -2.188 -52.477 ***
H 0.528 -49.657 *** -1.140 -49.658 *** -3.083 -49.649 ***
N 0.632 -39.031 *** -1.096 -39.038 *** -2.825 -39.032 ***
China Mobile H 1.296 -52.456 *** -1.300 -52.479 *** -1.566 -52.470 ***
N 1.305 -41.764 *** -1.195 -41.798 *** -1.505 -41.791 ***
China Telecom H 0.732 -26.546 *** -1.994 -26.559 *** -1.954 -26.606 ***
N 0.709 -33.261 *** -2.014 -33.269 *** -1.695 -33.303 ***
CNOOC H 1.740 -44.261 *** -1.001 -44.325 *** -2.905 -44.317 ***
N 1.733 -35.545 *** -1.175 -35.633 *** -3.022 -35.628 ***
Note: A represents shares listed and traded on China A market; H represents shares listed and traded on Hong Kong market, 
and N  represents shares listed and traded on New York market; 
Model 3Model 2Model 1
First Difference First Difference First DifferenceLevel Level Level
(No drift no trend) (With drift) (With drift and trend)
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Appendix 7: Granger-causality Test Results 
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Appendix 7.1: Granger causality test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
Listed on China A- and B-Share Markets 
 
 
H o : No causality from China B to China A
Prob. Prob. 
Anhui Guijing Distiller 0.653 0.625 0.859 0.488
Bengang Steel Plate 2.507 ** 0.040 0.983 0.416
BOE Technology 4.737 *** 0.001 4.575 *** 0.001
Changchai Company 0.416 0.797 0.793 0.529
China Fanda 1.115 0.348 0.261 0.903
China First Pencil  5.189 *** 0.000 0.751 0.557
China Interational Marine Container 0.894 0.467 1.489 0.203
China Merchants Propert Development 4.364 *** 0.002 4.822 *** 0.001
China Textile Machinery 9.452 *** 0.000 2.786 ** 0.025
China Vanke  2.099 * 0.078 2.301 * 0.056
Congqing Changan Automobile 2.826 ** 0.024 0.855 0.490
CSG Holding  0.633 0.639 2.317 * 0.055
Dalian Referigerator 3.087 ** 0.015 0.569 0.685
Danhua chemical  3.948 *** 0.003 4.955 *** 0.001
Dazhong Transportation 1.602 0.171 1.652 0.158
Double Coin  0.241 0.915 0.718 0.579
Eastern Communications 2.774 ** 0.026 0.903 0.461
Foshan Electrical 0.854 0.491 2.562 ** 0.037
Guangdong Electric Power 0.296 0.881 1.176 0.319
Guangdong Provincial Expressway 0.524 0.718 0.854 0.491
Guandgong Sunrise 2.670 ** 0.031 14.536 *** 0.000
Hainan Airlines  1.872 0.113 0.475 0.754
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 7.700 *** 0.000 1.708 0.145
Hainan Pearl River Holdings 14.128 *** 0.000 2.812 ** 0.024
Hefei Meiling  0.868 0.483 1.741 0.138
Huadian Energy  1.416 0.226 0.629 0.642
Huangshan Tourism  1.165 0.324 0.417 0.796
Huaxin Cement  2.458 ** 0.044 1.048 0.381
Inner Mongolia Eerduosica 1.307 0.265 0.520 0.721
Jiangling Motors   3.233 ** 0.012 1.394 0.233
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 1.066 0.372 2.484 ** 0.042
Jinshan Development  4.780 *** 0.001 1.568 0.180
Jinzhou Port  3.837 *** 0.004 0.652 0.625
Konka Group 2.866 0.022 0.276 0.894
Livzon Pharmaceutical 2.774 ** 0.026 1.009 0.402
Luthai Textile 1.769 0.132 1.441 0.218
SGSB Group 2.501 ** 0.041 0.289 0.885
Shangdong Chenming Paper 0.710 0.585 0.806 0.521
Shanghai Automation Instrument 4.774 *** 0.001 3.199 ** 0.012
Shanghai Baosight 10.137 *** 0.000 2.234 * 0.063
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali 0.393 0.814 0.482 0.749
Shanghai Diesel 1.242 0.291 1.337 0.254
Shanghai Dingli Technology 3.798 *** 0.004 5.192 *** 0.000
Shanghai Erfangji 7.937 *** 0.000 1.351 0.248
Shanghai Friendship 0.336 0.854 2.930 ** 0.020
Shanghai Haixin Group 0.855 0.490 3.046 ** 0.016
Shanghai Highly Group 1.310 0.264 2.793 ** 0.025
Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel 1.154 0.329 2.412 ** 0.047
Shanghai Jinjiang International 2.207 * 0.066 1.310 0.264
Shanghai Jinqiao  2.359 * 0.051 1.273 0.278
Shanghai Kaikai  4.286 *** 0.002 12.727 *** 0.000
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 0.479 0.751 1.884 0.110
Shanghai Mechanic and Electrical 2.951 ** 0.019 5.526 *** 0.000
Shanghai MRA Trading 2.252 * 0.061 1.211 0.304
Shanghai Nine Dragon 1.680 0.152 2.557 ** 0.037
Shanghai Potevio 1.070 0.370 0.572 0.683
Shanghai Sanmao 2.812 ** 0.024 0.758 0.552
Shanghai Wingsung 3.308 ** 0.010 1.891 0.109
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington 1.781 0.130 1.074 0.367
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery 1.559 0.183 1.917 0.105
Shenzhen SEG  0.697 0.594 2.571 ** 0.036
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 0.424 0.791 3.441 *** 0.008
Shenzhen Textile 2.365 * 0.051 1.050 0.380
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical 4.070 *** 0.003 3.535 *** 0.007
Shenzhen International Enterprise 0.658 0.621 6.222 *** 0.000
Shenzhen Nanshan Power 4.382 *** 0.002 1.289 0.272
Shenzhen Properties and Resources 1.971 * 0.096 6.364 *** 0.000
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial 13.281 *** 0.000 0.753 0.556
Shenzhen Tellus 12.890 *** 0.000 5.252 *** 0.000
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile 12.713 *** 0.000 2.777 ** 0.026
Shenzhen Zhongheng Huafa 11.603 *** 0.000 3.790 *** 0.004
Shijianzhuang Baoshi 1.440 0.218 2.057 * 0.084
SVA Electron  6.115 *** 0.000 0.259 0.904
Weifu High Technology 0.386 0.818 2.060 * 0.083
Wuxi Littleswan  1.384 0.237 0.475 0.754
Yantai Changyu 0.299 0.878 4.422 *** 0.001
Zhong Lu 3.275 ** 0.011 2.008 * 0.091
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
Pairwise Granger Causality Pairwise Granger Causality 
H o : No causality from China A to China B
F-Statistic F-Statistic
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Appendix 7.2: Granger causality test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
Listed on China A-Share and Hong Kong Markets 
 
H o : No causality from Hong Kong to China A
Prob. Prob. 
Air China 0.396 0.812 3.841 *** 0.004
Angang Steel 3.223 ** 0.012 7.432 *** 0.000
Anhui Conch Cement 0.380 0.823 11.716 *** 0.000
Anhui Expressway 0.778 0.540 3.117 ** 0.015
Bank of China 0.331 0.857 0.952 0.433
Bank of Communications 1.061 0.375 0.986 0.415
Beijing North Star 0.725 0.575 3.048 ** 0.017
Beiren Printing and Machinery 1.798 0.126 1.963 * 0.097
China Citic Bank 4.033 *** 0.003 1.857 0.117
China Coal Energy 0.925 0.450 1.532 0.194
China Construction Bank 0.920 0.453 0.638 0.636
China Cosco Holding 1.893 0.111 2.518 ** 0.041
China Merchants Bank 1.503 0.200 2.322 * 0.056
China Oilfield Services 1.035 0.389 2.013 * 0.092
China Railway Construction 1.724 0.146 0.727 0.575
China Railway Group 3.874 *** 0.005 1.850 0.120
China Shenhua Energy 2.901 ** 0.022 3.502 *** 0.008
China Ship Container 3.090 ** 0.017 1.250 0.290
China Shipping Development 0.887 0.471 6.427 *** 0.000
Datang International Power 2.087 * 0.081 0.802 0.524
Dongfang Electric 0.145 0.965 8.639 *** 0.000
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical 4.436 *** 0.001 1.066 0.372
Guangzhou Shipyard 2.121 * 0.076 5.473 *** 0.000
Hisense Kelon 0.670 0.613 0.253 0.908
Huadian Power 1.367 0.243 2.519 ** 0.040
Industrial and Commerce Bank 0.711 0.585 0.647 0.630
Jiangsu Expressway 0.988 0.413 0.467 0.760
Jiangxi Cooper 0.272 0.896 9.963 *** 0.000
Jingwei Textile 1.523 0.193 4.203 *** 0.002
Maanshan Iron 1.814 0.123 2.783 ** 0.025
Nanjing Panda 3.157 ** 0.013 0.438 0.781
Northest Electric 0.449 0.774 2.984 ** 0.018
Ping An Insurance 2.445 ** 0.046 2.595 ** 0.036
Shangdong Xinhua 0.835 0.503 1.745 0.137
Shenji Group 5.938 *** 0.000 1.167 0.324
Sinopec Yizheng 7.977 *** 0.000 0.643 0.632
Tianjin Capital Environment 1.151 0.331 1.234 0.294
Tsigtao Brewery 2.490 ** 0.041 3.678 *** 0.005
Weichai Power 2.362 * 0.053 1.213 0.304
Zijin Mining 2.698 ** 0.033 0.369 0.830
ZTE 5.313 *** 0.000 1.200 0.309
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
Pairwise Granger Causality Pairwise Granger Causality 
H o : No causality from China A to Hong Kong
F-Statistic F-Statistic
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Appendix 7.3: Granger causality test Results for Chinese Firms Dual-
Listed on China A- Share, Hong Kong and New York Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A:
H o : No causality from New York to China A
Prob. Prob. 
Aluminum 1.931 0.104 6.977 *** 0.000
China Eastern Airlines 1.175 0.320 15.205 *** 0.000
China United Telecom 1.046 0.382 3.893 *** 0.004
China Life Insurance 1.408 0.230 5.394 *** 0.000
China Petrol and Chemical 1.206 0.306 6.287 *** 0.000
China Southern Airlines 2.280 * 0.059 13.695 *** 0.000
Guangshen Railway 3.448 *** 0.009 1.212 0.305
Huaneng Power 1.148 0.332 6.982 *** 0.000
Petro China 0.717 0.581 3.934 *** 0.004
Sinopec Shanghai 1.637 0.162 1.889 0.110
Yanzhou Coal 0.955 0.431 5.971 *** 0.000
Panel B:
H o : No causality from Hong Kong to China A
Prob. Prob. 
Aluminum 1.982 * 0.096 3.494 *** 0.008
China Eastern Airlines 1.003 0.405 8.749 *** 0.000
China United Telecom 1.324 0.259 3.028 ** 0.017
China Life Insurance 1.012 0.400 0.242 0.914
China Petrol and Chemical 2.595 ** 0.035 6.287 *** 0.000
China Southern Airlines 1.331 0.256 9.380 *** 0.000
Guangshen Railway 2.919 ** 0.021 0.773 0.543
Huaneng Power 1.516 0.195 4.081 *** 0.003
Petro China 0.637 0.637 0.624 0.646
Sinopec Shanghai 0.833 0.504 2.496 ** 0.041
Yanzhou Coal 1.164 0.325 3.554 *** 0.007
Panel C:
H o : No causality from Hong Kong to New York H o : No causality from New York to Hong Kong
F-Statistic Prob. F-Statistic Prob. 
Aluminum 6.435 *** 0.000 137.622 *** 0.000
China Eastern Airlines 66.311 *** 0.000 27.663 *** 0.000
China United Telecom 6.389 *** 0.000 146.943 *** 0.000
China Life Insurance 3.230 ** 0.012 88.449 *** 0.000
China Petrol and Chemical 12.386 *** 0.000 80.723 *** 0.000
China Southern Airlines 30.197 *** 0.000 47.973 *** 0.000
Guangshen Railway 16.178 *** 0.000 68.092 *** 0.000
Huaneng Power 9.332 *** 0.000 155.145 *** 0.000
Petro China 9.268 *** 0.000 141.044 *** 0.000
Sinopec Shanghai 28.365 *** 0.000 56.800 *** 0.000
Yanzhou Coal 36.414 *** 0.000 31.055 *** 0.000
China Mobile 9.674 *** 0.000 222.707 *** 0.000
China Telecom 6.705 *** 0.000 75.760 *** 0.000
CNOOC 5.194 *** 0.000 197.529 *** 0.000
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
Pairwise Granger Causality Pairwise Granger Causality 
Pairwise Granger Causality Pairwise Granger Causality 
H o : No causality from China A to Hong Kong
F-Statistic F-Statistic
Pairwise Granger Causality Pairwise Granger Causality 
H o : No causality from China A to New York
F-Statistic F-Statistic
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Appendix 8: Price Premium for Dual-listings 
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